

UNIVERSITY OF DELHI



ARTS LIBRARY

D.U.P.—178—5-2002—20.000

ARTS LIBRARY
DELHI UNIVERSITY LIBRARY SYSTEM

Cl. No. *V23.135.156*

Ac. No. *5738*

This book should be returned on or before the date last stamped below. An overdue charge of Re. 1 will be charged for each day the book is kept overtime.

(Authority : E.C. Res. 200 dated 27th August 1996).

· ANGLO-SIKH RELATIONS

CHAPTERS FROM J. D. CUNNINGHAM'S
" HISTORY OF THE SIKHS "

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND Notes

BY

ANIL CHANDRA BANERJEE, M.A., Ph.D.
Frenchand Roychand Scholar, Mouat Medallist
LECTURER IN HISTORY, CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

A. MUKHERJEE & CO., LTD. :: CALCUTTA

FIRST EDITION : May, 1949

Price Rupees Eight only

EV
V236 P. 119
1491

E7848

Published by A. Mukherjee, 2, College Square, Calcutta.

Printed by B. N. Bagchi, Arthik Jagat Press,
122, Bowbazar Street, Calcutta.

To
The Memory of
THOSE VALLIANT SIKHS
WHO DIED FOR FAITH AND COUNTRY

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

One who possesses no claims to systematic scholarship, and who nevertheless asks the public to approve of his labours in a field of some difficulty, is bound to show to his readers that he has at least had fair means of obtaining accurate information and of coming to just conclusions.

Towards the end of the year 1837, the Author received, through the unsolicited favour of Lord Auckland, the appointment of Assistant to Colonel Wade, the Political Agent at Ludhiana, and the officer in charge of the British relations with the Punjab and the chiefs of Afghanistan. He was at the same time required, as an engineer officer, to render Ferozpur a defensible post, that little place having been declared a feudal escheat, and its position being regarded as one of military importance. His plans for effecting the object in view met the approval of Sir Henry Fane, the Commander-in-Chief; but it was eventually thought proper to do more than cover the town with a slight parapet, and the scheme for reseating Shah Shuja on his throne seemed at the time to make the English and Sikh Governments so wholly one, that the matter dropped, and Ferozpur was allowed to become a cantonment with scarcely the means at hand of saving its ammunition from a few predatory horse.

The Author was also present at the interview which took place in 1838, between Ranjit Singh and Lord Auckland. In 1839 he accompanied Shahzada Timur and Colonel Wade to Peshawar, and he was with them when they forced the Pass of Khyber, and laid open the road to Kabul. In 1840 he was placed in administrative charge of the district of Ludhiana; and towards the end of the same year, he was deputed by the new frontier Agent, Mr. Clerk, to accompany Colonel Shelton and his relieving brigade to Peshawar, whence he returned with the troops escorting Dost Muhammad Khan under Colonel Wheeler. During part of 1841 he was in magisterial charge of the Ferozpur

EDITOR'S PREFACE

Cunningham's *History of the Sikhs* will always remain a classic, for he was a faithful and conscientious historian who knew his subject well. His chapters on the Gurus and the Sikh War of Independence in the eighteenth century are inadequate and out of date, for in his days original sources relating to that period were in many cases not available or properly understood. But Cunningham was thoroughly familiar with official correspondence relating to Anglo-Sikh friendship and hostility, and he knew some of the actors who played a leading part in the last act of the Sikh drama. As a British officer he was, of course, loyal to his country and his Government; but he understood and sympathised with the Sikh point of view. For all these reasons Cunningham's chapters on Anglo-Sikh relations have a permanent value.

In reprinting those chapters for the convenience of the public I have not omitted or altered a single word occurring in the original, but I have omitted some portions which had no connection with the main theme, i.e., Anglo-Sikh relations, and in some cases I have changed the present tense into the past tense. Some foot notes, and portions of some foot notes, have been omitted. Some new foot notes—those marked with an asterisk—have been added. The spelling of proper names has been modernised. The text has been divided into convenient chapters and sections. The Index and the Introduction are mine. The map is a new addition intended to illustrate the text.

A. C. BANERJEE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Malleson writes thus about Cunningham's *History of the Sikhs* :

"The work appeared in 1849. Extremely well-written, giving the fullest and the most accurate details of events, the book possessed one quality which, in the view of the Governor-General of the day, the Marquis of Dalhousie, rendered the publication of it a crime. It told the whole truth, the unpalatable truth, regarding the First Sikh War: it exposed the real strength of the Sikh army; the conduct of and the negotiations with, the Sikh chiefs.

The book, if unnoticed by high authority, would have injured no one. The Punjab had been annexed, or was in the process of annexation, when it appeared. But a despotic Government cannot endure truths which seem to reflect on the justice of its own policy. Looking at the policy of annexation from the basis of Cunningham's book, that policy was undoubtedly unjust. Cunningham's book would be widely read, and would influence the general verdict. That an officer holding a high political office should write a book which, by the facts disclosed in it, reflected, however indirectly, on his policy, was not to be endured. With one stroke of the pen, then, he removed Cunningham from his appointment at Bhopal. Cunningham, stunned by the blow, entirely unexpected, died of a broken heart!"

This volume is based on the first edition of Cunningham's original book. In the *Preface* to the second edition he wrote : "In this Second Edition the author has made some alterations in the text of the last chapter,¹ where it seemed that his readers had inferred more than was meant; but the sense and spirit of what was originally written have been carefully preserved, notwithstanding the modifications of expression now introduced". Apart from some foot notes which were added, extended or omitted, the main differences between the two editions are noted below.

*1 Chapter on the First Anglo-Sikh War.

to the ambition of the English; and they were rendered suspicious by the formation of new military posts on their frontier, contrary to prescriptive usage and for reasons of which they did not perceive the force or admit the validity. The English looked upon these measures with reference to *their own* schemes of amelioration; and they did not heed the conclusions which the Sikhs might draw from them, although such conclusions, how erroneous soever, would necessarily become motives of action to a rude and warlike race. Thus, at the last, regard was mainly had to the chance of predatory inroads, or to the possibility that sovereign and nobles and people, all combined, would intuitively court destruction by assailing their gigantic neighbour, and little thought was given to the selfish views of factious Sikh Chiefs, or to the natural effects of the suspicions of the Sikh commonalty when wrought upon by base men for their own ends. Thus, too, the original agreement which left the province of Sirhind free of troops and of British subjects, and which provided a confederacy of dependant States to soften the mutual action of a half-barbarous military dominion and of a humane and civilized Government, had been set aside by the English for objects which seemed urgent and expedient, but which were good in their motive rather than wise in their scope. The measure was misconstrued by the Sikhs to denote a gradual but settled plan of conquest; and hence the *subjective* mode of reasoning employed was not only vicious in logic, but being met by arguments even more narrow and one-sided, became faulty in policy, and, in truth, tended to bring about that collision which it was so much desired to avoid.

A corresponding singleness of apprehension also led the confident English to persevere in despising or misunderstanding the spirit of the disciples of Gobind. The unity and depth of feeling, derived from a young and fervid faith, were hardly recognised and no historical associations exalted Sikhs to the dignity of Rajputs and Pathans".

Page 120, Para 2: The entire portion of the para: "The same defective.....triumphs" was omitted in the second edition.

Page 121, Line 6: The word "not" is replaced by "scarcely" in the second edition.

Page 135, Line 26: The words "wisely.....made" were replaced by "timely and bold" in the second edition.

Page 135, Last line: The words "over a worthy enemy, in a well-planned and bravely fought battle" were added in the second edition after the word "triumph".

Page 143, Lines 19-28: The portion beginning with "But the warlike" &c. and ending in "was complete" was replaced in the second edition by: "But the necessities of war pressed upon the commanders, and *they* had effectually to disperse that army which had so long scorned their power. The fire of batteries and battalions precipitated the flight of the Sikhs through the waters of the Sutlej, and the triumph of the English became full and manifest."

Thus "it is apparent that the first edition contained nothing that the author afterwards thought prudent to retract".

Chapter I, Section I (The Sikh Misls) of the present volume is taken from Chapter IV of Cunningham's book, and the remaining two Sections of Chapter I from Cunningham's Chapter V.

Chapter II, Section I is taken from Cunningham's Chapter V, and Section II from Cunningham's Chapters VI-VII.

Chapter III, Section I is taken from Cunningham's Chapter VII, and Section II from Cunningham's Chapter VIII.

Chapter IV, Section I is taken from Cunningham's Chapter VIII, and the remaining Sections from Cunningham's Chapter IX.

CONTENTS

Subject	Page
Introduction	1
I. Sikhism and the Medieval Reformation xix—xxxv
II. Sikhs and Mughals xxxv—lii
III. Sikhs and Afghans li—lxi
IV. Sikhs and Marathas lxi—lxiv
V. Sikh Organisation lxiv—lxix
VI. Fall of the Sikhs lxx—lxxxiii
Text	1-148
CHAPTER I: Anglo-Sikh Relations in the Eighteenth Century 1-16
I. The Sikh <i>Misls</i> 1-6
II. The Sikhs and the Marathas 7-11
III. The Sikhs and the Second Anglo-Maratha War 11-16
CHAPTER II: Ranjit Singh and the East India Company 17-50
I. Treaty of Amritsar 17-26
II. Anglo-Sikh Relations, 1809-1838 27-50
CHAPTER III: The Sikhs and the First Afghan War 51-91
I. The Tripartite Treaty of 1838 51-64
II. The First Afghan War 64-91
CHAPTER IV: The First Anglo-Sikh War 92-148
I. Domestic Revolutions 92-109
II. Causes of the War 109-122
III. Military Operations 122-143
IV. Terms of Peace 144-148
Appendix	149-189
I. The Treaty with Lahore of 1806 149-150
II. Sir David Ochterloney's Proclamation of 1809 150-151
III. The Treaty with Lahore of 1809 151-152
IV. Proclamation of Protection to Cis-Sutlej States against Lahore (1809) 152-153
V. Proclamation of Protection to Cis-Sutlej States against one another (1811) 153-155
VI. Indus Navigation Treaty of 1832 155-158
VII. Supplementary Indus Navigation Treaty of 1834 158-160
VIII. The Tripartite Treaty with Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja of 1838 160-165
IX. Indus and Sutlej Toll Agreement of 1839 165-166

<i>Subject.</i>	<i>Page</i>
X. Indus and Sutlej Toll Agreement of 1840 ..	166—168
XI. Revenues of the Punjab as Estimated in 1844 ..	168—171
XII. The Army of Lahore, as Recorded in 1844 ..	172—173
XIII. Declaration of war of 1845 ..	174—176
XIV. First Treaty with Lahore of 1846 ..	176—180
XV. Supplementary Articles to First Treaty with Lahore of 1846 ..	180—182
XVI. Treaty with Golab Singh of 1846 ..	182—184
XVII. Second Treaty with Lahore of 1846 ..	184—188
XVIII. Terms granted to, and accepted by, Maharaja Dalip Singh (1849) ..	188—189
Index ..	190-192

INTRODUCTION

I. SIKHISM AND THE MEDIEVAL REFORMATION.

Beginnings of Reformation in South India

The great religious movement, which gradually permeated almost the whole of India, and exercised a powerful influence on spiritual and social life during the Middle Ages, had its origin in the South. Its beginnings may be traced to the work of the celebrated philosopher-reformer, Sankaracharyya, whose greatest achievement was the extermination of decadent Buddhism and the consequent revival of Hinduism, not only in the Deccan, but in Northern India as well. He established a logical monistic system on a very strong basis, but his emphasis on the path of knowledge, so congenial to the learned Brahmins immersed in the hoary traditions of the Upanishads, failed to evoke a hearty response from the common people. It was felt that the best way to attract the popular mind towards Hinduism was to interpret it in terms understood by the masses. The necessity of making Hinduism a living, active force in the life of the common people was gradually becoming stronger and stronger, for Islam had already thrown up a powerful challenge to the guardians of Hindu society in the South.

The rise of Islam in the beginning of the seventh century was almost immediately followed by the expansion of Arab maritime trade to the western coast of India. Colonisation naturally followed commerce. "From the seventh century onwards it is well known that Persian and Arab traders settled in large numbers at the different ports on the western coast of India and married women of the country and these settlements were specially large and important in Malabar where from a very early time it seems to have been the policy to afford every encouragement to traders at the ports".¹ There is epigraphic evidence to show that there were Arab settlements in western India in the eighth century.² It may be assumed that the num-

1 Sturrock, *South Kanara* (Madras District Manuals), p. 130.

2 Innes, *Gazetteer of Malabar and Anjengo*, p. 436.

ber of settlers increased after the conquest of Sind—there are references to Arab naval invasions of Broach and Kathiawad in the eighth century—and that the religion of the new-comers was making peaceful conquests in this hospitable country. The beginning of the ninth century saw the conversion of the last of the Cheraman Perumal Kings of Malabar.¹ Although the story of this conversion is not free from legendary embellishments, we may safely conclude that Islam was flourishing on the west coast. Masudi, who visited India in 916 A.D., found more than 10,000 Muslim settlers at Seymore (modern Chaul).²

It is possible that Sankaracharya's great revivalist movement was not altogether unconnected with the challenge of Islam. That crusader against Buddhism and Jainism could hardly have been totally indifferent to the new faith from beyond the seas gradually feeling its way within the sacred fold of the Vedic religion. Fawcett says, "He was born at Kaladi near the Eluvayi river when the country was in peril. Her King had been converted to Islam, and that religion was gaining ground. Brahminism must be revived, so Sivā was re-incarnated in the child of a widow". The fact that neither the incidents of Sankara's life³ nor his numerous writings betray any reaction against Islam need not surprise us, for it is doubtful whether Islam was at that time strong enough in Southern India to create serious alarm in Hindu society. He might have hoped that the revival of Brahmanism at the cost of Buddhism would naturally curb the zeal and influence of the Muslim missionaries. A specific crusade against Islam was probably uncalled for at the time.

Some modern writers seem to believe that Sankara defended Hinduism against Islam with weapons borrowed from the Muslims. Dr. Tarachand admits that there is no direct testimony to establish a connection between Sankara and Islam, but

1 Logan, *Malabar*, Vol. I, p. 245.

2 Elliot and Dowson, Vol. I, translation of extracts from Masudi.

3 Dr. Tarachand (*Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, p. 107) thinks that 'the circumstance of his practical excommunication with all his family by the Brahmans, and his seeking a Nayar's aid in performing the rites of the dead on the demise of his mother' indicate Sankara's connection with the Muslims. This assumption does not appeal to us.

he has his suspicions. He says, "Sankara was born at a time when Muslims were beginning their activities in India, and, if tradition is correct, when they had gained a notable success in the extension of their faith by converting the King of the land. He was born and brought up at a place where many ships from Arabia and the Persian Gulf touched. If his extreme monism, his stripping of the *One* of all semblances of duality, his attempt to establish this monism on the authority of revealed scriptures, his desire to purge the cult of many abuses, had even a faint echo of the new noises that were abroad, it would not be a matter for great surprise or utter incredulity"¹. To us it seems that Sankara, a Brahmin steeped in the tradition of Vedic learning, required no 'faint echo' coming from aliens to appreciate the significance of monism². The conception of appealing to revealed scriptures need not have been borrowed from Islamic theology, for in those days every Brahmin believed that *Śruti* offered the final solution of all religious problems. If Sankara was in any way connected with Islam, he was an enemy rather than a borrower. He was the leader of a great defensive movement : Hinduism had to be defended against the encroachments of Buddhism and Islam.

But, as we have said, Sankara failed to bring Hinduism to the level of a really popular religion, understood and appreciated by the masses to whom Islam naturally made a powerful appeal. Another transformation of the Vedic religion was required for the protection of the Hindu society against the growing threat of Islam. Muslim travellers visiting Southern India in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries refer to the increasing number and strength of the Muslims. The *Bhakti* cult provided the much-needed relief, and it was brought into prominence by the great Vaishnava teacher Ramanuja, who probably flourished in the eleventh century.

The development of Vaishnavism as a distinct cult in Southern India was due to the Alvars, but its philosophical basis

1 *Influence of Islam On Indian Culture*, p. 111.

2 Sankara holds that Self and Brahman are absolutely one; according to him, worship consists in the realisation of this absolute unity between Self and the Object of worship (*i.e.*, Brahman). Islamic monotheism is quite foreign to this idea of the identification of God with the worshipper.

was provided by Ramanuja. He rejected Sankara's theory of absolute monism and declared that the human soul could attain God by *Bhakti* alone. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the cult of *Bhakti* was propagated in Southern India by Vaishnava teachers like Madhva, Visnu Swami, Vallabha, Pillai Lokacharyya and Vedanta Desika. Philosophically some of these teachers were not in complete agreement with Ramanuja; but the emphasis on *Bhakti* was the common feature of their teachings. One of the most remarkable features of the *Bhakti* cult was that it paved the way for the liberalisation of society. The old privileges of the higher castes could not be completely swept away, but the Sudras and the 'untouchables' received a recognised religious status. Ramanuja allowed them to attend certain temples on particular days in the year. He also gave religious instruction to some Sudras and attached them to his school (*sampradaya*). Nothing more could be expected from an orthodox reformer like Ramanuja in an age of religious strife and intolerance.

Dr. Tarachand observes that the 'speculations and religious tone' of these Vaishnava teachers 'show closer parallelism' in relation to Islam. According to him, the following characteristics of South Indian religious thought from the ninth century onwards 'strongly point to Islamic influence': the increasing emphasis on monotheism, emotional worship, self-surrender (*prapatti*) and adoration of the teacher (*Guru-bhakti*), laxity in the rigours of the caste system, and indifference towards mere ritual¹. If we accept this theory, we must conclude that the whole religious movement in medieval India was a direct result of the impact of Islam upon Hindu civilisation.

The emphasis on monotheism began with Sankara, who clearly derived it from Vedic sources. Ramanuja and his followers, who believed in qualified monism, needed no loan from Islam. Their writings clearly show that their eye were directed towards the past, not to the regions beyond the sea whence merchants and missionaries were coming to find hospitable shelter in this country. Dr. Tarachand admits that monotheistic worship had been vindicated by the labours of Sankara's prede-

1 *Influence of Islam On Indian Culture*, pp. 112-116.

cessors, but he treads on uncertain ground when he observes: "The establishment of this monotheistical tendency received a powerful impetus from the appearance of so uncompromisingly monotheistic a religion as Islam". Sankara and Ramanuja were great thinkers, but like all successful reformers they were practical men too, so far as the religious issue was concerned. In giving decadent Hinduism a new and more attractive shape, they were defending it against all rivals—Buddhism, Jainism, Christianity and Islam. A general relying on defensive tactics proceeds cautiously; his caution increases if he is as conservative in temperament and training as Sankara and Ramanuja. He is not likely to absorb new ideas, or even to receive old wine in new bottle.

Emotional worship and self-surrender are peculiarly Vaishnava ideals, and we find their best and noblest literary expression in the *Srimad Bhagavat*. This great work was undoubtedly composed before the advent of Islam in India. There is no doubt that it was widely known. Those two Vaishnava ideals were not confined to Southern India. We find them beautifully expressed in Jaidev's *Gita Govinda*, a lyrical poem written on the eve of the appearance of the Muslims in Eastern India, and obviously uninfluenced by them. Under these circumstances we need not assume that, because the word *Islam* means surrender, the idea of surrender to God must have been a gift of the followers of the Prophet.

Laxity in the rigours of the caste system was probably a legacy of the Buddhists, although Islam may have exercised some influence on Hindu society in this respect. It should be noted, however, that Ramanuja admitted the Sudras to temples under restrictions, and *Bhakti* itself was permitted only to the higher castes, not to the Sudras. The caste system has always been more strict in Southern India than in the North, and it is in Southern India that the Muslims had the earliest opportunity of exercising their influence. Indeed, the medieval *Smṛiti* works of the Bengal school, led by the celebrated scholar Raghunandan, show that the reaction of Islam on Hindu society was, in some cases at least, an undue emphasis on the caste system. The law-makers were afraid lest the increasing inter-

course between the two communities should relax the rigours of the old social system. As the defenders of that system they considered it their duty to reinforce the caste rules with new punishments and increasing intolerance.

Guru-bhakti or devotion to a religious teacher is an old Indian idea¹, as Dr. Tarachand himself admits, but he says, "... this ancient homage that the disciple paid to the preceptor is not the same thing as devotion to a spiritual director who is human yet divine, who is a link in the hierarchical chain of preceptors (*pir, shaikh, Imam*, prophet or *qutb*), each successor receiving inspiration from his predecessor and being the keeper of the traditions of the sect to which the novice once admitted belongs for ever". The idea of a 'hierarchical chain of preceptors . . . each successor receiving inspiration from his predecessors' is a conception familiar to all students of ancient Indian history. We speak of *Guru parampara*, the Charvaka school of philosophy, the Kautilya school of political thought, etc. The Vedic, Epic and Puranic literatures contain innumerable instances of religious teachers and devoted disciples. Some teachers created new sects or schools of thought, while others confined their spiritual or temporal instructions to the exposition of teachings of sects or schools already in existence. The distinction drawn by Dr. Tarachand between the conceptions of Guruship in ancient Hinduism and Islam is too subtle for practical use.

Indifference towards rituals was a logical corollary of Sankara's teaching. Kumarila emphasized the Mimamsa teaching, which attached too much importance to rituals. Hindu society was at that time tired of rituals. Possibly the black rituals of the Tantric Buddhists had exasperated the popular mind. The natural reaction was insistence on *Bhakti*, and this presupposes the relegation of rituals to the background. It should be noted, however, that Ramanuja emphasized the importance of some curious culinary rules².

¹ *Chaitanya-Charitamrita* of Krishnadas Kaviraj, an authoritative biography of Chaitanya as well as a standard exposition of Bengal Vaishnavism, identifies Guru with Krishna (*Adi Lila*, Chap. I) on the authority of a *shloka* from the *Srimad Bhagvat* (xi. 17. 27).

² Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Vol. VI, pp. 98, 102-103. "Nabhaji states that the strict culinary rules of Ramanuj were not made for caste

It seems, therefore, that all those features of South Indian religious thought, which Dr. Tarachand traces to Islamic influence, may be satisfactorily explained with exclusive reference to the purely Hindu background. He admits this, but adds that the combination was non-Indian in origin and inspiration : " . . . most of the elements in the Southern schools of devotion and philosophy, taken singly, were derived from ancient systems; but the elements in their totality and in their peculiar emphasis betray a singular approximation to Muslim faith and, therefore, make the argument for Islamic influence probable".¹ These words are probably an echo of the following observations of Barth² quoted by him: "The Arabs of the Khilafat had arrived on these shores in the character of travellers and had established commercial relations and intercourse with these parts long before the Afghans, Turks, or Mongols, their co-religionists, came as conquerors. Now, it is precisely in these parts that from the ninth to the twelfth century, those great religious movements took their rise which are connected with the names of Sankara, Ramanuja, Anandathirtha and Basava, out of which the majority of the historical sects came and to which Hindustan presents nothing analogous till a much later period".

This argument is little more than the well-known logical fallacy called *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. It is necessary to remember that 'the elements in their totality and in their peculiar emphasis' were not devised at a particular time by a particular individual or school of thought. We have to deal with a complicated process of evolution covering a period of not less than five centuries and moulded by religious teachers whose opinions often differed on fundamental points. Is it not too much to assume that all the Southern reformers, from Sankara to Vedanta Desika, systematically borrowed ideas from Islam and gave ancient Hindu ideas an Islamic stamp, although, as Dr. Tarachand admits, "the argument for borrowing cannot be substantiated by direct proof philological or otherwise"³? It is

purposes, but for the glory of God and purity of worship". This seems to be the later Vaishnavic interpretation of a system the rigidity of which was originally due to caste ideas. Ramananda rejected these culinary rules.

1 *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, p. 107.

2 *Religions of India*.

3 *Influence of Islam On Indian Culture*, pp. 107-108.

far more logical to assume that Sankara, Ramanuja and their followers were neither conscious imitators nor unconscious followers of Islam. They felt the necessity of giving Hinduism a new shape in response to the requirements of contemporary society and also, probably, to counteract the growing threat of the Muslim saints. For the achievement of this purpose they turned to the *Srutis*, the perennial source of inspiration for the devout Hindus of all ages, and succeeded in giving reformation a conservative appearance.

Beginnings of Reformation in North India

Medieval Reformation assumes a definitely liberal character with Ramananda, whom Dr. Tarachand rightly describes as "the bridge between the *Bhakti* movement of the south and the north".¹ Although a disciple of the Ramanuja school, he founded a new sect which offered more generous recognition to the spirit of the age. As Macauliffe says, "The theological tenets of the new faith corresponded to some extent with those of Ramanuja, except that Sita and Rama instead of Lakshmi and Narayana² became special objects of Ramananda's worship, and the culinary and kindred rules of the Ramanujis were generously relaxed"³. He admitted to his sect disciples from all castes, even from Muslims, and called them 'the liberated'. "He deemed forms of adoration superfluous, and held that the supreme reward of devotion was to be obtained by incessantly uttering God's name".⁴

The simplification of worship and the liberalisation of the traditional caste rules were Ramananda's most important contributions to the solution of the religious problems of his day. There are reasons to believe that these novelties were due, in some measure at least, to the influence of Islam. Ramananda certainly flourished after the establishment and consolidation of Muslim rule in Northern India.⁵ By that time Islam must have

1 *Influence of Islam On Indian Culture*, p. 143.

2 Was this substitution due to the fact that Sita and Rama were far more familiar to the people of Benares and the adjoining region than Lakshmi and Narayana?

3 Vol. VI, p. 103.

4 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, p. 104.

5 For the controversy regarding the dates of his birth and death, see Tarachand, *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, pp. 142-143.

usurped a large place in the religious life of the country. Its liberalism must have appeared as a formidable threat to the orthodox section of the Hindus. The country badly required religious reformers who would be prepared to accept the challenge of Islam and to defend Hinduism with weapons stolen from the enemy's camp. Such a champion the liberal section of the Hindus found in Ramananda. Macauliffe says, "It is certain that Ramananda came in contact at Benares with learned Musalmans"¹ This contact ushered in one of the most fruitful movements in Indian history.

But we must not exaggerate Ramananda's success. There is no evidence to show that his teaching served as a step towards bridging the gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims. The Muslim community did not accept the Rama-Sita creed. His only known Muslim disciple was Kabir; and, according to one tradition, Kabir was not a born Muslim. Nor did the Hindus accept Ramananda as a recognised religious teacher; on the other hand, Hinduism seems to have engulfed the liberal movement initiated by him. "Most of the present followers of Ramananda appear to have completely fallen away from his teaching, and observe caste rules with the utmost strictness. As far as their tenets are concerned, they appear to have become hopelessly confused with the Ramanujis, and to differ only in their sectarian marks and their preference for Sita and Rama to Lakshmi and Narayana as subjects of worship"².

The most fruitful aspect of Ramananda's work is to be found in the teaching of Kabir, perhaps the most cosmopolitan reformer of medieval India. Macauliffe says, "Kabir has written works which all religious denominations can accept, and which, if perused without bigotry, are advantageous for the salvation of all persons. Kabir was so steadfast in his utterance of God's name, that in comparison with it he deemed worthless the rules of caste and the Hindu and Muhammadan religious observances"³. This cosmopolitanism was probably due in a large measure to the variety of his religious training. He was subjected to Hindu influences from his earliest years. In Benares

1 Vol. VI, p. 102.

2 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, p. 105.

3 Vol. VI, p. 126.

he lived in a strong Hindu environment. But Islam had a natural claim to his allegiance. Torn asunder by doubts and deep searchings of heart, he became a nonconformist, a victim of persecution by the orthodox sections of both the communities¹. Mohsin Fani says, "... at the time when he was in search of a spiritual guide, he visited the best of the Musulmans and Hindus, but did not find what he sought; at last somebody gave him direction to an old man of bright genius, the Brahman Ramananda."² Kabir himself acknowledges his debt to his Guru in the following words: "I... was awakened by Ramananda".³ He also refers to his association with Muslim saints at various places.⁴ Like Guru Nanak, he seems to have been unfamiliar with sacred languages and learned scriptures, although his association with saints of different schools familiarised him with technical philosophical terms, some of which he utilised in his verses. Like Guru Nanak, again, he eschewed asceticism and lived the unconventional life of a simple householder⁵.

The strain of mysticism which is so remarkable a feature of Kabir's verses did not prevent him from playing the part of a practical reformer. He was the first leader of the medieval Reformation to make a conscious effort for Hindu-Muslim unity in the sphere of religion. He says, "The Hindu and Turk have one path which the True Teacher has pointed out" Again: "... The religion of those who understand is one, whether they are *Pandits* or *Shaikhs*". He regrets: "Hindus call upon *Rama*, the Musalmans on *Rahiman*, yet both fight and kill each other, and none knows the truth"⁶. The charge preferred against him before the Sultan⁷ by the Muslims and

1 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 124-137.

2 *Dubistan*, trans. Troyer and Shea, Vol. I, p. 186.

3 *Bijak*, Ramaini, p. 77.

4 *Bijak*, Ramaini, p. 43. Kabir says that "for long he listened to Shaikh Taqi". One of the Muslims who approached Sikandar Lodi for punishing Kabir on the ground of heresy was Shaikh Taqi. (Macauliffe, Vol. VI, p. 132). Were these two persons identical?

5 In one respect there was an important difference between Kabir and the later Sikh Gurus. While he held the doctrine of *ahimsa* and even extended it to flowers, they allowed, and even encouraged, the use of animal flesh as food. (Macauliffe, Vol. VI, p. 141).

6 Quoted in Tarachand, *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, p. 165.

7 For Sikandar Lodi's attempt to persecute Kabir, see Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 131-134.

Brahmins of Benarés was that "those who paid heed to what he said, remained neither Hindus nor Musalmans": The charge was true. We are told that after his death a quarrel arose between the Hindus and the Muslims for the disposal of his body. He belonged to both the communities. His determination to die at Magahar in preference to Benares¹ was a powerful blow against the rituals and conventions which guided the Hindus and the Muslims of his age.

Ramananda and his followers, specially Kabir, seem to have exercised a profound influence on Sikhism. Only one hymn attributed to Ramananda has found place in the *Granth Sahib*, but it has a typical affinity with the teachings of the Sikh Gurus.

"One day I

 was proceeding to worship God in a temple,
 When my spiritual guide showed me God in my heart.
 The Veds and the Purans all have I seen and searched.
 O true guru, I am a sacrifice unto thee
 The guru's word cutteth away millions of sins."²

Among the non-Sikh *Bhagats* Kabir enjoys the place of honour in the *Granth Sahib*. A very large number of his verses³ has been included in that holy collection. The following verses,⁴ quoted at random, well illustrate Kabir's religious views :

"If union with God be obtained by going about naked,
 All the deer of the forest shall be saved".
 "They who bathe in the evening and the morning,
 Are like frogs in the water".
 "While dwelling in the womb man hath not family or caste;
 All men have sprung from the seed of Brahm".
 "God cannot be obtained *even* by offering one's weight in gold;
 But I have purchased Him with my soul".
 "No body obeyeth his parents when alive, yet he giveth
 them feasts when dead;
 Say how shall the poor parents obtain what the ravens and
 the dogs have eaten".

1 According to the Hindus, death at Magahar entailed rebirth as an ass, whereas death at Benares conferred salvation.

2 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, p. 105

3 The English translation of these verses covers 175 pages of Macauliffe's book.

4 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 145, 146, 152, 163, 183, 202, 215, 238, 253, 301, 303.

"Those who understand the guru's instruction,
Lend their ears to nothing else".

"A mother beareth not in mind
All the faults her son committeth.
O God, I am Thy child;
Why destroyest Thou not my demerits?"

"Worship the Lord, the only God,
Serving the guru is the true ablution".

"As without music there cannot be dancing,
So without a *guru man cannot reach God's court*".

"Make thy mind thy Kaaba, thy body its enclosing temple,
Conscience its prime teacher;
Then, O priest, call men to pray to that mosque
Which hath ten gates".¹

"Kabir, become the broken stones of the road; lay aside
thine intellectual pride;
If such a servant there be, he shall meet God".

"Kabir, dispel doubts, leave the books of *the pandits*;
Having searched the Sanskrit books fix thy thought on God's feet."

Apart from Kabir, the hymns of some other disciples of Ramananda are represented in the *Granth Sahib*. Dhanna, a Jat born in Rajputana, met Ramananda at Benares and received initiation from him. He was inspired by the example of *Bhagats* like Namdev, Kabir, Rav Das and Sain. His religious views are embodied in the following extract:

"When the guru caused the wealth of divine knowledge to enter me,
I meditated on God, and accepted in my heart that He was One.

I have embraced the love and service of God and known comfort; I
am satiated and satisfied, and have obtained salvation."²

Pipa, another prominent disciple of Ramananda, was the ruler of a small State called Gagaraungarh. He was originally

1 This is Kabir's reply to a Muslim priest who advised him to make a pilgrimage to Mecca. Compare the following hymn of Guru Nanak:

"Make kindness thy mosque, sincerity thy prayer-carpet, what is just and lawful thy Quran,

Modesty thy circumcision, civility thy fasting, so shalt thou be a Mussalman;

Make right conduct thy Kaaba, truth thy spiritual guide, good words thy creed and thy prayer,

The will of God thy rosary, and God will preserve thine honour, O Nanak".

(Macauliffe, Vol. I, p. 38).

2 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 106-111.

a worshipper of Durga, but when he came into contact with Ramananda he became a monotheist. The following extract from a hymn of Pipa, included in the *Granth Sahib*, shows that, according to him, "it is internal not external worship which is advantageous":

"What is in the universe is found in the body: Whoever searcheth for it shall find it there.

Pipa representeth, God is the Primal Essence; when there is a true guru he will show him."¹

Sain, another disciple of Ramananda, was a barbar at the court of the Raja of Rewa. Later on his saintliness made him the spiritual preceptor of his royal master. The descendants of Sain are now said to be followers of Kabir. One of his hymns is included in the *arati*, a divine service of the Sikhs which is sung when lamps are lit in the evening. Sain addresses God as 'Lord of Lakshmi' and says:

*"Thy name is the best lamp, meditation thereon the purest wick;
Thou alone art the Bright One, O God".²*

Many hymns of Rav Das, another disciple of Ramananda, are found in the *Granth Sahib*. He lived at Benares and earned his living by mending shoes. He says:

"Between Thee and me, between me and Thee what difference
can there be?
The same as between gold and the bracelet, between water and
its ripples".

"If what are merits and what demerits be decided by listening to the Veds and Purans, doubt *shall result*.

Doubt shall *thus* even dwell in the heart; who shall dispel pride?
Man washeth his body with water, but in his heart there is evil
of every description".

"How shall thy slave perform Thy worship?

Let me dedicate and offer my body and soul as my worship,

Thus, by the guru's favour, shall I find the Pure One.

I cannot perform Thine adoration and worship *according to Hindu rites*".³

1 See Macauliffe, Vol. VI. pp. 111-119.

2 See Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 120-122.

3 See Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 316-342.

These disciples of Ramananda spread his message throughout Northern India and the Deccan.¹ The careers of Kabir, Sain and Rav Das showed that religious instruction need not be the monopoly of the Brahmins, nor need spiritual uplift be dependent on the study of the *sastras*. Caste lost its position as the sole criterion of human worth, and the human soul found itself endowed with a new-born value. Sikhism is obviously an offshoot of this remarkable change of outlook. The great compiler of the *Granth Sahib* recognised the debt of Sikhism to the Ramananda school by including so many hymns of that school in the holy book.

Relation between Sikhism and Medieval Reformation

The great variety of the hymns collected in the *Granth Sahib* shows to what an extent Sikhism was in fruitful contact with the medieval Reformation in all its aspects. The *Bhagats* belong almost to all communities, castes and provinces. The general uniformity of their views on spiritual and social problems leaves no room for doubt that the basic principle of the Reformation was one, although personal factors, combined with the peculiarity of political forces and social phenomena in different parts of the country, sooner or later canalised it into different streams.

Reformation in Maharashtra began with Jnanesvar, but Namdev was the first Marathi exponent of the popular *Bhakti* cult. He was a tailor by profession. Tradition assigns his birth to the year 1270 A.D., but Sir R. G. Bhandarkar thinks that he flourished in the fourteenth century. If we accept the traditional date, we must recognise him as the pioneer of religious liberalism in medieval India. Pandharpur on the banks of the Bhima was the centre of the *Bhakti* movement in Maharashtra, and Vithoba was the beloved god. It was at Pandharpur that Namdev died, but so strong was his influence and so wide his reputation in the different parts of India that the Sikhs and his Punjabi followers claim that he was cremated at Ghuman in the Gurdaspur district of the Punjab. Even now there is at Ghuman a well-attended shrine dedicated to Namdev².

1 The followers of Kabir alone founded twelve branches of his *Panth*.

2 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 17-40.

A large number of Namdev's hymns is found in the *Granth Sahib*. Some extracts¹ are quoted below :

"If I bring flowers and weave a garland to worship the idol
The bee hath first smelled the flowers; God is contained in the
bee; why should I weave Him a garland?

In this world is God; in the next world is God; there is no part
of the world without Him".

"Men who are pandits shout the Veds.
But the ignorant Namdev only knoweth God".

"Were I to perform the horse-sacrifice,
Give my weight in gold as alms,
Bathe at Prayag,
It would not be equal, O Nama, to singing God's praises".

"The Hindus worship their temple, the Musalmans their mosque.
Nama worshippeth Him who hath neither temple nor mosque".

The compositions of two other Marathi saints are represented in the *Granth Sahib*. Trilochan belonged to the Vaisya caste. He was a contemporary of Namdev. The kernel of his teaching is: "God is contained in every place".² Paramananda lived near Pandharpur, but nothing is known about the incidents of his life. "It is said that he had the same love and affection for God as the milkmaids had for Krishna". He emphasized the value of uttering God's name as a devotional exercise. The traditional method of Hindu worship is described as futile in the following hymn:

"O man, what hast thou done by hearing the Purans ?
Thou hast performed no steady worship, and not given alms to
the hungry.
Lust thou hast not forgotten, wrath hast thou not forgotten,
covetousness hath not left thee.
Slander hath not left thy lips, and fruitless hath been all thy
devotion".³

Guru Arjan selected some isolated hymns of other well-known *Bhagats*. Sadhana, a contemporary of Namdev, was an inhabitant of Sind and a butcher by profession. His attitude was one of absolute self-surrender to the Lord, and no persecution could shake his convictions.

1 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 42, 51, 54, 58.

2 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 76-81.

3 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, 82-84.

"Even though thou, O God, consign me to hell, I shall not dispute it or turn away from it.

Even thou' Thou bestow Heaven on me I shall not rejoice or praise it".¹

No details are available about Beni, but "owing to the great difficulty of his writings it is believed that he is of comparatively ancient date". He says:

"All that man's worship is vain, and he is blind
Who hath not recognized the Supreme God.
Saith Beni, meditate on God by the guru's instruction;
Without a true guru the way is not found".²

"The Sur Das, one of whose hymns is found in the *Granth Sahib*, must not be confounded with Sur Das, a blind poet famous in the north of India as the author of *The Sur Sagar*". The Sur Das with whom we are concerned here was a learned Brahmin of the sixteenth century. In describing the happiness resulting from communion with God he says:

"He who forsaketh God and desireth any one else, is like a leech on a leprous body".³

The *Granth Sahib* gives us some hymns composed by two Muslim *Bhagats*—Shaikh Farid and Bhikan. In placing devotion above community Guru Arjan followed the example of catholicity laid down by Guru Nanak, who had travelled to the holy land of Islam and come under the spiritual influence of 'Guru' Murad.⁴ Shaikh Farid is said to have been born in 1173 A.D. and we are told that the celebrated saint Nizam-ud-din Auliya was one of his disciples. Guru Nanak met Shaikh Brahm (Ibrahim), Shaikh Farid's successor, who was known as Farid the Second. Macauliffe says, "It is certain that it was Shaikh Brahm who composed the sloks and hymns bearing the name of Farid in the *Granth Sahib*, though he used the name of the founder of the spiritual line as his poetical *nom de plume*." Shaikh Brahm died in 1552 A.D.⁵

1 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 84-88.

2 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 88-93.

3 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 417-420.

4 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 72-73.

5 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 357-359.

One of Shaikh Farīd's *sloks* bears a close resemblance to Christian teaching :

"Farid, if men beat thee with their fists, beat them not in return;
Nay, kiss their feet and go home".¹

God, says Farid, dwells within the devotee's heart :

"Farid, why wanderest thou from forest to forest breaking down
branches and thorns ?

It is in the heart that God dwelleth; why seekest thou Him in
the forest?"²

Macauliffe identifies Bhikan of the *Granth Sahib* with Shaikh Bhikan of Kakori (near Lucknow) who died in the early part of Akbar's reign, but this identification is very doubtful. Badauni says, "Shaikh Bhikan was the most learned of the learned men of his time, abstemious and well-versed in the holy law, while in devout piety even Abu Hanifa, the greatest of the Imams, was his inferior". He who satisfied Badauni's standard of learning and orthodoxy could hardly have been a liberal reformer. Macauliffe rightly says that the author of the hymns bearing the name of Bhikan in the *Granth Sahib* "must have been some religious man who resembled Shaikh Farid II, and was largely tinged with the reformatory ideas then prevalent in India. It has been conjectured, with some show of probability, that Bhikan was a follower of Kabir".

One of his hymns shows that Bhikan was a true *Bhakta* :

"My tongue is happy in repeating, mine ear in hearing, and my
mind in thinking on God's name.

Saith Bhikan, both mine eyes are satisfied; wherever I look
there is God".³

Macauliffe suggests that some of the hymns of the non-Sikh *Bhagats* are "quite opposed to the principles and tenets" of Sikhism, but they were included in the *Granth Sahib* merely to give the readers an idea of the historical development of the

1 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, p. 394.

2 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, p. 396.

3 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 414-416.

Sikh reformation.¹ This view has been criticised and it has been pointed out that "there is nothing in these hymns which is opposed to the principles and tenets of Sikhism, as Guru Arjan understood them".² By emphasizing the historical link between the non-Sikh *Bhagats* and the holy scripture of the Sikhs Macauliffe made it clear that Sikhism was not an exotic, that it was but a peculiar expression of the *Bhakti* movement which swept over India, that it derived vigour and inspiration from the perennial spring of India's spiritual life. This emphasis on the historical aspect of Sikhism disposes of the contention: "Guru Nanak was a revolutionary who aimed at upsetting the cherished institutions of the society in which he was born, bringing about a social cataclysm and building a new order on the ruins of the old". In the true historical perspective the founder of Sikhism appears to be "a reformer who wanted to remove the abuses that had crept into the old order and set it right by restating it in terms of newer environments".³ Sikhism faced a problem of adjustment, not of extermination.

Sikhism and Bengal Vaishnavism

Guru Nanak was a contemporary of Chaitanya, the great founder of Bengal Vaishnavism, and there is some evidence to show that they met at Puri.⁴ Both of them played a decisive part in shaping the religious Reformation which swept over medieval India. Both of them formulated their teachings against the background of Islamic influence on Hindu religion and culture.⁵ There are superficial resemblances between the doctrines taught by them. For instance, Krishnadas Kaviraj, whose great work⁶ is an authoritative biography of Chaitanya as well as a standard exposition of Bengal Vaishnavism, observes: "If a creature adores Krishna and serves his Guru, he is released from the meshes of illusion and attains to Krishna's feet" (i.e., salvation).

1 Preface, p. xxxii.

2 I. Banerjee *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 133-134.

3 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, p. 113.

4 *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Calcutta session, 1939, pp. 762-763.

5 Dr. Tarachand thinks that both Nanak and Chaitanya were deeply indebted to Islam. See *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, pp. 176-177, 218-219. This view requires modification.

6 *Chaitanya-Charitamrita*.

Again: "Leaving these (i.e., temptations) and the religious systems based on caste, (the true Vaishnava) helplessly takes refuge with Krishna".¹ Adoration of God and devotion to Guru are the leading features of Sikhism as well. But there are differences—and vital differences—between Sikhism and Bengal Vaishnavism which the historian of medieval India cannot afford to ignore.

Even a casual observer must be struck with the close affinity existing between ancient Hinduism and Bengal Vaishnavism; the breach between ancient Hinduism and Sikhism was certainly wider. While Guru Nanak's scanty references to the Hindu scriptures seem to show that he was "only superficially acquainted with the Vedic and Puranic literature",² the literature of Bengal Vaishnavism is thoroughly permeated with the Vedic and Puranic spirit and imagery. The *Srimad Bhagbat* is the universally accepted primary scripture of Bengal Vaishnavism; Sikhism is not at all dependent on any ancient Hindu text. Although Bengal Vaishnavism imparted at least as great an impetus to the development of vernacular literature in Bengal as Sikhism did in the Punjab, yet many standard works on Bengal Vaishnavism, including a dramatic biography of Chaitanya,³ were written in Sanskrit. The *Chaitanya-Charitamrita* of Krishnadas Kaviraj is written in Bengali, but it is interspersed with Sanskrit *shlokas* quoted from the *Srimad Bhagvad*, *Gita*, and other works. The most authentic philosophical exposition of *Rasa-sastra* is to be found in the difficult Sanskrit works written by the three revered Goswamis—Rup, Sanatan⁴ and Jiv. Indeed, the Vaishnavas of Bengal did not try to dislodge Sanskrit from the position of the sacred language of the Hindus, although they composed poetical works and lyrics—all of them religious in character—in the Bengali language.

The antecedents of the founder and expounders of Bengal Vaishnavism explain this curious devotion of an essentially popular religion to the language and philosophy of ancient

1 Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Chaitanya*, pp. 278, 281.

2 Tarachand, *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, pp. 176-177.

3 *Chaitanya-Chandrodaya*.

4 Dr. Tarachand (*Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, p. 219) erroneously says that Rup and Sanatan were Muslims.

Hinduism. Unlike Guru Nanak, who cannot be described as a learned man in the ordinary sense of that word, Chaitanya was a profound scholar. His proficiency in Grammar and Logic excited the wonder of Navadvip, one of the greatest centres of Sanskrit learning in those days. He set up as a teacher in his early youth. Unlike Guru Nanak, who came from the lower stratum of Hindu society, Chaitanya was a Brahmin. The environments in which they lived were radically different. Nanak passed his impressionable years in rural areas subject to predominantly Islamic influence, but Chaitanya grew up in a centre of orthodox learning. Naturally their outlook on life and religion was different. Chaitanya quoted Sanskrit *slokas* when he was in ecstasy; he loved to reside at Puri, a sacred place of pilgrimage for the orthodox Hindus. His religion was rooted deeply in the past. His followers did nothing to encourage a new departure. Men like Rup, Sanatan and Krishnadas Kaviraj were deeply versed in ancient learning; the successors of Guru Nanak were not at all inclined to master or make use of the Hindu scriptures.

The entire dependence of Sikhism on the vernacular, to the total exclusion of Sanskrit, had two important consequences. Centuries of tradition had familiarised the Hindus with Vedic and Puranic stories and ideas, and a religion which was based on the total denial of the validity of these stories and ideas appeared to them in the light of a strange and alien novelty. Vaishnavism in Bengal did not in this respect involve a breach with the past. Throughout the orthodox section of the Hindu society Krishna was regarded as a deity to be worshipped. The emphasis on the idea (derived from the *Srimad Bhagavat*¹) that Krishna was God (not a mere incarnation of God) was not in itself enough to create a gulf between orthodoxy and Reformation. In explaining and justifying their religious position the Vaishnavas took shelter behind some of the *sastrās* which the orthodox Hindus revered (for example, *Gita*, *Srimad Bhagavat*, etc.,) and utilised the language which the latter regarded as sacred. One of the inevitable effects of this difference between Sikhism and Bengal Vaishnavism was that, while the former made slow progress among a comparatively uneducated and socially inferior population, the latter appealed to high and low alike, to the learned as

1 I. 3. 28. Cf. *Chaitanya-Charitamrita*, Ali Lila, Chap. II.

well as the illiterate. The converts to Sikhism belonged mainly to the agricultural class, deprived of the blessings of learning by the social and religious conventions of those days, quite unfamiliar with the *sastras* and infinitely less open to their influence.¹ They easily appreciated a religion which improved their social position and promised salvation through simple devotion and service. But the higher classes, more educated, more familiar with Vedic and Puranic ideas, were conscious that Sikhism represented a definite breach with the past. Naturally they were not as anxious as the agricultural classes to get rid of traditions and conventions. Vaishnavism certainly presented this dilemma to the high castes and educated Hindus of Bengal, but in far less acute a degree. While the Brahmins of the Punjab could not embrace Sikhism without cutting themselves adrift from the century-old moorings of their society, the Brahmins of Bengal could with less difficulty transfer their allegiance to a reformed faith ostensibly based on ancient and venerated scriptures.

Another effect of the exclusive employment of the vernacular as the sole medium of religious worship was that Sikhism could not spread beyond the area in which that language was understood. Although there were isolated Sikh *sangats* in places far away from the Punjab (in Patna, Dhubri, Dacca and Nander, for instance),² it must be recognised that Sikhism has all along been a provincial religion. Bengali Vaishnavism, on the other hand, powerfully affected other provinces like Orissa and Assam; its message spread in Southern and Western India, and its centre was a place outside Bengal—Brindaban. This difference between the two reformed faiths may have been partly due to linguistic grounds. The philosophy of Bengal Vaishnavism was expounded by Rup, Sanatan and Jiv Goswami in Sanskrit, a language understood all over India. There was, thus, no linguistic barrier to the spread of Vaishnavism. Sikhism, on the other hand, was expounded verbally by the Gurus in a language which was not understood beyond the frontiers of the Punjab. Of the ten Gurus, only Nanak, Tegh Bahadur and Gobind Singh travelled exten-

1 Only 9 p.c. of the Khatri belong to the Sikh religion. See I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 20-21.

2 The establishment of these isolated centres of Sikh worship may be attributed tentatively to the Sikh merchants trading in different parts of India.

sively outside the Punjab. It is difficult to ascertain how many converts they made beyond the homeland of Sikhism. Their number could not have been large, and they, or their descendants, must have found it difficult to maintain a living contact with their new faith. For about a century after its birth Sikhism had no scripture, no authoritative work in which the faithful could find the solution of his spiritual doubts and the satisfaction of his spiritual cravings. The compilation of the *Granth Sahib* did not solve this vital problem. How could a non-Punjabi Sikh living at Dhubri or at Dacca or at Nander understand the holy book? A Sikh merchant might be his neighbour, but all Sikhs were not competent to explain the scripture. No such difficulty was experienced by a Tamil or Assamese or Rajput Vaishnava who was personally ignorant of Sanskrit, for Sanskrit-knowing *pandits* were then available in every Indian village.

It must be recognised that the very confinement within the limits of the Punjab gave Sikhism a compactness and solidarity which Bengal Vaishnavism could never attain due partly to its wide distribution in different provinces. Living within the boundaries of one single province, speaking the same language, familiar with the same political, economic and social conditions, the Sikhs lived as fellow members of a common society, united by religious and social ties which became stronger and stronger with the lapse of time. There was no such geographical, political, economic or social unity within Vaishnavism; the bond of a common faith was there but it was not strong enough to transcend all barriers.

Two important factors strengthened this initial solidarity of Sikhism. In the first place, Guru Nanak took a revolutionary measure when he selected Angad as his successor.¹ The idea of Guruship was familiar in ancient and medieval India, but no other reformed faith transformed it into a living institution. Kabir's death was followed by the disintegration of his *panth* and the growth of twelve different schools, each with its own spiritual teacher. Chaitanya did not nominate any successor to guide his sect after his death. The result was that Vaishnavism could not organise itself under the shelter and inspiration of any central authority. His companions filled up the gap for

¹ I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Kāhāsa*, Vol. I, pp. 146-147.

some time, but their death was followed by the inevitable relaxation of rules and disintegration of organisation. Sikhism escaped a similar fate because its founder was wise enough to nominate a successor. The Gurus constituted the much-needed central authority which provided cohesion and ensured unity. When Guru Gobind transferred the leadership to the Khalsa, disintegration was averted by the long course of training and discipline through which the Sikhs had passed during the preceding two centuries.

Guru Arjan's gifts as an organiser are well-known. The compilation of the *Granth Sahib* was perhaps his greatest contribution to the solidarity of Sikhism. The *masand* system, a unifying factor in his days, became a disintegrating factor under his successors, and in the interest of unity it had to be abolished. But the *Granth Sahib* became, and remains to this day, the symbol and embodiment of Sikh unity. Guru Gobind clearly recognised its historical position when he vested in it the joint leadership of the Sikhs. The *Granth Sahib* became the Quran of Sikhism, but, fortunately for the Sikhs, conflicting commentaries did not obscure its meaning as they did in the case of the holy book of Islam. Bengal Vaishnavism did not provide its votaries with an authoritative scripture like the *Granth Sahib*. The *Srimad Bhagvat*, differently interpreted by conflicting commentaries, written against a background which had long ago lost touch with historical reality, speaking through a language which was a mystery to millions of Vaishnavas, inspired by a difficult philosophical idealism beyond their understanding—such a book could not fill up in the Vaishnava society the place accorded to the *Granth Sahib* by the Sikhs.

One far reaching result of the growing solidarity of the Sikhs was the gradual elimination of the caste system. There is enough evidence to show that Guru Nanak did not abolish the caste system.¹ Sikh tradition shows that it survived in some form or other till the inauguration of the Khalsa by Guru Gobind.²

1 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, Appendix A.

2 In 1783 Forster (*A Journey from Bengal to England* p. 256) noted that "the Sikhs formed matrimonial connection only in their respective tribes".

Sikhism provided a natural solution of the social and religious problems created by the caste system: the gradual relaxation of its rigidity culminated in its total abolition. In the days of the early Gurus the Sikhs hesitated to uproot the system which had so long been recognised by the Hindus as the only possible standard of social life. Gradually they perceived their alienation from the Hindu society. Different castes began to take food on a footing of equality from the Guru's kitchen and even to intermarry. Islam provided the example of a caste-less society. By the time of Guru Gobind the process of evolution was complete, and Sikhism got rid of caste.

Bengal Vaishnavism began with a programme similar to that of Guru Nanak, but the culmination was different. Bipin Chandra Pal says [

"The Movement of Shree Chaitanya helped very largely to emancipate the so-called lower classes or castes of Bengalee Hindus from the many social disabilities under which they had been living in the old Brahminical society. Shree Chaitanya Mahaprabhu tried to abolish the current caste exclusiveness of Brahminical Hinduism. He accepted many a qualified non-Brahmin, even of the so-called untouchable caste into the ministry of his new congregation. These people became the *gurus* or spiritual leaders or preceptors of the new community, taking equal place with the hereditary Brahmins, who joined the new Movement"¹

With a view 'to create a new and reformed community, freed from the trainnels of the old and medieval Hindu society, particularly the bondage of Brahminical laws and customs,' Chaitanya and his associates simplified the ancient laws and customs regarding important ceremonies like marriage, *sradh*, etc. The worship of numerous gods and goddesses was abjured, although the importance of toleration was clearly recognised. Unfortunately, however, this promising movement was confronted with unbreakable orthodoxy within its own fold. B. C. Pal says :

¹ *Bengal Vaishnavism*, p. 119.

"Converts to Shree Chaitanya's Vaishnava cult belonging to the higher castes of Hindus, the Brahmins, the Vaidyas and the Kayasthas, could not sacrifice their social position to the demands of the new culture. All that they did was, therefore, only to adopt the so-called spiritual laws of it, namely, to accept their initiation at the hands of the Vaishnava gurus, and pursue the spiritual and subjective disciplines of the new culture, while continuing to observe the general laws of Hindu society in regard to social and sacerdotal affairs. The new community of Vaishnavas in Bengal was thus divided almost from the very beginning into two sections, one consisting of those who were obedient to the laws of Chaitanya, and the other, though initiated in the worship of Shree Krishna, continuing in their loyalty to the old Brahminical laws."¹ The former, "to whatever caste they might originally belong, were gradually condemned to a very low social position on account of their Bohemian ways, particularly in the matter of marriage."² This triumph of Hindu orthodoxy virtually killed the spirit of the social message of Bengal Vaishnavism.

Closely connected with the question of caste is the traditional classification of worships according to the qualifications of the worshipper (*adhikari-bheda*). The Vaishnava attitude towards the caste system was incompatible with the recognition of that classification. A religion which recognised different methods of worship (like *jnana-marga*, *bhakti-marga* etc.) and emphasized the validity of rituals could not place all men and women in the same category, but, according to the Vaishnavas, the highest and purest worship of the Lord consisted in the repetition of His holy name. "This required no rituals, no offerings of flowers or leaves or edibles to the Deity, or the services of the Brahmins. Whoever took the name of the Lord became purified by that one single act and was qualified to worship the Lord. In this way the Bengal Vaishnava cult . . . granted the highest religious franchise, hitherto enjoyed by the Brahmins only, to all men and women, irrespective of all considerations of birth, parentage and social status."³ In this respect Sikhism is in complete accord with Bengal Vaishnavism.

1 *Bengal Vaishnavism*, pp. 122-123.

2 B. C. Pal, *Bengal Vaishnavism*, pp. 123-124.

3 B. C. Pal, *Bengal Vaishnavism*, p. 129.

The only direct evidence revealing any intimate relation between Sikhism and Bengal Vaishnavism is the inclusion of two hymns¹ attributed to Jaidev, the celebrated author of the *Gita-Govinda*, in the *Granth Sahib*. Macauliffe says: "Notwithstanding the lusciousness and sensuous beauty of several parts of the *Gita-Govind*, there can be no doubt that Jaidev intended the poem as an elaborate religious allegory. This, too, is insisted on by the author of the *Bhagat Mal*, who states that the love scenes and rhetorical graces of the poet are not to be understood in the sense that persons of evil minds and dispositions attach to them."²

It may be safely said that Guru Arjan's selection of Jaidev as one of the *Bhagats* of the *Granth Sahib* was due to the long tradition which regarded the *Gita-Govinda* "not so much as a poetical composition of great beauty³ as an authoritative religious text, illustrating the refined subtleties of Vaishnava theology and *Rasa-Sastra*." The fame of this great poem "has never been confined within the limits of Bengal. It has claimed more than forty commentators from different provinces and more than a dozen imitations; it has been cited extensively in the anthologies"⁴ The legends incorporated in the *Bhaktamala*, some of which are echoed by Macauliffe,⁵ show in what light Jaidev was glorified in the eyes of the later Vaishnavas. This glorification is dimly reflected in the homage paid to him by Guru Arjan.

It is curious, however, to note that the two hymns included in the *Granth Sahib* have nothing Vaishnavic about them. The first hymn is devoted to the praise of God in general terms. The

1 Macauliffe, Vol. VI, pp. 15-17.

2 Vol. VI, p. 10.

3 The following remarks of Dr. S. K. De deserve careful consideration: "It should not be forgotten that Jayadeva flourished at least three centuries before the promulgation of the *Rasa-Sastra* of Rupa Gosvamin As a poet of undoubted gifts, it could not have been his concern to compose a religious treatise according to any particularly Vaishnava dogmatics . . ." (*History of Bengal*, ed. R. C. Majumdar, Vol. I, pp. 369-370).

4 S. K. De, in *History of Bengal*, ed. R. C. Majumdar, Vol. I, pp. 367-368.

5 Vol. VI, pp. 8-12.

name 'Krishna' is not used; there is no allusion to Radha. The second hymn, says Macauliffe, "is given to illustrate the practice of *yog*." It contains the sentence: "I have become blended with God as water with water." This identification of self with *Brahman* is a leading feature of Sankara's Advaita philosophy; it is quite alien to the *Rasa-sastra* expounded by the Vaishnava Goswamis of Bengal.

In conclusion, it may be observed that there is a vital difference between the monothelism of the Sikhs and the monotheism of the Vaishnavas. According to Sikhism, God has no form. In this respect the Sikh creed is identical with Islam and Christianity. But the Krishna (or the ultimate Reality) of the Vaishnavas is not *nirakara* (without a form); Chaitanya described Him as *chidakara* (possessing a spiritual body). Bipin Chandra Pal explains the Vaishnava standpoint in the following words:

"... In every ... system, whether Hindu Vaishnavic or Shaiva or Christian or Islam or Judaic, which accepts the worship of the Lord as an eternal duty we must concede to the Lord some notes or marks of differentiation from His worshipper. Bengal Vaishnavism declares that these notes or marks, or, in a word, this 'form' of the Lord, is not material but spiritual. The Lord, therefore, is not without form but has a spiritual form of His own. The Lord is not without body but has a spiritual body."¹

Very few worshippers could conceive of this spiritual body. The natural result was the practical recognition of image worship by the vast majority of the Vaishnavas.

II. SIKHS AND MUGHALS.

Of all the products of medieval Reformation Sikhism alone came into conflict with the established State, and it was this conflict which gave it political importance in the eighteenth century. Indeed, the challenge of the Mughal Empire was the turning point in the history of the Sikhs. If the mighty Mughal Government had left the Sikhs in peace, free to sing their

¹ *Bengal Vaishnavism*, p. 26.

hymns and to develop their *langars*, it is quite probable that Sikhism would have remained a comparatively obscure Provincial cult. Persecution brought it to the stage of Indian history. Through blood, sweat and tears it walked to political power: the peaceful sect established by Guru Nanak developed into the invincible Khalsa.

Sikhism and Mughal Imperialism were born about the same time, although there was no historical connection between them. Guru Nanak was born in 1469 and died in 1538. It was probably after 1520 that he began an intensive propaganda in the Punjab.¹ Babur was born in 1483 and his first invasion of India took place in 1519. In his third expedition (1524) he advanced far into the heart of the Punjab and besieged a place called Sayyidpur (modern Eminabad in the Gujranwala district). Probably Guru Nanak was then near about the scene of occurrence, for the capture of Sayyidpur is described in some of his hymns.² It is said that the Guru and his servant Mardana were imprisoned by Babur's officers and then released when his holiness was demonstrated. We are told that Babur visited the Guru and fell down at his feet. This story may or may not be true, but Babur's connection with Guru Nanak is referred to by Bhai Gurdas and Mohsin Fani.³ In any case, the pious Guru could not play any important part in the turmoil of that age of strife, and he was interested in problems which had no meaning for the conqueror.

The four successors of Guru Nanak devoted themselves to the peaceful consolidation of the *Panth* and their relations with the Mughal Empire were very friendly till the death of Akbar. It is said that Humayun visited Guru Angad (1538-1552) after his defeat at Kanauj. The authenticity of this story is doubtful,⁴ but Akbar certainly visited Guru Arjun Das (1552-1574), although all the episodes connected with that visit may not be acceptable to sober history.⁵ There is a tradition that the site of the sacred tank of Amritsar was granted by Akbar to Guru

1 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, p. 86.

2 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 36-38, 47.

3 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 87-88.

4 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, p. 151.

5 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 171, 174-177.

Ram Das (1574-1581).¹ The friendliness shown by the liberal Emperor raised the prestige of the Guru and attached to Sikhism a new significance which naturally impressed the local people. But direct imperial patronage was out of the question, and the progress of Sikhism was due to its inner spiritual strength and the organising ability of the Gurus.

It is significant that even in the tolerant days of Akbar the Sikhs had occasionally to face troubles from their intolerant Muslim neighbours. When his disciples became impatient Guru Amar Das pacified them by saying: "It is not proper for saints to take revenge".² This is a crucial instance revealing the essentially peaceful character of Sikhism. Not to speak of defying the State, the Sikhs would not even defend themselves against intolerant oppression from a sister community.

Like his predecessors Guru Arjan (1581-1606) steadily worked for consolidation. The compilation of the holy *Granth* (1604) marked the climax of the formative period of Sikhism. Akbar set aside complaints against the Guru, visited him and even consented to partial remission of the revenues at his request.³ But Akbar's death was followed by a sudden reversal of Mughal policy towards Sikhism: generous friendship gave place to open hostility. This was probably due to three important factors. In the first place, Jahangir did not inherit his father's catholicism. His own words betray his intolerance of Sikhism and his determination to crush it.⁴ Secondly, as a result of the organisational work of the Sikh Gurus for a little less than a century "the Sikh community had come to acquire the position of an *imperium in imperio*, that of a separate polity within the Mughal Empire".⁵ Whether the Sikhs were inspired by political motives was a question which the Mughal State

1 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, p. 186.

2 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 172-173.

3 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 212-214.

4 See Rogers and Beveridge, *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Vol. I, p. 72, Jahangir says, "Many times it occurred to me to put a stop to this vain affair (i.e., spread of Sikhism) or to bring him (i.e., Guru Arjan) into the assembly of the people of Islam".

5 See I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 263-266; Vol. II, pp. 1-2.

did not stop to examine; for its purposes it was enough that something like a State had grown up in the Punjab. Knowingly or unknowingly the Sikhs had thrown up a challenge which the Mughal State could not ignore. Thirdly, the peaceful character of the Sikh community was probably being affected by large scale conversion of the turbulent Jats. "Guru Arjan is said to have converted almost the entire Jat peasantry of the Manjha tract and there can be little doubt that by the time of Guru Hargobind the Jats formed by far the preponderant element in the Sikh community."¹ The traditional habits of the Jats² could not be easily fitted into the socio-religious structure of a peaceful community. It may be surmised that the conciliatory spirit of Guru Amar Das was gradually losing its hold over a community in which fighters and plunderers were far more numerous than true Sikhs who might be called saints.

During the pontificate of Guru Hargobind (1606-1645) the relationship between the Mughal State and the Sikh community was one of unstable equilibrium. Guru Arjan's execution (1606) left the Sikhs almost leaderless, for his son and successor was a boy of eleven, and he was imprisoned by Jahangir soon after his accession to the *gadi*. What this imprisonment was due to, and how long it lasted, we do not definitely know. It is not unlikely that Hargobind created suspicions about himself by following his father's last message: "Let him sit fully armed on his throne and maintain an army to the best of his ability."³ Guru Arjan might have realised at the last tragic moment of his life that the Mughal challenge could not be met except through an appeal to arms. The Jat converts might have appeared to him to be good material for an army. His young son might have begun to give effect to this new policy. The Mughal State was alert, and the potential rebel was thrown into the dark fort of Gwalior. There, probably, he had time to think over the whole problem. Young as he was, he was wise enough to realise that open rebellion was out of the question. The Mughal Empire was at the height of its power and glory, and he was the leader of a small community of peasants. So after his release he adopted towards the Mughal

1 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, p. 21.

2 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. II, pp. 35-44.

3 Macauliffe, Vol. III, p. 99.

Government a policy of friendly co-operation, and under the guise of a Mughal official he created the nucleus of an army which might be utilised for the defence of his community if the Mughal Government delivered another blow. Had Hargobind accepted sentiment as his guide he would not have played the humiliating role of an official under his father's murderer. But he was a far-sighted leader; he looked to the future rather than to the past. He could not sacrifice the safety of his community by pursuing a reckless and futile policy of vengeance against an infinitely more powerful enemy.

But the policy of creating an army out of political malcontents and fugitives from justice¹ could not be long concealed from the Mughal Government. After the death of indolent Jahangir and the accession of enterprising Shah Jahan that Government became more active and vigorous. A period of open hostilities followed, at the end of which Hargobind took refuge in the hills. For the remaining ten years of his life he remained at peace: he was too weak to attack the Mughals and too insignificant to be attacked by them.

The next Guru, Har Rai (1645-1660), was connected with Dara's attempt to secure the imperial throne.² For this offence he had to send his eldest son, Ram Rai, as a hostage to Aurangzib's court. His successor, Har Krishan (1660-1664), was summoned to Delhi to justify his claim to the *gadi* which Ram Rai demanded on hereditary principles. After his premature death in Delhi the *gadi* was occupied by Tegh Bahadur (1664-1675), whom Aurangzib executed in 1675. It is difficult to understand why Aurangzib took no decisive step against the Sikh Gurus during the first 17 years of his reign. During this period he lived in Northern India, close to the land of the Sikhs, and he was not too busy to deal with them. Har Rai was not a strong leader, Har Krishan was a boy and Tegh Bahadur was an adventurer in distant provinces. It may be argued that the Sikhs showed no signs of disaffection and were, therefore, left undisturbed. But their religion was certainly repugnant to the intolerant Emperor, and that was reason enough, in his eyes, for drastic steps.³

1 See I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. II, p. 21.

2 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. II, pp. 50-51.

3 See Macauliffe, Vol. IV, pp. 317-318, for a Sikh tradition about his policy.

There is no doubt that Guru Tegh Bahadur fell a victim to Aurangzib's religious bigotry,¹ but there is no reason to accept Macauliffe's statement that he wanted to "free the earth from the burden of the Muhammadans".² Had he been a political leader of some importance, the Muslim historians of Aurangzib's reign would not have remained absolutely silent about him. In the *Bachitra Natak* Guru Gobind Singh clearly says that his father "protected the frontal marks and sacrificial threads of the Hindus", "put an end to his life for the sake of holy men" and "suffered martyrdom for the sake of his religion."³ The Sikh community had not yet evolved a political programme. Moreover, it was absurd for that small and weak community to think of "freeing the earth from the burden of the Muhammadans" in the year 1675 when Aurangzib apparently ruled in unassailed majesty.

The story that Guru Gobind's (1675-1708) mission was to avenge his father's death and to destroy the Mughal Empire has found acceptance with almost all modern writers. Cunningham says that he became "the irreconcilable foe of the Mahometan name", "conceived the noble idea of moulding the vanquished Hindoos into a new and aspiring people", and "in the heart of a powerful empire set himself to the task of subverting it." Dr. Narang speaks of avenging Tegh Bahadur's death and striking a blow at the power of Aurangzib.⁴ Sir J. N. Sarkar says that Gobind was "not the person to leave his father's death unavenged", and that he "began a policy of open hostility to Islam".⁵ Is this interpretation of the Guru's career consistent with the known facts of his life? In the *Bachitra Natak*, which most probably refers to the period preceding the creation of the Khalsa,⁶ the Guru says :

"The successors of both Baba Nanak and Babar
Were created by God Himself.
Recognize the former as a spiritual
And the latter as a temporal King.

1 See I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. II, pp. 57-63.

2 Vol. IV, p. 372.

3 Macauliffe, Vol. V, p. 295.

4 *Transformation of Sikhism*, p. 150.

5 *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, pp. 355, 359.

6 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. II, Appendix B.

Babar's successors shall seize and plunder those
Who deliver not the Guru's money".¹

In these lines we almost have an echo of the famous Christian dictum: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's". Instead of aiming at the destruction of the Mughal Empire the Guru recognizes in it a creation of God, legitimises it in the eyes of his followers by calling upon them to acknowledge the temporal authority of Babur's successors, and even invokes its assistance for the punishment of those 'who deliver not the Guru's money'.

The history of Guru Gobind Singh's military operations is admittedly obscure, but during the pre-Khalsa period he seems to have fought against the Mughal Government as an ally of the rebellious Hill Rajas rather than on his own account.² The creation of the Khalsa was apparently a defensive measure, not an aggressive step aimed specifically at the Mughal Empire. Indeed, we are told that the "immediate effect of the coming of the Khalsa was to spread something like consternation among the Hill chiefs."³ It was on the invitation of the Hill chiefs that the Mughal officials turned once again against the Sikhs and inflicted grievous wounds, personal and political, on the Guru.⁴ It was probably with a view to punish Wazir Khan, the *Faujdar* of Sarhind who had cruelly murdered his sons, that Guru Gobind Singh sent an appeal to Aurangzib and, after the old Emperor's death, joined Bahadur Shah.⁵ If the Guru's policy was to begin a general war against the Mughal Government, he would have remained in the Punjab instead of following the new Emperor to the Deccan. The Sikh tradition as recorded by Macauliffe clearly shows that it was against Wazir Khan personally, not against the Mughal Government, that the Guru's hostility was directed. We are told that just before his death he sent Banda to the Punjab with "instructions to cut off Wazir Khan's head with his own hands, and not entrust this pious duty to any subordinate". After the plunder

1 Macauliffe, Vol. V, p. 305.

2 See I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. II, Chapter III.

3 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. II, p. 126.

4 See I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. II, pp. 131-138.

5 See I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. II, pp. 139-151.

of Sarhind and the punishment of Wazir Khan, Mata Sundari, one of Guru Gobind's wives, wrote a letter to Banda "to the effect that he had now accomplished the mission imposed on him by the Guru, namely, to bring the Governor of Sarhind to justice, and it was time for him to arrest his career of carnage and spoliation."¹

Whether Banda was actually commissioned by Guru Gobind Singh to punish Wazir Khan, we do not know; but he certainly set aside all the restraints which the sixth and tenth Gurus had observed in their relations with the Mughal Empire, and declared what was virtually a general war against the Mughal Government, although its scope was necessarily limited to the Punjab. This significant change of policy was probably due primarily to the recklessness of Banda's character, for, unlike the Gurus, he was a fanatic. The Mughal Empire was still strong enough to crush a localised rebellion, and Banda failed to consolidate his temporary sovereignty.

For about four decades the Sikhs, left leaderless by Banda's death, fought against the declining Mughal Empire. It was the age of martyrs and of undying faith. In spite of the growing weakness of the Mughal Government the Sikhs could only manage to preserve their existence; they could not make themselves *de facto* rulers of the Punjab. When Mughal authority was on the verge of collapse the Sikhs suddenly found a new and far more powerful enemy—the Afghans.

III. SIKHS AND AFGHANS.

After the assassination of Nadir Shah his empire broke up into pieces and his general, Ahmad Khan Abdali, Chief of the Sadozai clan, became King of an independent Afghanistan^a (1747 A.D.). Nadir Shah had wrested from the decadent

1 Macauliffe, Vol. V, pp. 230, 234-235, 238-239, 250.

2 "The country, now termed Afghanistan, had merely consisted of a congeries of petty states, ruled by tyrannical Chiefs, who were frequently at war with one another. Later it became provinces of great empires which were ruled by foreign conquerors and their descendants. Later again, it was a dismembered country, with its provinces held by three neighbouring states. Now, for the first time in its chequered history, Afghanistan became an independent state. . . ." (Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan*, Vol. I, p. 367).

Mughal Empire not only Afghanistan but also the trans-Indus districts of the Punjab. Ahmad Shah Abdali inherited not only this part of Nadir Shah's empire but also his anti-Mughal policy. The motives underlying Abdali's Indian expeditions have been explained by Elphinstone¹ in the following words:

"For the consolidation of his power at home he relied, in a great measure, on the effects of his foreign wars. If these were successful, his victories would raise his reputation, and his conquests would supply him with the means of maintaining an army, and of attaching the Afghan chiefs by favours and rewards: the hopes of plunder would induce many tribes to join him, whom he could not easily have compelled to submit: by carrying the great men with his army he would be able to prevent their increasing, or even preserving their influence in their tribes; and the habits of military obedience would prepare them for a cheerful submission to his government at home: the troops also, having the king continuously before their eyes, and witnessing the submission of their hereditary chiefs, would learn to regard him as the head of the nation; and he might hope, as the event proved, that his popular manners, and the courage, activity, vigilance, and other military virtues which he possessed, would impress all ranks with respect, and strongly attach his soldiers to his person".

Ahmad Shah Abdali invaded India for the first time in 1748 and for the last time in 1767. In 1752 he secured from the helpless Mughal Emperor, Ahmad Shah, formal cession of the *subahs* of Lahore and Multan. The Punjab then became a starting point for fresh expeditions against the Gangetic Doab. In the Punjab itself, however, the Sikhs effectively challenged the authority of the Afghans, and neither force nor diplomacy enabled Abdali to consolidate his hold over that disturbed province. The Sikhs established their *de facto* sovereignty and struck coins probably for the first time in 1765. During the last six years of his life (1767-1773) Ahmad Shah Abdali made no attempt to crush the Sikhs. The Sikhs were a nation in arms inspired by religious fervour and Abdali was an alien conqueror depending on mercenary soldiers. Geography as well as

¹ *An Account of the Kingdom of Cabul*, Vol. II, pp. 283-284.

local conditions favoured the Sikhs. Rebellions in Afghanistan and wars on his western frontier distracted Abdali's attention from India. Peshawar remained a part of the Afghan Empire, but the Punjab proper practically fell to the Sikhs.

Ahmad Shah Abdali was succeeded by his son Timur Shah (1773-1793), who had acted as his deputy in the Punjab in 1757-58 and written a book on the Sikhs known as *Hakikat-Bina-wa-Uruj-Firkah-i-Sikhan*.¹ He transferred the capital of the Afghan Empire from Kandahar to Kabul. Towards the close of his reign the Amirs of Sind refused to pay tribute and that province became practically independent of Afghanistan. In 1780 he conquered Multan from the Sikhs. Kashmir was reconquered from a rebellious Afghan Governor who was assisted by the Sikhs. Bahawal Khan, the enterprising chief of Bahawalpur, submitted after the capture of his capital. Apparently Timur Shah left the Punjab undisturbed and confined his attention to the outlying tracts—Sind, Bahawalpur, the Khyber region and Kashmir. It was only at Multan that he came in direct contact with the Sikhs, and geographically and historically Multan was intimately connected with Sind. So the Sikhs got a long respite which they used in consolidating their hold on the Punjab. Elphinstone says, "Timur Shah . . . gave way to his natural indolence. His whole policy was directed to secure his tranquillity: he never appears to have thought of aggrandizing himself, and all the operations in which he was . . . engaged, were intended merely for the defence of his dominions . . . This policy succeeded moderately well in maintaining internal tranquillity: the provinces immediately under the King remained quiet, . . . but the remote provinces gradually withdrew themselves from the control of the court; the Government lost its reputation and influence abroad; and the states which had been obliged to preserve their own territories by submission to Ahmad Shah, now began to meditate schemes for aggrandizing themselves at the expense of the Durranis".²

A vigorous, though ill-planned and unsuccessful, attempt to prevent the disintegration of the Afghan Empire was made by

1 Translated by Dr. I. Banerjee, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, March, 1942.

2 *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, Vol. II, pp. 300-302.

Timur Shah's son and successor, Zaman Shah (1793-1800). His failure to crush the Sikhs and make himself the arbiter of the fate of Northern India like his grandfather was due to several reasons. He was young in age and without large experience of war and administration. He 'committed the whole of his powers and duties to an unworthy favourite'—his Wazir, who was 'universally detested'. He not only deprived the leading Sardars of their traditional authority and influence but also 'alienated them by a system of silent persecution'. He shocked the proud Afghans by 'sanguinary executions'. He fought simultaneously on two fronts—east and west,—and failed to make a lasting impression either on India or on Persia. Elphinstone says, "In his foreign policy his first object ought to have been to defend Khorasan. The power of Persia was now consolidated in the hands of an active prince, who had already turned his attention to the conquest of that province, and some exertion on the part of Shah Zaman was obviously required to check his progress; such a course was indeed necessary to the success even of his eastern expeditions. India was as much altered as Persia since the time of Ahmad Shah, and nothing was to be gained there but by long and uninterrupted operations. There were no longer treasures at Delhi to reward a march to that city; and the more desirable object of reducing the Punjab, was not to be accomplished by a hasty incursion. The plan opposed by the Sikhs to Ahmad Shah, which was to evacuate their country on his approach, and return when his army was withdrawn, could only be baffled by keeping a force in the country sufficient to retain possession; and that measure could only be accomplished when the western frontier was secure".¹

1 *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, Vol. II, p. 312. The western frontier could not be secure as long as Persia wanted Khorasan and Herat and was encouraged by England to maintain pressure on Zaman Shah. The Afghan ruler's threat to India compelled Lord Wellesley to send to the Court of Persia two envoys—Mehdi Ali Khan and Sir John Malcolm. The former was instructed "to take measures for inducing the Court of Persia to keep Zaman Shah in perpetual check (so as to preclude him from returning to India) but without any decided act of hostility". The latter was asked "to induce Fath Ali Shah to maintain pressure on Zaman Shah by threatening Khurasan and Herat. . . ." (Sykes, *History of Afghanistan*, Vol. I, pp. 377-378).

Zaman Shah's pressure on the Punjab began immediately after his accession. In 1793-94 he came to Peshawar, reduced Kashmir which had revolted after his father's death, and realised tribute from Sind. In 1795 he came as far as Hasan Abdal. During his third Indian expedition (1796-97) he occupied Lahore (January 3, 1797) and placed garrisons to keep under control the region between the Jhelam and the Chenab. But the Sikhs, who had fled away on his approach, restored their power after his departure. In 1798 Zaman Shah came again and re-occupied Lahore, which was taken by Ranjit Singh on July 6, 1799, six months after his retreat. The Sukerchakia chief was confirmed in his possession of the capital of the Punjab by a grant from Zaman Shah which probably arrived in March, 1800.¹

Soon after the loss of Lahore Zaman Shah was overthrown and blinded. His successor was his brother, Shah Mahmud, who had a short and troubled reign (1800-1803). He was succeeded by his brother, Shah Shuja (1800-1809), the unfortunate puppet for whom England fought the disastrous First Afghan War. He was able to control Peshawar and realise tribute from Sind, but in the Punjab Ranjit Singh was too strong to be assailed.² Thus Zaman Shah was the last Afghan ruler who claimed *de facto* authority over the Punjab and suzerainty over the Sikhs. During the reigns of his weak successors the newly-established Sikh Monarchy assumed the aggressive and conquered some of those Indian districts where Afghan rule still lingered. Kashmir, the modern North-West Frontier Province and Multan were occupied by Ranjit Singh. Sind would have fallen but for persistent British intervention.

Ranjit Singh's spectacular success in the north-west was due, politically, to two factors. The treaty of Amritsar (1809) made it impossible for him to cross the Sutlej; but the British Government gave him a free hand in Kashmir and Peshawar. Had the Cis-Sutlej States been left to themselves, they would certainly have been absorbed by the youthful and vigorous Monarchy. Had Delhi been left under Sindhia's control, Ranjit

1 See N. K. Sinha, *Ranjit Singh*, pp. 12-13.

2 Elphinstone wrote in 1809, "Almost the whole of the Punjab belongs to Ranjit Singh" (*An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, Vol. I, p. 111).

Singh might have cast covetous eyes on the fallen imperial capital. The conquest of the Cis-Sutlej States and the occupation of Delhi might have occupied his time and energy and his active interest might not have been attracted to the mountainous Afghan-held north-west. In that case the Kashmir-Peshawar regions would have been cut off from India, and either the Kabul Monarchy or independent Afghan chieftains would have continued to rule there. The re-amalgamation of the north-west in India was one of the greatest achievements of the Sikhs.

This achievement was rendered possible by the disintegration of the Afghan Monarchy. If the successors of Ahmad Shah Abdali had been as able and resourceful as he was, they could in all probability have prevented Ranjit Singh from occupying Kashmir and Peshawar. The success of the Sikhs against Abdali in the Punjab was due to reasons which could not operate in their favour outside the Punjab. In the Kashmir-Peshawar regions the local population, being predominantly Muslim, would have opposed the Sikhs; in any case guerilla warfare would have been more difficult than it was in the heart of the Punjab. The religious zeal evoked by the urgent need of defending the holy places would have been less active in case of war for conquest. The mountains of the north-west would have rendered fighting difficult. The area of hostilities would have been, in most cases, nearer to Kabul and thus in direct contact with the Afghan capital. These difficulties might have deterred even Ranjit Singh from measuring his sword with a competent and determined ruler of Kabul.

Fortunately for the Sikhs, Kabul had no really competent and determined ruler for about half a century (1773-1826). "The history of the Afghan monarchy", says Kaye, "is a history of a long series of revolutions. Seldom has the country rested from strife—seldom has the sword rested in the scabbard". Shah Shuja lost his throne in 1809. Shah Mahmud again reigned at Kabul, but that indolent voluptuary left the difficult task of governing to Sardar Fath Khan, who, says Ferrier, was "celebrated and popular throughout Central Asia." He realised tribute from Sind and Baluchistan and reduced the turbulent Hazara tribe; but he failed to win over Ranjit Singh by diplo-

macy or to weaken him by force.¹ In 1816 he occupied Herat. The unworthy King blinded this able Wazir in 1818. The Barakzai brothers, of whom Fath Khan was the eldest, revolted and dethroned Shah Mahmud. The dethroned King found shelter at Herat, where he and his son, Shah Kamran, ruled for many years.

Shah Mahmud's dethronement marked the downfall of the Sadozai dynasty founded by Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1747; the Barakzai dynasty began to dominate the Afghan scene. Afghanistan lost its unity. After several years of fighting one of the Barakzai brothers, Dost Muhammad Khan, became the acknowledged ruler of Kabul, Ghazni and Jalalabad. His brothers held Kandahar. Herat was ruled by Shah Mahmud. Balkh and Badakhshan remained independent principalities.

The unsettled conditions in Afghanistan encouraged the designs of Shah Shuja, who was then a British pensionary at Ludhiana. He promised independence to the Amirs of Sind in return for their assistance, and with Captain Wade's support he concluded a treaty with Ranjit Singh waiving his rights on Peshawar. The Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, granted an advance of his pension to the penniless ex-monarch. Leaving Ludhiana in February, 1833, Shah Shuja occupied Shikarpur; defeated the recalcitrant Amirs of Sind in January, 1834, and realised from them five lakhs of rupees. Proceeding towards Kandahar he defeated Kohandil Khan at the Khojak Pass; but Dost Muhammad Khan marched to the aid of his brothers and Shah Shuja was finally defeated. This victory raised the prestige of the ruler of Kabul and he was proclaimed *Amir-ul-Muminin*.²

Meanwhile Ranjit Singh had occupied Peshawar and driven out Sultan Muhammad Khan, who fled to Jalalabad and professed loyalty to Dost Muhammad Khan. The latter now began a persistent struggle for the recovery of Peshawar, and solicited in vain the support of the British Government.³ Lord Auck-

1 See N. K. Sinha, *Ranjit Singh*, pp. 42-52.

2 See below, p. 51.

3 See below, pp. 51-55.

land's refusal to help him threw Dost Muhammad Khan into Russian arms. Sir Percy Sykes condemns British policy and writes: "... influenced by the indefatigable Wade, the Sikhs were regarded not only as valuable allies but also as an outer line of defence against French or Russian invaders. This policy was distinctly short-sighted since it depended upon the loyalty but also on the power, life and health of Ranjit Singh, who had ruined his health by debauchery and drink and had already been struck with paralysis in 1834. He had a second seizure in 1838, in which year he met Lord Auckland. Upon his death in 1839, six years of anarchy succeeded, which led to the ultimate annexation of the Punjab by the British. Surely to make paralytic Ranjit Singh the sheet-anchor of the British policy was most unwise".¹ But the Sikhs had proved their strength by occupying and retaining possession of Peshawar, and nobody could then foresee "six years of anarchy". Indeed, but for Nao Nihal Singh's sudden and tragic death² it is quite probable that the Sikh Monarchy would have long survived the death of its founder.

Into the circumstances leading to the First Afghan War we need not enter. Cunningham says that Ranjit Singh joined the Tripartite Treaty³ rather reluctantly.⁴ "The *Maharaja*", says Sykes, "generally speaking, was not disposed to help the scheme enthusiastically, since he realized that, if it were successful, the power of the British would be increased to his own detriment, as also would that of Shah Shuja. Moreover, he was aware that the *Khalsa* feared the Khaibar Pass and its warlike custodians. Finally, he realized that he was to pull the chestnuts out of fire . . .".⁵ But, apart from British pressure, he could not remain indifferent to a political revolution in Afghanistan. Perhaps he felt flattered by the fact that "he was acknowledged to be an arbiter in the fate of that empire which had tyrannized over his peasant forefathers".⁶

1 *History of Afghanistan*, Vol. I, pp. 398-399.

2 See below, p. 70.

3 See below, pp. 160-165.

4 See below, p. 62.

5 *History of Afghanistan*, Vol. II, p. 2.

6 See below, p. 63.

Domestic revolutions prevented the Sikhs from playing their legitimate part in the First Afghan War. On account of his declining health, and his feeling that "he was in truth fairly in collision with the English",¹ Ranjit Singh "became indifferent about the careful fulfilment of the engagements into which he had entered".² To the day of his death this "unwilling sharer" in the campaign hoped "that the English would yet be baffled".³ It was due to his objections to the British army traversing the Punjab that the line of march was selected through Bahawalpur and Sind.⁴ Kandahar fell in April, 1839. Ranjit Singh died on June 27, 1839. Ghazni was captured on July 23, 1839, and Kabul fell two weeks later.

Kharak Singh, Ranjit Singh's worthless son and successor, died after a brief nominal rule of 16 months on November 5, 1840. During this period the *de facto* ruler was his son, Nao Nihal Singh, who met a tragic death on the day on which he "became a king in name as well as in power". He was not friendly to the British Government, to whom he did not give more than half-hearted co-operation in the Afghan War.⁵ Meanwhile, after defeats and adventures Dost Muhammad Khan had surrendered to the British army. On November 12, 1840, he left Kabul under escort for India. The rivalry between Sher Singh and Chand Kaur⁶ created new complications. If the British had their complaints,⁷ the Sikhs had their grievances⁸ too. During the last stage of the Afghan War the weakness of Sher Singh and the question of Jalalabad prevented effective co-operation between the Sikhs and the British Government.⁹

On his return journey towards Kabul Dost Muhammad was received by Sher Singh at Lahore and a formal treaty of friend-

1 See below, p. 63.

2 See below, p. 63.

3 See below, p. 64.

4 Sykes, *History of Afghanistan*, Vol. II, p. 5.

5 See below, pp. 63-71.

6 See below, pp. 71-79.

7 See below, pp. 65-67. See also Sykes, *History of Afghanistan*, Vol. II, p. 16.

8 See below, pp. 69, 76-78.

9 See below, pp. 84-91.

ship was concluded in February, 1843.¹ His relations with his ambitious and enterprising son Akbar Khan were not very cordial. In the winter of 1845 a cavalry force sent by Akbar Khan came to help the Sikhs against the British Government. In 1848, during the Second Anglo-Sikh War, Dost Muhammad himself occupied Peshawar and Attock, which was then held by Colonel Herbert, and 5,000 horsemen sent by him took part in the battle of Gujarat on the Sikh side. But the British cavalry defeated the Afghans and compelled the Amir to retreat. Attock and Peshawar were lost to the Afghans and annexed to the British Empire. The Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1855 put an end, temporarily, to the period of hostility between the Afghans and the British successors of the Sikhs.

IV. SIKHS AND MARATHAS.

It was in the Punjab that the Marathas were involved in that conflict with the Afghans which culminated in the disaster of Panipat. The Marathas were invited to the Punjab by Adina Beg Khan, the crafty *Faujdar* of the Jalandhar Doab, whose aim was to drive away the Afghans with their help so that he might be the *de facto* ruler of the Province. If the Marathas and the Sikhs had united against the Afghans, the history of north-west India might have taken a different course. "But neither among the Marathas nor among the Sikhs was there any one far-sighted enough to realize that combination was the vital need of the hour. The unbecoming pride and presumption of the Marathas, their failure to grasp the realities of the situation, the proverbial Maratha greed for plunder, the presence of the wily Adina Beg whose interest was to keep these two peoples divided, the prevalent Sikh view that regarded the Marathas as intruders—all combined to make a fusion between these two peoples beyond even the domain of possibility".²

In April, 1758, the Marathas entered Lahore, which had been already evacuated by Timur Shah, Ahmad Shah Abdali's son and deputy in the Punjab. The high water level of the Chenab prevented them from crossing that river and pursuing the Afghans up to Attock. Hard pressed for want of money

¹ See below, p. 91.

² N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, p. 34.

and anxious to return to the Deccan for a decisive campaign against the Nizam, the Marathas retreated from the Punjab, leaving Adina Beg Khan as Governor and fixing an annual tribute of 75 lakhs of rupees. This was a very bad arrangement, and it proved absolutely unworkable after the death of Adina Beg Khan in October, 1758. In 1759 Ahmad Shah Abdali re-occupied Lahore, and on January 14, 1761, he won his crowning victory over the Marathas at Panipat. An attempt to bring about a Maratha-Sikh alliance on the eve of that battle proved abortive.

Not long after the battle of Panipat the Sikhs established their *de facto* sovereignty in the Punjab. The Marathas confined their attention to Malwa, Rajputana and the Ganges-Jumna Doab; the Punjab was beyond their horizon. On January 6, 1772, Shah Alam entered Delhi as Emperor under Maratha protection. Thus Delhi became the bastion of Maratha power in the north-west, and it was as the *de facto* ruler of Delhi that Mahadji Sindhia came into close contact with the Sikhs. They were no longer predatory bands harassed by, and harassing, the Afghans; they had established small principalities united in a confederation and inspired by a common religious fervour. Timur Shah made no serious attempt to reconquer the Punjab and Zaman Shah's raids had no permanent effect. The gradual withdrawal of the Afghans left the Sikhs face to face with the Marathas, whose power in Northern India was represented by Sindhia and Holkar.

It has been suggested that Mahadji Sindhia's military power 'held back Timur Shah's barbarian hordes longing for the loot of India'.¹ This view has been criticised on the ground that if Timur Shah had been really afraid of Sindhia, he could at least have advanced into the Punjab during Sindhia's temporary eclipse (1786-1788).² As a matter of fact the Sikhs were by this time able to take care of themselves; they did not require the protection of Sindhia's name. Moreover, Sindhia's interests were confined to the Cis-Sutlej region; he was too wise to be allured, like Raghunath Rao, by the prospect of planting the Maratha banner on the ramparts of Lahore.

¹ Keene, *Hindustan Under Free Lances*, p. 51.

² N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, p. 90.

The plundering raids of the Cis-Sutlej Sikhs kept the masters of Delhi busy for many years. For twenty years (1784-1803) Sindhia's Government had to deal with them. The Sikh-Maratha treaty¹ of 1785 had no practical result, partly because the Sikhs were dissatisfied with certain conditions, and partly because they were encouraged by Anderson, British Resident with Sindhia, and Sir John Cumming, commanding the Company's troops in Oudh. "It was British policy to prevent the union of the Sikhs and the Marathas, without making any definite commitments".² This diplomatic game is accounted for by Cunningham in the following words: "This alliance was considered to clearly point at the kingdom of Oudh, which the English were bound to defend, and perhaps to affect the authority of Delhi, which they wished to see strong . . .".³

During the last years of his life Mahadji Sindhia took strong steps to prevent the almost regular raids of the Sikhs into the Ganges-Jumna Doab up to the very gates of Delhi. Grant Duff says, "The insecurity of his frontier, the Sikh predatory incursions, their claims to levy blackmail in the Doab—all these led Mahadji Sindhia to contemplate an expedition for the chastisement of the more refractory chiefs, when death frustrated his designs in 1794". It was a policy of "chastisement," not of conquest, which he pursued. Perhaps he found the Sikhs too strong; perhaps his real centre of interest lay elsewhere.

Under Daulat Rao Sindhia the charge of Delhi was held successively by De Boigne and Perron. They were, on the whole, able to keep the Sikh plunderers in check.⁴ A new factor was introduced into Maratha-Sikh relations by the rise of the famous English adventurer, George Thomas, who established an independent principality in the Hansi-Hissar region in or about 1797. His depredations threw the Sikhs into the arms of Perron. A joint Maratha-Sikh expedition compelled Thomas to abandon all his conquests. The victors quarrelled over the

1 See below, pp. 7-8.

2 N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, pp. 119, 133-136.

3 See below, p. 8.

4 See below, pp. 8-11.

spoils¹ but an entirely new situation soon arose out of the Second Anglo-Maratha War, which brought the Sikhs into direct contact with the East India Company.²

V. SIKH ORGANISATION.

"The Guruship came to acquire in Sikhism a meaning quite its own³ and the predominant personality of the Guru supplied a nucleus around which the Sikh *Panth* could gradually arise."⁴ Under the leadership of the Gurus the Sikhs evolved a sense of corporate unity which found expression through two peculiar institutions—*langar* and *sangat*.⁵ The *Masand* system⁶ served as a cohesive force and as a centralising factor. Centralisation and unity reached the climax in the days of Guru Arjan, who left the Sikhs a compact, well-knit and self-conscious community. That the Sikhs could play an effective and distinguished part in Indian history was due largely to their organisational strength which drew its moral inspiration from their religious fervour.

The importance attached to the Guruship did not, however, create a community depending on autocratic leadership. The ideal of brotherhood was an active principle from the very beginning; as a result, the Sikh community was governed by principles of equality and democracy.⁷ Even the Gurus, unconditional surrender to whom was one of the cardinal doctrines of Sikhism, respected the wishes of their disciples in all matters. "The individual Sikh was . . . exalted to a position almost equal to that of the Guru himself".⁸ Guru Ram Das said:

1 N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, pp. 128-129.

2 See below, pp. 11-16.

3 See I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 229-250.

4 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, p. 11.

5 See I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 158-169, 256-261.

6 See I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 195-196, 261, 265-266.

7 See I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 241-246.

8 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, p. 246.

"To those who obey the will of the Guru, I am ever a sacrifice ;
I am ever a sacrifice to those who have served the Guru."¹

Guru Hargobind almost identified the Guru with the disciple when he said :

"Deem the Sikh who comes to you with the Guru's name on his lips as your Guru".²

Bhai Gurdas said :

"Where there are two Sikhs there is a company of saints, where there are five Sikhs there is God."

"The Guru is the Sikh and the Sikh is the Guru".³

In the seventeenth century the unity of the Sikhs was disturbed by several factors, of which the growth of the dissentient sects⁴ and the degeneration of the *Masands*⁵ deserve special mention. Guru Gobind Singh boldly dealt with these problems and restored to the Sikh community such cohesion as it had not enjoyed since the days of Guru Arjan. The new ceremony of initiation (*pahul*) introduced by him emphasized the inherent democracy in Sikhism as also that tendency towards militarisation which had been gathering momentum since the days of Guru Hargobind. "The Guru's conception of the Khalsa was a fully democratic compact community, armed to the teeth, struggling to maintain what it conceived to be the right path and fighting incessantly and without compunction tyranny and injustice in all their forms".⁶

This crusade against tyranny and injustice was not to be fought under the leadership of a personal Guru. A military organisation demands unity of leadership. Instead of strengthening the Guruship, which provided that unity, Guru Gobind Singh abolished it altogether. "He invested the sect with the dignity of Gurudom",⁷ thereby apparently dissolving the great unifying principle which had held the Sikhs together for two centuries. Behind this seemingly strange measure there must

1 Macauliffe, Vol. II, p. 329.

2 Macauliffe, Vol. IV, p. 219.

3 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 246, 248.

4 See Macauliffe, Vol. I. Introduction.

5 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. II, pp. 56, 108-111.

6 I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. II, p. 119.

7 Macauliffe, Vol. V, p. 96.

have been some very convincing reasons; otherwise so shrewd and capable a leader like Guru Gobind Singh would not have set aside the most fundamental institution in Sikhism. Dr. Narang says, "He did not appoint any successor, not only because his own sons were all dead, but because he perhaps anticipated the abuses of the office if it fell into unworthy hands".¹ There is little doubt, however, that the Guruship was abolished in 1699, when the Guru's sons were alive. In the Keshgarh assembly the Guru received baptism from five worthy Sikhs. When they were astonished at his proposal he said, "The Khalsa is the Guru and the Guru is the Khalsa. There is no difference between you and me. As Guru Nanak seated Guru Angad on the throne, so have I made you also a Guru".² In the hour of his final defeat at Chamkaur he entrusted the Guruship to the five Sikhs who alone remained of his army. He said, "I shall ever be among five Sikhs".³ There is no reason to think that Guru Gobind Singh "anticipated the abuse of the office if it fell into unworthy hands." His sons were courageous, and courage was the primary quality required of a leader of the Khalsa. It seems that the abolition of the Guruship had a logical connection with the Guru's war against sectarianism within the Sikh community. The sects owed their origin to the ambition of the disappointed candidates for the *takht*. It was not enough to boycott the existing sects; the origin of new sects must be prevented. The abolition of the Guruship was the only remedy of a fell disease.

Teja Singh remarks, "If we read Sikh history aright, the Sikh community would appear, as an organized unit, to have undergone a course of discipline in the hands of ten Gurus, until its character was fully developed and the Guru merged his personality in the body of the nation thus reached."⁴ The writer assures for the Sikhs a course of uninterrupted and continuous development through a process of systematic and logical training, and overlooks the difficulty that this simplification of history is confronted by inconvenient facts almost at every step.

1 *Transformation of Sikhism*, p. 169.

2 Macauliffe, Vol. V, p. 96.

3 Macauliffe, Vol. V, p. 189.

4 *Sikhism*, p. 28. The author has elaborated his argument in *Growth of Responsibility in Sikhism*.

We must admit, however, that the abolition of the Guruship was not an unnatural and unforeseen development. The impersonal character of the Guruship and the mystic identification of the Guru with the Sikh, which were emphasized from the beginning of Sikh history, foreshadowed a peculiar development to which Guru Gobind Singh gave visible expression.

Banda was not a Guru, but his frantic career offers a good example of personal leadership. It was after his death that the Sikh community was really left to itself, without an adored leader to guide its desperate struggle against the Mughals and the Afghans. The War of Independence brought out the internal strength of the community. Sikh democracy was put to a severe test, and it was not found wanting. The community not only survived half a century of persecution and war; it created a State. "For the successful termination of the Sikh war of independence, we should give the credit to the entire nation, not to any individual. That would be against the spirit of the whole enterprise".¹

The exigencies of war turned democracy into what Cunningham calls "theocratic confederate feudalism".² It is hardly correct to apply to the *Misl* organisation the adjectives "theocratic" and "feudal". In explaining the word "theocratic" Cunningham says: "God was their helper and only judge, community of faith or object was their moving principle . . ." Every student of Political Science knows that such a system is not theocracy in the strict sense of the term. Again, Feudalism can hardly exist apart from Monarchy. The so-called Sikh feudal chiefs owed no obligations, military or fiscal, to any common superior. The *Misls* really formed a confederacy which was democratic in composition and religious in its cohesive principle. There were "masters as well as servants", as there must be in every State; but Cunningham emphasizes the basic principle of freedom when he says, "Every Sikh was free, and each was a substantive member of the Commonwealth".

Ranjit Singh transformed this Commonwealth into a Monarchy. The *Sarbat Khalsa* was not a body competent to govern

1 N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, p. 68.

2 See below, pp. 1—5. See also N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, pp. 141-145.

the Punjab; a loose military confederacy arising out of a desperate war could not become an instrument of civil government. The gradual withdrawal of Afghan pressure removed the greatest incentive to unity and offered free scope to the greed and jealousy of the fierce and illiterate chiefs who dominated the *Misls*.¹ Parochial in their outlook, they failed to realise the urgent need of continued unity in the face of potential dangers: prospects of Afghan aggression (as in the days of Zaman Shah); consolidation of Maratha power in the Delhi-Agra region; Britain's interest in Oudh. Fortunately for the Sikhs, neither the Afghans nor the Marathas nor the British challenged them effectively. The challenge came from within—from the enterprising and ruthless chief of the *Sukerchakia Misl*. Within a few years a consolidated military Monarchy arose out of the ruins of the confederacy which had made the Sikhs a political power for the first time in their history.

It is not incorrect to say that the Monarchy was absolute in practice but a continuation of the Commonwealth in theory. Ranjit Singh, we are told, "professedly regarded himself as nothing more than a mere drum of the commonwealth for the assertion of the political supremacy of the Khalsa".² Instead of openly assuming the royal title he used the word "*Sarkar*" to indicate the source of authority. The Government was called *Khalsaji* or *Sarkar Khalsa*. The *Akalis*³ as well as powerful jagirdars restrained him; behind them lay the vague authority of the common people, strengthened by undying traditions of popular sovereignty as also by the possession of arms. But Ranjit Singh was shrewd enough to monopolise effective power. Like Henry VII and Henry VIII of England he deliberately weakened the old nobility and created a new nobility grateful to and dependent on him. His reliance on the Jammu brothers, Fakir Azizuddin and competent officers like Muhkam Chand and Dewan Chand, as well as his big standing army organised by European officers indirectly humiliated the Sikh nobility. It was a system of checks and balances, and it worked only so long as there was a consummate and masterful diplomat at the top.

1 See below, pp. 3-5.

2 See N. K. Sinha, *Ranjit Singh*, pp. 134-137

3 See below, pp. 5-6.

This system inevitably broke down after Ranjit Singh's death. Nobles, favourites and adventurers began to scramble for power and property, and the unworthy occupants of the throne, unable to restrain the general rush for plunder, looked for support to the British Government.¹ The Sikh soldiers realised the gravity of the situation and an unerring instinct led them to the conclusion that the Khalsa alone—not the selfish nobility or the puppet Monarchy—could save the Sikh State. The old democratic tradition, submerged for about half a century under the spell of the great King's success, reasserted itself. The army, organised in *Panchayets*, assumed charge of affairs with the deliberate intention of protecting the inheritance of the Khalsa.² This significant change did not elude Cunningham's sympathetic observation. Speaking of the year 1841 he observes, "... the relation of the army to the State had become wholly altered; it was no longer the willing instrument of an arbitrary and genial Government, but it looked upon itself, and was regarded by others, as the representative body of the Sikh people, as the *Khalsa* itself assembled by tribes or centuries to take part in public affairs. The efficiency of the army as a disciplined force was not much impaired, for a higher feeling possessed the men, and increased alacrity and resolution supplied the place of exact training".³ Ordinary English writers totally failed to grasp the existence and significance of this "higher feeling"; but what Cunningham says about the conduct of the army during the initial years 1841-46 clearly shows that it was not a selfish, disorganised rabble.⁴ Indeed, the common people stood against the deliberate betrayal of the Sikh by its corrupt leaders, and if they failed to save it against a combined onslaught—the Sikh nobility allied with British Imperialism, their memory deserves a place of honour in the annals of Sikhism.

1 See below, pp. 64-65, 68-75, 80-84, 92-109.

2 Lord Hardinge refers to this change as a "democratic revolution". (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1846, p. 6.)

3 See below, p. 78.

4 See below, pp. 78-79, 94, 97-98, 102-105, 108, 117-119, 122-148.

VI. FALL OF THE SIKHS.

The suzerainty of the East India Company on the Sikh Kingdom was virtually established immediately after Ranjit Singh's death. Cunningham refers to 'Kharak Singh's own desire of resting upon the influence of the British Agent'.¹ Had Nao Nihal Singh's life been prolonged he might have tried to preserve the semblance of independence; but it is not unlikely that his suspicion of Dhian Singh would have thrown him into the arms of the British.² Sher Singh was virtually a British nominee,³ although he had his suspicions.⁴ When Major Broadfoot took the plainly hostile step of declaring "the Cis-Sutlej possessions of Lahore to be under British protection equally with Patiala and other chiefships",⁵ he was openly asserting British suzerainty over the Lahore State.

Treaties of Lahore

The causes of the First Anglo-Sikh War are described by Cunningham with an insight and judicial detachment which can hardly be improved upon.⁶ The result of the war was a foregone conclusion, for the patriotic bravery of the common soldier could not resist the military power of the British Government reinforced by the treachery of the acknowledged leaders of the Sikh State.⁷ The victorious Governor-General proceeded cautiously in dealing with the defeated Monarchy. Military considerations ruled out annexation. There were about 33,000 Sikh troops at Lahore, Amritsar and Peshawar, and the British army was quite insufficient for the purpose of completely subjugating the Punjab.⁸ The policy of Subsidiary Alliance, adopted by Lord Wellesley and extended by Lord Hastings, was no longer in favour. It was decided to impose on the Punjab a modified form of Subsidiary Alliance, which would preserve the Sikh Monarchy

1 See below, p. 64.

2 See below, pp. 64-71.

3 See below, pp. 64, 71-73, 75-77.

4 See below, pp. 90-91.

5 See below, p. 114.

6 See below, pp. 109-122.

7 Even Sir William Lee-Warner (*Life of Dalhousie*, Vol. I, p. 147) admits that the defeat of the Sikhs was due "mainly. . . to the treachery of . . . Lal and Tej Singh".

8 Gough and Innes, *The Sikhs and The Sikh Wars*, pp. 142-143.

without endangering the safety of the north-west frontier and threatening the East India Company's authority in the rest of India.

The treaties of March, 1846,¹ virtually destroyed the independence of the Sikh State. The Maharaja engaged "to disband the mutinous troops of the Lahore army, taking from them their arms". He agreed to limit "the regular army of the Lahore State" to "25 battalions of infantry, consisting of 800 bayonets each, with 12,000 cavalry: this number at no time to be exceeded without the concurrence of the British Government". No independent State would have accepted these crucial restrictions on its own sovereignty. Moreover, the Maharaja also surrendered to the British Government "the control of the rivers Beas and Sutlej, with the continuations of the latter river . . . to the confluence of the Indus at Mithankot, and the control of the Indus from Mithankot to the borders of Baluchistan, . . . in respect to tolls and ferries". The Articles relating to the passage of British troops through Sikh territory, the employment of "any British subject" or "the subject of any European or American State" by the Sikh Government and the arbitration of the British Government "in the event of any dispute or difference arising between the Lahore State and Raja Golas Singh" remind us of similar provisions in treaties of Subsidiary Alliance concluded by Lord Wellesley and Lord Hastings. Although the British Government engaged not to "exercise any interference in the internal administration of the Lahore State", yet the Governor-General promised to "give the aid of his advice and good offices for the furtherance of the interests of the Lahore Government". Such "aid" could hardly be distinguished from dictation. The Sikhs could no longer conquer territories from the Afghans, for it was agreed that "the limits of the Lahore territories shall not be, at any time, changed without the concurrence of the British Government".²

The task of disbanding "the mutinous troops of the Lahore army" was too difficult for Lal Singh and his pro-British support-

¹ See below, pp. 176-180, 184-188.

² See Articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 of the Treaty of March 9,

ers. So the Treaty of March 11, 1846, provided that a British force should remain stationed at Lahore "for the purpose of protecting the person of the Maharaja, and the inhabitants of the city of Lahore, during the reorganisation of the Sikh army". The preamble clearly says that this arrangement was made because "the Lahore Government has solicited the Governor-General to leave a British force at Lahore". The British troops were to be "placed in full possession of the fort and the city of Lahore" and the Lahore troops were to be "removed from within the city".¹ Thus the Government of Lal Singh and "all the traitorous chiefs" depended for its very existence on "foreign support". It was no longer a really Sikh Government drawing its inspiration and strength from the unqualified allegiance of the Sikh people.

Kashmir Rebellion

Lal Singh's friendship with the British Government could not survive the rebellion of the Governor of Kashmir, Sheikh Imamuddin,² who refused to surrender that province to Golab Singh, thus violating Article 4 of the Treaty of March 9, 1846. The British Government then called upon the Lahore Government "to coerce their subject, and to make over the province to the representative of the British Government, in fulfilment of the conditions of the treaty". Imamuddin defeated Gulab Singh's forces and killed his agent, Dewan Lakhpat Rai, before the orders of the Lahore *Durbar* could reach him. He strengthened himself "by an appeal to Mussulman hopes, and religious fanaticism".³ Several Muslim tribes in and around Kashmir rose in his favour. It was, however, an unequal contest. Under pressure from the British Government the Lahore *Durbar* sent troops under Sardar Uttar Singh Man, Sardar Tej Singh, Sardar Chattar Singh and Sardar Sher Singh to assist Golab Singh. The Governor-General also kept several regiments in readiness to march from Jalandhar to Jammu to protect Golab Singh's rear.⁴ It was estimated that the combined forces numbered

1 See Articles 1, 2 of the Treaty of March 11, 1846.

2 See "The Kashmir Rebellion and the Trial of Raja Lal Singh" by Dr. I. Banerjee, *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 1939.

3 The Governor-General to the Secret Committee: *Parliamentary Papers*, 1847, No. 4.

4 The Governor-General to the Secret Committee: *Parliamentary Papers*, 1847, No. 4.

about 80,000 men.¹ Unable to continue resistance against such a large body of troops, Sheikh Imamuddin surrendered himself to the Governor-General's Agent at Thunahi on November 1, 1846. On November 9 Gulab Singh entered the capital of Kashmir and the rule of the Dogra family began.²

Meanwhile the Sheikh's *vakil*, Puran Chand, had told Lieutenant Edwardes, a British officer serving as Assistant Political Agent, that his master had been "secretly instigated in his resistance to Maharaja Golab Singh in Kashmir by communications sent to him by the Wazir Lal Singh". It was also reported "that the Maharani had held a confidential conversation with Bhai Ram Singh, explaining to him her position and that of the Wazir, and attaching the greatest importance to the recovery of letters addressed to the Sheikh by the Wazir on the subject of Kashmir". These reports, "combined with the delays and evasions of the Wazir during the preceding five months", led the Governor-General to suspect "that the Wazir Lal Singh was implicated in the Sheikh's misconduct, secretly encouraging the Lahore Governor of Kashmir to resist the orders publicly sent to him by his Government, to withdraw from the province, delivering up the country to the Maharaja (*i. e.* Golab Singh), in pursuance of the Treaty".³

At the time of his surrender Sheikh Imamuddin had secured from the Governor-General's Agent a guarantee that if his opposition to Golab Singh had really been "instigated by the Lahore Minister, the *Durbar* should not be permitted to inflict upon him, either in his person or his property, any penalty on account of his conduct on this occasion". The Agent had "pledged his Government to a full and impartial investigation of the matter". The Governor-General constituted a Tribunal with Frederick Currie as President and Major-General Littler, Lt.-Col. Lawrence, John Lawrence and Lt.-Col. Goldie as members.

The enquiry opened on December 3, 1846. In support of his statement Sheikh Imamuddin produced three documents:

1 Lt.-Col. Lawrence's estimate: *Parliamentary Papers*, 1847, No. 6.

2 The Governor-General to the Secret Committee: *Parliamentary Papers*, 1847, No. 7.

3 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1847, No. 4.

a *parwana* bearing the seal of Maharaja Dalip Singh and the sign manual of Lal Singh; an *ekrarnama* or deed of promise signed by Lal Singh; a letter alleged to be written by Lal Singh to the Sheikh.¹ His case was also supported by the oral evidence of Ratanchand, the *Munshi* of the *Durbar*, who wrote the *parwana*, Puran Chand, who wrote the *ekrarnama*, and Dewan Hakim Rai, a special emissary sent by the Lahore *Durbar* to the Sheikh in Kashmir. The case against the Sheikh was submitted by Dewan Dinanath, who argued that the documents were forged and that the whole story was improbable in itself. The Court refused to accept his arguments, and relying mainly on the *parwana*, observed:

"Upon full deliberation and consideration of the evidence and statements . . . , we are unanimously of opinion that it is established and proved, that the Vizier, Raja Lal Singh, did encourage Sheikh Imamuddin to excite disturbance in Kashmir and to oppose the occupation of the province by Maharaja Gopal Singh; and that he did encourage the troops in the province to aid Sheikh Imamuddin in the late rebellion. We do not find it proved that the other members of the *Durbar* were participators with Raja Lal Singh in the above proceeding, or cognizant thereof".²

In defining the scope and implications of the enquiry the Governor-General had observed:

"If it be proved that the Vizier secretly encouraged the Sheikh to violate the Treaty which the Lahore *Durbar* was bound faithfully to carry into effect, the immediate consequence of this betrayal of duty to the Maharaja Dalip Singh, and of good faith to the British Government, will be the deposition of the Vizier The conviction of the Lahore Government in being implicated in gross and violent infraction of the Lahore Treaty might, if pushed to the extreme limit of our right, lead to very serious consequences; but it is not my intention to make the Lahore State responsible for the misconduct of one or more individuals, when there is every reason to believe that

¹ Proceedings of the Court of Enquiry : *Parliamentary Papers*, 1847.

² Proceedings of the Court of Enquiry : *Parliamentary Papers*, 1847.

the misconduct is to be attributed to personal hatred of the Maharaja Golab Singh, and not to any political combination to violate the Treaty with the British Government".¹

Lal Singh's guilt was, in the Governor-General's view, "fully established" by the unanimous verdict of the Tribunal; it was also established that his "criminality . . . was not participated in by the Sikh nation". So the Governor-General "consented to accept the deposition of Raja Lal Singh as an atonement for the attempt to infringe the Treaty". Lal Singh was not only deposed. He was to be placed in the custody of the British officer in charge at Ferozpur and then to be conveyed to such a place in the interior of Hindustan as the Governor-General might decide. If we accept the theory of Lal Singh's guilt, which *prima facie* evidence seems to support, we must assume that his "hatred of Golab Singh had practically blinded him and he perhaps hoped against hope"² that even with British assistance the Dogra Chief would not be able to establish himself as ruler of Kashmir.

British Protectorate

After the suppression of the Kashmir rebellion the chiefs of the Lahore State were offered their choice of two alternatives. Either they must manage their own affairs without British assistance or interference, or the entire civil and military administration of the Punjab must be left to the British Government during the minority of the Maharaja. They found themselves compelled by circumstances to choose the second alternative. So the second treaty of Lahore³ (also called treaty of Bhyrowal) established what was virtually a British Protectorate in the Punjab. The British Resident was vested with "full authority to direct and control all matters in every department of the State" (Article 2). There was to be a Council of Regency composed of eight prominent chiefs, which was to 'conduct' the administration of the country "in consultation with the British Resident, who shall have full authority to direct and control the duties of

1 Letter to Frederick Currie: *Parliamentary Papers*, 1847, No. 8.

2 *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 1939, p. 1325.

3 See below, pp. 184-188.

every department". The Governor-General was "at liberty to occupy with British soldiers any fort or military post in the Lahore territories" (Article 8). A British force was to remain at Lahore "for the protection of the Maharaja and the preservation of the peace of the country" (Article 7).

These explicit terms of the treaty leave no room for doubt that the Council of Regency could not claim any effective voice in the administration of the State. Lord Hardinge wrote to the Secret Committee on December 21, 1846: "These terms give the British Resident unlimited authority in all matters of internal administration, and external relations, during the Maharaja's minority".¹

So the British Resident, Henry Lawrence, was the virtual dictator of the Punjab. The position of the Council of Regency is thus explained in the Governor-General's letter to the Resident, dated July 8, 1847:

"It is politic that the Resident should carry the Native Council with him, the members of which are, however, entirely under his control and guidance; he can change them and appoint others, and in military affairs his power is as unlimited as in the civil administration; he can withdraw Sikh garrisons, replacing them by British troops, in any and every part of the Punjab".²

The Resident wrote to the Governor-General in August, 1847:

"On the whole, the Durbar (i.e., the Council of Regency) give me as much support as I can reasonably expect; there has been a quiet struggle for mastery, but as, though I am polite to all, I allow nothing that appears to me wrong to pass unnoticed, the members of the council are gradually falling into the proper train, and refer most questions to me, and, in words at least, allow, more fully even than I wish, that they are only executive officers,—to do as they are bid".³

1 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1847, p. 24.

2 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, p. 18.

3 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, p. 32

Banishment of Maharani Jindan

Within a few months of the consolidation of the Resident's authority Maharani Jindan was removed from Lahore to the Sheikhpura fort, 20 miles distant from the capital. There was a plot for the murder of the Resident and Tej Singh, whose treachery to the Sikh State and loyalty to the British Government were notorious. It was proved that the Maharani's Private Secretary, Buta Singh, was implicated in the plot, and it was suspected that she herself was "cognisant" of the design, if not its instigator". Henry Lawrence wanted to banish her from the Punjab, but the Council of Regency was "decidedly averse to incur what they considered the odium of participating in effecting the banishment of the Maharani".¹ A Proclamation dated August 20, 1847, announced her removal from the capital.

On the day following the issue of this Proclamation Henry Lawrence took leave and his brother, John Lawrence, acted for him until the arrival of the new Resident, Sir Frederick Currie. In May, 1848, the Maharani was banished from the Punjab and placed under surveillance at Benares. It was suspected that she was connected with intrigues and plots against the British Government. Such suspicions were probably not without justification, but her influence was obviously exaggerated by the new Resident.² Major Edwardes, who knew the Punjab of these critical days thoroughly well, wrote: "... Rani Jhunda, who had more wit and daring than any man of her nation, was weary of scattering 'ambiguous voices', and of writing incendiary epistles from Sheikhpura to quondam *mauvais sujets*. Her memory survived, for she was not a woman to be forgotten; but her influence had followed her power, and there was no longer a man found in the Punjab who would shoulder a musket at her bidding".³ Sir Frederick Currie apparently thought that her presence was a serious threat to British authority in the Punjab. He wrote on May 16, 1848:

1 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, pp. 35, 51.

2 Sir Frederick Currie "had no special knowledge of the Punjab, no special intimacy with the officers there, and no personal touch with the natives". (Gough and Innes, *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, p. 157).

3 *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, Vol. II. p. 412.

"Her summary banishment from the Punjab, and residence at Benares, under the surveillance of the Governor-General's Agent, subject to such custody as will prevent all intrigue and correspondence for the future, seems to me the best course which we could adopt".¹

The order for the Maharani's banishment was signed by only three members of the Council of Regency, one of them being her personal enemy Tej Singh, and by a brother of one of the Councillors. Obviously the Council refused to take responsibility for this drastic step. It is also significant that the order was issued "according to the advice of Sir Frederick Currie, Bart., and Fakir Nur-ud-din".² The Resident avoided a formal trial for two reasons. In the first place, although he was convinced that the Maharani was "deeply implicated" in "conspiracies for tampering with the sepoys, and making revolt and insurrection", he was doubtful whether "legal proof of the delinquency of the Maharani was available". Secondly, he was afraid that a formal trial of Ranjit Singh's widow "would be most unpopular and hurtful to the feelings of the people".³

The Maharani was not only banished; petty indignities were inflicted upon her, and her position was made as humiliating as possible.⁴ In a letter to Captain Abbott Dost Muhammad observed: "Such treatment is considered objectionable by all creeds, and both high and low prefer death".⁵ The reaction of the Sikh soldiers sent to suppress the Multan rebellion was thus described in the Resident's letter to the Governor-General, dated May 25, 1848:

"... the Khalsa soldiery, on hearing of the removal of the Maharani, were much disturbed; they said that she was the Mother of the Khalsa, and that, as she was gone, and the young Dalip Singh in our hands, they had no longer any one to fight for or uphold; that they had no inducement to oppose Mulraj: and if he came to attack them, would seize the Sardars and their officers, and go over to him".⁶

1 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, p. 168.

2 See Bell, *Annexation of the Punjab*, pp. 14-15.

3 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, p. 168.

4 See Bell, *Annexation of the Punjab*, pp. 16-18.

5 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, p. 512.

6 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, p. 179.

Bell's conclusion is justified: "The Rani's banishment was looked upon by all who were attached to Ranjit Singh's Kingdom, at once as a national insult, and as a preliminary step to the dethronement of her son, and the destruction of the state".¹

Second Anglo-Sikh War

In April, 1848, Dewan Mulraj, Governor of Multan, raised the standard of rebellion. Four years earlier he had succeeded his father, Dewan Sawan Mal, one of the leading chiefs of Ranjit Singh's days. Unable or unwilling to pay the money demanded from him by the Lahore *Durbar* under the direction of John Lawrence, he offered his resignation which was accepted. His successor-designate, Sardar Khan Singh Man, accompanied by two British officers, Mr. Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Watson, went to Multan. The fort was formally surrendered, but immediately afterwards the British officers were attacked and wounded. On the next day (April 20, 1848) fire was opened from the fort, the British officers were killed and Sardar Khan Singh made terms for himself.

Into the details of the military operations² which followed we need not enter. After two protracted sieges Multan surrendered on January 22, 1849. Later on Dewan Mulraj was tried at Lahore for complicity in the murder of Agnew and Anderson and found guilty. As there were extenuating circumstances he was not sentenced to death. He spent the remainder of his life in confinement.

Towards the beginning of the hostilities three columns of *Durbar* troops were despatched to Multan under command respectively of Jawahir Mal, Sher Singh and Imam-ud-din. "As far as can be judged, he (Sher Singh) himself at this time intended to remain loyal; but his men's sympathies were certainly on the other side, and the chances that they would desert on the first convenient opportunity were enormous".³ It is uncertain when he made up his mind to join the revolt; but on September 14, 1848, when the first siege of Multan was going on, he suddenly marched with his army to join Mulraj.

1 *Annexation of the Punjab*, p. 20.

2 See Gough and Innes, *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, pp. 159-186, 198-204.

3 Gough and Innes, *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, p. 176.

It has been argued that the rebellions of Mulraj and Sher Singh were "equally unpremeditated". Before the murderous attack on the British officers Mulraj had discharged almost all his regular troops, and at that time he had only five or six field guns.¹ He was "rich, in infirm health and without children, timid, unpopular with the army and people".² The man who led the attack on the British officers was a soldier, "brooding perchance", as Major Edwardes wrote, "over his long services and probable dismissal".³ Bell says : "The attack on the two British officers sent to relieve him of his post, was caused by a sudden impulse of discontent and fanaticism, in the results of which, after a vain attempt to quell it, Moolraj felt himself irretrievably compromised. With hope of scant mercy from the British Government, and certain of death from the mutinous soldiery, if he trusted to that mercy, he yielded to circumstances, and accepted the lot that fate flung before him".⁴ Even Lord Dalhousie admitted that "the first outbreak was unpremeditated, and, in a manner, accidental".⁵

Sher Singh's rebellion was probably the result of his father's troubles and suspicions. Sardar Chattar Singh was Nazim or Governor of the Hazara district. He was assisted by Captain James Abbott who concluded, soon after the outbreak of rebellion at Multan, that the old Sikh chief was "at the head of a conspiracy for the expulsion of the English from the Punjab, and was about to head a crusade against the British forces at Lahore".⁶ There was no evidence justifying this conclusion, and there was every reason why Chattar Singh should remain loyal to the British Government. "He is", we are told in official records, "now infirm and in ill health, and has obtained much wealth, and an honourable position in the present administration, while his daughter is the betrothed wife of the young Maharaja of Lahore".⁷ Captain Abbott's openly suspicious conduct and the Resident's refusal to fix a date for the celebra-

1 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, p. 133.

2 Bell, *Annexation of the Punjab*, p. 40.

3 *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, Vol. II, p. 51.

4 *Annexation of the Punjab*, p. 40.

5 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, p. 585.

6 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, p. 279.

7 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, p. 225.

tion of Dalip Singh's marriage with Chattar Singh's daughter created in the mind of that old chief a sinister impression about the aims of British policy in the Punjab. A Muslim rebellion against the Sikh State in the Hazara district, encouraged, if not organised, by Captain Abbott, goaded Chattar Singh into open rebellion.¹ Captain Nicholson rightly concluded that Chattar Singh's conduct was the result of "terror and anxiety".² In any case, Sher Singh, who was in constant communication with his father, joined Mulraj only when the old chief had committed himself irrevocably.

The rebellion of Chattar Singh and Sher Singh converted the isolated incident at Multan into a general war. On January 18, 1849, the British army won what Lord Dalhousie's biographer describes as "the doubtful victory of Chilianwala".³ The last decisive battle took place at Gujarat⁴ on February 21, 1849.

Annexation of the Punjab

Lord Dalhousie's biographer says: "There can be no doubt that when he first received intelligence of the Multan tragedy, any thought of annexation that may have crossed his mind was instantly dismissed". The Governor-General wrote to Sir John Hobhouse on May 3, 1848: "I have no intention to make this incident an excuse for picking a quarrel with the State. . . .". On August 15, 1848,—before Sher Singh's rebellion—he informed Hobhouse that "annexation of the Punjab is the most advantageous policy for us to pursue". Hobhouse gave a qualified and hypothetical consent to annexation, but he preferred "complete subjection without the name, if such a result can be secured". By March 24, 1849, Lord Dalhousie had made up his mind, for on that date he wrote to Hobhouse: "I have never felt, more especially since the Afghans came upon the stage,⁵ the tremor of a doubt, or seen reason to question for a moment the necessity of the policy which I submitted to you". To the

1 See Bell, *Annexation of the Punjab*, pp. 20-37.

2 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, p. 308.

3 See Lee-Warner, *Life of Dalhousie*, Vol. I, pp. 206-211. See also Gough and Innes, *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, pp. 215-234.

4 See Gough and Innes, *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, pp. 244-250.

5 See above, "Sikhs and Afghans".

coming of the Afghans he assigned particular importance, for he wrote to Hobhouse on June 15, 1849; "The Afghans had entered on the scene, and had converted the war, or sought to convert it, from a struggle between English and Sikhs, into a general conflict between the British power and the Mahomedan". Lord Dalhousie was also convinced that "complete subjection without the name was not possible". On April 7, 1849, the Government of India observed in a despatch: "Experience has shown us that a strong Hindu Government, capable of controlling its army, and governing its own subjects, cannot be formed in the Punjab. The materials for it do not exist".¹

Thus Lord Dalhousie's correspondence with the authorities in London gives us practically one reason for annexation: the protected Sikh Monarchy could not be expected to maintain order within and deal with the Afghan menace in the north-west. There is much to be said in favour of this view. Ranjit Singh's administrative organisation had evidently broken up. The second war had created widespread disorder.² The Maharaja was a minor. His natural guardian, Maharani Jindan, was an exile. There was hardly any Sikh Sardar on whose loyalty and ability the British Government could place reasonable reliance. Even after the bitter experience of defeat and exile Dost Muhammad was anxious to recover Peshawar. A weak buffer State is worse than useless. The time had obviously come for the British Government to take direct charge of the vulnerable frontier, so that in case of a renewed Russo-Afghan threat its military operations would not be hampered by the weakness and jealousy of a decadent Sikh Monarchy.

Even accepting the validity of these arguments it must be admitted that any other Governor-General would have hesitated many times before taking such a drastic step against the deliberate advice of a sober and experienced counsellor like Henry

1 See Lee-Warner, *Life of Dalhousie*, Vol. I, pp. 233-242.

2 Lord Dalhousie wrote on June 15, 1849: "The Governments were gone; there was no police; the Darbar officials were already disregarded even in districts bordering on our own. No revenue could have been collected, no order could have been preserved." (Lee-Warner, *Life of Dalhousie*, Vol. I, pp. 239-240).

Lawrence. In deciding upon annexation, we are told, "Lord Dalhousie acted directly on the principle—precisely the reverse of Lord Hardinge's—which avowedly guided his policy throughout his administration. In his own words, used on a subsequent occasion, it was his 'strong and deliberate opinion that in the execution of a wise and sound policy, the British Government is bound not to put aside or neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue as may from time to time present themselves'."¹ Whether the Second Anglo-Sikh War provided a 'rightful opportunity' for the annexation of the Punjab is a question to which different answers may be given. There are writers who think that "it was a breach of trust", for Dālp Singh's territory was annexed by his guardian—the British Government.² It is interesting, but unprofitable, to enquire into legal and ethical aspects of political questions, for human history has not yet arrived at a stage when political interests are subordinated to law or ethics.

1 Gough and Innes, *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, p. 262.

2 Bell, *Annexation of the Punjab*, pp. 8-9, 87.

CHAPTER I

ANGLO-SIKH RELATIONS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

I. THE SIKH MISLS

[After the failure of Ahmad Shah Abdali to consolidate his hold on the Punjab the Sikhs established their *de facto* sovereignty, struck coins probably for the first time in 1765¹ and formed themselves into *Misls* or confederacies.]

Every Sikh was free, and each was a substantive member of the Commonwealth; but their means, their abilities, and their opportunities were various and unequal, and it was soon found that all could not lead, and that there were even then masters as well as servants. Their system naturally resolved itself into a theocratic confederate feudalism, with all the confusion and uncertainty attendant upon a triple alliance of the kind in a society half barbarous. God was their helper and only judge, community of faith or object was their moving principle, and warlike array, the devotion to steel of Gobind², was their material instrument. Year by year the "Sarbat Khalsa",³ or whole Sikh people, met once at least⁴ at Amritsar,

*1 See N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, pp. 71-74.

Cunningham says, "The rupees struck were called 'Gobind Shahi,' and the use of the Emperor's name was rejected (Browne, *Tracts*, ii. 28), although existing coins show that it was afterwards occasionally inserted by petty chiefs. On most coins struck by Ranjit Singh is the inscription, '*Degh, wah Tegh, wah Fateh, wah Nasrat be dirang. Yaft az Nanak Guru Gobind Singh*,' that is, literally, 'Grace, power, and victory, victory without pause, Guru Gobind Singh obtained from Nanak.'

*2 Guru Gobind Singh said :

"All-steel, I am Thy slave.

Deeming me Thine own, preserve me"

Again :

"I bow with love and devotion to the Holy Sword.

Assist me that I may complete this work."

See Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Vol. V, pp. 286, 287, 311;
I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. II, Chapter IV.

*3 See N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, pp. 141-144.

*4 They usually met twice a year during the *Baisakhi* and the *Dewali*.

on the occasion of the festival of the mythological Rama, when the cessation of the periodical rains rendered military operations practicable. It was perhaps hoped that the performance of religious duties, and the awe inspired by so holy a place might cause selfishness to yield to a regard for the general welfare, and the assembly of chiefs was termed a *Gurumatta*, to denote that, in conformity with Gobind's injunction, they sought wisdom and unanimity of counsel from their teacher and the book of his word¹. The leaders who thus piously met, owned no subjection to one another, and they were imperfectly obeyed by the majority of their followers; but the obvious feudal or military notion of a chain of dependence was acknowledged as the law, and the federate chiefs partitioned their joint conquests equally among themselves, and divided their respective shares in the same manner among their own leaders of bands, while these again subdivided their portions among their own dependents, agreeably to the general custom of subinfeudation.² This positive or understood rule was not, however, always applicable to actual conditions, for the Sikhs were in part of their posses-

1 "Mat" means understanding, and "Matta" counsel or wisdom. Hence *Gurumatta* becomes, literally, "the advice of the Guru".

Malcolm (*Sketch*, p. 52) considers, and Browne (*Tracts*, ii. vii.) leaves it to be implied, that Gobind directed the assemblage of *Gurumatta*; but there is no authority for believing that he ordained any formal or particular institution, although, doubtless the general scope of his injunctions, and the peculiar political circumstances of the times, gave additional force to the practice of holding diets or conclaves—a practice common to mankind everywhere, and systematised in India from time immemorial. Compare Forster, *Travels*, i. 323 &c., for some observations on the transient Sikh government of the time. and on the more enduring characteristics of the people. See also Malcolm, *Sketch*, p. 120, for the ceremonial forms of a *Gurumatta*.

2 Compare Murray, *Runjeet Singh*, p. 33-37. From tracts of country which the Sikhs subdued but did not occupy, "*Rakhi*," literally, protection money, was regularly levied. The "*Rakhi*" varied in amount from perhaps a fifth to a half of the rental or government share of the produce. It corresponded with the Maratha "*chauth*," or fourth, and both terms meant "black mail", or, in a higher sense, tribute. Compare Browne, *India Tracts*, ii. viii, and Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 32. The subdivisions of property were sometimes so minute that two, or three, or ten Sikhs might become co-partners in the rental of one village, or in the house tax of one street of a town, while the fact that jurisdiction accompanied such right increased the confusion,

sions "earth-born", or many held lands in which the mere withdrawal of a central authority had left them wholly independent of control. In theory such men were neither the subjects nor the retainers of any feudal chief, and they could transfer their services to whom they pleased, or they could themselves become leaders, and acquire new lands for their own use in the name of the *Khalsa* or commonwealth. It would be idle to call an ever-changing state of alliance and dependence by the name of a constitution, and we must look for the existence of the faint outline of a system, among the emancipated Sikhs, rather in the dictates of our common nature, than in the enactments of assemblies, or in the injunctions of their religious guides. It was soon apparent that the strong were ever ready to make themselves obeyed, and ever anxious to appropriate all within their power, and that unity of creed or of race nowhere deters men from preying upon one another. A full persuasion of God's grace was nevertheless present to the mind of a Sikh, and every member of that faith continues to defer to the mystic *Khalsa*; but it requires the touch of genius, or the operation of peculiar circumstances, to give direction and complete effect to the enthusiastic belief of a multitude.

The confederacies into which the Sikhs resolved themselves have been usually recorded as twelve in number,¹ and the term used to denote such a union was the Arabic word *Misl*, alike or equal.² Each *Misl* obeyed or followed a "Sardar", that is, simply, a chief or leader; but so general a title was applicable to the head of a small band as to the commander of a large host of the free and equal "Singhs" of the system. The confe-

*1 For the history of the *Misls*, see N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, pp. 75-81.

2 Notwithstanding this usual derivation of the term, it may be remembered that the Arabic term "*Muslehut*" (spelt with another 's' than that in *misl*), means armed men and warlike people. "*Misl*," moreover, means, in India, a file of papers, or indeed any thing serried or placed in ranks.

Captain Murray (*Runjeet Singh*, p. 29 &c.) seems to have been the first who perceived and pointed out the Sikh system of "*Misls*". Neither the organization nor the term is mentioned specifically by Forster, or Browne, or Malcolm, and at first Sir David Ochterloney considered and acted as if "*misl*" meant tribe or race, instead of party or confederacy. (Sir D. Ochterloney to the Government of India, 30th December, 1809).

deracies did not all exist in their full strength at the same time, but one "*Misl*" gave birth to another; for the federative principle necessarily pervaded the union, and an aspiring chief could separate himself from his immediate party, to form, perhaps, a greater one of his own. The *Misls* were again distinguished by titles derived from the name, the village, the district, or the progenitor of the first or most eminent chief, or from some peculiarity of custom or of leadership. Thus, of the twelve,—1. the *Bhangis* were so called from the real or fancied fondness of its members for the use of an intoxicating drug¹; 2. the *Nishanwalas* followed the standard bearers of the united army; 3. the *Shahids*² and *Nihangs* were headed by the descendants of honoured martyrs and zealots; 4. the *Ramgarhias* took their name from the Ram Rouni, or Fortalice of God, at Amritsar, enlarged into Ramgarh, or Fort of the Lord, by Jassa the Carpenter; 5. the *Nakkais* arose in a tract of country to the south of Lahore so called; 6. the *Ahluwalias* derived their title from the village in which Jassa, who first proclaimed the existence of the army of the new theocracy, had helped his father to distil spirits; 7. the *Kankeyas*; 8. the *Fyzullapurias* or *Singhpurias*; 9. the *Sukerchakias*, and 10. perhaps, the *Dallwalas*, were similarly so denominated from the villages of their chiefs; 11. the *Karora Singhias* took the name of their third leader, but they were sometimes called *Punjarhias*, from the village of their first chief; and 12. the *Phulkias*³ went back to the common ancestor of Ala Singh and other Sardars of his family.

Of the *Misls*, all save that of *Phulkia* arose in the Punjab or to the north of the Sutlej, and they were termed *Manjha* Singhs, from the name of the country around Lahore, and in

1 *Bhang* is a product of the hemp plant, and it is to the Sikhs what opium is to Rajputs.

2 Cunningham says, "The *Nishanwalas* and *Shahids* scarcely formed *Misls* in the conventional meaning of the term, but complementary bodies set apart and honoured by all for particular reasons." Again: "Perhaps Captain Murray is scarcely warranted in making the *Nishanwalas* and *Shahids* regular *Misls*. Other bodies, especially to the westward of the Jhelam, might, with equal reason, have been held to represent separate confederacies. Captain Murray, indeed, in such matters of detail, merely express the local opinions of the neighbourhood of the Sutlej."

*3 The chiefs of Patiala, Nabha, Jhind and Kythal. For their history, see Lepel Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*.

contradistinction to the *Malwa* Singhs, so called from the general appellation of the districts lying between Sirhind and Sirsa.

The number of horsemen which the Sikhs could muster have been variously estimated from seventy thousand to four times that amount, and the relative strength of each confederacy is equally a subject of doubt.¹ All that is certain is the great superiority of the *Bhangis*, and the low position of the *Nakkais* and *Sukerchakias*. The first could perhaps assemble 20,000 men in its widely scattered possessions, and the last about a tenth of that number; and the most moderate estimate of the total force of the nation may likewise be assumed to be the truest. All the Sikhs were horsemen, and among a half barbarous people dwelling on plains, or in action with undisciplined forces, cavalry must ever be the most formidable arm. The Sikhs speedily became famous for the effective use of the matchlock when mounted, and this skill is said to have descended to them from their ancestors, in whose hands the bow was a fatal weapon. Infantry were almost solely used to garrison forts, or a man followed a *Misl* on foot, until plunder gave him a horse or the means of buying one. Cannon was not used by the early Sikhs, and its introduction was very gradual, for its possession implies wealth, or an organization both civil and military.²

Besides the regular confederacies, with their moderate degree of subordination, there was a body of men who threw off all subjection to earthly governors, and who peculiarly represented the religious element of Sikhism. These were the *Akalis*, the immortals, or rather the soldiers of God, who, with their blue dress and bracelets of steel, claimed for themselves a direct institution by Gobind Singh. The Guru had called upon

1 Forster in 1783 (*Travels*, i. 333) said the Sikh forces were estimated at 300,000, but might be taken at 200,000. Browne (*Tracts, Illustrative Map*) about the same period enumerates 73,000 horsemen, and 25,000 foot. Twenty years afterwards Colonel Francklin said, in one work (*Life of Shah Alum*, note, p. 75.), that the Sikhs mustered 248,000 cavalry, and in another book (*Life of George Thomas*, note, p. 68), that they could not lead into action more than 64,000. George Thomas himself estimated their strength at 60,000 horse, and 5,000 foot. (*Life*, by Francklin, p. 274.)

2 George Thomas, giving the supposed status of 1800 A.D., says the Sikhs had 40 pieces of field artillery. (*Life* by Francklin, p. 274.)

men to sacrifice everything for their faith, to leave their homes and to follow the profession of arms; but he and all his predecessors had likewise denounced the inert asceticism of the Hindu sects,¹ and thus the fanatical feeling of a Sikh took a destructive turn. The *Akalis* formed themselves in their struggle to reconcile warlike activity with the relinquishment of the world. The meek and humble were satisfied with the assiduous performance of menial offices in temples, but the fierce enthusiasm of others prompted them to act from time to time as the armed guardians of Amritsar, or suddenly to go where blind impulse might lead them, and to win their daily bread, even single-handed, at the point of the sword². They also took upon themselves something of the authority of censors, and, although no leader appears to have fallen by their hands for defection to the *Khalsa*, they inspired awe as well as respect, and would sometimes plunder those who had offended them or had injured the commonwealth. The passions of the *Akalis* had full play until Ranjit Singh became supreme, and it cost that able and resolute chief much time and trouble, at once to suppress them, and to preserve his own reputation with the people.

*1 Sikhism was a religion of householders and there was no place in it for asceticism. See I. Bancejee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol. I, pp. 160-162.

2 Compare Malcolm (*Sketch*, p. 115), who repeats, and apparently acquiesces in, the opinion, that the *Akalis* were instituted as an order by Guru Gobind. There is not, however, any writing of Gobind's on record, which shows that he wished the Sikh faith to be represented by mere zealots, and it seems clear that the class of men arose as stated in the text.

So strong is the feeling that a Sikh should work, or have an occupation, that one who abandons the world, and is not of a warlike turn, will still employ himself in some way for the benefit of the community. Thus the author once found an *Akali* repairing, or rather making, a road, among precipitous ravines, from the plain of the Sutlej to the petty town of Kiratpur. He avoided intercourse with the world generally. He was highly esteemed by the people, who left food and clothing at particular places for him, and his earnest persevering character had made an evident impression on a Hindu shepherd boy, who had adopted part of the *Akali* dress, and spoke with awe of the devotee.

II. THE SIKHS AND THE MARATHAS

[In 1784 the famous French general Bussy wrote: "The Sikhs are masters of the country which lies between Delhi and the empire of Persia. They have formed a kind of republic. . ."¹ Unfortunately they had no unity, and their 'republic' had no effective central authority. The *Misls* exhausted themselves in petty wars with one another.² The *Bhangis*, the *Kanheyas* and the *Sukerchukias* came into prominence, and ultimately Ranjit Singh, the *Sukerchakia* chief, established a military Monarchy.

Meanwhile the Afghans steadily lost their hold on the Punjab. Timur Shah, Ahmad Shah Abdali's son and successor, wrested Multan from the hands of the *Bhangis* in 1780, but he made no serious attempt to reconquer the Punjab. After his death in 1793 his son and successor, Zaman Shah, made several attempts to repeat the exploits of his grandfather, but his raids had no permanent effect on the fortunes of the Sikhs. He left Lahore on January 4, 1796; Ranjit Singh occupied that city on July 6, 1799.³

The gradual withdrawal of the Afghans left the Sikhs face to face with the Marathas. After the shattering defeat of 1761⁴ they succeeded in recovering their political influence in North India during the brief reign of Peshwa Madhav Rao I.⁵ His premature death in 1772 was followed by civil war and the First Anglo-Maratha War. Then Mahadji Sindhia established his ascendancy in the court of Delhi⁶ and concluded a treaty with the Sikhs in 1785 in the name of the *roi faincant*, Emperor Shah Alam II. The plundering raids of the Cis-Sutlej Sikhs compelled him to send expeditions against them.⁷

The abilities of Mahadji Sindhia restored the power of the Marathas in Northern India, and the discipline of his regular brigades seemed to place his administration on a firm and lasting basis. He mastered Agra in 1785, and was made deputy viceregent of the Empire by the titular Emperor, Shah Alam. He entered at the same time into an engagement with confederate Sikh chiefs, to the effect that of all their joint conquests on either side of the Jumna, he should have two-thirds and the

*1 Quoted in N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, p. 83.

*2 See Latif, *History of the Panjab*, pp. 296-345.

*3 See N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, pp. 85-99; Ranjit Singh, pp. 10-12.

*4 See Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 235-372.

*5 See A. C. Bancrjee, *Peshwa Madhav Rao I*, pp. 131-184.

*6 See Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, pp. 287-325, 393-470.

*7 See N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, pp. 117-124.

"Khalsa" the remainder.¹ This alliance was considered to clearly point at the kingdom of Oudh, which the English were bound to defend, and perhaps to affect the authority of Delhi, which they wished to see strong; but the schemes of the Maratha were for a time interrupted by the Rohilla, Ghulam Qadir. This chief succeeded his father Zabita Khan in 1785, and had contrived, by an adventurous step, to become the master of the Emperor's person little more than a year afterwards. He was led on from one excess to another, till at last, in 1788, he put out the eyes of his unfortunate sovereign, plundered the palace in search of imaginary treasures, and declared an unheeded youth to be the successor of Akbar and Aurangzeb. These proceedings facilitated Sindhia's views, nor was his supremacy unwelcome in Delhi after the atrocities of Ghulam Qadir and the savage Afghans. His regular administration soon curbed the predatory Sikhs, and instead of allies they found that they would merely be tolerated as dependants or as servants. Rai Singh, the patriarchal chief of Jugadhri, was retained for the time as farmer of considerable districts in the Doab, and, during ten years, three expeditions of exaction were directed against Patiala and other States in the province of Sirhind. Patiala was managed with some degree of prudence by Nannu Mal,² the Hindu Dewan of the deceased Amar Singh, but he seems to have trusted for military support to Baghel Singh, the leader of the *Karora Singhs*, who contrived to maintain a large body of horse, partly as a judicious mediator, and partly by helping Patiala in levying contributions on weaker brethren, in aid of the Mughal and Maratha demands, which could neither be readily met nor prudently resisted.³

General Perron succeeded his countryman De Boigne, in the command of Daulat Rao Sindhia's⁴ largest regular forces, in the year 1797, and he was soon after appointed the Maharaja's deputy in Northern India. His ambition surpassed his powers; but his plans were nevertheless systematic, and he might have temporarily extended his own, or the Maratha, authority to

1 Browne, *India Tracts*, ii, 29.

* For the terms of the treaty, see N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, pp. 118-119.

² See Lepel Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp. 55-74.

³ Manuscript accounts. Compare Francklin's *Shah Alum*, p. 179-185.

⁴ Successor of Mahadji Sindhia.

Lahore, had not Sindhia's influence been endangered by Holkar, and had not Perron's own purposes been crossed by the hostility and success of the adventurer George Thomas. This Englishman was bred to the sea, but an eccentricity of character, or a restless love of change, caused him to desert from a vessel of war at Madras in 1781-82, and to take military service with the petty chiefs of that presidency. He wandered to the north of India, and in 1787 he was employed by the well-known Begam Samru, and soon rose high in favour with that lady. In six years he became dissatisfied, and entered the service of Apa Khande Rao, one of Sindhia's principal officers, and under whom De Boigne had formed his first regiments. While in the Maratha employ, Thomas defeated a party of Sikhs at Karnal, and he performed various other services; but seeing the distracted state of the country, he formed the not impracticable scheme of establishing a separate authority of his own. He repaired the crumbling walls of the once important Hansi, he assembled soldiers about him, cast guns and deliberately proceeded to acquire territory. Perron was apprehensive of his power—the more so, perhaps, as Thomas was encouraged by Holkar, and supported by Lukwa Dada and other Marathas, who entertained a great jealousy of the French commandant.¹

In 1799, Thomas invested the town of Jhind, belonging to Bhag Singh, of the *Phulkia* confederacy. The old chief, Baghel Singh *Karora Singhia*, and the Amazonian sister² of the imbecile Raja of Patiala, relieved the place, but they were repulsed when they attacked Thomas on his retreat to Hansi. In 1800 Thomas took Fathabad, which had been deserted during the famine of 1783, and subsequently occupied by the predatory Bhattis of Haryana, then rising into local repute, notwithstanding the efforts of the Patiala chief, who, however, affected to consider them as his subjects, and gave them some aid against Thomas. Patiala was the next object of Thomas's ambition, and he was encouraged by the temporary secession of the sister of the chief;

¹ Francklin's *Life of George Thomas*, p. 1, 79, 107 &c., and Major Smith's *Sketch of Regular Corps in the Service of Indian Princes*, p. 118 &c.

² Bibi Rajindar. For her career and character, see Lepel Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp. 47, 58, 66, 71.

but the aged Tara Singh of the *Dallewalia* confederacy interfered, and Thomas had to act with caution. He obtained, nevertheless, a partial success over Tara Singh, he received the submission of the Pathans of Maler Kotla, and he was welcomed as a deliverer by the converted Mahomedans of Raikot, who had held Ludhiana for some time, and all of whom were equally jealous of the Sikhs. At this time Sahib Singh, a Bedi of the race of Nanak, pretended to religious inspiration, and, having collected a large force, he invested Ludhiana, took the town of Maler Kotla, and called on the English adventurer to obey him as the true representative of the Sikh prophet. But Sahib Singh could not long impose even on his countrymen, and he had to retire across the Sutlej. Thomas's situation was not greatly improved by the absence of the Bedi, for the combination against him was general, and he retired from the neighbourhood of Ludhiana towards his stronghold of Hansi. He again took the field, and attacked Sufidon, an old town belonging to the chief of Jhind. He was repulsed, but the place not appearing tenable, it was evacuated, and he obtained possession of it. At this time he is said to have had ten battalions and sixty guns, and to have possessed a territory yielding about 450,000 rupees, two-thirds of which he held by right of seizure, and one-third as a Maratha feudatory; but he had rejected all Perron's overtures with suspicion, and Perron was resolved to crush him. Thomas was thus forced to come to terms with the Sikhs, and he wished it to appear that he had engaged them on his side against Perron; but they were really desirous of getting rid of one who plainly designed their ruin, or at least their subjection, and the alacrity of Patiala in the Maratha service induced a promise, on the part of the French commander, of the restitution of the conquests of Amar Singh in Hariana. After twice beating back Perron's troops at points sixty miles distant, Thomas was compelled to surrender in the beginning of 1802, and he retired into the British provinces, where he died in the course of the same year.¹

¹ See generally Francklin's *Life of Thomas*, and p. 21 &c., of Major Smith's *Sketch of Regular Corps in Indian States*. The Sikh accounts attribute many exploits to the sister of the Raja of Patiala, and among them an expedition into the hill territory of Nahan, the state from which Patiala wrested the vale of Pinjor, with its hanging gardens, not, however, without the aid of Bourquin, the deputy of Perron.

Perron had thus far succeeded. His lieutenant, by name Bourquin, made a progress through the Cis-Sutlej states to levy contributions, and the commander himself dreamt of a dominion reaching to the Afghan hills, and of becoming as independent of Sindhia as that chief was of the Peshwa.¹ He formed an engagement with Ranjit Singh for a joint expedition to the Indus, and for a partition of the country south of Lahore;² but Holkar had given a rude shock to Sindhia's power, and Perron had long evaded a compliance with the Maharaja's urgent calls for troops to aid him where support was most essential. Sindhia became involved with the English, and the interested hesitation of Perron was punished by his supercession. He was not able, or he did not try, to recover his authority by vigorous military operations; he knew he had committed himself, and he effected his escape from the suspicious Marathas to the safety and repose of the British territories, which were then about to be extended by the victories of Delhi and Laswari, of Assaye and Argaum.³

III. THE SIKHS AND THE SECOND ANGLO-MARATHA WAR

[The Second Anglo-Maratha War brought the Sikhs into direct contact with the East India Company. Although some of them fought at first on the Maratha side, most of the Cis-Sutlej chiefs were wise enough to worship the rising sun, and Ranjit Singh shrewdly kept himself aloof from all entanglements. Lord Lake's policy of conciliating the Sikhs was not implemented because the reaction against Lord Wellesley's aggressive policy was then in full swing. But the British masters of Delhi could not remain altogether indifferent to the Sikh rulers of the Punjab. The treaty of 1809 regularised the position arising out of the collapse of Sindhia's authority in the Delhi-Agra region.]

In the beginning of the eighteenth century, the agents of the infant Company of English merchants were vexatiously detained at the imperial capital by the insurrection of the Sikhs under Banda, and the discreet "factors", who were petitioning

1 Malcolm (*Sketch*, p. 106) considers that Perron could easily have reduced the Sikhs, and mastered the Punjab.

2 This alliance is given on the authority of a representation made to the Resident at Delhi, agreeably to his letter to Sir David Ochterloney of 5th July, 1814.

3 Compare Major Smith's *Account of Regular Corps in Indian States*, p. 31 &c.

for some trading privileges, perhaps witnessed the heroic death of the national *Singhs*, the soldiers of the "*Khalsa*", without comprehending the spirit evoked by the genius of Gobind, and without dreaming of the broad fabric of empire about to be reared on their own patient labours.¹ Forty years afterwards, the merchant Omichand played a conspicuous part in the revolution which was crowned by the battle of Plassey; but the sectarian Sikh, the worldly votary of Nanak, who used religion as a garb of outward decorum, was outwitted by the audacious falsehood of Clive; he quailed before the stern scorn of the English conqueror, and he perished the victim of his own base avarice.² In 1744 the progress of the genuine Sikhs attracted the notice of Hastings, and he seems to have thought that the presence of a British agent at the court of Delhi might help to deter them from molesting the Wazir of Oudh.³ But the Sikhs had learnt to dread others as well as to be a cause of fear, and shortly afterwards they asked the British Resident to enter into a defensive alliance against the Marathas, and to accept the services of thirty thousand horsemen, who had posted themselves near Delhi to watch the motions of Sindhia.⁴ The English had then a slight knowledge of a new and distant people, and an estimate, two generations old, may provoke a smile from the protectors of Lahore. "The Sikhs", says Colonel Francklin, "are in their persons tall, . . . their aspect is ferocious, and their eyes piercing; . . . they resemble the Arabs of the Eu-

1 In the *Granth* of Guru Gobind there are at least four allusions to Europeans, the last referring specially to an Englishman. 1st, in the *Alal Stut*, Europeans are enumerated among the tribes inhabiting India; 2nd and 3rd, in the *Kalgi* chapters of the 24 *Avatars*, apparently in praise of the systematic modes of Europeans; and 4th, in the Persian *Hikayats*, where both a European and an Englishman appear as champions for the hand of a royal damsel, to be vanquished, of course, by the hero of the tale.

2 That Omichand was a Sikh, is given on the authority of Forster, *Travels*, i. 337. That he died of a broken heart, is doubted by Professor Wilson. (Mill, *India*, iii. 192, note, edition 1840.)

3 Browne, *India Tracts*, ii. 29, 30, and Francklin's *Shah Alum*, p. 115, 116.

4 Auber's *Rise and Progress of the British Power in India*, ii. 26, 27. The chief who made the overtures was Dultcha Singh of Rudowr on the Jumna who afterwards entered Sindhia's service. Compare Francklin's *Shah Alum*, p. 78, note.

phrates, but they speak the language of the Afghans; their collected army amounts to 250,000 men, a terrific force, yet from want of union not much to be dreaded."¹ The judicious and observing Forster put some confidence in similar statements of their vast array, but he estimated more surely than any other early writer, the real character of the Sikhs, and the remark of 1783, that an able chief would probably attain to absolute power on the ruins of the rude commonwealth, and become the terror of his neighbours, was amply borne out by the career of Ranjit Singh.²

The battle of Delhi was fought³ on the 11th September, 1803, and five thousand Sikhs swelled an army which the speedy capture of Aligarh had taken by surprise.⁴ The Marathas were overthrown, and the Sikhs dispersed, but the latter soon afterwards tendered their allegiance to the British commander. Among the more important chiefs whose alliance, or whose occasional services were accepted, were Bhai Lal Singh of Kythai, who had witnessed the success of Lord Lake, Bhag Singh, the patriarchal chief of Jhind, and, after a time, Bhanga Singh, the savage master of Thanesar.⁵ The victory of Las-

1 Francklin's *Shah Atum*, p. 75, 77, 78.

2 Forster's *Travels*, ii. 340. See also p. 324, where he says the Sikhs had raised in the Punjab a solid structure of religion.

* Forster wrote: "... we may see some ambitious chief led on by his genius and success, and, absorbing the power of his associates, display from the ruins of their commonwealth, the standard of monarchy". Warren Hastings wrote in 1787: "A constitution so framed, may subsist unchanged for a length of time, while it has no powerful neighbours to invade it and while it remains confined within the limits of its native territory. But when it aims at permanent conquest and carries the principles of its own construction into new establishments, it becomes liable to almost certain variation from whatever rules they adopt for the distribution of territory or the appropriation of revenue, because both must introduce a new species of property and add to the individual power which becomes possessed of it. In such a change of polity, should it so happen that one man of superior capacity and enterprise should acquire but a few degrees of power beyond his nearest competitors, it will be easy to trace in the primitive defects of such a government the gradual and easy means by which the whole might be enveloped within his own supremacy".

*3 By the British Commander-in-Chief, General Lake.

4 Major Smith's *Account of Regular Corps in Indian States*, p. 34.

5 *Manuscript Memoranda of Personal Enquiries*.

*See Lepel Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp. 59, 90, 320-321.

wari was fought within two months,¹ and the Maratha power seemed to be annihilated in Northern India. The old blind Emperor Shah Alam was again flattered with the semblance of kingly power, his pride was soothed by the demeanour of the conqueror, and, as the Mughal name was still imposing, the feelings of the free but loyal soldier were doubtless gratified by the bestowal of a title which declared an English nobleman to be "the sword of the state" of the great Tamerlane.²

The enterprising Jaswant Rao Holkar had by this time determined on the invasion of Upper India and the retreat of Colonel Monson buoyed him up with hopes of victory and dominion. Delhi was invested, and the Doab was filled with troops; but the successful defence of the capital by Sir David Ochterloney, and the reverse of Dig, drove the great marauder back into Rajputana. During these operations a British detachment under Colonel Burn was hard pressed at Shamli, near Saharanpur, and the opportune assistance of Lal Singh of Kythai and Bhag Singh of Jhind contributed to its ultimate relief.³ The same Sikh chiefs deserved and received the thanks of Lord Lake for attacking and killing one Eka Rao, a Maratha commander who had taken up a position between Delhi and Panipat; but others were disposed to adhere to their sometime allies, and Sher Singh of Buria fell in action with Colonel Burn and the conduct of Gurdit Singh of Ladwa induced the British General to deprive him of his villages in the Doab, and of the town of Karnal.⁴

In 1805, Holkar and Amir Khan again moved northward, and proclaimed that they would be joined by the Sikhs, and even by the Afghans; but the rapid movements of Lord Lake converted their advance into a retreat or a flight. They delayed some time at Patiala, and they did not fail to make a pecuniary profit out of the differences then existing between the imbecile

*1 November 1, 1803.

2 Mill's *History of British India*, Wilson's edition, vi. 510.

3 Manuscript memoranda. Both this aid in 1804, and the opposition of the Sikhs at Delhi, in 1803, seem to have escaped the notice of English observers, or to have been thought undeserving of record by English historians. (Mill's *History*, vi. 503, 592, edition 1840.)

4 Manuscript memoranda of written documents and of personal inquiries.

Raja and his wife¹; but when the English army reached the neighbourhood of Karnal, Holkar continued his retreat towards the north, levying contributions where he could, but without being joined by any of the Sikh chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej states. In the Punjab itself, he is represented to have induced some to adopt his cause, but Ranjit Singh long kept aloof, and when at last he met Holkar at Amritsar, the astute young chief wanted aid in reducing Kasur before he would give the Maharathas any assistance against the English.² Amir Khan would wish it to be believed, that *he* was unwilling to be a party to an attack upon good Mahomedans, and it is certain that the perplexed Jaswant Rao talked of hurrying on to Peshawar; but Lord Lake was in force on the banks of the Bias, the political demands of the British commander were moderate, and on the 24th December, 1805, an arrangement was come to, which allowed Holkar to return quietly to Central India.³

Lord Lake was joined on his advance by the two chiefs, Lal Singh and Bhag Singh, whose services have already been mentioned, and at Patiala he was welcomed by the weak and inoffensive Sahib Singh, who presented the keys of his citadel, and expatiated on his devotion to the British Government. Bhag Singh was the maternal uncle of Ranjit Singh, and his services were not unimportant in determining that calculating leader to avoid an encounter with disciplined battalions and a trained artillery. Ranjit Singh is believed to have visited the British camp in disguise, that he might himself witness the military array of a leader who had successively vanquished both Sindhia and Holkar,⁴ and he was, moreover, too acute to see any permanent advantage in linking his fortunes with those of men reduced to the condition of fugitives. Fateh Singh Ahluwalia, the grand nephew of Jassa Singh Kallal, and the chosen companion of the future Maharaja, was the medium of intercourse, and an arrangement was soon entered into, with "Sardars"

1 Amir Khan, in his *Memoirs* (p. 276.), says characteristically, that Holkar remarked to him, on observing the silly differences between the Raja and the Rani, "God has assuredly sent us these two pigeons to pluck; do you espouse the cause of the one, while I take up with the other."

*2 See N. K. Sinha, *Ranjit Singh*, p. 18.

3 Compare Amir Khan's *Memoirs*, p. 275, and Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 57. &c.

4. See Moorecroft, *Travels*, i. 162.

Ranjit Singh and Fateh Singh jointly, which provided that Holkar should be compelled to retire from Amritsar, and that so long as the two chiefs conducted themselves as friends, the English Government would never form any plans for the seizure of their territories.¹ Lord Lake entered into a friendly correspondence with Sansar Chand, of Katoch, who was imitating Ranjit Singh by bringing the petty hill chiefs under subjection; but no engagement was entered into, and the British commander returned to the provinces by the road of Ambala and Karnal.²

The connection of Lord Lake with many of the Sikh chiefs of Sirhind had been intimate, and the services of some had been opportune and valuable. Immediately after the battle of Delhi, Bhag Singh of Jhind was upheld in a jagir which he possessed near that city, and in 1804 another estate was conferred jointly on him and his friend Lal Singh of Kythal. In 1806, these leaders were further rewarded with life grants, yielding about 11,000*l.* a year, and Lord Lake was understood to be willing to have given them the districts of Hansi and Hissar on the same terms; but these almost desert tracts were objected to as unprofitable. Other petty chiefs received rewards corresponding with their services, and all were assured that they should continue to enjoy the territorial possessions which they held at the time of British interference, without being liable to the payment of tribute. These declarations or arrangements were made when the policy of Lord Wellesley was suffering under condemnation; the reign of the English was to be limited by the Jumna, a formal treaty with Jaipur was abrogated, the relations of the Indian Government with Bharatpur were left doubtful and, although nothing was made known to the Sikh chiefs of Sirhind, their connection with the English came virtually to an end, so far as regarded the reciprocal benefits of alliance.³

1 See the treaty itself, Appendix A.

2 The public records show that a newswriter was maintained for some time in Katoch, and the correspondence about Sansar Chand leaves the impression that Ranjit Singh could never wholly forget the Raja's original superiority, nor the English divest themselves of a feeling that he was independent of Lahore.

3 The original grants to Jhind, and Kythal, and others and also similar papers of assurance, are carefully preserved by the several families; and the various English documents show that Bhag Singh, of Jhind, was always regarded with much kindness by Lord Lake, Sir John Malcolm, and Sir David Ochterloney.

CHAPTER II

RANJIT SINGH AND THE EAST INDIA COMPANY¹

I. TREATY OF AMRITSAR

[Ranjit Singh succeeded his father Maha Singh in the leadership of the *Sukerchakia Misl* in 1790. He occupied Lahore in 1799. Amritsar was occupied probably in 1805. By that time he was realising tribute from Jammu and Kasur. In 1805-7 he led two Cis-Sutlej expeditions and took *nazrana* from the chiefs of Patiala, Nabha, Maler Kotla, Kythai, Shahbad, Ambala, Buria and Kalsia. The third Cis-Sutlej expedition was undertaken in 1808 when negotiations with Metcalfe had begun. Maler Kotla was made tributary. Ambala was annexed, Thanewar submitted, Faridkot and Maler Kotla were threatened. In the words of Ranjit Singh's court historian, "there was practically an earthquake in the Cis-Sutlej country".² But a sudden change in the European situation deprived Ranjit Singh of his opportunity, and he had to relinquish his claims on the Cis-Sutlej region by the treaty of 1809.]

The approach of Holkar and Amir Khan recalled, first, Fateh Singh, and afterwards himself,³ to the proper city of the whole Sikh people.⁴ The danger seemed imminent, for a famed leader of the dominant Marathas was desirous of bringing down an Afghan host, and the English army, exact in discipline, and representing a power of unknown views and resources, had reached the neighbourhood of Amritsar.⁵

A formal council was held by the Sikhs, but a portion only of their leaders were present. The singleness of purpose, the confident belief in the aid of God, which had animated mechanics and shepherds to resent persecution, and to triumph over Ahmad Shah, no longer possessed the minds of their descendants, born to comparative power and affluence, and who, like

*1 According to Cunningham, the facts incorporated in this chapter "follow very closely the author's narratives of the British connection with the Sikhs, drawn up for Government."

*2 *Umdat-ut-Tawarikh*, quoted in N. K. Sinha, *Ranjit Singh*, p. 25.

*3 Ranjit Singh.

*4 Amritsar.

*5 See Elphinstone's *Cabul*, ii. 325, and Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 56-57.

rude and ignorant men broken loose from all law, gave the rein to their grosser passions. Their ambition was personal and their desire was for worldly enjoyment. The genuine spirit of Sikhism had again sought the dwelling of the peasant to reproduce itself in another form; the rude system of mixed independence and confederacy was unsuited to an extended dominion; it had served its ends of immediate agglomeration, and the *Misls* were in effect dissolved. The mass of the people remained satisfied with their village freedom, to which taxation and inquisition were unknown; but the petty chiefs and their paid followers, to whom their faith was the mere expression of a conventional custom, were anxious for predatory licence, and for additions to their temporal power. Some were willing to join the English, others were ready to link their fortunes with the Marathas, and all had become jealous of Ranjit Singh, who alone was desirous of excluding the stranger invaders, as the great obstacles to his own ambition of founding a military monarchy which should ensure to the people the congenial occupation of conquest. In truth, Ranjit Singh laboured, with more or less of intelligent design, to give unity and coherence to diverse atoms and scattered elements; to mould the increasing Sikh nation into a well-ordered State, or commonwealth, as Gobind had developed a sect into a people, and had given application and purpose to the general institutions of Nanak.¹

Holkar retired, and Ranjit Singh, as has been mentioned, entered into a vague but friendly alliance with the British Government. Towards the close of the same year, he was invited to interfere in a quarrel between the Chief of Nabha and the Raja of Patiala, and it would be curious to trace, whether the English authorities had first refused to mediate in the dispute in consequence of the repeated instructions to avoid all connection with powers beyond the Jumna. Ranjit Singh crossed the Sutlej, and took Ludhiana from the declining Mahomedan family which had sought the protection of the adventurer George Thomas. The place was bestowed upon his uncle, Bhag Singh of Jhind, and as both Jaswant Singh of Nabha, whom he had gone

1 Malcolm (*Sketch*, p. 106, 107) remarks on the want of unanimity among the Sikhs at the time of Lord Lake's expedition. Compare Murray's *Ranjit Singh*, p. 57, 58.

to aid, and Sahib Singh of Patiala, whom he had gone to coerce, were glad to be rid of his destructive arbitration, he retired with the present of a piece of artillery and some treasure, and went towards the hills of Kangra, partly that he might pay his superstitious devotions at the natural flames of Jwala Mukhi.¹

In the beginning of 1808, various places in the Upper Punjab were taken from their independent Sikh proprietors, and brought under the direct management of the new kingdom of Lahore, and Mukkam Chand was at the same time employed in effecting a settlement of the territories which had been seized on the left bank of the Sutlej. But Ranjit Singh's systematic aggressions had begun to excite fear in the minds of the Sikhs of Sirhind, and a formal deputation, consisting of the chiefs of Jhind and Kythai, and the Dewau, or Minister of Patiala, proceeded to Delhi, in March 1808, to ask for British protection. The communications of the English Government with the chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej States had not been altogether broken off, and the Governor-General had at this time assured the Mahomedan Khan of Kunjpura, near Karnal,² that he need be under no apprehensions with regard to his hereditary possessions, while the petty Sikh chief of Sikri had performed some services which were deemed worthy of a pension.³ But the deputies of the collective States could obtain no positive assurances from the British authorities at Delhi, although they were led to hope that, in the hour of need, they would not be deserted. This was scarcely sufficient to save them from loss, and perhaps from ruin; and, as Ranjit Singh had sent messengers to calm their apprehensions, and to urge them to join his camp, they left Delhi for the purpose of making their own terms with the acknowledged Raja of Lahore.⁴

¹ See Murray's *Ranjit Singh*, p. 59, 60. The letter of Sir Charles Metcalfe to Government, of the 17th June, 1809, shows that Ranjit Singh was not strong enough at the time in question, 1806, to interfere, by open force, in the affairs of the Malwa Sikhs, and the letters of Sir David Ochterloney, of 14th Feb., and 7th March, 1809, and 30th July, 1811, show that the English engagements of 1805, with the Patiala and other chiefs, were virtually at an end, so far as regarded the reciprocal benefits of alliance.

² In a document, dated 18th January, 1808.

³ Mr. Clerk of Ambala to the agent at Delhi, 19th May, 1837.

⁴ See Murray's *Ranjit Singh*, p. 64, 65.

The Governor-General of 1805, who dissolved, or deprecated, treaties with princes beyond the Jumna, and declared that river to be the limit of British dominion, had no personal knowledge of the hopes and fears with which the invasions of Shah Zaman agitated the minds of men for the period of three or four years; and had the Sikhs of Sirhind sought protection from Lord Cornwallis, they would doubtless have received a decisive answer in the negative. But the reply of encouragement given in the beginning of 1808 was prompted by renewed danger; and the belief that the French, the Turkish, and the Persian emperors meditated the subjugation of India, led another new Governor-General to seek alliances, not only beyond the Jumna, but beyond the Indus.¹ The designs or the desires of Napoleon appeared to render a defensive alliance with the Afghans and with the Sikhs imperative; Mr. Elphinstone was deputed to the court of Shah Shuja, and, in September 1808, Mr. Metcalfe was sent on a mission to Ranjit Singh for the purpose of bringing about the desired confederation. The chiefs of Patiala, Jhind, and Kythal, were also verbally assured that they had become dependent princes of the British Government; for the progress of Ranjit Singh seemed to render the interposition of some friendly States, between his military domination and the peaceful sway of the English, a measure of prudence and foresight.²

Mr. Metcalfe was received by Ranjit Singh at his newly conquered town of Kasur, but the chief affected to consider himself as the head of the whole Sikh people, and to regard the possession of Lahore as giving him an additional claim to supremacy over Sirhind. He did not, perhaps, see that a French invasion would be ruinous to his interests, he rather feared the colossal power on his borders, and he resented the intention of confining him to the Sutlej.³ He suddenly broke off negotiations, and made his third inroad to the south of the Sutlej. He seized

1 Mr. Auber (*Rise and Progress of the British Power in India*, ii. 461), notices the triple alliance which threatened Hindustan.

2 Government to Sir David Ochterloney, 14th Nov. 1808. Compare Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 65, 66.

3 Moorcroft ascertained (*Travels*, i. 94) that Ranjit Singh had serious thoughts of appealing to the sword, so unpalatable was English interference. The well-known Fakir Aziz-ud-din was one of the two persons who dissuaded him from war.

Faridkot and Ambala, levied exactions in Maler Kotla and Thaneswar, and entered into a symbolical brotherhood or alliance with the Raja of Patiala. The British envoy remonstrated against these virtual acts of hostility, and he remained on the banks of the Sutlej until Ranjit Singh recrossed that river.¹

The proceedings of the Ruler of Lahore determined the Governor-General, if doubtful before, to advance a detachment of troops to the Sutlej, to support Mr. Metcalfe in his negotiations, and to effectually confine Ranjit Singh to the northward of that river.² Provision would also be thus made, it was said, for possible warlike operations of a more extensive character, and the British frontier would be covered by a confederacy of friendly chiefs, instead of threatened by a hostile military government. A body of troops was accordingly moved across the Jwuna in January 1809, under the command of Sir David Ochterlony. The general advanced, by way of Buria and Patiala, towards Ludhiana; he was welcomed by all the Sirhind chiefs, save Jodh Singh Kalsia, the nominal head of the *Karora Singhia* confederacy: but during his march he was not without apprehensions that Ranjit Singh might openly break with his Government, and, after an interview with certain agents whom that chief had sent to him with the view of opening a double negotiation, he made a detour and a halt, in order to be near his supplies should hostilities take place.³

Ranjit Singh was somewhat discomposed by the near presence of a British force, but he continued to evade compliance with the propositions of the envoy, and he complained that Mr. Metcalfe was needlessly reserved about his acquisitions on the south banks of the Sutlej, with regard to which the Government had only declared that the restoration of his last conquests, and the absolute withdrawal of his troops to the northward of the

1 Murray's *Ranjit Singh*, p. 66.

2 Government to Sir David Ochterlony, 14th Nov. and 29th Dec., 1808.

3 Sir David Ochterlony to Government, 20th Jan., and 4th, 9th, and 14th Feb., 1809, with Government to Sir David Ochterlony, of 13th March, 1809. Government by no means approved of what Sir David Ochterlony had done, and he, feeling aggrieved, virtually tendered his resignation of his command. (Sir David Ochterlony to Government, 19th April, 1809.)

river, must form the indispensable basis of further negotiations.¹ Affairs were in this way when intelligence from Europe induced the Governor-General to believe that Napoleon must abandon his designs upon India, or at least so far suspend them as to render defensive precautions unnecessary.² It was therefore made known, that the object of the English Government had become limited to the security of the country south of the Sutlej from the encroachments of Ranjit Singh; for that, independent of the possible approach of a European enemy, it was considered advisable on other grounds to afford protection to the southern Sikhs. Ranjit Singh must still, nevertheless, withdraw his troops to the right bank of the Sutlej, his last usurpations must also be restored, but the restitution of his first conquests would not be insisted on; while, to remove all cause of suspicion, the detachment under Sir David Ochterloney could fall back from Ludhiana to Karnal, and take up its permanent position at the latter place.³ But the British commander represented the advantage of keeping the force where it was; his Government assented to its detention, at least for a time, and Ludhiana thus continued uninterruptedly to form a station for British troops.⁴

In the beginning of February 1809, Sir David Ochterloney had issued a proclamation declaring the Cis-Sutlej States to be under British protection, and that any aggressions of the Chief of Lahore would be resisted with arms.⁵ Ranjit Singh then perceived that the British authorities were in earnest, and the fear

1 Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 14th Feb. 1809, and Government to Sir D. Ochterloney, 30th July, 1809. Lient.-Colonel Lawrence (*Adventures in the Punjab*, p. 131, note g) makes Sir Charles Metcalfe sufficiently communicative on this occasion with regard to other territories, for he is declared to have told the Maharaja that, by a compliance with the then demands of the English, he would ensure their neutrality with respect to encroachments elsewhere.

2 Government to Sir David Ochterloney, 30th Jan., 1809.

* Sir Arthur Wellesley's victories in the Peninsular War and the conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Dardanelles (January, 1809) changed the European situation in England's favour.

3 Government to Sir David Ochterloney, 30th Jan., 6th Feb., and 13th March, 1809.

4 Sir David Ochterloney to Government, 6th May, 1809, and Government to Sir David Ochterloney, 13th June, 1809.

5 See Appendix A.

struck him that the still independent leaders of the Punjab might likewise tender their allegiance and have it accepted. All chance of empire would thus be lost, and he prudently made up his mind without further delay. He withdrew his troops as required, he relinquished his last acquisitions, and at Amritsar, on the 25th April, 1809, the now single Chief of Lahore signed a treaty which left him the master of the tracts he had originally occupied to the south of the Sutlej, but confined his ambition for the future to the north and westward of that river.¹

The Sikh, and the few included Hindu and Mahomedan chiefs, between the Sutlej and Jumna, having been taken under British protection, it became necessary to define the terms on which they were secured from foreign danger. Sir David Ochterloney observed,² that when the chiefs first sought protection, their jealousy of the English would have yielded to their fears of Ranjit Singh, and they would have agreed to any conditions proposed, including a regular tribute. But their first overtures had been rejected, and the mission to Lahore had taught them to regard *their* defence as a secondary object, and to think that *English* apprehensions of remote foreigners had saved *them* from the arbiter of the Punjab. Protection, indeed, had become no longer a matter of choice; they must have accepted it, or they would have been treated as enemies.³ Wherefore, continued Sir David, the chiefs expected that the protection would be gratuitous. The Government, on its part, was inclined to be liberal to its new dependents, and finally a proclamation was issued on the 3rd May, 1809, guaranteeing the chiefs of "Sirhind and Malwa" against the power of Ranjit Singh, leaving them absolute in their own territories, exempting them from

1 See the treaty itself, Appendix A. Compare Murray's *Ranjit Singh*, p. 67, 68.

2 Sir David Ochterloney to Government, 17th March, 1809.

3 See also Government to Resident at Delhi, 26th Dec. 1808. Baron Hugel (*Travels*, p. 279) likewise attributes the interference of the English, in part at least, to selfishness, but with him the motive was the petty desire of benefiting by escheats, which the dissipated character of the chiefs was likely to render speedy and numerous ! This appetite for morsels of territory, however, really arose at a subsequent date, and did not move the English in 1809.

tribute, but requiring assistance in time of war, and making some minor provisions which need not be recapitulated.¹

No sooner were the chiefs relieved of their fears of Ranjit Singh, than the more turbulent began to prey upon one another, or upon their weaker neighbours; and, although the Governor-General had not wished them to consider themselves as in absolute subjection to the British power,² Mr. Metcalfe pointed out³ that it was necessary to declare the chiefs to be protected singly against one another, as well as collectively against Ranjit Singh; for, if such a degree of security were not guaranteed, the oppressed would necessarily have recourse to the only other person who could use coercion with effect, *viz.* to the Raja of Lahore. The justness of these views was admitted, and, on the 22nd August, 1811, a second proclamation was issued, warning the chiefs against attempts at usurpation, and reassuring them of independence and of protection against Ranjit Singh.⁴ Nevertheless, encroachments did not at once cease, and the Jodh Singh Kalsia, who avoided giving in his adhesion to the British Government on the advance of Sir David Ochterloney, required to have troops sent against him in 1818, to compel the surrender of tracts which he had forcibly seized.⁵

The history of the southern or Malwa Sikhs need not be continued, although it presents many points of interest to the general reader, as well as to the student and to those concerned in the administration of India. The British functionaries soon became involved in intricate questions about interference between equal chiefs, and between chiefs and their confederates

1 Appendix A.

2 Government to Sir David Ochterloney, 10th April, 1809.

3 Mr. Metcalfe to Government, 17th June, 1809.

4 See the proclamation, Appendix A.

5 Resident at Delhi to Agent at Ambala, 27th October, 1818, mulcting the chief in the military expenses incurred, 65,000 rupees. The head of the family, Jodh Singh, had recently returned with Ranjit Singh's army from the capture of Multan, and he was always treated with consideration by the Maharaja; and, bearing in mind the different views taken by dependent Sikhs and governing English, of rights of succession, he had fair grounds of dissatisfaction. He claimed to be the head of the *Karora Singhia Misl*, and to be the heir of all childless feudatories. The British Government, however, made itself the valid or efficient head of the confederacy.

or dependents; they laboured to reconcile the Hindu law of inheritance with the varied customs of different races, and with the alleged family usages of peasants suddenly become princes. They had to decide on questions of escheat, and being strongly impressed with the superiority of British municipal rule, and with the undoubted claim of the paramount to some benefit from the protection it afforded, they strove to prove that collateral heirs had a limited right only, and that exemption from tribute necessarily implied an enlarged liability to confiscation. They had to define the common boundary of the Sikh States and of British rule, and they were prone to show, after the manner of Ranjit Singh, that the present possession of a principal town gave a right to all the villages which had ever been attached to it as the seat of a local authority, and that all waste lands belonged to the supreme power, although the dependent might have last possessed them in sovereignty and immediately brought them under the plough. They had to exercise a paramount municipal control, and in the surrender of criminals, and in the demand for compensation for property stolen from British subjects, the original arbitrary nature of the decisions enforced, has not yet been entirely replaced by rules of reciprocity. But the Government of a large empire will always be open to obloquy, and liable to misconception, from the acts of officious and ill judging servants, who think that they best serve the complicated interests of their own rulers by lessening the material power of others, and that any advantage they may seem to have gained for the State they obey, will surely promote their own objects. Nor, in such matters, are servants alone to blame; and the whole system of internal government in India requires to be remodelled, and made the subject of a legislation at once wise, considerate, and comprehensive. In the Sikh States ignorance has been the main cause of mistakes and heart burnings, and in 1818 Sir David Ochterlony frankly owned to the Marquis of Hastings,¹ that his proclamation of 1802 had been based on an erroneous idea. He thought that a few great chiefs only existed between the Sutlej and Jumna, and that on them would devolve the maintenance of order; whereas he found that the dissolution of the *Misls*, faulty as was their formation, had almost thrown the Sikhs back upon the individual independence of the times

1 In a private communication, dated 17th May, 1818.

of Ahmad Shah. Both in considering the relation of the chiefs to one another, and their relation collectively to the British Government, too little regard was perhaps had to the peculiar circumstances of the Sikh people. They were in a state of progression among races as barbarous as themselves, when suddenly the colossal power of England arrested them, and required the exercise of political moderation and the practice of a just morality from men ignorant alike of despotic control and of regulated freedom.¹

1 In the Sikh states on either side of the Sutlej, the British Government was long fortunate in being represented by such men as Capt. Murray and Mr. Clerk, Sir David Ochterloney and Lieut.-Colonel Wade—so different from one another, and yet so useful to one common purpose of good for the English power. These men, by their personal character or influence, added to the general reputation of their countrymen, and they gave adaptation and flexibility to the rigid unsympathising nature of a foreign and civilised supremacy. Sir David Ochterloney will long live in the memory of the people of Northern India as one of the greatest of the conquering English chiefs: and he was among the very last of the British leaders who endeared himself, both to the army which followed him and to the princes who bowed before the colossal power of his race.

Nevertheless, the best of subordinate authorities, immersed in details and occupied with local affairs, are liable to be biassed by views which promise immediate and special advantage. They can seldom be more than upright or dexterous administrators, and they can still more rarely be men whose minds have been enlarged by study and reflection as well as by actual experience of the world. Thus the ablest but too often resemble merely the practical man of the moment; while the supreme authority, especially when absent from his councillors and intent upon some great undertaking, is of necessity dependent mainly upon the local representatives of the Government, whose notions must inevitably be partial or one-sided, for good, indeed, as well as for evil. The author has thus, even during his short service, seen many reasons to be thankful that there is a remote deliberative or corrective body, which can survey things through an atmosphere cleared of mists, and which can judge of measures with reference both to the universal principles of justice and statesmanship, and to their particular bearing on the English supremacy in India, which should be characterised by certainty and consistency of operation, and tempered by a spirit of forbearance and adaptation.

II. ANGLO-SIKH RELATIONS, 1809-1838

A treaty of peace and friendship was thus formed between Ranjit Singh and the English Government; but confidence is a plant of slow growth, and doubt and suspicion are not always removed by formal protestations. While arrangements were pending with the Maharaja, the British authorities were assured that he had made propositions to Sindhia;¹ agents from Gwalior, from Holkar, and from Amir Khan,² continued to show themselves for years at Lahore, and their masters long dwelt on the hope that the tribes of the Punjab and of the Deccan might yet be united against the stranger conquerors. It was further believed by the English rulers, that Ranjit Singh was anxiously trying to induce the Sikhs of Sirhind to throw off their allegiance, and to join him and Holkar against their protectors.³ Other special instances might also be quoted, and Sir David Ochterloney even thought it prudent to lay in supplies and to throw up defensive lines at Ludhiana.⁴ Ranjit Singh had likewise his suspicions, but they were necessarily expressed in ambiguous terms, and were rather to be deduced from his acts and correspondence, and from a consideration of his position, than to be looked for in overt statements or remonstrances. By degrees the apprehensions of the two Governments mutually vanished, and while Ranjit Singh felt he could freely exercise his ambition beyond the Sutlej, the English were persuaded he would not embroil himself with its restless allies in the south, so long as he had occupation elsewhere. In 1811 presents were exchanged between the Governor-General and the Maharaja,⁵ and during the following year Sir David Ochterloney became his guest at the marriage of his son, Kharak Singh,⁶ and from that period until within a year of the late war,⁷ the rumours of a Sikh inva-

1 Resident at Delhi to Sir David Ochterloney, 28th June, 1809.

2 Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 15th Oct., 1809; 5th, 6th, and 7th December, 1809; and 5th and 30th January and 22nd August, 1810.

3 Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 5th January, 1810.

4 Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 31st December, 1809, and 7th September, 1810.

5 A carriage was at this time sent to Lahore. See, further, Resident of Delhi to Sir D. Ochterloney, 25th February, 1811, and Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 15th November, 1811.

6 Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 18th July, 1811, and 23rd January, 1812.

*7 First Anglo-Sikh War.

sion served to amuse the idle and to alarm the credulous, without causing uneasiness to the British Viceroy.

On the departure of Mr. Metcalfe, the first care of Ranjit Singh was to strengthen both his frontier post of Filor opposite Ludhiana, and Gobindgarh, the citadel of Amritsar, which he had begun to build as soon as he got possession of the religious capital of his people.¹ He was invited, almost at the same time, by Sansar Chand, of Katoch, to aid in resisting the Gurkhas, who were still pressing their long-continued siege of Kangra, and who had effectually dispelled the Rajput prince's dreams of a supremacy reaching from the Jumna to the Jhelum. The stronghold was offered to the Sikh ruler as the price of his assistance, but Sansar Chand hoped, in the meantime, to gain admittance himself, by showing to the Gurkhas the futility of resisting Ranjit Singh, and by promising to surrender the fort to the Nepal commander, if allowed to withdraw his family. The Maharaja saw through the schemes of Sansar Chand, and he made the son of his ally a prisoner, while he dexterously cajoled the Kathmandu General, Amar Singh Thapa, who proposed a joint warfare against the mountaineers, and to take, or receive, in the meantime the fort of Kangra as part of the *Gurkha* share of the general spoil. He got possession of the place by suddenly demanding admittance as the expected relief. Sansar Chand was foiled, and Amar Singh retreated across the Sutlej, loudly exclaiming that he had been grossly duped.² The active Nepalese commander soon put down some disorders which had arisen in his rear, but the disgrace of his failure before Kangra rankled in his mind, and he made preparations for another expedition against it. He proposed to Sir David Ochterloney a joint march to the Indus, and a separate appropriation of the plains and the hills,³ and Ranjit Singh, ignorant alike of English moderation and of international law, became apprehensive lest the allies of Nepal should be glad of a pretext for coercing one who had so unwillingly acceded to their limitation of his ambition.

1 Compare Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 76.

2 Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 76, 77. The Maharaja told Captain Wade that the Gurkhas wanted to share Kashmir with him, but that he thought it best to keep them out of the Punjab altogether. (Capt. Wade to Government, 25th May, 1831.)

3 Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 16th and 30th December, 1809 !

He made known that *he* was desirous of meeting Amar Singh Thapa on his own ground; and the reply of the Governor-General that he might not only himself cross the Sutlej to chastise the invading Gurkhas in the hills, but that, if they descended into the plains of Sirhind, he would receive English assistance, gave him another proof that the river of the treaty was really to be an impassable barrier. He had got the assurance he wanted, and he talked no more of carrying his horsemen into mountain recesses.¹ But Amar Singh long brooded over his reverse, and tried in various ways to induce the British authorities to join him in assailing the Punjab. The treaty with Nepal, he would say, made all strangers the mutual friends or enemies of the two Governments, and Ranjit Singh had wantonly attacked the Gurkha possessions in Katoch. Besides, he would argue, to advance is the safest policy, and what could have brought the English to the Sutlej but the intention of going beyond it?² The war of 1814 followed, and the English became the neighbours of the Sikhs in the hills as well as in the plains, and the Gurkhas, instead of grasping Kashmir, trembled for their homes in Kathmandu. Ranjit Singh was not then asked to give his assistance, but Sansar Chand was directly called upon by the English representative to attack the Gurkhas and their allies,—a hasty requisition, which produced a remonstrance from the Maharaja, and an admission, on the part of Sir David Ochterloney, that his supremacy was not questioned; while the experienced Hindu chief had forborne to commit himself with either State, by promising much and doing little.³

1 Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 12th September, 1811, and Government to Sir D. Ochterloney, 4th October, and 22nd November, 1811.

2 Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 20th December, 1813.

3 Government to Sir David Ochterloney, 1st and 20th October, 1814. Resident at Delhi to Sir D. Ochterloney, 11th October, 1814, and Sir David's letter to Ranjit Singh, dated 29th November, 1814.

During the war of 1814 Sir David Ochterloney sometimes almost despaired of success; and, amid his vexation, he once at least recorded his opinion that the Sepoys of the Indian army were unequal to such mountain warfare as was being waged. (Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 22nd December, 1814.) The most active and useful ally of the English during the war was Raja Ramsaran of Hindur (or Nalgarh), the descendant of the Hari Chand slain by Guru Gobind, and who was himself the ready coadjutor of Sansar Chand in many aggressions upon others, as well

Ranjit Singh felt secure on the Upper Sutlej, but a new danger assailed him in the beginning of 1810, and again set him to work to dive to the bottom of British counsels. Mr. Elphinstone had scarcely concluded a treaty with Shah Shuja against the Persians and French, before that prince was driven out of his kingdom by the brother whom he had himself supplanted, and who had placed his affairs in the hands of the able minister, Fateh Khan. The Maharaja was at Wazirabad, sequestering that place from the family of a deceased Sikh chief, when he heard of Shah Shuja's progress to the eastward with vague hopes of procuring assistance from one friendly power or another. Ranjit Singh remembered the use he had himself made of Shah Zaman's grant of Lahore, he feared the whole Punjab might similarly be surrendered to the English in return for a few battalions, and he desired to keep a representative of imperial power within his own grasp.¹ He amused the ex-King with the offer of co-operation in the recovery of Multan and Kashmir, and he said he would himself proceed to meet the Shah to save him further journeying towards Hindustan.² They saw one another at Sahiwal, but no determinate arrangement was come to, for some prospects of success dawned upon the Shah, and he felt reason to distrust Ranjit Singh's sincerity.³ The conferences were broken off; but the Maharaja hastened, while there was yet an appearance of union, to demand the surrender of Multan for himself in the name of the King. The great gun called "Zem Zem", or the "Bunghee Tope", was brought from Lahore to batter the walls of the citadel; but all his efforts were in vain, and he retired, foiled, in the month of April, with no more than 180,000 rupees to soothe his mortified vanity. The Governor, Mazaffar Khan, was by this time in correspondence with the British Viceroy in Calcutta and Ranjit Singh feared that a

as in resisting the Gurkhas. The venerable chief was still alive in 1846, and he continued to talk with admiration of Sir David Ochterloney and his "eighteen pounders," and to expatiate upon the aid he himself rendered in dragging them up the steep slopes of the Himalayas.

1 Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 10th and 30th December, 1809.

2 Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 7th, 10th, 17th, and 30th December, 1809, and 30th January, 1810.

3 Shah Shuja's Autobiography, chap. xxii, published in the *Calcutta Monthly Journal* for 1839. The original was undoubtedly revised, if not really written, by the Shah.

tender of allegiance might not only be made but accepted.¹ He therefore proposed to Sir David Ochterloney that the two "allied powers" should march against Multan and divide the conquest equally.² It was surmised that he wanted the siege train of the English, but he may likewise have wished to know whether the Sutlej was to be as good a boundary in the south as in the north. He was told reprovingly that the English committed aggressions upon no one, but otherwise the tenor of the correspondence was such as to lead him to believe that he would not be interfered with in his designs upon Multan.³

Some differences had arisen with the British authorities regarding the right to a place named Wadni, to the south of the Sutlej, which had been transferred by Ranjit Singh to his intriguing and ambitious mother-in-law, Sada Kaur, in the 1808. The lady was regarded by the English agents as being the independent representative of the interests of the *Kanheya* confederacy of Sikhs on *their* side of the river, and therefore as having a right to their protection. But Ranjit Singh had quarrelled with and imprisoned his mother-in-law, and had taken possession of the fort of Wadni. It was resolved to eject him by force, and a detachment of troops marched from Ludhiana and restored the authority of the captive widow. Ranjit Singh prudently made no attempt to resist the British agent, but he was not without apprehensions that his occupation of the place would be construed into a breach of the treaty, and he busied himself with defensive preparations. A friendly letter from the superior authorities at Delhi relieved him of his fears.⁴

1 Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 29th March, and 23rd May, 1810. In the latter it is stated that 250,000 rupees were paid, and the sum of 180,000 is given on Capt. Murray's authority. (*Life of Runjeet Singh*, p. 81.)

2 Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 23rd July, and 13th August, 1810.

3 Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 29th March and 17th September, 1810, and Government to Sir D. Ochterloney, 25th September, 1810. Compare Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 80, 81.

4 Compare Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 134, where the proceedings are given very briefly, and scarcely with accuracy. Capt. Murray's and Capt. Ross's letters to the Resident at Delhi, from February to September, 1822, give details, and other information is obtainable from the letters of Sir D. Ochterloney to Capt. Ross, dated 7th November, 1821, and of

In the year 1820, Appa Sahib, the deposed Raja of the Maratha kingdom of Nagpur, escaped from the custody of the British authorities and repaired to Amritsar. He would seem to have had the command of large sums of money, and he endeavored to engage Ranjit Singh in his cause; but the Maharaja had been told the fugitive was the violent enemy of his English allies, and he ordered him to quit his territories. The chief took up his abode for a time in Sansar Chand's principality of Katoch, and while there he would appear to have entered into some idle schemes with Prince Haidar, a son of Shah Zaman, for the subjugation of India, south and east of the Sutlej. The Durani was to be monarch of the whole, from Delhi to Cape Comorin; but the Maratha was to be wazir of the empire, and to hold the Deccan as a dependent sovereign. The Punjab was not included; but it did not transpire that either Ranjit Singh, or Sansar Chand, or the two ex-Kings of Kabul, were privy to the design, and, as soon as the circumstance became known, Sansar Chand compelled his guest to proceed elsewhere. Appa Sahib repaired, in 1822, to Mandi, which lies between Kangra and the Sutlej; but he wandered to Amritsar about 1828, and only finally quitted the country during the following year, to find an asylum with the Raja of Jodhpur. That state had become an English dependency, and the ex-Raja's surrender was required; but the strong objections of the Rajput induced the Government to be satisfied with a promise of his safe custody, and he died almost forgotten in the year 1840.¹

Raja Bir Singh, of Nurpur, in the hills, had been dispossessed of his chiefship in the year 1816. He sought refuge to the south of the Sutlej, and immediately made proposals to Shah Shuja, who had just reached Ludhiana, to enter into a the Governor-General's Agent at Delhi to Capt. Murray, of 22nd June, and to Government of the 23rd August, 1822; and from those of Government to the Governor-General's Agent, 24th April, 13th July, and 18th October, 1822.

¹ Compare Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 126; Moorcroft's *Travels*, i. 109; and the quasi-official authority, the *Bengal and Agra Gazetteer* for 1841, 1842 (articles "Nagpoor" and "Jodhpur"). See also Capt. Murray's letters to Resident at Delhi, 24th November and 22nd December, 1821, the 13th January, 1822, and 16th June, 1824; and likewise Capt. Wade to Resident at Delhi, 15th March, 1828.

combination against Ranjit Singh. The Maharaja had not altogether despised similar tenders of allegiance from various discontented chiefs, when the Shah was his prisoner guest in Lahore; he remembered the treaty between the Shah and the English, and he knew how readily dethroned Kings might be made use of by the ambitious. He wished to ascertain the views of the English authorities, but he veiled his suspicions of *them* in terms of apprehension of the Nurpur Raja. His troops, he said, were absent in the neighbourhood of Multan, and Bir Singh might cross the Sutlej and raise disturbances. The reception of emissaries by Shah Shuja was then discountenanced, and the residence of the exiled Raja at Ludhiana was discouraged; but Ranjit Singh was told that his right to attempt the recovery of his chiefship was admitted, although he would not be allowed to organize the means of doing so within the British limits. The Maharaja seemed satisfied that Lahore would be safe while absent in the south or west, and he said no more.¹

In the year 1819, the able and adventurous traveller, Moorcroft, left the plains of India in the hope of reaching Yarkand and Bokhara. In the hills of the Punjab he experienced difficulties, and he was induced to repair to Lahore to wait upon Ranjit Singh. He was honourably received, and any lurking suspicions of his own designs, or of the views of his Government, were soon dispelled. The Maharaja conversed with frankness of the events of his life; he showed the traveller his bands of horsemen and battalions of infantry, and encouraged him to visit any part of the capital without hesitation, and at his own leisure. Mr. Moorcroft's medical skill and general knowledge, his candid manner and personal activity, produced an impression favourable to himself and advantageous to his countrymen; but his proposition that British merchandize should be admitted into the Punjab at a fixed scale of duties, was received with evasion. The Maharaja's revenues might be affected, it was

1 The public correspondence generally of 1816-17 has here been referred to, and especially the letter of Government to Resident at Delhi, dated 11th April, 1817. Bir Singh made another attempt to recover his principality; but he was seized and imprisoned. (Murray's *Ranjit Singh*, p. 145, and Capt. Murray to Resident at Delhi, 25th February, 1827.) He was subsequently released, and was alive, but unheeded, in 1844.

said, and his principal officers, whose advice was necessary, were absent on distant expeditions. Every facility was afforded to Mr. Moorcraft in prosecuting his journey.

Ranjit Singh had become master of the Punjab almost unheeded by the English; but the position and views of that people had changed since they asked his aid against the armies of Napoleon. The Jumna and the sea-coast of Bombay were no longer the proclaimed limits of their empire; the Narmada had been crossed, the States of Rajputana had been rendered tributary, and, with the laudable design of diffusing wealth and of linking remote provinces together in the strong and useful bonds of commerce, they were about to enter upon schemes of navigation and of trade, which caused them to deprecate the ambition of the King of the Sikhs, and led them, by sure yet unforeseen steps, to absorb his dominion in their own, and to grasp, perhaps inscrutably to chasten, with the cold unfeeling hand of worldly rule, the youthful spirit of social change and religious reformation evoked by the genius of Nanak and Gobind.

In 1825 Ranjit Singh's attention was amused with overtures from the Gurkhas, who forgot his former rivalry in the overwhelming greatness of the English; but the precise object of the Nepalese did not transpire, and the restless spirit of the Sikh chief soon led him to the Chenab, with the design of seizing Shikarpur.¹ The occurrence of a scarcity in Sind, and perhaps the rumours of the hostile preparations of the English against Bharatpur, induced him to return to his capital before the end of the year. The *Jat* usurper of the Jumna² asked his brother *Jat* of the Ravi to aid him; but the Maharaja affected to discredit the mission, and so satisfied the British authorities without compromising himself with the master of a fortress which had successfully resisted the disciplined troops and the dreaded artillery of his neighbours.³ But about the same time Ranjit Singh likewise found reason to distrust the possessors of strongholds; and Fateh Singh Ahluwalia was constrained by his old

1 Agent at Delhi to Capt. Murray, 18th March, 1825, and Capt. Murray in reply, 28th March. Compare also Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 144.

*2 Durjan Sal, usurper of Bharatpur.

3 Capt. Murray to the Resident at Delhi, 1st and 3rd October, 1825, and Capt. Wade to Capt. Murray, 5th October, 1825.

brother in arms to leave a masonry citadel unfinished, and was further induced by his own fears to fly to the south of the Sutlej. He was assured of English protection in his ancestral estates in the Sirhind province, but Ranjit Singh, remembering perhaps the joint treaty with Lord Lake, earnestly endeavoured to allay the fears of the fugitive, and to recall a chief so dangerous in the hands of his allies. Fateh Singh returned to Lahore in 1827; he was received with marked honour, and he was confirmed in nearly all his possessions.¹

Towards the end of 1826, Ranjit Singh was attacked with sickness, and he sought the aid of European skill. Dr. Murray, a surgeon in the British-Indian army, was sent to attend him, and he remained at Lahore for some time, although the Maharaja was more disposed to trust to time and abstinence, or to the empirical remedies of his own physicians, than to the prescribers of unknown drugs and the practisers of new ways. Ranjit Singh, nevertheless, liked to have his foreign medical adviser near him, as one from whom information could be gained, and whom it might be advantageous to please. He seemed anxious about the proposed visit of Lord Amherst, the Governor-General, to the northern provinces; he asked about the qualities of the Burmese troops, and the amount of money demanded by the English victors at the end of the war with that people; he was inquisitive about the mutiny of a regiment of Sepoys at Barrackpore, and he wished to know whether native troops had been employed in quelling it.² On the arrival of Lord Amherst at Simla, in 1827, a further degree of intimacy became inevitable; a mission of welcome and inquiry was sent

1 Resident at Delhi to Capt. Murray, 13th January, 1826, and Capt. Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 144. The old chief had, as early as 1811, desired to be regarded as separately connected with the English, so fearful had he become of his "Turban-brother." (Government to Sir D. Ochterloney, 4th October, 1811.)

The cis-Sutlej Mahomedan Chief of Mamdot, formerly at Kasur, fled and returned about the same time as Fateh Singh, for similar reasons, and after making similar endeavours to be recognised as an English dependent (Government to Resident at Delhi, 28th April, 1827, with correspondence to which it relates, and compare Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 145.)

2 Capt. Wade to the Resident at Delhi, 24th September and 30th November, 1826, and 1st January, 1827. Compare Murray's *Runjeet Singh* p. 145.

* See N. K. Sinha, *Ranjit Singh*, p. 131.

to wait upon his Lordship, and the compliment was returned by the deputation of Captain Wade, the British frontier authority, to the Maharaja's court.¹ During the following year the English commander-in-chief arrived at Ludhiana, and Ranjit Singh sent an agent to convey to him his good wishes; but an expected invitation to visit the strongholds of the Punjab was not given to the captor of Bharatpur.²

The little business to be transacted between the British and Sikh Governments was entrusted to the management of the Resident at Delhi, who gave his orders to Captain Murray, the Political Agent at Ambala, who again had under him an assistant, Captain Wade, at Ludhiana, mainly in connection with the affairs of the garrison of that place. When Captain Wade was at Lahore, the Maharaja expressed a wish that, for the sake of despatch in business, the agency for his Cis-Sutlej possessions should be vested in the officer at Ludhiana subordinate to the Resident at Delhi, but independent of the officer at Ambala.³ This wish was complied with,⁴ but in attempting to define the extent of the territories in question, it was found that there were several doubtful points to be settled. Ranjit Singh claimed supremacy over Chamkaur, and Anandpur Makhwal, and other places belonging to the Sodhis, or collateral representatives of Guru Gobind. He also claimed Wadni, which, a few years before, had been wrested from him on the plea that it was his mother-in-law's; and he claimed Firozpur, then held by a childless widow, and also all the Ahluwalia districts, besides others which need not be particularized.⁵ The claims of the Maharaja over Firozpur and the ancestral possessions of

1 Government to Capt. Wade, 2nd May, 1827.

2 Murray's *Ranjeet Singh*, p. 147.

3 Capt. Wade to Resident at Delhi, 20th June, 1827.

4 Government to Resident at Delhi, 4th October, 1827.

5 Capt. Wade to the Resident at Delhi, 20th January, 1828, and Capt. Murray to the same, 19th February, 1828.

In the case of Firozpur, Government subsequently decided (Government to Agent at Delhi, 24th November, 1838), that certain collateral heirs (who had put in a claim) could not succeed, as, according to Hindu Law and Sikh usage, no right of descent existed after a division had taken place. So uncertain, however, is the practice of the English, that one or more precedents in favour of the Firozpur claimants might readily be found within the range of cases connected with the Sikh states.

Fateh Singh Ahluwalia were rejected; but the British title to supremacy over Wadni could no longer, it was found, be maintained. The claims of Lahore to Chamkaur and Anandpur Mahowal were expediently admitted, for the British right did not seem worth maintaining, and the affairs of the priestly class of Sikhs could be best managed by a ruler of their own faith.¹ Ranjit Singh disliked the loss of Firozpur, which the English long continued to admire as a commanding position,² but the settlement generally was such as seemed to lessen the chances of future collision between the two Governments. Ranjit Singh's connection with the English thus became more and more close.

The fame of Ranjit Singh was now at its height, and his friendship was sought by distant sovereigns. In 1820, agents from Baluchistan brought horses to the Sikh ruler, and hoped that the frontier posts of Hurrund and Dajel, westward of the Indus, which his feudatory of Bahawalpur had usurped, would be restored to the Khan.³ The Maharaja was likewise in communication with Shah Mahmud of Herat⁴ and in 1830 he was invited, by Baiza Bai of Gwalior,⁵ to honour the nuptials of the young Sindhia with his presence.⁶ The English were at the same time not without a suspicion that he had opened a corres-

1 Government to the Resident at Delhi, 14th November, 1828.

2 In 1823 Capt. Murray talked of the "strong and important fortress" of Firozpur having been recovered by Ranjit Singh, for the widow proprietress from whom it had been seized by a claimant (Captain Murray to the Agent at Delhi, 20th July, 1823), and the supreme authorities similarly talked (Government to Agent at Delhi, 30th January, 1824) of the political and military advantages of Firozpur over Ludhiana.

3 Capt. Wade to the Resident at Delhi, 3rd May, 1829, and 29th April, 1830. Hurrund was once a place of considerable repute. (See *Munshee Mahun Lal's Journal*, under date 3rd March, 1836.) The Bahawalpur Memoirs show that the Nawab was aided by the treachery of others in acquiring it. The place had to be retaken by General Ventura (as the author learnt from that officer), when Bahawal Khan was deprived of his territories west of the Sutlej.

4 Capt. Wade to Resident at Delhi, 31st January, 1829, and 3rd December, 1830.

*5 Wife of Danlat Rao Sindhia.

6 Capt. Wade to Resident at Delhi, 7th April, 1830. The Maharaja declined the invitation, saying Sindhia was not at Lahore when *his* son was married.

poundence with Russia¹ and they were themselves about to flatter him as one necessary to the fulfilment of their expanding views of just influence and profitable commerce.

In the beginning of 1831, Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General of India, arrived at Simla, and a Sikh deputation waited upon his Lordship to convey to him Ranjit Singh's complimentary wishes for his own welfare and the prosperity of his Government. The increasing warmth of the season prevented the despatch of a formal return mission, but Captain Wade, the Political Agent at Ludhiana, was made the bearer of a letter to the Maharaja, thanking him for his attention. The principal duty of the agent was, however, to ascertain whether Ranjit Singh wished, and would propose, to have an interview with Lord William Bentinck, for it was a matter in which it was thought the English Viceroy could not take the initiative.² The object of the Governor-General was mainly to give the world an impression of complete unanimity between the two States; but the Maharaja wished to strengthen his own authority, and to lead the Sikh public to believe his dynasty was acknowledged as the proper head of the *Khalsa*, by the predominant English rulers. The able chief, Hari Singh, was one of those most averse to the recognition of the right of Prince Kharak Singh, and the heir-apparent himself would seem to have been aware of the feelings of the Sikh people, for he had the year before opened a correspondence with the Governor of Bombay, as if to derive hope from the vague terms of a complimentary reply.³ Ranjit Singh thus readily proposed a meeting, and one took place at Rupar, on the banks of the Sutlej, in the month of October (1831). A present of horses from the King of England

1 Capt. Wade to Resident at Delhi. 24th August, 1830.

2 Government to Capt. Wade. 23th April, 1831, and Murray's *Ranjit Singh*, p. 162.

3 With regard to this interchange of letters, see the Persian Secretary to the Political Secretary at Bombay, 6th July, 1830.

That Ranjit Singh was jealous, personally, of Hari Singh, or that the servant would have proved a traitor to the living master is not probable: but Hari Singh was a zealous Sikh and an ambitious man, and Kharak Singh was always full of doubts and apprehensions with respect to his succession and even his safety. Ranjit Singh's anxiety with regard to the meeting at Rupar, exaggerated, perhaps, by M. Allard, may be learnt from Mr. Prinsep's account in Murray's *Ranjit Singh*, p. 152.

had, in the meantime, reached Lahore, by the Indus and Ravi rivers, under the escort of Lieutenant Burnes, and during one of the several interviews with the Governor-General, Ranjit Singh had sought for and obtained a written assurance of perpetual friendship.¹ The impression went abroad that his family would be supported by the English Government, and ostensibly Ranjit Singh's objects seemed wholly, as they had been partly, gained. But his mind was not set at ease about Sind: vague accounts had reached him of some design with regard to that country: he plainly hinted his own schemes, and observed, the Amirs had no efficient troops, and that they could not be well disposed towards the English, as they had thrown difficulties in the way of Lieutenant Burnes' progress.² But the Governor-General would not divulge to his inquiring guest and ally the tenor of propositions already on their way to the chiefs of Sind, confessedly lest the Maharaja should at once endeavour to counteract his peaceful and beneficial intentions.³ Ranjit Singh may or may not have felt that he was distrusted, but as he was to be a party to the opening of the navigation of the Indus, and as the project had been matured, it would have better suited the character and the position of the British Government had no concealment been attempted.

The traveller Moorcroft had been impressed with the use which might be made of the Indus as a channel of British commerce,⁴ and the scheme of navigating that river and its tributaries was eagerly adopted by the Indian Government, and by the advocates of material utilitarianism. One object of sending King William's presents for Ranjit Singh by water, was to ascertain, as if undesignedly, the trading value of the classical

1 Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 166.

2 Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 167. This opinion of Ranjit Singh about Sindhian troops may not be pleasing to the victors of Dabo and Miani, although the Maharaja impugned not their courage, but their discipline and equipment. Shah Shuja's expedition, of 1834, nevertheless, served to show the fairness of Ranjit Singh's conclusions.

3 Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 167, 168. The whole of the tenth chapter of Capt. Murray's book, which includes the meeting at Rupar, may be regarded as the composition of Mr. Prinsep, the Secretary to Government, with the Governor-General.

4 Moorcroft, *Travels*, ii. 328.

stream,¹ and the result of Lieutenant Burnes' observations convinced Lord William Bentinck of its superiority over the Ganges. There seemed also, in his Lordship's opinion, good reason to believe that the great western valley had at one time been as populous as that of the east, and it was thought that the judicious exercise of the paramount influence of the British Government might remove those political obstacles which had banished commerce from the rivers of Alexander.² It was therefore resolved, in the current language of the day, to open the Indus to the navigation of the world.

Before the Governor-General met Ranjit Singh, he had directed Colonel Pottinger to proceed to Hyderabad, to negotiate with the Amirs of Sind the opening of the lower portion of the river to all boats on the payment of a fixed toll;³ and, two months afterwards, towards the end of 1831, he wrote to the Maharaja that the desire he had formerly expressed to see a steam-boat was a proof of his enlightened understanding, and was likely to be gratified before long, as it was wished to draw closer the commercial relations of the two States. Captain Wade was at the same time sent to explain, in person, the object of Colonel Pottinger's mission to Sind, to propose the free navigation of the Sutlej in continuation of that of the Lower Indus, and to assure the Maharaja that, by the extension of British commerce, was not meant the extension of the British power.⁴ But Ranjit Singh, also, had his views and his suspicions.⁵ In the south of the Punjab he had wrought by indirect means, as long as it was necessary to do so among a newly conquered people. The Nawab of Bahawalpur, his manager of the country across to Dera Ghuzi Khan, was less regular in his payments than he should have been, and his expulsion

1 Government to Colonel Pottinger, October 22nd, 1831, and Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 153.

2 Government to Col. Pottinger, 22nd October, 1831.

3 Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 168.

4 Government to Capt. Wade, 19th December, 1831. It is admitted that the mission, or the scheme, had a political reference to Russia and her designs, but the Governor-General would not avow his motives. (Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, p. 168.)

5 Ranjit Singh's attention was mainly directed to Sind, and a rumored matrimonial alliance between one of the Amirs, or the son of one of them, and a Persian princess, caused him some anxiety. (Capt. Wade to Government, 5th August, 1831.)

from the Punjab proper would be profitable, and unaccompanied with danger, if the English remained neuter. Again, Bahawal Khan was virtually a chief protected by the British Government on the left bank of the Sutlej, and Lieutenant Burnes was on his way up the Indus. The Maharaja, ever mistrustful, conceived that the political status of that officer's observation would be referred to and upheld by his Government as the true and permanent one,¹ and hence the envoy found affairs in process of change when he left the main stream of the Indus, and previous to the interview at Rupar, General Ventura had dispossessed Bahawal Khan both of his Lahore farms, and of his ancestral territories on the right bank of the Sutlej.² Further, Shikarpur formed no part of the Sind of the Kalhoras or Talpurs; it had only fallen to the latter usurpers after the death of Muhammad Azim Khan, the Wazir of the titular King, Shah Ayub, and it continued to be held jointly by the three families of Khairpur, Mirpur, and Hyderabad, as a fortuitous possession. Ranjit Singh considered that he, as the paramount of the Barakzais of the Indus, had a better right to the district than the Amirs of south-eastern Sind, and he was bent upon annexing it to his dominions.³

Such was Ranjit Singh's temper of mind when visited by Captain Wade to negotiate the opening of the Sutlej to British traders. The Maharaja avowed himself well pleased, but he had hoped that the English were about to force their way through Sind; he asked how many regiments Colonel Pottinger had with him, and he urged his readiness to march and coerce the Amirs.⁴ It was further ascertained that he had made propositions to Mir Ali Murad, of Mirpur, to farm Dera Ghazi Khan, as if to sow dissensions among the Talpurs, and to gain friends for Lahore, while Colonel Pottinger was winning allies for the English.⁵ But he perceived that the Governor-General had

1 This view appears to have subsequently occurred to Capt. Wade as having influenced the Maharaja. See his letter to Government, 18th October, 1836.

2 Capt. Wade to Government, 5th November, 1831.

3 This argument was continually used by Ranjit Singh. See, for instance, Capt. Wade to Government, 15th January, 1837.

4 Capt. Wade to Government, 1st and 13th February, 1832.

5 Capt. Wade to Government, 21st December, 1831; and Col. Pottinger to Government, 23rd September, 1837.

resolved upon his course, and he gave his assent to the common use of the Sutlej and Indus, and to the residence of a British officer at Mithankot to superintend the navigation.¹ He did not desire to appear as if in opposition to his allies of many years, but he did not seek to conceal from Captain Wade his opinion that the commercial measures of the English had really abridged his political power, when he gave up for the time the intention of seizing Shikarpur.²

The connection of the English with the nations of the Indus was about to be rendered more complicated by the revived hopes of Shah Shuja. That ill-fated King had taken up his abode at Ludhiana, in the year 1821, and he brooded at his leisure over schemes for the reconquest of Khorasan. In 1826 he was in correspondence with Ranjit Singh, who ever regretted that the Shah was not his guest or his prisoner.³ In 1827 he made propositions to the British Government, and he was told that he was welcome to recover his kingdom with the aid of Ranjit Singh, or of the Sindhians, but that, if he failed, his present hosts might not again receive him.⁴ In 1829 the Shah was induced by the strange state of affairs in Peshawar, consequent on Syed Ahmed's ascendancy,⁵ to suggest to Ranjit Singh that, with Sikh aid, he could readily master it, and reign once more an independent sovereign. The Maharaja amused him with vain hopes, but the English repeated their warning, and the ex-King's hopes soon fell.⁶ In 1831 they again rose, for the Talpur Amirs disliked the approach of English envoys, and they gave encouragement to the tenders of their titular monarch.⁷

1 See Appendix A. A tariff on goods was at first talked of, but subsequently a toll on boats was preferred. From the Himalayas to the sea the whole toll was fixed at 570 rupees, of which the Lahore Government got Rs. 155-4-0 for territories on the right bank, and Rs. 39-5-1 for territories on the left bank of the Sutlej. (Government to Capt. Wade, 9th June, 1834, and Capt. Wade to Government, 13th December, 1835.)

2 Capt. Wade to Government, 13th February, 1832.

3 Capt. Wade to the Resident at Delhi, 25th July, 1826.

4 Resident at Delhi to Capt. Wade, 25th July, 1827.

*5 Syed Ahmad, the famous Wahabi leader, occupied Peshawar and established his political influence in the tribal areas.

6 Government to Resident at Delhi, 12th June, 1829.

7 Capt. Wade to Government. 9th September. 1831.

Negotiations were reopened with Ranjit Singh, who was likewise out of humour with the English about Sind, and he was not unwilling to aid the Shah in the recovery of his rightful throne; but the views of the Sikh reached to the Persian frontier as well as to the shores of the ocean, and he suggested that it would be well if the slaughter of kine were prohibited throughout Afghanistan, and if the gates of Somnath were restored to their original temple. The Shah was not prepared for these concessions, and he evaded them, by reminding the Maharaja that his chosen allies, the English, freely took the lives of cows, and that a prophecy foreboded the downfall of the Sikh empire on the removal of the gates from Ghazni.¹

In 1832 a rumoured advance of the Persians against Herat gave further encouragement to Shah Shuja in his designs.² The perplexed Amirs of Sind offered him assistance if he would relinquish his supremacy, and the Shah promised acquiescence if he succeeded.³ To Ranjit Singh the Shah offered to waive his right to Peshawar and other districts beyond the Indus, and also to give an acquittance for the Koh-i-nur diamond, in return for assistance in men and money. The Maharaja was doubtful what to do; he was willing to secure an additional title to Peshawar, but he was apprehensive of the Shah's designs, should the expedition be successful.⁴ He wished, moreover, to know the precise views of the English, and he therefore proposed that they should be parties to any engagement entered into, for he had no confidence, he said, in Afghans.⁵ Each of the three parties had distinct and incompatible objects. Ranjit Singh

1 Capt. Wade to Government, 21st November, 1831. Considering the ridicule occasioned by the subsequent removal by the English of these traditional gates, it may gratify the approvers and originators of that measure to know that they *were* of some local importance. When the author was at Bahawalpur, in 1845, a number of Afghan merchants came to ask him whether their restoration could be brought about—for the repute of the fane (a tomb made a temple by superstition), and the income of its pir or saint, had much declined. They would carefully convey them back, they said, and they added that they understood the Hindus did not want them, and that of course they could be of no value to the Christians!

2 Government to Capt. Wade, 19th October, 1832.

3 Capt. Wade to Government, 15th September, 1832.

4 Capt. Wade to Government, 13th December, 1832.

5 Capt. Wade to Government, 31st December, 1832.

wished to get rid of the English *commercial* objections to disturbing the Amirs of Sind, by offering to aid the rightful *political* paramount in its recovery. The ex-King thought the Maharaja really wished to get him into his power, and the project of dividing Sind fell to the ground.¹ The Talpur Amirs, on their part, thought that they would save Shikarpur by playing into the Shah's hands, and they therefore endeavoured to prevent a coalition between him and the Sikh ruler.²

The Shah could not come to any satisfactory terms with Ranjit Singh, but as his neutrality was essential, especially with regard to Shikarpur, a treaty of alliance was entered into by which the districts beyond the Indus, and in the possession of the Sikhs, were formally ceded to the Maharaja.³ The English had also become less averse to his attempt, and he was assured that his annual stipend would be continued to his family, and no warning was held out to him against returning, as had before been done.⁴ A third of his yearly allowance was even advanced to him: but the Political Agent was at the same time desired to impress upon all people, that the British Government had no interest in the Shah's proceedings, that its policy was one of complete neutrality, and it was added that Dost Muhammad could be so assured in reply to a letter received from him.⁵ Dost Muhammad had mastered Kabul shortly after Muhammad Azim Khan's death, and he soon learnt to become apprehensive of the English. In 1832, he cautioned the Amirs of Sind against allowing them to establish a commercial factory in Shikarpur, as Shah Shuja would certainly soon follow to guard it with an army,⁶ and he next sought, in the usual way, to ascertain the views of the paramounts of India by entering into a correspondence with them.

1 Capt. Wade to Government, 9th April, 1833.

2 Capt. Wade to Government, 27th March, 1833.

3 This treaty, which became the foundation of the Tripartite Treaty of 1838, was drawn up in March, 1833, and finally agreed to in August of that year. (Capt. Wade to Government, 17th June, 1834.) ♦

4 Government to Capt. Wade, 19th December, 1832.

5 Government to Capt. Faithful, Acting Political Agent, 13th December, 1832, and to Capt. Wade, 5th and 9th of March, 1833.

6 The Bahawalpur Memoirs state that such a recommendation was pressed by Dost Muhammad on the Amirs; the belief in the gradual conversion of "Kotis," or residencies or commercial houses, into "Chaonis",

Shah Shuja left Ludhiana in the middle of February, 1833. He had with him about 200,000 rupees in treasure, and nearly 8000 armed followers.¹ He got a gun and some camels from Bahawal Khan, he crossed the Indus towards the middle of May, and he entered Shikarpur without opposition. The Sindhians did not oppose him, but they rendered him no assistance, and they at last thought it better to break with him at once than to put *their* means into *his* hands for their own more assured destruction.² But they were signally defeated near Shikarpur on the 9th January, 1834, and they willingly paid 500,000 rupees in cash, and gave a promise of tribute for Shikarpur, to get rid of the victor's presence.³ The Shah proceeded towards Kandahar, and he maintained himself in the neighbourhood of that city for a few months; but, on the 1st July, he was brought to action by Dost Muhammad Khan and his brothers, and fairly routed.⁴ After many wanderings, and an appeal to Persia and to Shah Kamran, of Herat, and also an attempt upon Shikarpur,⁵ he returned to his old asylum at Ludhiana in March, 1835, bringing with him about 250,000 rupees in money and valuables.⁶

Ranjit Singh, on his part, was apprehensive that Shah Shuja might set aside their treaty of alliance; so he resolved to guard against the possible consequences of the ex-King's probable success, and to seize Peshawar before his tributaries could tender their allegiance to Kabul.⁷ A large force, under the nominal command of the Maharaja's grandson, Nao Nihal Singh, or military cantonnments, having, it may be inferred, become notorious as far as Kabul. Dost Muhammad's main object, however, was to keep Shah Shuja at a distance; and he always seems to have held that he was safe from the English themselves so long as Lahore remained unshaken. For another instance of the extent to which the English were thought to be identified with Shah Shuja, see the *Asiatic Journal*, xix. 38, as quoted by Professor Wilson in Moorcroft's *Travels*, note, p. 340, vol. ii.

1 Capt. Wade to Government, 9th April, 1833.

2 Capt. Wade to Government, 25th August, 1833, and the *Memoirs of the Bahawalpur Family*.

3 Capt. Wade to Government, 30th January, 1834.

4 Capt. Wade to Government, 25th July, 1834.

5 Capt. Wade to Government, 21st October and 29th December, 1834, and 6th February, 1835.

6 Capt. Wade to Government, 19th March, 1835.

7 Capt. Wade to Government, 17th June, 1834.

but really led by Sardar Hari Singh, crossed the Indus, and an increased tribute of horses was demanded on the plea of the prince's presence, for the first time, at the head of an army. The demand would seem to have been complied with, but the citadel of Peshawar was nevertheless assaulted and taken on the 6th May, 1834.¹ The hollow negotiations with Sultan Muhammad Khan are understood to have been precipitated by the impetuous Hari Singh, who openly expressed his contempt for all Afghans, and did not conceal his design to carry the Sikh arms beyond Peshawar.²

In 1833 Ranjit Singh proposed to send a chief to Calcutta with presents for the King of England, and not improbably with the view of ascertaining the general opinion about his designs on Sind. The mission, under Gujar Singh Majithia, finally took its departure in September, 1834, and was absent a year and a half.³

Ranjit Singh's main apprehensions were on the side of Peshawar, and his fondest hopes in the direction of Sind. The defeat which the Amirs had sustained diminished their confidence in themselves, and when Shah Shuja returned beaten from Kandahar, Nur Muhammad of Hyderabad was understood to be willing to surrender Shikarpur to the Maharaja, on condition of his guarantee against the attempts of the ex-King.⁴ But this pretext would not get rid of the English objection; and Ranjit Singh, moreover, had little confidence in the Sindhians. He kept, as a check over them, a representative of the expelled Kalhoras as a pensioner on his bounty, in Rajenpur beyond the Indus;⁵ and, at once to overawe both them and the Barakzais, he again opened a negotiation with Shah Shuja as soon as he

1 Capt. Wade to Government, 19th May, 1834.

2 These views of Hari Singh's were sufficiently notorious in the Punjab, when that chief was a person before the public.

3 Capt. Wade to Government, 11th Sept., 1834, and 4th April, 1836.

4 Capt. Wade to Government, 6th Feb., 1835.

5 Capt. Wade to Government, 17th June, 1834. Sarafaraz Khan, otherwise called Gholam Shah, was the Kalhora expelled by the Talpurs. He received Rajenpur in Jagir from Kabul, and was maintained in it by Ranjit Singh. The place was held to yield 100,000 rupees, including certain rents reserved by the state, but the district was not really worth 30,000 rupees.

returned to Ludhiana.¹ But his main difficulty was with his British allies; and, to prove to them the reasonableness of his discontent, he would instance the secret aid which the Muzari free-booters received from the Amirs;² he would again insist that Shikarpur was a dependency of the chiefs of Khorasan,³ and he would hint that the river below Mithankot was not the Indus but the Sutlej, the river of the treaty,—the stream which had so long given freshness and beauty to the emblematic garden of their friendship, and which continued its fertilizing way to the ocean, separating, yet uniting, the realms of the two brotherly powers of the East!⁴

But the English had formed a treaty of navigation with Sind, and the designs of Ranjit Singh were displeasing to them. They said they could not view without regret and disapprobation the prosecution of plans of unprovoked hostility against states to which *they* were bound by ties of interest and good will.⁵ They therefore wished to dissuade Ranjit Singh against any attempt on Shikarpur; but they felt that this must be done discreetly, for their object was to remain on terms of friendship with every one, and to make their influence available for the preservation of the general peace.⁶ Such were the sentiments of the English; but, in the meantime, the border disputes between the Sikhs and Sindhians were fast tending to produce a rupture. In 1833 the predatory tribe of Muzaris, lying along the right bank of the Indus, below Mithankot, had been chastised by the Governor of Multan, who proposed to put a garrison in their stronghold of Rojhan, but was restrained by the Maha-

1 Capt. Wade to Government, 17th April, 1835, and other letters of the same year. The Maharaja still urged that the English should guarantee, as it were, Shah Shuja's moderation in success; partly, perhaps, because the greatness of the elder dynasty of Ahmad Shah still dwelt in the mind of the first paramount of the Sikhs, but partly also with the view of sounding his European allies as to *their* real intentions.

2 Capt. Wade to Government, 5th Oct., 1836.

3 Capt. Wade to Government, 15th Jan., 1837.

4 Capt. Wade to Government, 5th Oct., 1836.

5 Government to Capt. Wade, 22nd Aug., 1836—This piece will recall to mind the usual argument of the Romans for interference, viz. that *their* friends were not to be molested by strangers.

6 Government to Capt. Wade, 22nd Aug., 1836.

raja from so doing.¹ In 1835 the Amirs of Khairpur were believed to be instigating the Muzaris in their attacks on the Sikh posts; and as the tribe was regarded by the English as dependent on Sind, although possessed of such a degree of separate existence as to warrant its mention in the commercial arrangements as being entitled to a fixed portion of the whole toll, the Amirs were informed that the English looked to them to restrain the Muzaris, so as to deprive Ranjit Singh of all pretext for interference.² The aggressions nevertheless continued, or were alleged to be continued; and in August, 1836, the Multan Governor took formal possession of Rojhan.³ In the October following the Muzaris were brought to action, and defeated, and the Sikhs occupied a fort called Ken, to the south of Rojhan, and beyond the proper limit of that tribe.⁴

Thus was Ranjit Singh gradually feeling his way by force; but the English had, in the mean time, resolved to go far beyond him in diplomacy. It had been determined that Captain Burnes should proceed on a commercial mission to the countries bordering on the Indus, with the view of completing the reopening of that river to the traffic of the world.⁵ But the Maharaja, it was said, should understand that their objects were purely mercantile, and that, indeed, his aid was looked for in establishing somewhere a great entrepot of trade, such as it had once been hoped, might have been commenced at Mithankot.⁶ Yet the views of the British authorities with regard to Sind were inevitably becoming political as well as commercial. The condition of that country, said the Governor-General, had been much thought about, and the result was a conviction that the connection with it should be drawn closer.⁷ The Amirs, he continued, might desire the protection of the English against Ranjit Singh, and previous negotiations, which their fears or their hostility had broken off, might be renewed with a view to giving them

1 Capt. Wade to Government, 27th May, 1835.

2 Government to Capt. Wade, 27th May, 1835, and 5th Sept., 1836; and Government to Col. Pottinger, 19th Sept., 1836.

3 Capt. Wade to Government, 29th Aug., 1836.

4 Capt. Wade to Government, 2nd Nov., 1836.

5 Government to Capt. Wade, 5th Sept., 1836.

6 Government to Capt. Wade, 5th Sept., 1836.

7 Government to Col. Pottinger, 26th Sept., 1836.

assistance; and, finally, it was determined that the English Government should mediate between Ranjit Singh and the Sindhians, and afterwards adjust the other external relations of the Amirs when a Resident should be stationed at Hyderabad.

With regard to Ranjit Singh, the English rulers observed that they were bound by the strongest considerations of political interest to prevent the extension of the Sikh power along the course of the Indus, and that, although they would respect the acknowledged territories of the Maharaja, they desired that his existing relations of peace should not be disturbed; for, if war took place, the Indus would never be opened to commerce. The Political Agent was directed to use every means short of menace to induce Ranjit Singh to abandon his designs against Shikarpur; and Shah Shuja, whose hopes were still great, and whose negotiations were still talked of, was to be told that if he left Ludhiana he must not return, and that the maintenance for his family would be at once discontinued. With regard to the Muzaris, whose lands had been actually occupied by the Sikhs, it was said that their reduction had effected an object of general benefit, and that the question of their permanent control could be determined at a future period.¹

The Sindhians, on their part, complained that the fort of Ken had been occupied, and in reply to Ranjit Singh's demand that their annual complimentary or prudential offerings should be increased, or that a large sum should be paid for the restoration of their captured fort, they avowed their determination to resort to arms.² Nor can there be any doubt that Sind would have been invaded by the Sikhs, had not Colonel Pottinger's negotiations for their protection deterred the Maharaja from an act which he apprehended the English might seize upon to declare *their* alliance at an end. The princes Kharak Singh and Nao Nihal Singh were each on the Indus, at the head of considerable armies, and the remonstrances of the British Political Agent alone detained the Maharaja himself at Lahore. Nevertheless, so evenly were peace and war balanced in Ranjit Singh's mind, that Captain Wade thought it advisable to proceed

1 Government to Capt. Wade, 26th Sept., 1836.

2 Capt. Wade to Government, 2nd Nov. and 13th Dec., 1836.

to his capital to explain to him in person the risks he would incur by acting in open opposition to the British Government. He listened, and at last yielded. His deference, he said, to the wishes of his allies took place of every other consideration; he would let his relations with the Amirs of Sind remain on their old footing, he would destroy the fort of Ken, but he would continue to occupy Rojhan and the Muzari territory.¹ Ranjit Singh was urged by his chiefs not to yield to the demands of the English, for to their understanding it was not clear where such demands would stop; but he shook his head, and asked them what had become of the two hundred thousand spears of the Mararhas !²—and, as if to show how completely he professed to forget or forgive the check imposed on him, invited the Governor-General to be present at Lahore on the occasion of the marriage of the grandson whom he had hoped to hail as the conqueror of Sind.³ Nevertheless he continued to entertain a hope that his objects might one day be attained; he avoided a distinct settlement of the boundary with the Amirs, and of the question of supremacy over the Muzaris.⁴ Neither was he disposed to relinquish Rojhan; the place remained a Sikh possession, and it may be regarded to have become formally such by the submission of the chief of the tribe in the year 1838.⁵

1 Capt. Wade to Government, 3rd Jan., 1837.

2 Compare Capt. Wade to Government, 11th Jan., 1837. Ranjit Singh not unfrequently referred to the overthrow of the Maratha power as a reason for remaining, under all and any circumstances, on good terms with his European allies.

3 Capt. Wade to Government, 5th Jan., 1837.

4 Capt. Wade to Government, 13th and 15th Feb., 8th July and 10th Aug., 1837.

5 Capt. Wade to Government, 9th Jan., 1838.

CHAPTER III

THE SIKHS AND THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR

I. THE TRIPARTITE TREATY OF 1838

[Muhammad Azim Khan died in 1823. He was succeeded by his son, Habibullah, whose "violent proceedings enabled his crafty and unscrupulous uncle, Dost Muhammad Khan, to seize Kabul, Ghazni and Jalalabad as his own, while a second set of his brothers held Kandahar in virtual independence, and a third governed Peshawar as the tributaries of Ranjit Singh . . . But the several brothers were jealous of one another, many desired separate principalities, Dost Muhammad aimed at supremacy, rumours of Persian designs alarmed them on the west, the aggressive policy of Ranjit Singh gave them greater cause of fear on the east". Sultan Muhammad Khan of Peshawar attempted to open negotiations with the British Government in 1829 and again in 1832.¹ "Nawab Jabbar Khan of Kabul likewise addressed letters to the British frontier authority, and in 1832 Dost Muhammad himself directly asked for the friendship of the English.² All these communications were politely acknowledged, but at the same time it was held desirable to avoid all intimacy of connection with rulers so remote."³ In 1854 Dost Muhammad left Kabul to oppose Shah Shuja who had arrived in force at Kandahar. Meanwhile the Sikhs had occupied Peshawar. Dost Muhammad defeated Shah Shuja and then concentrated his attention on recovering Peshawar. He declared war against the Sikhs, assumed the "proud distinction" of *Ghazi* and called himself Amir.⁴]

Dost Muhammad Khan, amid all his exultation, was still willing to use the intervention of unbelievers as well as the arms of the faithful, and he asked the English masters of India to help him in recovering Peshawar.⁵ The youth who had been sent to Ludhiana to become a student,⁶ was invested with the powers of a diplomatist, and the Amir sought to prejudice the British authorities against the Sikhs, by urging that *his* nephew and *their* guest had been treated with suspicion, and had suffered

1 Captain Wade to Government, 19th May and 3rd July, 1832.

2 Captain Wade to Government, 9th July, 1832, and 17th Jan., 1833.

3 Government to Captain Wade, 28th Feb., 1833.

4 Captain Wade to Government, 17th June, 1824; 25th Sept., 1834; 27th Jan., 1835.

5 Capt. Wade to Government, 4th Jan., and 13th Feb., 1835.

*6 Abdul Ghias Khan, son of Nawab Jabbar Khan.

restraint on his way across the Punjab. But the English had not yet thought of requiring him to be an ally for purposes of their own, and Dost Muhammad was simply assured that the son of Nawab Jabbar Khan should be well taken care of on the eastern side of the Sutlej. A direct reply to his solicitation was avoided, by enlarging on the partial truth that the Afghans were a commercial people equally with the English, and on the favourite scheme of the great traffickers of the world, the opening of the Indus to commerce. It was hoped, it was added, that the new impulse given to trade would better help the two Governments to cultivate a profitable friendship, and the wondering Amir, full of warlike schemes, was naively asked, whether he had any suggestions to offer about a direct route for merchandize between Kabul and the great boundary river of the Afghans.¹ The English rulers had also to reply to Ranjit Singh, who was naturally suspicious of the increasing intimacy between his allies and his enemies, and who desired that the European lords might appear rather as his than as Dost Muhammad's supporters; but the Governor-General observed that any endeavours to meditate would lead to consequences seriously embarrassing, and that Dost Muhammad would seem to have interpreted general professions of amity into promises of assistance.²

The two parties were thus left to their own means. Ranjit Singh began by detaching Sultan Muhammad Khan from the Amir, with whom he had sought a refuge on the occupation of Peshawar by the Sikhs; and the ejected tributary listened the more readily to the Maharaja's propositions, as he apprehended that Dost Muhammad would retain Peshawar for himself, should Ranjit Singh be beaten. Dost Muhammad came to the eastern entrance of the Khyber Pass, and Ranjit Singh amused him with proposals until he had concentrated his forces. On the 11th of May, 1835, the Amir was almost surrounded. He was to have been attacked on the 12th, but he thought it prudent to retreat, which he did with the loss of two guns and some baggage. He had designed to carry off the Sikh envoys, and to

1 Government to Capt. Wade, 19th April, 1834, and 11th Feb., 1835. Abdul Ghias Khan reached Ludhiana in June, 1834, and the original intention of sending him to study at Delhi was abandoned.

2 Government to Capt. Wade, 20th April, 1835.

profit by their presence as hostages or as prisoners; but his brother, Sultan Muhammad Khan, to whom the execution of the project had been entrusted, had determined on joining Ranjit Singh, and the rescue of the agents gave him a favourable introduction to the victor. Sultan Muhammad and his brothers had considerable Jaigirs conferred on them in the Peshawar district, but the military control and civil management of the province was vested solely in an officer appointed from Lahore.¹

Dost Muhammad suffered much in general estimation by withdrawing from an encounter with the Sikhs. His hopes in the English had not borne fruit, and he was disposed to court Persia;² but the connection was of less political credit and utility than one with the English, and he tried once more to move the Governor-General in his favour. The Sikhs, he said, were faithless, and he was wholly devoted to the interests of the British Government.³ The Kandahar brothers, also, being pressed by Shah Kamran of Herat, and unable to obtain aid from Dost Muhammad, made propositions to the English authorities; but Kamran's own apprehensions of Persia soon relieved them of their fears, and they did not press their solicitations for European aid.⁴ Ranjit Singh, on his part, disliked an English and Afghan alliance, and sought to draw Dost Muhammad within the vortex of his own influence. He gave the Amir vague hopes of obtaining Peshawar, and he asked him to send him some horses, which he had learnt was a sure way of leading others to believe they had won his favour. Dost Muhammad was not unwilling to obtain a hold on Peshawar, even as a tributary, but he felt that the presentation of horses would be

1 Capt. Wade to Government, 25th April, and 1st, 15th, and 19th May, 1835. Compare Masson, *Journeys*, iii. 342, &c.; Mohan Lal's *Life of Dost Mahomed*, i. 172, &c.; and also Dr. Harlan's *India and Afghanistan*, p. 124, 158. Dr. Harlan himself was one of the envoys sent to Dost Muhammad on the occasion.

The Sikhs are commonly said to have had 80,000 men in the Peshawar valley at this time.

2 Capt. Wade to Government, 23rd Feb., 1836. Dost Muhammad's overtures to Persia seem to have commenced in Sept., 1835.

3 Capt. Wade to Government, 19th July, 1836.

4 Capt. Wade to Government, 9th March, 1836.

declared by the Sikh to refer to Kabul and not to that province.¹ The disgrace of his retreat rankled in his mind, and he at last said that a battle must be fought at all risks.² He was the more inclined to resort to arms, as the Sikhs had sounded his brother, Jabbar Khan, and as Sardar Hari Singh had occupied the entrance of the Khyber Pass and entrenched a position at Jamrud, as the basis of his scheme for getting through the formidable defile.³ The Kabul troops marched and assembled on the eastern side of Khyber, under the command of Muhammad Akbar Khan, the most warlike of the Amir's sons. An attack was made on the post at Jamrud, on the 30th of April, 1837; but the Afghans could not carry it, although they threw the Sikhs into disorder. Hari Singh, by feigning a retreat, drew the enemy more fully into the plains; the brave leader was present everywhere amid his retiring and rallying masses, but he fell mortally wounded, and the opportune arrival of another portion of the Kabul forces converted the confusion of the Sikhs into a total defeat. But two guns only were lost; the Afghans could not master Jamrud or Peshawar itself, and, after plundering the valley for a few days, they retreated rather than risk a second battle with the reinforced army of Lahore.⁴

The death of Hari Singh and the defeat of his army caused some anxiety in Lahore; but the Maharaja promptly roused his people to exertion, and all readily responded to his call. It is stated that field-guns were dragged from Ramnagar, on the Chenab, to Peshawar, in six days, a distance, by road, of more

1 Capt. Wade to Government, 12th April, 1837.

2 Capt. Wade to Government, 1st May, 1837.

3 Capt. Wade to Government, 13th Jan., 1837.

4 Capt. Wade to Government, 13th and 23rd May, and 5th July, 1837. Compare Masson, *Journeys*, iii. 382, 487, and Mohan Lal's *Life of Dost Mahomed*, i. 226 &c.

It seems that the Afghans were at first routed or repulsed with the loss of some guns, but that the opportune arrival of Sams-ud-din Khan, a relation of the Amir, with a considerable detachment, turned the battle in their favour. It is nevertheless believed that had not Hari Singh been killed, the Sikhs would have retrieved the day. The troops in the Peshawar valley had been considerably reduced by the withdrawal of large parties to Lahore, to make a display on the occasion of Nao Nihal Singh's marriage, and of the expected visit of the English Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief.

than two hundred miles.¹ Ranjit Singh advanced in person to Rhotas, and the active Dhian Singh hastened to the frontier, and set an example of devotion and labour by working with his own hands on the foundations of a regular fort at Jamrud.² Dost Muhammad was buoyed up by his fruitless victory, and he became more than ever desirous of recovering a province so wholly Afghan; but Ranjit Singh contrived to amuse him, and the Maharaja was found to be again in treaty with the Amir, and again in treaty with Shah Shuja, and with both at the same time.³ But the commercial envoy of the English had gradually sailed high up the Indus of their imaginary commerce, and to his Government the time seemed to have come when political interference would no longer be embarrassing, but, on the contrary, highly advantageous to schemes of peaceful trade and beneficial intercourse. It was made known that the British rulers would be glad to be the means of negotiating a peace honourable to both parties, yet the scale was turned in favour of the Afghan, by the simultaneous admission that Peshawar was a place to which Dost Muhammad could scarcely be expected to resign all claim.⁴ Nevertheless, it was said, the wishes of Ranjit Singh could be ascertained by Captain Wade, and Captain Burnes could similarly inquire about the views of the Amir. The latter officer was formally invested with diplomatic powers,⁵ and the idle designs, or restless intrigues, of Persians and Russians soon caused the disputes of Sikhs and Afghans to merge in the British scheme of reseating Shah Shuja on the throne of Kabul. At the end of a generation the repose of the English master of India was again disturbed by the rumoured march of European armies,⁶ and their suspicions were further roused by the conduct of the French General, Allard. That officer, after

1 Lient.-Col. Steinbach (*Punjab*, p. 64, 68) mentions that he had himself marched with his Sikh regiment 300 miles in twelve days, and that the distance had been performed by others in eleven.

2 Mr. Clerk's Memorandum of 1842, regarding the Sikh chiefs, drawn up for Lord Ellenborough.

3 Compare Capt. Wade to Government, 3rd June, 1837, and Government to Capt. Wade, 7th Aug., 1837.

4 Government to Capt. Wade, 31st July, 1837.

5 Government to Capt. Wade, 11th Sept., 1837.

6 The idea of Russian designs on India engaged the attention of the British Viceroy in 1831 (see Murray's *Runjeet Singh*, by Prinsep,

a residence of several years in the Punjab, had been enabled to visit his native country, and he returned by way of Calcutta in the year 1836. While in France he had induced his Government to give him a document accrediting him to Ranjit Singh, in case his life should be endangered, or in case he should be refused permission to quit the Lahore dominions. It was understood by the English that the paper was only to be produced to the *Maharaja* in an extremity of the kind mentioned; but General Allard himself considered that it was only to be so laid in form before the *English authorities*, in support of a demand for aid when he might chauce to be straitened. He at once delivered his credentials to the Sikh ruler; it was rumoured that General Allard had become a French Ambassador, and it was some time before the British authorities forgave the fancied deceit, or the vain effrontery of their guest.¹

Ranjit Singh had invited the Governor-General of India, the Governor of Agra (Sir Charles Metcalfe), and the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces to be present at the nuptials of his grandson, which he designed to celebrate with much splendour. The Prince was wedded to a daughter of the Sikh Chief, Shyam Singh Atariwala, in the beginning of March, 1837, but of

p. 168), and it at the same time possessed the inquiring but sanguine mind of Capt. Burnes, who afterwards gave the notion so much notoriety. (See Capt. Wade to Government, 3rd Aug., 1831.)

1 The author gives what the French officers held to be the intended use of the credentials, on the competent authority of General Ventura, with whom he formerly had conversations on the subject. The English view, however, is that which was taken by the British Ambassador in Paris, as well as by the authorities in Calcutta; with whom General Allard was in personal communication. (Government to Capt. Wade, 16th Jan. and 3rd April, 1837).

Of the two views, that of the English is the less honourable, with reference to their duty towards Ranjit Singh, who might have justly resented any attempt on the part of a servant to put himself beyond the power of his master, and any interference in that servant's behalf on the part of the British Government.

In the letter to Ranjit Singh, Louis Philippe is styled, in French, "Empereur" (Capt. Wade to Government, 15th Sept., 1837); a title which, at the time, may have pleased the vanity of the French, although it could not have informed the understandings of the Sikhs, as, agreeably to Persian and Indian practice, King or Queen is always translated "Padshah" equally with Emperor.

the English authorities Sir Henry Fane alone was able to attend. That able Commander was ever a careful observer of military means and of soldierly qualities; he formed an estimate of the force which would be required for the complete subjugation of the Punjab, but at the same time he laid it down as a principle, that the Sutlej and the wastes of Rajputana and Sind were the best boundaries which the English could have in the east.¹ The prospect of a war with the Sikhs was then remote, and hostile designs could not with honour be entertained by a guest. Sir Henry Fane, therefore, entered heartily into the marriage festivities of Lahore, and his active mind was amused with giving shape to a scheme, which the intuitive sagacity of Ranjit Singh had acquiesced in, as pleasing to the just pride or useful vanity of English soldiers. The project of establishing an Order of Merit similar to those dying exponents of warlike skill and chivalrous fraternity among European nations, had been for some time entertained, and although such a system of distinction can be adapted to the genius of any people, the object of the Maharaja was simply to gratify his English neighbours, and advantage was accordingly taken of Sir Henry Fane's presence to establish the "Order of the auspicious Star of the Punjab" on a purely British model.² This method of pleasing, or occupying the attention of the English authorities was not unusual with Ranjit Singh, and he was always ready to inquire concerning matters which interested them, or which might be turned to account by himself. He would ask for specimens of, and for information about, the manufacture of Sambar salt and Malwa opium.³ So early as 1812 he had made trial of the sincerity of his new allies, or had shown his admiration of their

1 These views of Sir Henry Fane's may not be on record, but they were well known to those about his Excellency. His estimate was, as I remember to have heard from Capt. Wade, 67,000 men, and he thought there might be a two years' active warfare.

This visit to Lahore was perhaps mainly useful in enabling Lieut.-Col. Garden, the indefatigable Quarter-master-General of the Bengal army, to compile a detailed map of that part of the country, and which formed the groundwork of all the maps used when hostilities did at last break out with the Sikhs.

2 Capt. Wade to Government, 7th April, 1837.

3 Capt. Wade to the Resident at Delhi, 2nd Jan., 1831, and to Government, 25th Dec., 1835.

skill, by asking for five hundred muskets. These were at once furnished to him; but a subsequent request for a supply of fifty thousand such weapons excited a passing suspicion.¹ He readily entered into a scheme of freighting a number of boats with merchandize for Bombay, and he was praised for the interest he took in commerce, until it was known that he wished the returned cargo to consist of arms for his infantry.² He would have his artillerymen learn gunnery at Ludhiana,³ and he would send shells of zinc to be inspected in the hope that he might receive some hints about the manufacture of iron sharpshooters.⁴ He would inquire about the details of European warfare, and he sought for copies of the pay regulations of the Indian army and of the English practice of courts martial, and bestowed dresses of honour on the translator of these complicated and inapplicable systems,⁵ while, to further satisfy himself, he would ask what punishment had been found an efficient substitute for flogging.⁶ He sent a lad, the relation of one of his chiefs, to learn English at the Ludhiana school, in order, he said, that the youth might aid him in his correspondence with the British Government which Lord William Bentinck had wished to carry on in the English tongue instead of in Persian;⁷ and he sent a number of young men to learn something of medicine at the Ludhiana dispensary, which had been set on foot by the Political Agent—but in order, the Maharaja said, that they might be useful in

1 Capt. Wade to Government, 22nd July, 1836.

2 Compare Government to Capt. Wade, 11th Sept., 1837.

3 Capt. Wade to Government, 7th Dec., 1831.

4 When the restoration of Shah Shuja was resolved on, Ranjit Singh sent shells to Ludhiana to be looked at and commented on, as if, being engaged in one political cause, there should not be any reserve about military secrets!

5 Major Hough, who added to the reputation of the Indian army by his useful publications, put the practice of courts martial into a Sikh dress for Ranjit Singh, (Government to Capt. Wade, 21st November, 1834).

6 Government to Capt. Wade, 18th May, 1835, intimating that solitary confinement had been found a good substitute.

7 Capt. Wade to Government, 11th April, 1835. Some of the Princes of India, all of whom are ever prone to suspicion, were not without a belief that, by writing in English, it was designed to keep them in ignorance of the real views and declarations of their paramount.

his battalions.¹ In such ways, half serious, half idle, did Ranjit Singh endeavour to ingratiate himself with the representatives of a power he could not withstand and never wholly trusted.

Ranjit Singh's rejoicings over the marriage and youthful promise of his grandson were rudely interrupted by the success of the Afghans at Jamrud, and the death of his able leader Hari Singh, as has been already related. The old man was moved to tears when he heard of the fate of the only genuine Sikh chief of his creation;² and he had scarcely vindicated his supremacy on the frontier, by filling the valley of Peshawar with troops, when the English interfered to embitter the short remainder of his life, and to set bounds to his ambition on the west, as they had already done on the east and south. The commercial policy of the British people required that peace and industry should at once be introduced among the half-barbarous tribes of Sind, Khorasan, and the Punjab; and it was vainly sought to give fixed limits to newly-founded feudal Governments, and to impress moderation of desire upon grasping military sovereigns. It was wished that Ranjit Singh should be content with his past achievements; that the Amirs of Sind, and the Chiefs of Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul should feel themselves secure in what they held, but incapable of obtaining more; and that the restless Shah Shuja should quietly abandon all hope of regaining the crown of his daily dreams.³ These were the views which the English Viceroy required his agents to impress on Talpurs, Barakazis, and Sikhs, and their impracticability might have quietly and harmlessly become apparent, had not Russia found reason and opportunity to push her intrigues, through Persia and

1 Some of these young men were employed with the force raised at Peshawar, in 1839, to enable Prince Timur to march through Khyber.

2 Capt. Wade to Government, 13th May, 1837, quoting Dr. Wood, a surgeon in the British army, temporarily deputed to attend on Ranjit Singh and who was with his camp at Rhotas on this occasion.

3 Compare Government to Capt. Wade, 13th Nov., 1837, and to Capt. Burnes and Capt. Wade, both of the 20th January, 1838. With regard to Sind, also, the views of Ranjit Singh were not held to be pleasing, and the terms of his communication with the Amirs were thought equivocal, or denotative of a reservation, or of the expression of a right he did not possess. (Government to Capt. Wade, 25th Sept., and 13th Nov., 1837).

Turkistan, to the banks of the Indus.¹ The desire of effecting a reconciliation between Ranjit Singh and Dost Muhammad induced the British Government to offer its mediation;² the predilections of its frank and enterprising envoy led him to seize upon the admission that the Amir could scarcely be expected to resign all pretensions to Peshawar.³ The crafty chief made use of this partiality, and of the fact that his friendship was courted, to try and secure himself against the only power he really feared, *vis.* that of the Sikhs; and he renewed his overtures to Persia and welcomed a Russian emissary, with the view of intimidating the English into the surrender of Peshawar, and into a guarantee against Ranjit Singh. Friendly assurances to the Kandahar brothers, and a hint that the Sikhs were at liberty to march on Kabul, would have given Dost Muhammad a proper sense of his insignificance,⁴ but the truth and the importance of his hostile designs were both believed or assumed by the British Govern-

1 Without reference to the settled policy of Russia, or to what she may always have thought of the virtual support which England gave to Persia and Turkey against her power, the presence of inquiring agents in Khorasan and Turkistan, and the progressive extension of the British Indian dominion, must have put her on the alert, if they did not fill her with reasonable suspicions.

2 Government to Capt. Wade, 31st July, 1837.

3 These predilections of Sir Alexander Burnes, and the hopes founded on them by Dost Muhammad, were sufficiently notorious to those in personal communication with that valuable pioneer of the English; and his strong wish to recover Peshawar, at least for Sultan Muhammad Khan, is distinctly stated in his own words, in Masson's *Journeys* (iii. 423). The idea of taking the district from the Sikhs, either for Dost Muhammad or his brothers, is moreover apparent from Sir Alexander Burnes' published letters, of 5th Oct., 1837, and 26th Jan. and 13th March, 1838 (Parliamentary Papers, 1839), from the Government replies of remark and caution, dated 20th Jan., and especially of 27th April, 1838, and from Mr. Masson's statements (*Journeys*, iii. 423, 448). Mr. Masson himself thought it would be but justice to restore the district to Sultan Muhammad Khan, while Munshi Mohan Lal (*Life of Dost Mohamed*, i. 257, &c.) represents the Amir to have thought that the surrender of Peshawar to his brother would have been more prejudicial to his interests than its retention by the Sikhs.

4 Such were Capt. Wade's views, and they are sketched in his letters of the 15th May, and 28th Oct., 1837, with reference to commercial objects, although the line of policy may not have been steadily adhered to, or fully developed.

ment, while the rumours of northern invasion were eagerly received and industriously spread by the vanquished Princes of India, and the whole country vibrated with the hope that the uncongenial domination of the English was about to yield to the ascendancy of another and less dissimilar race.¹ The recall of Captain Burnes from Kabul gave speciousness to the wildest statements; the advantage of striking some great blow became more and more obvious; for the sake of consistency it was necessary to maintain peace on the Indus, and it was wisely resolved to make a triumphant progress through Central Asia, and to leave Shah Shuja as a dependent Prince on his ancestral throne. The conception was bold and perfect; and had it been steadily adhered to, the whole project would have eminently answered the ends intended, and would have been, in every way, worthy of the English name.²

In the beginning of 1838 the Governor-General did not contemplate the restoration of Shah Shuja³; but in four months the scheme was adopted, and in May of that year Sir William Macnaghten was sent to Ranjit Singh to unfold the views of the British Government.⁴ The Maharaja grasped at the first idea

1 The extent to which this feeling was prevalent is known to those who were observers of Indian affairs at the time, and it is dwelt upon in the Governor-General's minute of the 20th Aug., 1839.

2 The Governor-General's minute of 12th May, 1838, and his declaration of the 1st October, of the same year, may be referred to as summing up the views which moved the British Government on the occasion. Both were published by order of Parliament in March, 1839.

3 Government to Capt. Wade, 20th Jan., 1838.

4 The proximate cause of the resolution to restore Shah Shuja was, of course, the preference given by Dost Muhammad to a Persian and Russian over a British alliance, and the immediate object of deputing Sir W. Macnaghten to Lahore was to make Ranjit Singh as much as possible a party to the policy adopted. (See, among other letters, Government to Capt. Wade, 15th May, 1838). The deputation crossed into the Punjab at Rupar on the 20th May. It remained some time at Adinanagar, and afterwards went to Lahore. The first interview with Ranjit Singh was on the 31st May, the last on the 13th July. Sir William Macnaghten recrossed the Sutlej at Ludhiana on the 15th July and on that and the following day he arranged with Shah Shuja in person the terms of his restoration.

Two months before the deputation waited upon Ranjit Singh, he had visited Jammu for apparently the first time in his life, and the same may be regarded as the last in which the worn-out Prince tasted of unalloyed

which presented itself, of making use of the Shah at the head of his armies, with the proclaimed support of the paramount power in India; but he disliked the complete view of the scheme, and the active co-operation of his old allies. It chafed him that he was to resign all hope of Shikarpur, and that he was to be inclosed within the iron arms of the English rule. He suddenly broke up his camp at Adinanagar, leaving the British envoys to follow at their leisure, or to return, if they pleased, to Simla; and it was not until he was told the expedition would be undertaken whether he chose to share in it or not, that he assented to a modification of his own treaty with Shah Shuja, and that the triple alliance was formed for the subversion of the power of the Barakznis.¹ The English, on their part, insisted on a double invasion of Afghanistan: first, because the Amirs of Sind disliked a proffered treaty of alliance or dependence, and they could conveniently be coerced as tributaries by Shah Shuja on his way to Kandahar; and, secondly, because it was not deemed prudent to place the ex-King in the hands of Ranjit Singh, who might be tempted to use him for Sikh rather than for British objects.² It was, therefore, arranged that the Shah himself

happiness. Golab Singh received his sovereign with every demonstration of loyalty, and, bowing to the Maharaja's feet, he laid before him presents worth nearly forty thousand pounds, saying he was the humblest of his slaves, and the most grateful of those on whom he had heaped favours. Ranjit Singh shed tears, but afterwards pertinently observed that, in Jammu, gold might be seen where formerly there was nought but stones. (Major Mackeson's letter to Capt. Wade, 31st March, 1838).

1 That Ranjit Singh was told he would be left out if he did not choose to come in, does not appear on public record. It was, however, the only convincing argument used during the long discussions, and I think Major Mackeson was made the bearer of the message to that effect.

2 Compare the Governor-General's minute of 12th of May, 1838, and his instructions to Sir William Macnaghten of the 15th of the same month. Ranjit Singh was anxious to get something lasting and tangible as his share of the profit of the expedition, and he wanted Jalalabad, as there seemed to be a difficulty about Shikarpur. The Maharaja got, indeed, a subsidy of two hundred thousand rupees a year from the Shah for the use of his troops; a concession which did not altogether satisfy the Governor-General (see letter to Sir William Macnaghten, 2nd July, 1838), and the article became, in fact, a dead letter.

The idea of creating a friendly power in Afghanistan, by guiding Ranjit Singh upon Kabul, seems to have been seriously entertained, and it was a scheme which promised many solid advantages. Compare the

should march by way of Shikarpur and Quetta, while his son moved on Kabul by the road of Peshawar, and at the head of a force provided by the Maharaja of the Punjab. The British force assembled at Ferozepur towards the close of 1838, and further eclat was given to the opening of a memorable campaign, by an interchange of hospitalities between the English Viceroy and the Sikh Ruler.¹ Ostensibly Ranjit Singh had reached the summit of his ambition; he was acknowledged to be an arbiter in the fate of that empire which had tyrannized over his peasant forefathers, and he was treated with the greatest distinction by the foreign paramounts of India: but his health had become seriously impaired; he felt that he was in truth fairly in collision with the English, and he became indifferent about the careful fulfilment of the engagements into which he had entered. Shahzada Timur marched from Lahore in January, 1839, accompanied by Colonel Wade as the British representative; but it was with difficulty the stipulated auxiliary force was got together at Peshawar, and although a considerable army at last encamped in the valley, the commander, the Maharaja's grandson, thwarted the negotiations of Prince Timur and the English Agent, endeavouring to gain friends for Lahore rather than for the proclaimed sovereign of the Afghans.² Ranjit

Governor-General's minute, 12th May, 1838, the author's abstract of which differs somewhat from the copy printed by order of Parliament in 1839, and Mr. Masson (*Journeys*, iii. 487, 488) who refers to a communication for Sir William Macnaghten on the subject. For the treaty about the restoration of Shah Shuja, see Appendix.

1 At one of the several meetings which took place on this occasion, there was an interchange of compliments, which may be noticed. Ranjit Singh likened the friendship of the two states to an apple, the red and yellow colours of which were, he said, so blended, that although the semblance was twofold, the reality was one. Lord Auckland replied that the Maharaja's simile was very happy, inasmuch as red and yellow were the national colours of the English and Sikhs respectively; to which Ranjit Singh rejoined in the same strain that the comparison was indeed in every way appropriate, for the friendship of the two powers was, like the apple, fair and delicious. The translations were given in English and Urdu with elegance and emphasis by Sir William Macnaghten and Fakir Aziz-ud-din, both of whom were masters, although in different ways, of language, whether written or spoken.

2 See, among other letters, Capt. Wade to Government, 18th Aug., 1839. For some interesting details regarding Cap. Wade's military proceedings, see Lieut. Barr's published *Journal*, and for the diplomatic

Singh's health continued to decline. He heard of the fall of Kandahar in April, and the delay at that place may have served to cheer his vexed spirit with the hope that the English would yet be baffled; but he died on the 27th of June, at the age of fifty-nine, before the capture of Ghazni and the occupation of Kabul, and the forcing of the Khyber Pass with the aid of his own troops, placed the seal of success on a campaign in which he was an unwilling sharer.

II. THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR

Before Ranjit Singh's death the Rajas of Jammu had usurped to themselves the whole of the functions of Government, which the absence of Nao Nihal Singh enabled them to do with little difficulty. The imbecile Kharak Singh was acknowledged as the master of the Punjab; but Sher Singh, the reputed son of the deceased King, at once urged his superior claims or merits on the attention of the British Viceroy;¹ and Nao Nihal Singh, the real offspring of the titular sovereign, hastened from Peshawar to take upon himself the duties of ruler. The Prince, a youth of eighteen, was in his heart opposed to the proclaimed minister and the Rajas of Jammu; but the ascendancy of one Chait Singh over the weak mind of the Maharaja, and Kharak Singh's own desire of resting upon the influence of the British Agent, induced the two parties to coalesce, first for the destruction of the minion and afterwards for the removal of Colonel Wade. That officer had stood high with Ranjit Singh as a liberal construer of Sikh rights, or as one who would carefully show how a collision with the English was to be avoided; he had steadily refused to make Dhian Singh the medium of his communications with the old Maharaja; he had offended the heir-apparent by unceremoniously accusing him of machination with history, so to speak, of his mission, see Munshi Shahamat Ali's *Sikhs and Afghans*.

¹ Government to Mr. Clerk, 12th July, 1839. Mr. Clerk, who was acting for Col. Wade while absent at Peshawar, seems to have detained Sher Singh's messenger, and to have sent his letter to the Governor-General somewhat in that ordinary spirit of Indian correspondence, which "transmits" every thing "for information and for such orders as may seem necessary." Lord Auckland hastily desired Sher Singh to be told Kharak Singh was his master.

Afghan chiefs; and in the eyes of the Sikhs he was pledged to Kharak Singh at all hazards, by the prominent part he had taken in the meeting at Rupar before noticed. His presence was thus disliked, and his interference dreaded by men not inclined to wholly yield themselves to English counsels, and yet accustomed to see the suggestions of the Governor-General regularly carried into effect by the sovereign of Lahore.

The privacy of the Maharaja's household was rudely violated by the Prince and Minister at daybreak on the 8th of October, 1839, and Chait Singh was awakened from his slumbers to be put to death, within a few paces of his terrified master.¹ The removal of Colonel Wade was mixed up with the passage of British troops across the Punjab, and had to be effected in another manner.

The Governor-General had designed that the Anglo-Indian army which accompanied Shah Shuja should return by way of Peshawar, instead of retracing its steps through the Bolan Pass; and when his Lordship visited Ranjit Singh at Lahore, the proposition was verbally conceded, although not definitely settled by an interchange of letters.² In September, 1839, Mr. Clerk was sent on a mission of condolence and congratulation to the new Maharaja, and to finally arrange about the return of Lord Keane with the stormers of Ghazni. The Prince and Minister were each conscious of their mutual enmity, and secret design of grasping supremacy, but they were even more averse to the presence of a British army in the heart of the Punjab than to one hovering in a distant frontier. It might be used to take part with one or other claimant, or it might be turned against both in favour of the condemned Kharak Singh; but the passage of the troops could not be wholly refused, and they therefore

¹ Golab Singh was perhaps the most prominent and resolute actor in this tragedy, although his brother and Nao Nihal Singh were both present. Col. Wade was desired to express to the Lahore Court the regret of the British Government that such a scene of violence should have occurred (Government to Col. Wade, 28th Oct., 1839); and similarly Mr. Clerk had been directed to explain to Kharak Singh the disapprobation with which the English viewed the practice of *Sati* with reference to what had taken place at his father's funeral. (Government to Mr. Clerk, 20th Aug., 1839).

² Government to Mr. Clerk, 20th Aug., 1839.

urged a march by the difficult route of Dera Ismail Khan, and they succeeded in fixing upon a line which prudently avoided the capital and also in obtaining a premature assurance that an English force should not again march through Sikh country.¹ The chiefs were pleased with the new English negotiator, as all have ever been with that prompt and approved functionary. Something is always expected from a change, and when a return mission was deputed to Simla, it was whispered that Colonel Wade had made himself personally objectionable to those who exercise sway at Lahore; and the complaint was repeated to Lord Keane, when he quitted his army for a few days to visit the Maharaja.² In the month of November (1839), Colonel Wade was himself at the Sikh metropolis on his way from Kabul, but Kharak Singh was kept at distance on pretence of devotional observances, lest he should throw himself on the protection of one believed to be ill-disposed towards those who sought his life, or his virtual relinquishment of power.³

A portion of the British army of invasion had eventually to be left in Afghanistan, as it was thought that Shah Shuja could not maintain himself without support. The wants of regular forces are manifold, and a supply of stores and ammunition had to be collected for transmission to Kabul on Colonel Wade's resumption of his duties at Ludhiana, towards the end of 1839. It was desired to send a regiment of Sepoys as a guard with the convoy, but the Sikh Minister and heir-apparent urged that such could not be done under the terms of the agreement concluded a few months previously. The aversion to their old English

1 Mr. Clerk to Government, 14th Sept., 1839. The Governor-General was not satisfied that a kind of pledge had been given that British troops should not again cross the Punjab. (Government to Mr. Clerk, 14th Oct., 1839).

2 See, particularly, Government to Col. Wade, 29th Jan., 1840, and Col. Wade to Government, 1st April, 1840.

3 Compare Munshi Shahamat Ali's *Sikhs and Afghans*, p. 545, &c., and some remarks in a note, p. 545., about the English policy generally towards Kharak Singh, which note may safely be held to be Col. Wade's own. Doubtless had Col. Wade continued to enjoy the complete confidence or support of the Governor-General, the subsequent history of the Punjab would have been different from, if not better than that which all witnessed. So much might the British representative effect at an Indian court, without directly interfering, provided he was at once firm, judicious, and well-informed.

representative was mixed up with the general objection to making their country a common highway for foreign armies, and they thus ventured to offer obstructions to the speedy equipment of the isolated British forces, mainly with the view of discrediting Colonel Wade. The Governor-General was justly impressed with the necessity of keeping open the straight road to Kabul, and he yielded to the wishes of the Lahore factions and removed his Agent, but not before Dhian Singh and the Prince had despaired of effecting their object, and had allowed the convoy, bristling with bayonets, to proceed on its way.¹ In the beginning of April, 1840, Mr. Clerk succeeded to the charge of the British relations with the Punjab; and independent of his general qualifications, he was the person best suited to the requirements of the time; for the very reason which rendered the Agency of Colonel Wade invaluable when it was desired to preserve Sind and to invade Afghanistan, now rendered that of Mr. Clerk equally beneficial to the indeterminate policy of the English in India. Both officers had the confidence of the *de facto* Sikh rulers of the time, and all their recommendations were held to be given in a spirit of good will towards the Government of the Punjab, as well as in obedience to the dictates of British interests.

The Sikh Prince and the English Viceroy had thus each accomplished the objects of the moment. On the one hand, the Maharaja was overawed by the vigour and success of his aspiring son, and, on the other, the Punjab was freely opened to the passage of British troops, in support of a policy which connected the west of Europe with the south of Asia by an unbroken chain of alliances. The attention of each party was next turned to other matters of near concern, and the English recurred to their favourite scheme of navigating the Indus, and forming an *entrepot* on that river, which should at once become the centre of a vast traffic.²

1 The Governor-General was about to proceed to Calcutta, which made him the more desirous of having an Agent on the frontier, at once approved of by himself and agreeable to the Sikhs, i.e. to the influential parties for the time being at Lahore. (Government to Col. Wade, 29th Jan. 1840)

2 Government to Mr. Clerk, 4th May, 1840. The establishment of a great *entrepot* of trade was a main feature of the scheme for opening the navigation of the Indus. (Government to Capt. Wade, 5th Sept. 1836)

The treaty of 1834 had placed a toll on boats which used the channels of the Indus and Sutlej, and in 1839 the Sikhs deferred to the changing views of their allies, and put the duty on the goods themselves, according to an assumed *ad valorem* scale, instead of on the containing vessels.¹ This scheme inevitably gave rise to a system of search and detention, and in June, 1840, the tolls upon the *boats* were again re-imposed, but at reduced rates, and with the omission of such as contained grain, wood, and limestone.² But in spite of every Government endeavour, and of the adventitious aid of large consuming armies, the expectation of creating an active and valuable commerce by the Indus was not been fulfilled; partly because Sind and Afghanistan were, in truth, unproductive countries on the whole, and were inhabited by half savage races, with few wants and scanty means; and partly because a large capital had for ages been embarked in the land trade which connected the north of India with the south, which traversed the old principalities of Rajputana and the fertile plains of Malwa, and which gave a livelihood to the owners of numerous herds of camels and black cattle. To change the established economy of prudent merchants must be the work of time in a country long subject to political commotion, and the idea of forming an emporium by proclamation savoured more of Eastern vanity than of English sense and soberness.³

Naon Nihal Singh's great aim was to destroy, or to reduce to insignificance, the potent Raja of Jammu who wished to engross the whole power of the state, and who jointly held Ladakh and the hill principalities between the Ravi and Jhelum

1 Mr. Clerk to Government, 19th May and 18th Sept. 1839, and Government to Mr. Clerk, 20th Aug. 1839. For the agreement itself, see Appendix.

2 Mr. Clerk to Government, 5th May, and 15th July, 1840. For the agreement itself, see Appendix. Subsequently, idle discussions occasionally arose with local authorities, as to whether bamboos were wood, and whether rice was comprehended under the technical term "grain," which it was not in India. Similarly the limited meaning of "corn" in England had, perhaps, given rise to the phrase "bread-stuffs."

3 Nevertheless the experiment was repeated in 1846, on the annexation of the Jalandhar Doab, when it was hoped, but equally in vain, that Hoshiarpur might suddenly become a centre of exchange.

in fief, besides numerous estates in various parts of the Punjab. He took advantage of the repeated dilatoriness of the Mandi and other Rajput chiefs around Kangra in paying their stipulated tribute, to move a large force into the eastern hills; and the resistance his troops experienced amid mountain fastnesses seemed fully to justify the continuous dispatch of reinforcement. His design was, to place a considerable army immediately to the north-east of Jammu, to be ready to co-operate with the troops which could reach that place in a few marches from Lahore. The commanders chosen were the skilful General Ventura and the ardent young chief Ajit Singh Sindhanwala, neither of whom bore good will towards Raja Dhian Singh.¹ The plans of the youthful Prince thus seemed in every way well devised for placing the Rajas in his grasp, but his attention was distracted by disputes with the English authorities about the limits of the expanding dominion of Lahore and of the restored empire of Kabul, and by a direct accusation not only of encouraging turbulent refugees from Shah Shuja's power, but of giving friendly assurances to Dost Muhammad Khan, who was then preparing for that inroad which fluttered the English authorities in Khorasan, and yet paved the way for the surrender of their dreaded enemy. Shah Shuja claimed all places not specified in the treaty, or not directly held by Lahore; nor can it be denied that the English functionaries about the Shah were disposed to consider old Durani claims as more valid than the new rights of Sikh conquerors; and thus the *Province* of Peshawar, which the Punjab Government further maintained to have been ceded in form by the Shah separately in 1834, as well as by the treaty of 1838, was proposed to be reduced to strips of land along the banks of its dividing river.² Intercepted papers were produced, bearing the seals of Nao Nihal Singh, and promising pecuniary aid to Dost Muhammad, but the charge of treachery was calmly repelled, the seals were alleged to be forgeries and the British Agent for the Punjab admitted that it was not the character of the free and confident Sikhs to resort to secret and

1 Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 6th Sept., 1840.

2 See particularly Sir Wm. Macnaghten to Government, 28th Feb. and 12th March, 1840.

traitorous correspondence.¹ The Barakzai chief, Sultan Muhammad Khan, was, however, made to lead as prisoners to Ludhiana the Ghilzai rebels who had sought an asylum in his fief of Kohat, near Peshawar, and whose near presence disturbed the antagonistic rule of the arbitrary Shah and his moderate English allies.²

Nao Nihal Singh thus seemed to have overcome the danger which threatened him on the side of England, and to be on the eve of reducing the overgrown power of his grandfather's favourites. At the same time the end of the Maharaja's life was evidently approaching; and although his decline was credibly declared to have been hastened by drugs as well as by unfilial harshness, there was none who cared for a ruler so feeble and unworthy. Kharak Singh at last died on the 5th November, 1840, prematurely old and care-worn, at the age of thirty-eight, and Nao Nihal Singh became a King in name as well as in power; but the same day dazzled him with a crown and deprived him of life. He had performed the last rites at the funeral pyre of his father, and he was passing under a covered gateway with the eldest son of Golar Singh by his side, when a portion of the structure fell, and killed the Minister's nephew on the spot, and so seriously injured the Prince, that he became senseless at the time, and expired during the night. It is not positively known that the Rajas of Jammu thus designed to remove Nao Nihal Singh; but it is difficult to acquit them of the crime, and it is certain that they were capable of committing it. Self-defence is the only palliation, for it is equally certain that the Prince was compassing their degradation, and, perhaps, their destruction.³ Nao Nihal Singh was killed in his

1 Government to Mr. Clerk, 1st Oct., 1840, and Mr. Clerk to Government, 9th Dec. 1840. Compare, however, Col. Steinbach (*Punjab*, p. 23), who states that the Prince was rousing Nepal as well as Kabul to aid him in expelling the English; forgetful that Nao Nihal Singh's first object was to make himself master of the Punjab by destroying the Jammu Rajas.

2 Government to Mr. Clerk, 12th Oct., and Mr. Clerk to Government, 14th May, 10th Sept., and 24th Oct., 1840.

3 Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 6th, 7th, and 10th Nov., 1840, who further, in his memorandum of 1842, drawn up for Lord Ellenborough, mentions Gen. Ventura's opinion that the fall of the gateway was accidental. Lieut.-Col. Steinbach, *Punjab*, p. 24, and Major Smyth, *Reigning Family of Lahore* (p. 35, &c.), may be quoted as giving some particulars,

twentieth year; he promised to be an able and vigorous ruler; and had his life been spared, and had not English policy partly forestalled him, he would have found an ample field for his ambition in Sind, in Afghanistan, and beyond the Hindu Kush; and he might perhaps, at last, have boasted that the inroads of Mahmud and Timur had been fully avenged by the aroused peasants of India.

The good-natured voluptuary, Sher Singh, was regarded by the Sikh Minister and by the British Agent as the only person who could succeed to the sovereignty of the Punjab; and as he was absent from Lahore when the Maharaja died and his son was killed, Dhian Singh concealed the latter circumstance as long as possible, to give Sher Singh time to collect his immediate friends; and the English representative urged him by message to maintain good order along the frontier, as men's minds were likely to be excited by what had taken place.¹ But Sher Singh's paternity was more than doubtful²; he possessed no commanding and few popular qualities; the Rajas of Jammu were odious to the majority of the Sikh chiefs; and thus Chand Kaur, the widow of Kbarak Singh, and the mother of the slain Prince, assumed to herself the functions of regent or ruler, somewhat unexpectedly indeed, but still unopposed at the moment by those whom she had surprised. She was supported by several men of reputation, but mainly by the Sindhanwala family, which traced to a near and common ancestor with Ranjit Singh. The lady herself talked of adding to the claims of the youthful Hira Singh, by adopting him, as he had really, if not formally, been adopted by the old Maharaja. She further distracted the factions by declaring that her daughter-in-law was pregnant; and one party tried to gain her over by suggesting a marriage with Sher Singh, an alliance which she spurned, and the other more reasonably proposed Attar Singh Sindhanwala as a suitable partner, for she might have taken an honoured station in household agreeably to

the latter on the authority of an eye-witness, a European adventurer, known as Captain Gardner, who was present a part of the time, and whose testimony is unfavourable to Raja Dhian Singh.

¹ Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 7th Nov. 1840, and also Mr. Clerk's Memorandum of 1842.

² Cunningham says that Ranjit Singh "perhaps always gave credence to the report that Sher Singh was the son of a carpenter".

the latitude of village custom in the north-west of India. But the widow of the Maharaja loudly asserted her own right to supreme power, and after a few weeks the Government was stated to be composed, 1st of the "Mai," or "Mother," pre-eminently as sovereign, or as regent for the expected offspring of Nao Nihal Singh; 2nd, of Sher Singh as vicegerent, or as president of the council of state; and 3d. of Dhian Singh as Wazir, or executive Minister. The compromise was a mere temporary expedient and Dhian Singh and Sher Singh soon afterwards began to absent themselves for varying periods from Lahore : the one partly in the hope that the mass of business which had arisen with the English, and with which he was familiar, would show to all that his aid was essential to the Government; and the other, or indeed both of them, to silently take measures for gaining over the army with promises of donatives and increased pay, so that force might be resorted to at a fitting time. But the scorn with which Sher Singh's hereditary claim was treated made the Minister doubtful whether a more suitable instrument might not be necessary, and the English authorities were accordingly reminded of what perhaps they have never known, viz. that Rani Jindan, a favourite wife or concubine of Ranjit Singh, had borne to him a son named Dalip, a few months before the conferences took place about reseating Shah Shuja on the throne of Kabul.¹

The British Viceroy did not acknowledge Mai Chand Kaur as the undoubted successor of her husband and son, or as the sovereign of the country; but he treated her Government as one *de facto*, so far as to carry on business as usual through the accredited Agents of either power. The Governor-General's anxiety for preservation of order in the Punjab was nevertheless considerable; and it was increased by the state of affairs in Afghanistan, for the attempts of Dost Muhammad and the resolution of meeting him with English means alone, rendered the despatch of additional troops necessary, and before Kharak Singh's death three thousand men had reached Ferozpur on their

1 Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, of dates between the 10th Nov. 1840, and 2nd Jan. 1841, inclusive, particularly of the 11th and 24th Nov. and 11th Dec., besides those specified. It seems almost certain that the existence of the boy Dalip was not before known to the British authorities.

way to Kabul.¹ The progress of this strong brigade was not delayed by the contentions at Lahore; it pursued its march without interruption, and on its arrival at Peshawar it found Dost Muhammad a prisoner instead of a victor. The ex-Amir journeyed through the Punjab escorted by a relieved brigade; and although Sher Singh was then laying siege to the citadel of Lahore, the original prudence of fixing a route for British troops clear of the Sikh capital, and the complete subjugation of the Mahomedan tribes, left the English commander unaware of the struggle going on, except from ordinary reports and news-writers.²

The English Government made indeed no declaration with regard to the Lahore succession; but it was believed by all that Sher Singh was looked upon as the proper representative of the kingdom, and the advisers of *Mai Chand Kaur* soon found that they could not withstand the specious claims of the Prince, and the commanding influence of the British name, without throwing themselves wholly on the support of Raja Dhian Singh. That chief was at one time not unwilling to be the sole Minister of the Maharani, and the more sagacious Golab Singh saw advantages to his family amid the complex modes necessary in a female rule, which might not attend the direct sway of a Prince of average understanding, inclined to favouritism, and pledged to Sikh principles. But the *Mai's* councillors would not consent to be thrown wholly into the shade, and Dhian Singh thus kept aloof, and secretly assured Sher Singh of his support at a fitting time. The Prince, on his part, endeavoured to sound the English Agent as to his eventual recognition, and he was satisfied with the reply, although he merely received an assurance that the allies of thirty-two years wished to see a strong Government in the Punjab.³

Sher Singh had, with the Minister's aid, gained over some divisions of the army, and he believed that all would declare for

1 Government to Mr. Clerk, 1st and 2nd Nov., 1840, and other letters to and from that functionary.

2 The returning brigade was commanded by the veteran Col. Wheeler, whose name was familiar to the public in connection both with Afghan and Sikh wars.

3 See Mr. Clerk's letters to Government of Dec., 1840 and Jan., 1841, generally, particularly that of the 9th Jan.

him if he boldly put himself at their head. The eagerness of the Prince, or of his immediate followers, somewhat precipitated measures; and when he suddenly appeared at Lahore on the 14th January, 1841, he found that Dhian Singh had not arrived from Jammu, and that Golab Singh would rather fight for the Maharani, the acknowledged head of the state, than tamely become a party on compulsion to his ill-arranged schemes. But Sher Singh was no longer his own master, and the impetuous soldiery at once proceeded to breach the citadel. Golab Singh in vain urged some delay, or a suspension of hostilities; but on the 18th January, Dhian Singh and most of the principal chiefs had arrived and ranged themselves on one side or the other. A compromise took place; the *Mai* was outwardly treated with every honour, and large estates were conferred upon her; but Sher Singh was proclaimed Maharaja of the Punjab, Dhian Singh was declared once more to be Wazir of the state, and the pay of the soldiery was permanently raised by one rupee per mensem. The Sindhanwalas felt that they must be obnoxious to the new ruler; and Attar Singh and Ajit Singh took early measures to effect their escape from the capital, and eventually into the British territories; but Lehna Singh, the other principal member, remained with the division of the army which he commanded in the hills of Kulu and Mandi.¹

Sher Singh had induced the troops of the state to make him a King, but he was unable to command them as soldiers, or to sway them as men, and they took advantage of his incapacity and of their own strength to wreak their vengeance upon various officers who had offended them, and upon various regimental accountants and muster-masters who may have defrauded them of their pay. Some houses were plundered and several individuals were seized and slain. A few Europeans had likewise rendered themselves obnoxious; and General Court, a moderate and high-minded man, had to fly for his life, and a brave young Englishman named Foulkes was cruelly put to death. Nor was this spirit of violence confined to the troops at the capital, or to those in the eastern hills, but it spread to Kashmir and Peshawar; and in the former place, Mihan Singh, the Governor,

¹ See Mr. Clerk's letters, of dates from 17th to 30th Jan., 1841.

was killed by the soldiery; and in the latter, General Avitabile was so hard pressed, that he was ready to abandon his post and to seek safety in Jajalabad.¹ It was believed at the time, that the army would not rest satisfied with avenging what it considered its own injuries; it was thought it might proceed to a general plunder or confiscation of property; the population of either side of the Sutlej was prepared for an extensive commotion, and the wealthy merchants of Amritsar prophesied the pillage of their warehouses, and were clamorous for British protection. Sher Singh shrunk within himself appalled, and he seemed timorously to resort to the English Agent for support against the fierce spirit he had roused and could not control; or he doubtfully endeavoured to learn whether such disorders would be held equally to end his reign and the British alliance. The English watched the confusion with much interest and some anxiety, and when cities seemed about to be plundered, and provinces ravaged, the question of the duty of a civilized and powerful neighbour naturally suggested itself, and was answered by a cry for interference: but the shapes which the wish took were various and contradictory. Nevertheless, the natural desire for aggrandizement, added to the apparently disorganized state of the army, contributed to strengthen a willing belief in the inferiority of the Sikhs as soldiers, and in the great excellence of the mountain levies of the chiefs of Jammu, who alone seemed to remain the masters of their own servants. To the apprehension of the English authorities, the Sikhs were mere upstart peasants of doubtful courage, except when maddened by religious persecution; but the ancient name of Rajput was sufficient to invest the motley followers of a few valiant chiefs with every war-like quality. This erroneous estimate of the Sikhs tainted British counsels until the day of Ferozshahr.²

1 Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 26th Jan., 8th and 14th Feb., 28th April, and 30th May, 1841.

2 This erroneous estimate of the troops of the Jammu Rajas and other hill chiefs of the Punjab relatively to the Sikhs, may be seen insisted on in Mr. Clerk's letters to Government of the 2nd Jan., and 13th April, 1841, and especially in those of the 8th and 10th Dec., of that year, and of the 15th-Jan., 10th Feb., and 23rd April, 1842. Mr. Clerk's expressions are very decided, such as that the Sikhs feared the hill-men, who were braver, and that Rajputs might hold Afghans in check which Sikhs could not do; but he seems to have forgotten that the ancient Rajputs had, during the

The English seemed thus called upon to do something, and their Agent in Kabul, who was committed to make Shah Shuja a monarch in means as well as in rank, grasped at the death of Ranjit Singh's last representative; he pronounced the treaties with Lahore to be at an end, and he wanted to annex Peshawar to the Afghan sway. The British Government in Calcutta rebuked this hasty conclusion, but cheered itself with the prospect of eventually adding the Derajat of the Indus, as well as Peshawar, to the unproductive Durani kingdom, without any breach of faith towards the Sikhs; for it was considered that their dominions might soon be rent in two by the Sindhanwala Sardars and the Jammu Rajas.¹ The British Agent on the Sutlej did not think the Lahore empire so near its dissolution in that mode, and confident in his own dexterity, in the superiority of his troops, and in the greatness of the English name, he proposed to march to the Sikh capital with 12,000 men, to beat and disperse a rebel army four times more numerous, to restore order, to strengthen the sovereignty of Sher Singh, and take the cis-Sutlej districts and forty lakhs of rupees in coin as the price of his aid.² This promptitude made the Maharaja think himself in danger of his life at the hands of his subjects, and of his kingdom at the hands of his allies;³ nor was the Governor-General prepared for a virtual invasion, although he was ready to use force if a large majority of the Sikhs as well as the

century gone by, yielded on either side to the new and aspiring Gurkhas and Marathas, and even that the Sikhs themselves had laid the twice-born Piinces of the Himalayas under contribution from the Ganges to Kashmir.

1 See especially Government to Sir Wm. Macnaghten, of 28th Dec. 1840, in reply to his proposals of the 26th Nov. The Governor-General justly observed that the treaty was not formed with an individual chief, but with the Sikh state, so long as it might last and fulfil the obligations of its alliance.

2 Mr. Clerk to Government, of the 26th March, 1841.

3 When Sher Singh became aware of Mr. Clerk's propositions, he is said simply to have drawn his finger across his throat, meaning that the Sikhs would at once take his life if he assented to such measures. The readiness of the English to co-operate was first propounded to Fakir Aziz-ud-din, and that wary negotiator said the matter could not be trusted to paper, he would himself go and tell Sher Singh of it. He went, but he did not return, his object being to keep clear of schemes so hazardous.

Maharaja himself desired such intervention.¹ After this, the disorders in the army near Lahore gradually subsided; but the opinion got abroad that overtures had been made to the eager English; and so far were the Sikh soldiery from desiring foreign assistance, that Lehna Singh Sindhanwala was imprisoned by his own men in the Mandi hills, on a charge of conspiracy with his refugee brother to introduce the supremacy of strangers.²

The suspicions and hatred of the Sikhs were further roused by the proceedings of an officer, afterwards nominated to represent British friendship and moderation. Major Broadfoot had been appointed to recruit a corps of Sappers and Miners for the service of Shah Shuja, and as the family of that sovereign, and also the blind Shah Zaman with his wives and children, were about to proceed to Kabul, he was charged with the care of the large and motley convoy. He entered the Punjab in April, 1841, when the mutinous spirit of the Sikh army was spreading from the capital to the provinces. A body of mixed or Mahomedan troops had been directed by the Lahore Government to accompany the royal families as an escort of protection, but Major Broadfoot became suspicious of the good faith of this detachment, and on the banks of the Ravi he prepared to resist, with his newly recruited regiment, an attack on the part of those who had been sent to conduct him in safety. On his way to the Indus he was even more suspicious of other bodies of troops which he met or passed; he believed them to be intent on plundering his camp, and he considered that he only avoided collisions by dexterous negotiations and by timely demonstrations of force. On crossing the river at Attok, his persuasion of the hostile designs of the battalions in that neighbourhood and towards Peshawar was so strong, that he put his camp in a complete state of defence, broke up the bridge of boats, and called upon the Afghan population to rise and aid him against the troops of their Government. But it does not appear that his apprehensions had even a plausible foundation, until at this time he seized certain deputies from a mutinous

1 Government to Mr. Clerk, 18th Feb., and 29th March, 1841. The Governor-General truly remarked that Mr. Clerk, rather than the Maharaja, had proposed an armed interference.

2 Mr. Clerk to Government, 25th March, 1841.

regiment when on their way back from a conference with their commander, and who appear to have come within the limits of the British pickets. This proceeding alarmed both General Avitabile, the Governor of Peshawar, and the British Agent at that place; and a brigade, already warned, was hurried from Jalalabad to overawe the Sikh forces encamped near the Indus. But the Shah's families and their numerous followers had passed on unmolested before the auxiliary troops had cleared the Khyber Pass, and the whole proceeding merely served to irritate and excite the distrust of the Sikhs generally, and to give Sher Singh an opportunity of pointing out to his tumultuous soldiers that the Punjab was surrounded by English armies, both ready and willing to make war upon them.¹

Before the middle of 1841 the more violent proceedings of the Lahore troops had ceased, but the relation of the army to the State had become wholly altered; it was no longer the willing instrument of an arbitrary and genial Government, but it looked upon itself, and was regarded by others, as the representative body of the Sikh people, as the *Khalsa* itself assembled by tribes or centuries to take its part in public affairs. The efficiency of the army as a disciplined force was not much impaired, for a higher feeling possessed the men, and increased alacrity and resolution supplied the place of exact training. They were sensible of the advantage of systematic union, and they were proud of their armed array as the visible body of Gobind's commonwealth. As a general rule, the troops were obedient to their appointed officers, so far as concerned their ordinary military duties, but the position of a regiment, of a brigade, of a division, or of the whole army, relatively to the executive Government of the country, was determined by a committee or assemblage of committees termed a *Panch* or *Panchayet*, i.e., a jury or committee of five, composed of men selected from each battalion, or each company, in consideration of their general character as faithful *Sikh* soldiers, or from their particular influence in their native villages. The system of *Panchayets* is common throughout India, and every tribe, or section of a tribe, or trade, or calling, readily submits to the decisions of its elders or superiors seated together in consulta-

¹ Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 25th May and 10th June, 1841.

tion. In the Punjab the custom received a further development from the organization necessary to an army; and even in the crude form of representation thus achieved, the Sikh people were enabled to interfere with effect, and with some degree of consistency, in the nomination and in the removal of their rulers. But these large assemblies sometimes added military licence to popular tumult, and the corrupt spirit of mercenaries to the barbarous ignorance of ploughmen. Their resolutions were often unstable or unwise, and the representatives of different divisions might take opposite sides from sober conviction or self-willed prejudice, or they might be bribed and cajoled by such able and unscrupulous men as Raja Gholab Singh.¹

The partial repose in the autumn of 1841 was taken advantage of to recur to those mercantile objects, of which the British Government never lost sight. The facilities of navigating the Indus and Sutlej had been increased, and it was now sought to extend corresponding advantages to the land trade of the Punjab. Twenty years before, Mr. Moorcroft had, of his own instance, made proposals to Ranjit Singh for the admission of British goods into the Lahore dominion at fixed rates of duty.² In 1832, Colonel Wade again brought forward the subject of a general tariff for the Punjab, and the Maharaja appeared to be not indisposed to meet the views of his allies; but he really disliked to make arrangement of which he did not fully see the scope and tendency, and he thus tried to evade even a settlement of the river tolls, by saying that the prosperity of Amritsar would be affected, and by recurring to that ever ready objection, the slaughter of kine. Cows, he said, might be used as food by those who traversed the Punjab under a British guarantee.³ In 1840, when Afghanistan was garrisoned by Indian troops, the Governor-General pressed the subject a second

1 See Mr. Clerk's letter of the 14th March, 1841, for Fakir Aziz-ud-din's admission, that even then the army was united and ruled by its *panchayets*.

2 Moorcroft, *Travels*, i. 103.

3 Compare Col. Wade to Government, 7th Nov., and 5th Dec., 1832. These objections were often urged in India, not because they were felt to be reasonable in themselves, or applicable to the point at issue, but because it was the only thing which the English did not virtually profess a desire to change. Religion was thus brought in upon all occasions of apprehension or disinclination.

time on the notice of the Lahore authorities; and after a delay of more than a year, Sher Singh assented to a reduced scale and to a fixed rate of duty, and also to levy the whole sum at one place; but the charges still appeared excessive, and the British Viceroy lamented the ignorance displayed by the Sikh Maharaja, and the disregard which he evinced for the true interests of his subjects.¹

The Lahore Government was convulsed at its centre, but its spirit of progress and aggrandizement was active on the frontiers, where not hemmed in by British armies. The deputies in Kashmir had always been jealous of the usurpations of Golar Singh in Tibet, but Mihan Singh, a rude soldier, the Governor of the valley during the commotions at Lahore, was alarmed into concessions by the powerful and ambitious Rajas of Jammu, and he left Iskardo, and the whole valley of the Upper Indus, a free field for the aggressions of their lieutenants. Ahmad Shah, the reigning chief of Balti, had differences with his family, and he proposed to pass over his eldest son in favour of a younger one, in fixing the succession. The natural heir would seem to have endeavoured to interest the Governor of Kashmir, and also Zorawar Singh, the Jammu deputy in Ladakh, in his favour; and in 1840 he fled from his father and sought refuge and assistance in Leh. Gnodup Tunzin, the puppet King of Ladakh, had conceived the idea of throwing off the Jammu authority; he had been endeavouring to engage Ahmad Shah in the design; the absence of Zorawar Singh was opportune, and he allowed a party of Iskardo troops to march on Leh, and to carry off the son of their Chief. Zorawar Singh made this inroad a pretext for war; and before the middle of the year 1840 he was master of Little Tibet, but he left the chiefship in the family of Ahmad Shah, on the payment of a petty yearly tribute of seven thousand rupees, so barren are the rocky principalities between Imaus and Emodus.² Zorawar Singh was emboldened by his own success and by the dissensions at Lahore; he claimed fealty from Gilgit; he was under-

1 Government to Mr. Clerk, 4th May, 1840, and 11th Oct., 1841, and Mr. Clerk to Government of 20th Sept. 1841.

2 Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 26th April, 9th and 31st May, and 25th Aug. 1840.

stood to be desirous of quarrelling with the Chinese Governor of Yarkand; and he renewed antiquated claims of Ladakh supremacy, and demanded the surrender of Rohtak, Garo, and the lakes of Manasarowar from the priestly King of Lassa.¹

Zorawar Singh was desirous of acquiring territory, and he was also intent on monopolizing the trade in shawl-wool, a considerable branch of which followed the Sutlej and more eastern roads to Ludhiana and Delhi, and added nothing to the treasury of Jammu.² In May and June, 1841, he occupied the valleys of the Indus and Sutlej, to the sources of those rivers, and he fixed a garrison close to the frontiers of Nepal, and on the opposite side of the snowy range from the British post of Almora. The petty Rajput princes between the Kali and Sutlej suffered in their revenues, and trembled for their territories; the Nepal Government had renewed its intrigues of 1838, and was in correspondence with the crafty Minister of Lahore, and with the disaffected Sindhanwala chiefs;³ and the English Government itself was at war with China, at the distance of half the earth's circumference. It was held that the trade of British Indian subjects must not be interfered with by Jammu conquests in

1 Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 25th Aug., and 8th Oct., 1840, and 2nd Jan. and 5th June, 1841.

2 Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 5th and 22nd June, 1841.

3 Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 16th Aug., and 23rd Nov., 1840, and 17th Jan., 1841; and Government to Mr. Clerk, 19th Oct., 1840. The correspondence of Nepal with the Sikhs, or rather with the Jammu faction, doubtless arose in part from the presence of Matabar Singh, an eminent Gurkha, as a refugee in the Punjab. He crossed the Sutlej in 1838, and soon got a high command in the Lahore service, perhaps, a high position at the court. His success in this way, and his necessary correspondence with British functionaries, made the Nepal Government apprehensive of him, and at last he became so important in the eyes of the English themselves, that in 1840, when differences with Kathmandu seemed likely to lead to hostilities, overtures were virtually made to him, and he was kept in hand, as it were, to be supported as a claimant for power, or as a partisan leader, should active measures be necessary. He was thus induced to quit the Punjab, where his presence, indeed, was not otherwise satisfactory; but the differences with the Gurkhas were composed, and Matabar Singh was cast aside with an allowance of a thousand rupees a month from the potent Government which had demanded itself by using him as a tool. (Compare particularly Government to Mr. Clerk, 4th May and 26th Oct. 1840; and Mr. Clerk to Government, 22nd Oct., 1840).

Chinese Tibet; it was deemed unadvisable to allow the Lahore and Nepal dominions to march with one another behind the Himalayas; and it was thought the Emperor of Peking might confound independent Sikhs with the predominant English, and throw additional difficulties in the way of pending or probable negotiations.¹ It was, therefore, decided that Sher Singh should require his feudatories to evacuate the Lassa territories; a day, the 10th of December, 1841, was fixed for the surrender of Garo; and a British officer was sent to see that the Grand Lama's authority was fully re-established. The Maharaja and his tributaries yielded, and Zorawar Singh was recalled; but before the order could reach him, or be acted on, he was surrounded in the depth of winter, and at a height of twelve thousand feet or more above the sea, by a superior force from Lassa enured to frost and snow. The men of the Indian plains and southern Himalayas were straitened for fuel—as necessary as food in such a climate and at such a season; some even burnt the stocks of their muskets to warm their hands; and on the day of battle, in the middle of December, they were benumbed in their ranks during a fatal pause; their leader was slain, a few principal men were reserved as prisoners, but the mass was left to perish, huddled in heaps behind rocks, or at the bottoms of ravines. The neighbouring garrison on the Nepal frontier fled on hearing of the defeat; the men were not pursued, but in passing over ranges 16,000 feet high, on their way to Almora, the deadly cold reduced them to half their numbers, and left a moiety of the remainder maimed for life.²

During the spring of 1842 the victorious Chinese advanced along the Indus, and not only recovered their own province,

1 Compare Government to Mr. Clerk, 16th Aug. and 6th and 20th Sept. 1841. The Sikhs, too, had their views with regard to China, and naively proposed co-operation with the English, or a diversion in *Tartary* in favour of the war then in progress on the *sea coast*! (Mr. Clerk to Government, 18th Aug. and 20th Oct. 1841).

2 In this repaid sketch of Ladakh affairs, the author necessarily depended for the most part on his own personal knowledge. After the battle on the Manasarowar Lake, the western passages remained closed for five weeks, and the defeat of the Sikhs was thus made known in Calcutta and Peshawar, through the reports of the fugitives to Almora, before it was heard of in the neighbouring Garo.

but occupied Ladakh and laid siege to the citadel of Leh. The Kalmuks and the ancient Sokpos, or Sacae, talked of another invasion of Kashmir, and the Tatars of the Greater and Lesser Tibet were elate with the prospect of revenge and plunder: but troops were poured across the Himalayas; the swordsmen and cannoneers of the south were dreaded by the unwarlike Bhotis; the siege of Leh was raised, and in the month of September (1842) Golab Singh's commander seized the Lassa Wazir by treachery, and dislodged his troops by stratagem from a position between Leh and Rohtak, where they had proposed to await the return of winter. An arrangement was then come to between the Lassa and Lahore authorities, which placed matters on their old footing, agreeably to the desire of the English; and as the shawl-wool trade to the British provinces was also revived, no further intervention was considered necessary between the jealous Chinese and the restrained Sikhs.¹

When in April, 1841, the troops in Kashmir put their Governor to death, Raja Golab Singh was sent to restore order, and to place the authority of the new manager, Ghulam Muhiuddin, on a firm footing. The mutinous regiments were overpowered by numbers and punished with severity, and it was soon apparent that Golab Singh had made the Governor whom he was aiding a creature of his own, and had become the virtual master of the valley.² Neither the Minister nor his brother had ever been thought well pleased with English interference in the affairs of the Punjab; they were at the time in suspicious communication with Nepal; and they were held to be bound to Sultan Muhammad Khian, whose real or presumed intrigues with the enemies of Shah Shuja had occasioned his removal to Lahore a

1 At Amritsar in March, 1846, when Golab Singh was formally inaugurated as Maharaja of Jammu, he exhibited the engagement with the Lama of Lassa, drawn out on his part in yellow, and on the part of the Chinese in red ink, and each impressed with the open hand of the negotiators dipped in either colour instead of a regular seal or written signature. The "*Panja*," or *hand*, seemed in general use in Asia as typical of a covenant, and it was moreover a common emblem on the standards of the eastern Afghans.

2 Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 13th May, 9th July, and 3rd Sept. 1840.

year previously.¹ General Avitabile had become more and more urgent to be relieved from his dangerous post at Peshawar; the influence of Dhian Singh was predominant in Sikh counsels; and the English opinion of the ability of the Jammu Rajas and of the excellence of their troops was well known, and induced a belief in partiality to be presumed.² It was, therefore, proposed by Sher Singh to bestow the Afghan province on the restorer of order in Kashmir. But this arrangement would have placed the hills from the neighbourhood of Kangra to the Khyber Pass in the hands of men averse to the English and hostile to Shah Shuja; and as their troublesome ambition had been checked in Tibet, so it was resolved that their more dangerous establishment on the Kabul river should be prevented. In the autumn of 1841, therefore, the veto of the English Agent was put upon Raja Golab Singh's nomination to Peshawar.³

About two months afterwards, or on the 2nd November (1841), that insurrection broke out in Kabul which forms so painful a passage in British history. The first generous impulse was awed into a desire of annulling the Durani alliance, and of collecting a force on the Indus, or even so far back as the Sutlej, there to fight for the empire of Hindustan with the torrents of exulting Afghans which the startled imaginations of Englishmen readily conjured up. No confidence was placed in the efficiency or the friendship of the Sikhs,⁴ and although their aid was always considered of importance, the mode in which it was asked and used only served to sink the Lahore army lower than before in British estimation.⁵

1 For this presumed understanding between the Jammu Rajas and the Barakzais of Peshawar, Mr. Clerk's letter of the 8th Oct. 1840, may be referred to among others.

2 Mr. Clerk learnt upon and perhaps much overrated Dhian Singh's capacity, "his military talents, and aptitude for business." (Mr. Clerk to Government, 7th Nov. 1840, and 13th May, 1841.) General Ventura, for instance, considered the Raja to possess a very slender understanding, and in such a matter he may be held to be a fool as well as a competent judge, although personally averse to the Minister.

3 Government to Mr. Clerk, 2nd Aug., and Mr. Clerk to Government, 20th Aug. 1841.

4 Government to the Commander-in-Chief, 15th March, 1842.

5 Mr. Colvin, the Governor-General's Private Secretary, grounded his proposition for withdrawing to the Sutlej partly on Mr. Clerk's low

Four regiments of Sepoys marched from Firozpur without guns, and unsupported by cavalry, to vainly endeavour to force the Pass of Khyber; and the Sikh troops at Peshawar were urged by the local British authorities in their praiseworthy ardour, rather than deliberately ordered by their own Government at the instance of its ally, to co-operate in the attempt, or indeed to march alone to Jalalabad. The fact that the English had been beaten was notorious, and the belief in their alarm was welcome: the Sikh Governor was obliged, in the absence of orders, to take the sense of the regimental *panches* or committees; and the hasty requisition to march was rejected, through fear alone, as the English said, but really with feelings in which contempt, distrust, and apprehension were all mixed. The district Governor, General Avitabile, who fortunately still retained his province, freely gave what aid he could; some pieces of artillery were furnished as well as abundance of ordinary supplies, and the British detachment effected the relief of Ali Masjid. But the unpardonable neglect of going to the Fort without the food which had been provided, obliged the garrison to retreat after a few days, and the disinclination of the Sikhs to fight the battles of strangers communicated itself to the mercenary soldiers of the English, and thus added to the Governor-General's dislike of the Afghan connection.¹

estimate of the Sikhs, and their presumed inability to resist the Afghans. Colonel Wade seemed to have had a somewhat similar opinion of the comparative prowess of the two races, on the fair presumption that the note (page 535) of Munshi Shahamat Ali's *Sikhs and Afghans* was his. He says the Sikhs always dreaded the Khyberis; and, indeed, General Avitabile could also take up the notion with some reason, in one sense, as the Magistrate of a district surrounded by marauding highlanders, and with sufficient adroitness in another when he did not desire to see Sikh regiments hurried into mountain defiles at the instance of the English authorities. (Compare the *Calcutta Review*, No. III. p. 142).

1 The statements in this paragraph are mainly taken from the author's notes of official and demi-official correspondence. The letter of Government to Mr. Clerk, of the 7th Feb., 1842, may also be referred to about the failure to hold Ali Masjid; and, further, it may be mentioned that Mr. Clerk, in his letter of the 10th February, pointed out, that although the Sikhs might not willingly co-operate in any sudden assault planned by the English, they would be found ready to give assistance during the campaign in the ways their experience taught them to be the most likely to lead to success.

The necessity of at least relieving the garrison of Jalalabad was paramount, and in the spring of 1842 a well-equipped British force arrived at Peshawar; but the active co-operation of the Sikhs was still desirable, and it was sought for under the terms of an obsolete article of the tripartite treaty with Shah Shuja, which gave Lahore a subsidy of two lakhs of rupees in exchange for the services of 5,000 men.¹ Sher Singh was willing to assist beyond this limited degree; he greatly facilitated the purchase of grain and the hire of carriage cattle in the Punjab, and his auxiliaries could be made to outnumber the troops of his allies; but he felt uneasy about the proceedings of the Sindhanwala chiefs, one of whom had gone to Calcutta to urge his own claims, or those of Mai Chand Kaur, and all of whom retained influence in the Sikh ranks. He was assured that the refugees should not be allowed to disturb his reign, and there thus seemed to be no obstacle in the way of his full co-operation.² But the genuine Sikhs were held by the English to be both mutinous in disposition and inferior in warlike spirit; the soldiers of Jammu were preferred, and Golab Singh was required to proceed to Peshawar to repress the insubordinate *Khalsa* and to give General Pollock the assurance of efficient aid.³ The Raja was at the time completing the reduction of some insurgent tribes between Kashmir and Attok, and his heart was in Tibet, where he had himself lost an army and a kingdom. He went, but he knew the temper of his own hill

1 See Government to Mr. Clerk, 3rd May and 23rd July, 1842. The English Agents, however, rather tauntingly and imploringly reminded the Sikh authorities that they were bound to have such a force ready by agreement as well as by friendship, than formally revived the demand for its production under the stipulations of the treaty.

2 Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 2nd. Jan., and 31st. March, 1842, and Government to Mr. Clerk, 17th Jan., and 12th May, 1842. With regard to assistance rendered by the Sikhs during the Afghan War in furnishing escorts, grain, and carriage for the British troops, Mr. Clerk's letters of the 15th. Jan., 18th. May, and 14th. June, 1842, may be quoted. In the last it is stated that 17,381 camels had been procured through Sikh agency between 1839 and 1842.

3 Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 10th Jan., 13th Feb., and 6th May, 1842. Government at first seemed indifferent whether Golab Singh went or not; and, indeed, Mr. Clerk himself rather suggested than required the Raja's employment; but suggestions or wishes could not, under the circumstances, be misconstrued.

levies: he was naturally unwilling to run any risk by following the modes of strangers to which he was unused, and he failed in rendering the Sikh battalions as decorous and orderly as English regiments. His prudence and ill-success were looked upon as collusion and insincerity, and he was thought to be in league with Akbar Khan for the destruction of the army of an obnoxious European power.¹ Still his aid was held to be essential, and the local British officers proposed to bribe him by the offer of Jalalabad, independent of his sovereign Sher Singh. The scheme was justly condemned by Mr. Clerk,² the Khyber Pass was forced in the month of April, and the auxiliary Sikhs acquitted themselves to the satisfaction of the English General, without any promises having been made to the Raja of Jammu, who gladly hurried to the Ladakh frontier to look after interest dearer to him than the success or the vengeance of foreigners. It was designed by General Pollock to leave the whole of the Sikh division at Jalalabad to assist in holding that district, while the main English army went to Kabul; but the proper interposition of Colonel Lawrence³ enabled a portion of the Lahore troops to share in that retributive march, as they had before shared in the first invasion, and fully shown their fitness for meeting difficulties when left to do so in their own way.

The proposition of conferring Jalalabad on Golab Singh was taken up in a modified form by the new Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough. As his Lordship's views became formed, he laid it down as a principle, that neither the English nor the Sikh Government should hold dominion beyond the Himalayas and the "Saffed Koh" of Kabul; and as the Durani alliance seemed to be severed, there was little to apprehend from Jammu and Barakzai intrigues. It was, therefore, urged that Golab Singh should be required by the Maharaja to relinquish Ladakh,

1 Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 19th March, 1842.

2 Mr. Clerk to Government, 13th Feb., 1842. The officers referred to are Major Mackeson and Lieut.-Col. Sir Henry Lawrence, whose names were so intimately, and in so many ways honourably, identified with the career of the English in the north-west of India.

3 Lieut.-Col. Lawrence to Major Mackeson, 23rd Aug., 1842. Lieut.-Col. Lawrence's article in the *Calcutta Review* (No. III. p. 180.) may also be advantageously referred to about the proceedings at Peshawar under Col. Wild, Sir George Pollock, and Raja Golab Singh.

and to accept Jalalabad on equal terms of dependency on the Punjab.¹ The Sikhs were sufficiently desirous of adding to their dominion another Afghan district; but the terms did not satisfy Golab Singh, nor did Sher Singh see fit to come to any conclusion until he should know the final views of the English with regard to the recognition of a Government in Kabul.² The death of Shah Shuja and his suspicious proceedings were held to render the re-occupation of the country unnecessary, and the tripartite treaty was declared to be at an end;³ but the policy of march on the Afghan capital was strongly urged and wisely adopted.⁴ There seemed to be a prospect of wintering in Kabul, and it was not until the victorious troops were on their return to India, that it was believed the English would ever forego the possession of an empire. The Sikhs then consented to take Jalalabad, but before the order transferring it could reach General Pollock,⁵ that commander had destroyed the fortifications, and nominally abandoned the place to the King whom he had expediently set up in the Bala Hissar. It is probable that Sher Singh was not unwilling to be relieved of the invidious gift, for his own sway in Lahore was distracted, and Dost Muhammad was about to be released under the pledge of a safe passage through the Punjab dominions; and it may have been thought prudent to conciliate the father of Akbar Khan,

1 Government to Mr. Clerk, 27th April, 1842.

2 Mr. Clerk to Government, 18th May, 1842.

3 Government to Mr. Clerk, 27th May and 19th July, 1842. In the treaty drafted by the Sikhs to take the place of the tripartite one, they put forward a claim of superiority over Sind, and somewhat evaded the question of being parties only, instead of principals, to the acknowledgment of a ruler in Kabul. The treaty, however, never took a definite shape.

4 Even the Sikhs talked of the impolicy, or, at least the disgrace, of suddenly and wholly withdrawing from Afghanistan in the manner proposed. (Mr. Clerk to Government, 19th July, 1842) Mr. Clerk himself was among the most prominent of those who at first modestly urged a march on Kabul, and afterwards manfully remonstrated against a hasty abandonment of the country. (See his letter above quoted, and also that of the 23rd April, 1842).

5 The order was dated the 18th Oct., 1842. Lord Ellenborough himself was not without a suspicion that the victorious generals might frame excuses for wintering in Kabul, and the expedition of Sir John M'Caskill into Kohistan was less pleasing to him on that account than it would otherwise have been.

so famous for his successes against the English, by the surrender of a possession it was inconvenient to hold.¹

The Governor-General had prudently resolved to assemble an army at Firozpur, as a reserve in case of further disasters in Afghanistan, and to make known to the princes of India that their English masters had the ready means of beating any who might rebel.² Lord Ellenborough was also desirous of an interview with Sher Singh, and as gratitude was uppermost for the time, and added a grace even to success, it was proposed to thank the Maharaja in person for the proofs which he had afforded of his continued friendship. To invest the scene with greater eclat, it was further determined, in the spirit of the moment, to give expression to British sincerity and moderation at the head of the two armies returning victorious from Kabul,

1 The Sikhs were not unwilling to acquire territory, but they wished to see their way clearly, and they were unable to do so until the English had determined on their own line of policy. The Sikhs knew indeed of the resolution of the Governor-General to sever all connection with Afghanistan, but they also knew the sentiments of the majority of Englishmen about at least temporarily retaining it. They saw, moreover, that recruited armies were still in possession of every stronghold, and policy was new to them of voluntarily relinquishing dominion. They therefore paused, and the subsequent release of Dost Muhammad again fettered them when the retirement of the troops seemed to leave them free to act, for they were bound to escort the Amir safely across the Punjab, and could not therefore make terms with him. The Sikhs would have worked through Sultan Muhammad Khan and other chiefs, until they were in a condition to use the frequent plea of the English, of being able to govern better than dependants. (Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 2nd Sept., 1842).

2 Lord Auckland had likewise thought that such a demonstration might be advisable. (Government to Mr. Clerk, 3rd Dec., 1841). Of measures practically identified with Lord Ellenborough's administration, Lord Auckland may further claim the merit of giving the generals commanding in Afghanistan supreme authority (Resolution of Government, 6th Jan., 1842.), and of directing Sir William Nott to act without reference to previous instructions, and as he might deem best for the safety of his troops and the honour of the British name. (Government to Sir William Nott, 10th Feb., 1842.) To Lord Auckland however, is due the *doubtful* praise of suggesting the release of Dost Muhammad (Government to Mr. Clerk, 24th Feb., 1842); and he must certainly bear a share of the blame attached to the exaggerated estimate formed of the dangers which threatened the English after the retreat from Kabul, and to the timorous rather than prudent design of falling back on the Indus, or even on the Sutlej.

with their numbers increased to nearly forty thousand men by the force assembled on the Sutlej. The native English portion of this array was considerable, and perhaps so many Europeans had never stood together under arms on Indian ground since Alexander and his Greeks made the Punjab a province of Macedonia. The Sikhs generally were pleased with one cause of this assemblage, and they were glad to be relieved of the presence of the English on their western frontier; but Sher Singh himself did not look forward to his visit to Lord Ellenborough without some misgivings, although under other circumstances his vanity would have been gratified by the opportunity of displaying his power and magnificence: He felt his incapacity as a ruler, and he needlessly feared that he might be called to account for Sikh excesses and for a suspected intercourse with the hostile Amirs of Sind then trembling for their fate, and even that the subjugation of the Punjab was to be made the stepping-stone to the complete reduction of Afghanistan. He had no confidence in himself; and he dreaded the vengeance of his followers, who believed him capable of sacrificing the *Khal'at* to his own interests. Nor was Dhian Singh supposed to be willing that the Maharaja should meet the Governor-General, and his suspicious temper made him apprehensive that his sovereign might induce the English Viceroy to accede to his ruin, or to the reduction of his exotic influence. Thus both Sher Singh and his Minister perhaps rejoiced that a misunderstanding which prevented the reception at Ludhiana of Lehna Singh Majithia was seized hold of by the English to render a meeting doubtful or impossible.¹ Lord Ellenborough justly took offence at a slight

1 On several occasions Raja Dhian Singh expressed his apprehensions of an English invasion, as also did Maharaja Sher Singh. (See, for instance, Mr. Clerk to Government, 2nd Jan., 1842). The writer of the article in the *Cutcutta Review* (No. II. p. 493), who is believed to be Lieut.-Col. Lawrence, admits Dhian Singh's aversion to a meeting between his sovereign and the British Governor-General. The reviewer likewise describes Sher Singh's anxiety at the time, but considers him to have been desirous of throwing himself unreservedly on English protection, as doubtless he might have been, had he thought himself secure from assassination, and that Lord Ellenborough would have kept *him* seated on the throne of Lahore at all hazards.

About the suspected hostile intercourse with the Amirs of Sind, see Thornton's *History of India*, vi. 447. The Sikhs, however, were never required to give any explanation of the charges.

which, however unwittingly, had been really offered to him; he was not easily appeased; and when the personal apologies of the Minister, accompanied by the young heir-apparent, had removed every ground of displeasure, the appointed time, the beginning of January, 1843, for the breaking-up of the large army had arrived, and the Governor-General did not care to detain his war-worn regiments any longer from their distant stations. No interview thus took place with Sher Singh; but the boy Prince, Pertab Singh, was visited by Lord Ellenborough; and the rapidity with which a large escort of Sikh troops was crossed over the Sutlej when swollen with rain, and the alacrity and precision with which they manœuvred, deserved to have been well noted by the English captains, proud as they had reason to be of the numbers and achievements of their own troops. The Prince likewise reviewed the Anglo-Indian forces, and the Sikh chiefs looked with interest upon the defenders of Jalalabad, and with unmixed admiration upon General Nott followed by his valiant and compact band. At last the armed host broke up; the plains of Ferozpur were no longer white with numerous camps; and the relieved Sher Singh hastened, or was hurried, to Amritsar to return thanks to God that a great danger had passed away. This being over, he received Dost Muhammad Khan with distinction at Lahore, and in February (1843), entered into a formal treaty of friendship with the released Amir, which said nothing about the English gift of Jalalabad.¹

The misunderstanding to which Sardar Lehna Singh was a party was simply as follows :—The Sardar had been sent to wait upon the Governor-General on his arrival on the frontier, according to ordinary ceremonial. It was arranged that the Sardar should be received by his Lordship at Ludhiana, and the day and hour were fixed, and preparations duly made. Mr. Clerk went in person to meet the chief, and conduct him to the Governor-General's presence, *his understanding* being that he was to go half the distance or so towards the Sikh encampment. The Sardar understood or held that Mr. Clerk should or would come to his tent and thus he sat still while Mr. Clerk rested half way for two hours or more. Lord Ellenborough thought the excuse of the Sardar frivolous, and that offence was wantonly given, and he accordingly required an explanation to be afforded. (Government to Mr. Clerk, 15th Dec., 1842). There is some reason to believe that the Lahore Vakil, who was in the interest of Raja Dhian Singh, misled the obnoxious Lehna Singh about the arrangements for conducting him to the Governor-General's tents, with the view of discrediting him both with his own master and with the English.

1 Government to Mr. Clerk, 15th Feb., and 17th March, 1843.

CHAPTER IV

THE FIRST ANGLO-SIKH WAR

I. DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS

Sher Singh principally feared his own chiefs and subjects, and although the designed or fortuitous murder of *Mai Chand Kaur* in June, 1842,¹ relieved him of some of his apprehensions, he felt uneasy under the jealous domination of *Dhian Singh*, and began to listen readily to the smooth suggestions of *Bhai Gurmukh Singh*, his priest so to speak, and who was himself of some religious reputation, as well as the son of a man of acknowledged sanctity and influence.² The English Government, in its well meant but impracticable desire to unite all parties in the country, had urged the restoration to favour of the *Sindhanwala* chiefs, who kept its own agents on the alert, and the *Maharaja* himself in a state of doubt or alarm.³ *Sher Singh*, from his easiness of nature, was not averse to a reconciliation, and by degrees he even became not unwilling to have the family about him as some counterpoise to the *Rajas* of *Jammu*. Neither was *Dhian Singh* opposed to their return, for he thought

1 Mr. Clerk to Government, 15th June, 1842. The widow of *Maharaja Kharak Singh* was so severely beaten, as was said, by her female attendants, that she almost immediately expired. The only explanation offered, was that she had chidden the servants in question for some fault, and the public was naturally unwilling to believe *Sher Singh*, at least, guiltless of instigating the murder.

2 In the beginning of his reign, *Sher Singh* had leant much upon an active and ambitious follower, named *Jowla Singh*, whose bravery was conspicuous during the attack on *Lahore*. This petty leader hoped to supplant both the *Sindhanwala* chiefs and the *Jammu Rajas* and leading courtiers, but he proceeded too hastily; he was seized and imprisoned by *Dhian Singh* in May 1841, and died by foul means immediately afterwards. (Compare Mr. Clerk to Government, 7th May, and 10th June, 1841).

3 Mr. Clerk to Government, 7th April, 1842, and Government to Mr. Clerk, 12th May, 1842; see also Lieut.-Col. *Richmond* to Government, 5th Sept., 1843. Mr. Clerk became Lieutenant-Governor of *Agra* in June 1843, and he was succeeded as Agent on the frontier by Lieut.-Col. *Richmond*, an officer of repute, who had recently distinguished himself under *Sir George Pollock*.

they might be made some use of since Mai Chand Kaur was no more, and thus Ajit Singh and his uncles again took their accustomed places in the court of Lahore. Nevertheless during the summer of 1843, Dhian Singh perceived that his influence over the Maharaja was fairly on the wane; and he had good reason to dread the machinations of Gurmukh Singh and the passions of the multitude when roused by a man of his character. The Minister then again began to talk of the boy, Dalip Singh, and to endeavour to possess the minds of the Sindhanwala chiefs with the belief, that they had been inveigled to Lahore for their more assured destruction. Ajit Singh had by this time become the boon companion of the Maharaja; but he was himself ambitious of power, and he and his uncle Lehna Singh grasped at the idea of making the Minister a party to their own designs. They appeared to fall wholly into his views; and they would, they said, take Sher Singh's life to save their own. On the 15th September (1843), Ajit Singh induced the Maharaja to inspect some levies he had newly raised; he approached, as if to make an offering of a choice carbine, and to receive the commendations usual on such occasions, but he raised the weapon and shot his sovereign dead. The remorseless Lehna Singh took the life of the boy Pertab Singh at the same time, and the kinsmen then joined Dhian Singh, and proceeded with him to the citadel to proclaim a new King. The hitherto wary Minister was now caught in his own toils, and he became the dupe of his accomplices. He was separated from his immediate attendants, as if for the sake of greater privacy, and shot by the same audacious chief who had just imbrued his hands in the blood of their common master.¹ The conspirators were thus far successful in their daring and in their crimes, but they neglected to slay or imprison the son of their last victim; and the minds of the soldiers do not seem to have been prepared for the death of Dhian Singh, as they were for that of the Maharaja. The youthful Hira Singh was roused by his own danger and his filial duty; he could plausibly accuse the Sindhanwalas of being alone guilty of the treble murder which had taken place, and he largely promised rewards to the troops if they would avenge the death of *their* friend and *his* father. The army generally responded to his call, and the citadel was immediately assaulted; yet so strong was the feeling

1 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 17th and 18th Sept., 1843.

of aversion to Jammu ascendancy among the Sikh people, that could the feeble garrison have held out for three or four days, until the first impulse of anger and surprise had passed away, it is almost certain that Hira Singh must have fled for his life. But the place was entered on the second evening; the wounded Lehna Singh was at once slain; and Ajit Singh, in attempting to boldly escape over the lofty walls, fell and was also killed.¹ Dalip Singh was then proclaimed Maharaja, and Hira Singh was raised to the high and fatal office of Wazir; but he was all powerful for the moment; the Sindhanwala possessions were confiscated, and their dwellings razed to the ground: nor did the youthful avenger stay until he had found out and put to death Bhai Gurmukh Singh and Misr Beli Ram, the former of whom was believed to have connived at the death of his confiding master, and to have instigated the assassination of the Minister; and the latter of whom had always stood high in the favour of the great Maharaja, although strongly opposed to the aggrandizement of the Jammu family. Sardar Attar Singh Sindhanwala, who was hurrying to Lahore when he heard of the capture of the citadel, made a hasty attempt to rouse the village population in his favour through the influence of Bhai Bir Singh, a devotee of great repute; but the *Khalsa* was almost wholly represented by the army, and he crossed at once into the British territories to avoid the emissaries of Hira Singh.²

The new Minister added two rupees and a half, or five shillings a month, to the pay of the common soldiers, and he also discharged some arrears due to them. The army felt that it had become the master of the state and it endeavoured to procure donatives, or to place itself right in public estimation, by threatening to eject the Jammu faction, and to make Bhai Singh, already mentioned, a king as well as a priest.³ Jowahir Singh, the maternal uncle of the boy Maharaja, already grasped the highest post he could occupy; nor was the Minister's family united within itself. Suchet Singh's vanity was mortified by the ascendancy of his nephew, a stripling, unacquainted with war, and inexperienced in business; and he endeavoured to form

1 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 20th Sept., 1843.

2 Lieut.-Col. Richmond's letters from 21st Sept., to 2nd Oct., 1843.

3 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 26th Sept., 1843.

a party which should place him in power.¹ The youthful Wazir naturally turned to his other uncle, Golab Singh, for support, and that astute chief cared not who held titles while he was deferred to and left unrestrained; but the Sikhs were still averse to him personally, and jealous lest he should attempt to garrison every stronghold with his own followers. Golab Singh was, therefore, cautious in his proceedings, and before he reached Lahore, on the 10th of November, he had sought to ingratiate himself with all parties, save Jowahir Singh, whom he may have despised as of no capacity.² Jowahir Singh resented this conduct, and taking advantage of the ready access to the Maharaja's person which his relationship gave him, he went with the child in his arms, on the occasion of a review of some troops, and urged the assembled regiments to depose the Jammu Rajas, otherwise he would fly with his nephew, their acknowledged Prince, into the British territories. But the design of procuring aid from the English was displeasing to the Sikhs, both as an independent people and as a licentious soldiery, and Jowahir Singh was immediately made a prisoner, and thus received a lesson which influenced his conduct during the short remainder of his life.³

Nevertheless, Hira Singh continued to be beset with difficulties. There was one Fateh Khan Towana, a personal follower of Dhian Singh, who was supposed to have been privy to the intended assassination of his master, and to have designedly held back when Ajit Singh took the Raja to one side. This petty leader fled as soon as the army attacked the citadel, and endeavoured to raise an insurrection in his native province of Dera Ismail Khan, which caused the greater anxiety, as the attempt was supposed to be countenanced by the able and hostile Governor of Multan.⁴ Scarcely had measures been adopted for reducing the petty rebellion, when Kashmira Singh and Peshawara Singh, sons born to, or adopted by, Ranjit Singh at the period of his conquest of the two Afghan provinces from which they were named, started up as the rivals of the child and en-

1 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 16th and 22nd Oct., 1843.

2 Compare Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 26th Sept., and 16th Nov., 1843.

3 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 28th Nov., 1843.

4 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 12th Dec., 1843.

deavoured to form a party by appearing in open opposition at Sialkot. Some regiments ordered to Peshawar joined the two Princes; the Mahomedan regiments at Lahore refused to march against them unless a pure Sikh force did the same; and it was with difficulty, and only with the aid of Raja Golab Singh, that the siege of Sialkot was formed. The two young men soon showed themselves to be incapable of heading a party; Hira Singh relaxed in his efforts against them; and towards the end of March he raised the siege, and allowed them to go at large.¹ The Minister had, however less reason to be satisfied with the success of Jowahir Singh, who, about the same time induced his guards to release him and he was unwillingly allowed to assume his place in the court as the uncle of the child to whose sovereignty in the abstract all nominally deferred.²

Raja Suchet Singh was believed to have been a secret party to the attempts of Kashmira Singh, and the release of Jowahir Singh was also probably effected with his cognizance. The Raja believed himself to be popular with the army, and especially with the cavalry portion of it, which having an inferior organization began to show some jealousy of the systematic proceedings of the regular infantry and artillery. He had retired to the hills with great reluctance; he continued intent upon supplanting his nephew; and suddenly, on the evening of the 26th of March, 1844, he appeared at Lahore with a few followers; but he appealed in vain to the mass of the troops, partly because Hira Singh had been liberal in gifts and profuse in promises, and partly because the shrewd deputies who formed the *Panchayets* of the regiments had a sense of their own importance and were not to be won for purposes of mere faction without diligent and judicious seeking. Hence, on the morning after the arrival of the sanguine and hasty Raja, a large force marched against him without demur; but the chief was brave, he endeavoured to make a stand in a ruinous building, and he died fighting to the last, although his little band was almost destroyed by the fire of a numerous artillery before the assailants could reach the inclosure.³

1 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 23rd and 27th March, 1844.

2 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 27th March, 1844

3 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 29th March, 1844.

Within two months after this rash undertaking, Attar Singh Sindhanwala, who had been residing at Thaneswar, made a similar ill-judged attempt to gain over the army, and to expel Hira Singh. He crossed the Sutlej on the 2nd May, but instead of moving to a distance so as to avoid premature collisions, and to enable him to appeal to the feelings of the Sikhs, he at once joined Bhai Bir Singh, whose religious repute attracted numbers of the agricultural population, and took up a position almost opposite Ferozpur, and within 40 miles of the capital. The disaffected Kashmiri Singh joined the Chief, but Hira Singh stood as a suppliant before the assembled *Khalsa*, and roused the feelings of the troops by reminding them that the Sindhanwalas looked to the English for support. A large force promptly marched from Lahore, but it was wished to detach Bhai Bir Singh from the rebel, for to assail so holy a man was held to be sacrilege by the soldiers, and on the 7th of the month deputies were sent to induce the Bhai to retire. Some expressions moved the anger of Sardar Attar Singh, and he slew one of the deputies with his own hand. This act led to an immediate attack. Attar Singh and Kashmiri Singh were both killed, and it was found that cannon shot had likewise numbered Bhai Bir Singh with the slain. The commander on this occasion was Labh Singh, a Rajput of Jammu, and the possession of the family of Kashmiri Singh seemed to render his success more complete; but the Sikh infantry refused to allow the women and children to be removed to Lahore; and Labh Singh, alarmed by this proceeding and by the lamentations over the death of Bir Singh, hastened to the capital to ensure his own safety.¹

Hira Singh was thus successful against two main enemies of his rule, and as he had also come to an understanding with the Governor of Multan, the proceedings of Fatch Khan Towana gave him little uneasiness.² The army itself was his great cause of anxiety, not lest the Sikh dominion should be contracted, but lest he should be rejected as its master; for the *Panchayets*, although bent on retaining their own power, and on acquiring additional pay and privileges for

¹ Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 10th., 11th., and 12th. May, 1844.

² Compare Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 29th April, 1844.

their constituents the soldiers, were equally resolved on maintaining the integrity of the empire, and they arranged among themselves about the relief of the troops in the provinces. On the frontiers, indeed, the Sikhs continued to exhibit their innate vigour, and towards the end of 1843 the secluded principality of Gilgit was overrun and annexed to Kashmir. The *Panchayets* likewise felt that it was the design of the Raja and his advisers to disperse the Sikh army over the country, and to raise additional corps of hill men, but the committees will not allow a single regiment to quit Lahore without satisfying themselves of the necessity of the measure; and thus Hira Singh was induced to take advantage of a projected relief of the British troops in Sind, and the consequent march of several battalions towards the Sutlej, to heighten or give a colour to his own actual suspicions, and to hint that a near danger threatened the Sikhs on the side of the English. The *Khalsa* was most willing to encounter *that* neighbour, and a brigade was induced to move to Kasur, and others to shorter distances from the capital, under the plea, as avowed to the British authorities, of procuring forage and supplies with greater facility.¹ Such had indeed been Ranjit Singh's occasional practice when no assemblage of British forces could add to his ever present fears;² but Hira Singh's apprehensions of his own army and of his English allies were lessened by his rapid successes, and by the disgraceful spirit which then animated the regular regiments in the British service. The Sepoys refused to proceed to Sind, and the Sikhs watched the progress of the mutiny with a pleased surprise. It was new to them to see these renowned soldiers in opposition to their Government; but any glimmering hopes of fatal embarrassment to the colossal power of the foreigners were dispelled by the march of European troops, by the good example of the irregular cavalry, and by the returning sense of obedience of the Sepoys themselves. The British forces proceeded to Sind, and the Lahore detachment was withdrawn from Kasur.³

1 Compare Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 20th Dec., 1843, and 23rd March, 1844.

2 See for instance Sir David Ochterlony to Government, 16th Oct., 1812.

3 Compare Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 29th April, 1844.

Nevertheless there were not wanting causes of real or alleged dissatisfaction with the British Government, which at last served the useful purpose of engaging the attention of the Lahore soldiery. The protected Sikh Raja of Nabha had given a village, named Mowran, to Ranjit Singh at the Maharaja's request, in order that it might be bestowed on Dhanna Singh, a Nabha subject, but who stood high in favour with the master of the Punjab. The village was so given in 1819, or after the introduction of the English supremacy, but without the knowledge of the English authorities, which circumstance rendered the alienation invalid, if it were argued that the village had become separated from the British sovereignty. The Raja of Nabha became displeased with Dhanna Singh, and he resumed his gift in the year 1843; but in so doing his soldiers wantonly plundered the property of the feudatory, and thus gave the Lahore Government a ground of complaint, of which advantage was taken for party purposes.¹ But Hira Singh and his advisers took greater exception still at the decision of the British Government with regard to a quantity of coin and bullion which Raja Suchet Singh had secretly deposited in Firozpur, and which his servants were detected in endeavouring to remove after his death. The treasure was estimated at 1,500,000 rupees, and it was understood to have been sent to Firozpur during the recent Afghan War, for the purpose of being offered as part of an ingratiation loan to the English Government, which was borrowing money at the time from the protected Sikh chiefs. The Lahore Minister claimed the treasure both as the escheated property of a feudatory without male heirs of his body, and as the confiscated property of a rebel killed in arms against his sovereign; but the British Government considered the right to the property to be unaffected by the owner's treason, and required that the title to it, according to the laws of Jammu or of the Punjab, should be regularly pleaded and proved in a British court. It was argued in favour of Lahore that no British subject or defendant claimed the treasure, and that it might be expediently made over to the ruler of the Punjab for surrender to the legal or customary owner; but the supreme British authorities would not relax further from the conventional law of Europe than to say, that if the Maharaja would write that the Rajas Golab

1 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 18th and 28th May, 1844.

Singh and Hira Singh assented to the delivery of the treasure to the Sikh State for the purpose of being transferred to the rightful owners, it would no longer be detained. This proposal was not agreed to, partly because differences had in the meantime arisen between the uncle and nephew, and partly because the Lahore councillors considered their original grounds of claim to be irrefragable, according to Indian law and usage, and thus the money remained a source of dissatisfaction, until the English stood masters in Lahore, and accepted it as part of the price of Kashmir, when the valley was alienated to Raja Gholab Singh.¹

1 For the discussions about the surrender or the detention of the treasure, see the letters of Lieut.-Colonel Richmond to Government of the 7th April, 3rd. and 27th May, 25th July, 10th September, and 5th and 25th October, 1844; and of Government to Lieut.-Colonel Richmond of the 19th and 22nd April, 17th May, and 10th August of the same year.

The principle laid down of deciding the claim to the treasure at a British tribunal, and according to the laws of Lahore or of Jammu, does not distinguish between public and individual right of heirship; or rather it decides the question with reference solely to the law in private cases. Throughout India, the practical rule has ever been that such property shall be administered agreeably to the customs of the tribe or province to which the deceased belonged; and very frequently, when the only litigants are subjects of one and the same foreign state, it is expediently made over to the sovereign of that state for adjudication, on the plea that the rights of the parties can be best ascertained on the spot, and that every ruler is a renderer of justice.

In the present instance, the imperfection of the International Law of Europe may be more to blame than the Government of India and the legal authorities of Calcutta, for refusing to acknowledge the right of an allied and friendly state to the property of a childless rebel; to which property, moreover, no British subject or dependent preferred a claim. Vattel lays it down that a stranger's property remains a part of the aggregate wealth of his nation, and that the right to it is to be determined according to the laws of his own country (Book II. chap. viii. sects. 109 and 110); but in the section in question reference is solely made to cases in which subjects or private parties are litigants; although Mr. Chitty, in his note to sect. 103. (ed. 1834) shows that foreign sovereigns can in England sue, at least, British subjects.

The oriental customary law with regard to the estates and property of Jaigirdars (feudal beneficiaries) may be seen in Bernier's *Travels* (i. 183—187). The right of the Government is full, and it is based on the feeling or principle that a beneficiary has only the use during life of estates or offices, and that all he may have accumulated, through parsimony or oppression, is the property of the state. It may be difficult to decide

Hira Singh had, in his acts and successes, surpassed the general expectation, and the manner in which affairs were carried on seemed to argue unlooked-for abilities of a high order; but the Raja himself had little more than a noble presence and a conciliatory address to recommend him and the person who directed every measure was a Brahmin Pandit, named Jalla, the family priest, so to speak, of the Jammu brothers, and the tutor of Dhian Singh's sons. This crafty and ambitious man retained all the influence over the youthful Minister which he had exercised over the boyish pupil on whom Ranjit Singh lavished favours. Armies had marched, and chiefs had been vanquished, as if at the bidding of the preceptor become councillor. His views expanded, and he seems to have entertained the idea of founding a dynasty of "Peshwas" among the rude Jats of the Punjab, as had been done by one of his tribe among the equally rude Marathas of the south. He fully perceived that the Sikh army must be conciliated, and also that it must be employed. He despised, and with some reason, the spirit and capacity of most of the titular chiefs of the country; and he felt that Raja Golab Singh absorbed a large proportion of the revenues of the country, and seriously embarrassed the Central Government by his overgrown power and influence. It was primarily requisite to keep the army well and regularly paid, and hence the Pandit proceeded without scruple to sequester several of the fiefs of the Sardars, and gradually to inspire the soldiery with the necessity of a march against Jammu. Nor was he without a pretext for denouncing Golab Singh, as that unscrupulous chief had lately taken possession of the estates of Raja Suchet Singh, to which he regarded himself as the only heir.¹

between a people and an expelled sovereign, about his guilt or his tyranny, but there can be none in deciding between an allied state and its subject about treason or rebellion. Neither refugee traitors nor patriots are allowed to abuse their asylum by plotting against the Government which has cast them out; and an extension of the principle would prevent desperate adventurers defrauding the state which has reared and heaped favours on them, by removing their property previous to engaging in rash and criminal enterprises.

¹ Compare Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 13th Aug., and 10th Oct., 1844.

Jalla showed vigour and capacity in all he did, but he proceeded too hastily in some matters, and he attempted too much at one time. He did not, perhaps, understand the Sikh character in all its depths and ramifications, and he probably undervalued the subtlety of Golab Singh. The Raja, indeed, was induced to divide the Jaigirs of Suchet Singh with his nephew,¹ but Fateh Khan Towana again excited an insurrection in the Derajat;² Chattar Singh Atariwala took up arms near Rawalpindi,³ and the Mahomedan tribes south-west of Kashmir were encouraged in rebellion by the dexterous and experienced chief whom Pandit Jalla sought to crush.⁴ Peshawara Singh again aspired to the sovereignty of the Punjab; he was supported by Golab Singh, and Jalla at last perceived the necessity of coming to terms with one so formidable.⁵ A reconciliation was accordingly patched up, and the Raja sent his son Solhan Singh to Lahore.⁶ The hopes of Peshawara Singh then vanished, and he fled for safety to the south of the Sutlej.⁷

Pandit Jalla made the additional mistake of forgetting that the Sikhs were not jealous of Golab Singh alone, but of all strangers to their faith and race; and in trying to crush the chiefs, he had forgotten that they were Sikhs equally with the soldiers, and that the *Khalsa* was a word which could be used to unite the high and low. He showed no respect even to Sardars of ability and means. Lehna Singh Majithia quitted the Punjab, on pretence of a pilgrimage, in the month of March, 1844,⁸ and the only person who was raised to any dis-

1 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 30th Oct., 1844.

2 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 14th June, 1844.

3 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 16th Oct., 1844.

4 Major Broadfoot to Government, 24th Nov., 1844.

5 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 16th Oct., 1844, and Major Broadfoot to Government, 24th Nov., 1844.

6 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 30th Oct., 1844, and Major Broadfoot to Government, 13th Nov., and 16th Dec., 1844.

7 Major Broadfoot to Government, 14th and 18th Nov., 1844. Major Broadfoot, who succeeded Lieut.-Col. Richmond as Agent on the frontier on the 1st Nov., 1844, received Peshawara Singh with civilities unusual under the circumstances, and proposed to assign him allowance of a thousand rupees a month.

8 Lehna Singh went first to Hardwar and afterwards to Benares. He next visited Gaya and Jagannath and Calcutta, and he was residing in the last named place when hostilities broke out with the Sikhs.

tion was the unworthy Lal Singh, a Brahmin, and a follower of the Rajas of Jammu, but who was understood to have gained a disgraceful influence over the impure mind of Rani Jindan. The Pandit again, in his arrogance, had ventured to use some expressions of impatience and disrespect towards the mother of the Maharaja, and he had habitually treated Jawahir Singh, her brother, with neglect and contempt. The impulsive soldiery was wrought upon by the incensed woman and ambitious man; the relict of the great Maharaja appealed to the children of the *Khalsa*, already excited by the proscribed chiefs, and Hira Singh and Pandit Jalla perceived that their rule was at an end. On the 21st December, 1844, they endeavoured to avoid the wrath of the Sikh soldiery by a sudden flight from the capital, but they were overtaken and slain before they could reach Jammu, along with Sohan Singh, the cousin of the Minister, and Labh Singh, so lately hailed as a victorious commander. The memory of Pandit Jalla continued to be execrated, but the fate of Hira Singh excited some few regrets, for he had well avenged the death of his father, and he had borne his dignities with grace and modesty.¹

The sudden breaking up of Hira Singh's Government caused some confusion for a time, and the State seemed to be without a responsible head; but it was gradually perceived that Jawahir Singh, the brother, and Lal Singh, the favourite of the Rani, would form the most influential members of the administration.² Peshawara Singh, indeed, escaped from the custody of the British authorities, by whom he had been placed under surveillance, when he fled across the Sutlej; but he made no attempt at the moment to become supreme, and he seemed to adhere to those who had so signally avenged him on Hira Singh.³ The services of the troops were rewarded by the addition of half a rupee a month to the pay of the common soldier, many fiefs were restored, and the cupidity of all parties in the State was

1 Compare Major Broadfoot to Government, 24th and 28th Dec., 1844.

2 Compare Major Broadfoot to Government, 24th and 28th Dec., 1844.

3 Compare Major Broadfoot to Government, 28th Dec., 1844, and 4th Jan., 1845. As Major Broadfoot, however, points out, the Prince seemed ready enough to grasp at power even so early as January.

excited by a renewal of the designs against Golab Singh.¹ The disturbances in the mountains of Kashmir were put down, the insurgent Fateh Khan was taken into favour, Peshawar was secure against the power of all the Afghans, although it was known that Golab Singh encouraged the reduced Barakzais with promises of support;² but it was essential to the Government that the troops should be employed: it was pleasing to the men to be able to gratify their avarice or their vengeance, and they therefore marched against Jammu with alacrity.³

Golab Singh, who knew the relative inferiority of his soldiers, brought all his arts into play. He distributed his money freely among the *Panchayets* of regiments, he gratified the members of these committees by his personal attentions, and he again inspired Peshawara Singh with designs upon the sovereignty itself. He promised a gratuity to the army which had marched to urge upon him the propriety of submission, he agreed to surrender certain portions of the general possessions of the family, and to pay to the State a fine of 3,500,000 rupees.⁴ But an altercation arose between the Lahore and Jammu followers when the promised donative was being removed, which ended in a fatal affray; and afterwards an old Sikh chief, Fateh Singh Man, and one Butchna, who had deserted Golab Singh's service, were waylaid and slain.⁵ The Raja protested against the accusation of connivance or treachery; nor is it probable that at the time he desired to take the life of any one except Butchna, who had been variously employed by him, and who knew the extent of his resources. The act nevertheless greatly excited the Sikh soldiery, and Golab Singh perceived that submission alone would save Jammu from being sacked. He succeeded in partially gaining over two brigades, he joined their camp, and he arrived at Lahore early in April, 1845, half a prisoner, and yet not without a reasonable prospect

1 Compare Major Broadfoot to Government, 28th Dec., 1844, and 2nd Jan., 1845.

2 Major Broadfoot to Government, 16th Jan., 1845.

3 The troops further rejected the terms to which the Lahore court seemed inclined to come with Golab Singh. (Major Broadfoot to Government, 22nd Jan., 1845).

4 Major Broadfoot to Government, 18th March, 1845.

5 Major Broadfoot to Government, 3rd March, 1845.

of becoming the Minister of the country; for the mass of the Sikh soldiery thought that one so great had been sufficiently humbled, the *Panchayets* had been won by his money and his blandishments, and many of the old servants of Ranjit Singh had confidence in his ability and in his good will towards the State generally.¹ There yet, however, existed some remnants of the animosity which had proved fatal to Hira Singh; the representatives of many expelled hill chiefs were ready to compass the death of their greatest enemy; and an Akali fanatic could take the life of the "Dogra" Raja with applause and impunity. Jawahir Singh plainly aimed at the office of Wazir, and Lal Singh's own ambition prompted him to use his influence with the mother of the Maharaja to resist the growing feeling in favour of the chief whose capacity for affairs all envied and dreaded. Hence Golab Singh deemed it prudent to avoid a contest for power at that time, and to remove from Lahore to a place of greater safety. He agreed to pay in all a fine of 6,800,000 rupees, to yield up nearly all the districts which had been held by his family, excepting his own proper fiefs, and to renew his lease of the salt mines between the Indus and Jhelam, on terms which virtually deprived him of a large profit, and of the political superiority in the hills of Rhotas.² He was present at the installation of Jawahir Singh as Wazir on the 14th May,³ and at the betrothal of the Maharaja to a daughter of the Atari Chief Chhattar Singh on the 10th July;⁴ and towards the end of the following month he retired to Jammu, shorn of much real power, but became acceptable to the troops by his humility, and to the final conviction of the English authorities, that the levies of the mountain Rajputs were unequal to a contest even with the Sikh soldiery.⁵

The able Governor of Multan was assassinated in the month of September, 1844, by a man accused of marauding, and yet

1 Compare Major Broadfoot to Government, 8th and 9th April, and 5th May, 1845.

2 Major Broadfoot to Government, 5th May, 1845.

3 Major Broadfoot to Government, 24th May, 1845.

4 Major Broadfoot to Government, 14th July, 1845.

5 Major Broadfoot confessed that "late events had shown the Raja's weakness in the hills," where he should have been strongest, had his followers been brave and trusty. (Major Broadfoot to Government, 5th May, 1845).

imprudently allowed a considerable degree of liberty.¹ Mul Raj, the son of the Dewan, had been appointed or permitted to succeed his father by the declining Government of Hira Singh, and he showed more aptitude for affairs than was expected. He suppressed a mutiny among the provincial troops, partly composed of Sikhs, with vigour and success; and he was equally prompt in dealing with a younger brother, who desired to have half the province assigned to him as the equal heir of the deceased Dewan. Mul Raj put his brother in prison, and thus freed himself from all local dangers; but he had steadily evaded the demands of the Lahore court for an increased farm or contract, and he had likewise objected to the large *Nazarana*, or relief, which was required as the usual condition of succession. As soon, therefore, as Golab Singh had been reduced to obedience, it was proposed to dispatch a force against Multan, and the *Khalsa* approved of the measure through the assembled *Panchayets* of regiments and brigades. This resolution induced the new Governor to yield, and in September (1845) it was arranged that he should pay a fine of 1,800,000 rupees. He escaped an addition to his contract sum, but he was deprived of some petty districts to satisfy in a measure the letter of the original demand.²

The proceedings of Peshawara Singh caused more disquietude to the new Wazir personally than the hostility of Golab Singh or the resistance of the Governor of Multan. The Prince was vain and of slender capacity, but his relationship to Ranjit Singh gave him some hold upon the minds of the Sikhs. He was encouraged by Golab Singh, then safe in the hills, and he was assured of support by the brigade of troops which had made Jawahir Singh a prisoner, when that chief threatened to fly with the Maharaja into the British territories. Jawahir Singh had not heeded the value to the State of the prudence of the soldiers

1 Lieut.-Col. Richmond to Government, 10th Oct., 1844.

2 In this paragraph the author followed mainly his own notes of occurrences. The mutiny of the Multan troops took place in Nov., 1844. The Governor at once surrounded them, and demanded the ringleaders, and on their surrender being refused, he opened a fire upon their whole body, and killed, as was said, nearly 400 of them. Dewan Mul Raj seized and confined his brother in Aug., 1845, and in the following month the terms of his succession were settled with the Lahore court.

in restraining him; he thought only of the personal indignity, and soon after his accession to power he barbarously mutilated the commander of the offending division, by depriving him of his nose and ears. Peshawara Singh felt himself countenanced, and he endeavoured to rally a party around him at Sialkot, which he held in fief. But the Sikhs were not disposed to thus suddenly admit his pretensions; he was reduced to straits; and in the month of June he fled, and lived at large on the country, until towards the end of July, when he surprised the fort of Attock, proclaimed himself Maharaja, and entered into a correspondence with Dost Muhammad Khan. Sardar Chattar Singh of Atari was sent against the pretender, and troops were moved from Dera Ismail Khan to aid in reducing him. The Prince was beleaguered in his fort, and became aware of his insignificance; he submitted on the 30th August, and was directed to be removed to Lahore, but he was secretly put to death at the instigation of Jawahir Singh, and through the instrumentality, as understood, of Fateh Khan Towana, who sought by rendering an important service to further ingratiate himself with that master for the time being who had restored him to favour, and who had appointed him to the management of the upper Derajat of the Indus.¹

This last triumph was fatal to Jawahir Singh, and anger was added to the contempt in which he had always been held. He had sometimes displayed both energy and perseverance, but his vigour was the impulse of personal resentment, and it was never characterized by judgment or by superior intelligence. His original design of flying to the English had displeased the Sikhs, and rendered them suspicious of his good faith as a member of the *Khalsa*; and no sooner had his revenge been gratified by the expulsion of Hira Singh and Pandit Jalla, than he found himself the mere sport and plaything of the army, which had only united with him for the attainment of a common object. The soldiery began to talk of themselves as pre-eminently the *Panth Khalsaji*, or Congregation of Believers²; and Jawahir Singh was

1 Compare Major Broadfoot to Government, 14th and 26th July and 8th and 18th Sept., 1845.

2 Or, as the *Sarbat Khalsa*, the body of the elect. Major Broadfoot (letter of 2nd Feb., 1845) thought this title, which the soldiers arrogated to themselves, was new in correspondence; but Government pointed out, in reply, that it was an old term, according to the Calcutta records.

overawed by the spirit which animated the armed host. In the midst of the successes against Jammu, he trembled for his fate, and he twice laid plans for escaping to the south of the Sutlej; but the troops were jealous of such a step on the part of their nominal master. He felt that he was watched, and he abandoned the hope of escape to seek relief in dissipation, in the levy of Mahomedan regiments, and in idle or desperate threats of war with his British allies.¹ Jawahir Singh was thus despised and distrusted by the Sikhs themselves; their enmity to him was fomented by Lal Singh, who aimed at the post of Wazir; and the murder of Peshawara Singh added to the general exasperation, for the act was condemned as insulting to the people, and it was held up to reprobation by the chiefs as one which would compromise their own safety, if allowed to pass with impunity.² The *Panchayets* of regiments met in council, and they resolved that Jawahir Singh should die as a traitor to the commonwealth, for death is almost the only mode by which tumultuous, half-barbarous Governments can remove an obnoxious Minister. He was accordingly required to appear on the 21st September before the assembled *Khalsa* to answer for his misdeeds. He went, seated upon an elephant; but fearing his fate, he took with him the young Maharaja and a quantity of gold and jewels. On his arrival in front of the troops, he endeavoured to gain over some influential deputies and officers by present donatives and by lavish promises, but he was sternly desired to let the Maharaja be removed from his side, and to be himself silent. The boy was placed in a tent near at hand, and a party of soldiers advanced and put the Wazir to death by a discharge of musketry.³ Two other persons, the sycophants of the Minister, were killed at the same time, but no pillage or massacre occurred; the act partook of the solemnity and moderation of a judicial process, ordained and witnessed by a whole people; and the body of Jawahir Singh was allowed to be removed and burnt with the dreadful honours of the Sati sacrifice.

1 Compare Major Broadfoot to Government, 23rd and 28th Feb., 5th April (a demi-official letter), and 15th and 18th Sept., 1845.

2 Compare Major Broadfoot to Government, 22nd Sept., 1845.

3 Compare Major Broadfoot to Government, 26th Sept., 1845. It may be added that the Sikhs generally regarded Jawahir Singh as one ready to bring in the English, and as faithless to the *Khalsa*.

For some time after the death of Jawahir Singh, no one seemed willing to become the supreme administrative authority in the state, or to place himself at the head of that self-dependent army, which in a few months had led captive the formidable chief of Jammu, reduced to submission the powerful Governor of Multan, put down the rebellion of one recognized as the brother of the Maharaja, and pronounced and executed judgment on the highest functionary in the kingdom, and which had also without effort contrived to keep the famed Afghans in check at Peshawar and along the frontier. Raja Golab Singh was urged to repair to the capital, but he and all others were overawed, and Rani Jindan held herself for a time a regular court, in the absence of a Wazir. The army was partly satisfied with this arrangement, for the committees considered that they could keep the provinces obedient, and they reposed confidence in the talents or the integrity of the accountant Dinanath, of the paymaster Bhagat Ram, and of Nuruddin, almost as familiar as his old and infirm brother Aziz-ud-din with the particulars of the treaties and engagements with the English. The army had formerly required that these three men should be consulted by Jawahir Singh; but the advantage of a responsible head was, nevertheless, apparent, and as the soldiers were by degrees wrought upon to wage war with their European neighbours, Raja Lal Singh was nominated Wazir, and Sardar Tej Singh was reconfirmed in his office of Commander-in-Chief. These appointments were made early in November, 1845.¹

II. CAUSES OF THE WAR

The English Government had long expected that it would be forced into a war with the overbearing soldiery of the Punjab : the Indian public, which considered only the fact of the progressive aggrandizement of the strangers, was prepared to hear of the annexation of another kingdom without minutely inquiring or caring about the causes which led to it; and the more selfish chiefs of the Sikhs had always desired that such a degree of interference should be exercised in the affairs of their country as would guarantee to them the easy enjoyment of their possessions.

1 In this paragraph the author followed mainly his own notes of occurrences.

These wealthy and incapable men stood rebuked before the superior genius of Ranjit Singh, and before the mysterious spirit which animated the people arrayed in arms, and they thus fondly hoped that a change would give them all they could desire; but it is doubtful whether the Sikh soldiery ever seriously thought, although they often vauntingly boasted, of fighting with the paramount power of Hindusthan, until within two or three months of the first battles, and even then the rude and illiterate yeomen considered that they were about to enter upon a war purely defensive.

From the moment the Sikh army became predominant in the state, the English authorities had been persuaded that the machinery of Government would be broken up, that bands of plunderers would everywhere arise, and that the duty of a civilized people to society generally, and of a governing power to its own subjects, would all combine to bring on a collision; and thus measures which seemed sufficient were adopted for strengthening the frontier posts, and for having a force at hand which might prevent aggression, or which would at least exact retribution and vindicate the supremacy of the English name.¹ These were the fair and moderate objects of the British Government; but the Sikhs took a different view of the relative conditions of the two states; they feared the ambition of their colossal neighbour, they did not understand why they should be dreaded when intestine commotions reduced their comparative inferiority still lower; defensive measures took in their eyes the form of aggressive preparations, and they came to the conclusion that their country was to be invaded. Nor does this conviction of the weaker and less intelligent power appear to be unreasonable,—for it is always to be borne in mind that India was far behind Europe in civilization, and that political morality or moderation was as little appreciated in the East in these days as it was in Christendom in the middle ages. Hindustan, moreover, from Kabul to the valley of Assam and the island of Ceylon, was regarded as one country, and dominion in it was associated in the minds of the people with the predominance of one monarch or

1 Compare Minute by the Governor-General, of the 16th June, 1845, and the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 1st October, 1845. (*Parliamentary Paper*, 1846).

of one race. The supremacy of Vikramaditya and Chandragupta, of the Turkmaus and Moghuls, is familiar to all, and thus on hearing of further acquisitions by the English, a Hindu or Mahomedan simply observed that the destiny of the nation was great, or that its cannon was irresistible. A prince might chafe that he lost a province or was rendered tributary; but the public would never accuse the conquerors of unjust aggression, or at least of unrighteous and unprincipled ambition.

To this general persuasion of the Sikhs, in common with other Indian nations, that the English were ever ready to extend their power, was to be added the particular bearing of the British Government towards the Punjab itself. In 1809, when the apprehensions of a French invasion of the East had subsided, and the resolution of making the Jumna a boundary was still approved, the English Viceroy had said that rather than irritate Ranjit Singh, the detachment of troops which had been advanced to Ludhiana might be withdrawn to Karnal.¹ It was not indeed thought advisable to carry out the proposition; but up to the period of the Afghan War of 1838, the garrison of Ludhiana formed the only body of armed men near the Sikh frontier, excepting the provincial regiment raised at Subathu for the police of the hills after the Gurkha War. The advanced post on the Sutlej was of little military or political use; but it served as the most conspicuous symbol of the compact with the Sikhs; and they as the inferior power were always disposed to lean upon old engagements as those which warranted the least degree of intimacy or dictation. In 1835 the petty chiefship of Ferozpur, seventy miles lower down the Sutlej than Ludhiana, was occupied by the English as an escheat due to their protection of all Sikh lordships save that of Lahore. The advantages of the place in a military point of view had been perseveringly extolled, and its proximity to the capital of the Punjab made Ranjit Singh, in his prophetic fear, claim it as a dependency of his own. In 1838 the Maharaja's apprehensions that the insignificant town would become a cantonment were fully realized; for twelve thousand men assembled at Ferozpur to march to Khorasan; and as it was learnt, before the date fixed for the departure of the army, that the Persians had raised the siege of Herat, it was determined that

1 Government to Sir David Ochterloney, 30th January, 1809.

a small division should be left behind, until the success of the projected invasion rendered its presence no longer necessary.¹ But the succeeding warfare in Afghanistan and Sind gave the new cantonment a character of permanency, and in 1842 the remoteness from support of the two posts on the Sutlej was one of the arguments used for advancing a considerable body of troops to Ambala as a reserve, and for placing European regiments in the hills still closer to the Sikh frontier.² The relations of 1809 were nevertheless cherished by the Sikhs, although they may have been little heeded by the English amid the multifarious considerations attendant on their changed position in India.

It had never been concealed from the Sikh authorities, that the helpless condition of the acknowledged Government of the country was held to justify such additions to the troops at Ludhiana and Firozpur, as would give confidence to the inhabitants of these districts, and ensure the successful defence of the posts themselves against predatory bands.³ Nor did the Sikhs deny the right of the English to make what military arrangements they pleased for the security of their territories : but that any danger was to be apprehended from Lahore was not admitted by men conscious of their weakness ; and thus by every process of reasoning employed, the Sikhs still came to the same conclusion that they were threatened. Many circumstances, unheeded or undervalued by the English, gave further strength to

1 This was the understanding at the time, but no document appears to have been drawn up to that effect. It was indeed expected that Shah Shuja would be seated on his throne, and the British army withdrawn, all within a twelve month.

2 The author could not refer to any written record of these reasons, but he knew that they were used. When the step in advance were resolved on, it is only to be regretted that the cantonment was not formed at Sirhind, the advantages of which as a military post, with reference to the Punjab, as being central to all the principal passages of the Sutlej, Sir David Ochterloney had long before pointed out. (Sir D. Ochterloney to Government, 3rd May, 1810). Some delicacy, however, was felt towards the Sikhs of Patiala, to whom Sirhind belonged ; although the more important and less defensible step of alarming the Sikhs of Lahore had been taken without heed or hesitation.

3 Compare the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 2nd December, 1845 (*Parl. Papers*, 1846) ; and also his despatch of the 31st December, 1845. (*Parl. Papers*, p. 28).

this conviction. It had not indeed been made known to the Sikhs that Sir William Macnaghten and others had proposed to dismember their kingdom by bestowing Peshawar on Shah Shuja, when Ranjit Singh's line was held to end with the death of his grandson; but it would be idle to suppose the Lahore Government ignorant of a scheme which was discussed in official correspondence, and doubtless in private society, or of the previous desire of Sir Alexander Burnes to bestow the same tract on Dost Muhammad Khan; and the Sikh authorities must at least have had a lively remembrance of the English offer of 1843, to march upon their capital, and to disperse their army. Again, in 1844 and 1845, the facts were whispered abroad and treasured up, that the English were preparing boats at Bombay to make bridges across the Sutlej, that troops in Sind were being equipped for a march on Multan,¹ and that the various garrisons of the north-west provinces were being gradually reinforced, while some of them were being abundantly supplied with the munitions of war as well as with troops.² None of these things were communicated to the Sikh Government, but they were nevertheless believed by all parties, and they were held to denote a campaign, not of defence, but of aggression.³

1 The collection of the means at Sukkur for the equipment of a force of five thousand men, to march towards Multan, was a subject of ordinary official correspondence in 1844-45, as for instance, between the Military Board in Calcutta and the officers of departments under its control.

2 The details of the preparations made by Lords Ellenborough and Hardinge, may be seen in an article on the administration of the latter nobleman, in the *Calcutta Review*, which is understood to be the production of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence.

Up to 1838, the troops on the frontier amounted to one regiment at Subathu, and two at Ludhiana, with six pieces of artillery, equalling in all little more than 2,500 men. Lord Auckland made the total about 8,000, by increasing Ludhiana and creating Ferozpur. Lord Ellenborough formed further new stations at Ambala, Kasauli, and Simla, and placed in all about 14,000 men and 48 field guns on the frontier. Lord Hardinge increased the aggregate force to about 32,000 men, with 68 field guns, besides having 10,000 men with artillery at Meerut. After 1843, however, the station of Karnal, on the Jumna, was abandoned, which in 1838 and preceding years may have mustered about 4,000 men.

3 Compare the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, December 2, 1845.

The Sikhs thus considered that the fixed policy of the English was territorial aggrandizement, and that the immediate object of their ambition was the conquest of Lahore. This persuasion of the people was brought home to them by the acts of the British representative for the time, and by the opinion which they had preformed of his views. Mr. Clerk became Lieutenant-Governor of Agra in June 1843, and he was succeeded as Agent for the affairs of the Sikhs by Lieutenant-Colonel Richmond, whose place again was taken by Major Broadfoot, a man of undoubted energy and ability, in November of the following year. In India the views of the British Government are, by custom, made known to allies and dependants through one channel only, namely, that of an accredited English officer. The personal character of such a functionary gives a colour to all he does and says; the policy of the Government is indeed judged of by the bearing of its representative, and it is certain that the Sikh authorities did not derive any assurance of an increasing desire for peace, from the nomination of an officer who, thirty months before, had made so stormy a passage through their country.

One of Major Broadfoot's first acts was to declare the Cis-Sutlej possessions of Lahore to be under British protection equally with Patiala and other chiefships, and also to be liable to escheat on the death or deposition of Maharaja Dalip Singh.¹

1 Major Broadfoot (Letters to Government of the 7th December, 1844, 30th January and 28th February, 1845) may be referred to as explanatory of his views. In the last letter he distinctly says that if the young Maharaja Dalip Singh, who was then ill of the small-pox, should die, he would direct the reports regarding the Cis-Sutlej districts to be made to himself (through the Lahore vakil or agent indeed), and not to any one in the Punjab.

Major Broadfoot is understood to have quoted to the Sikhs a letter of Sir David Ochterloney's, dated the 7th May, 1809, to Mohkam Chand, Ranjit Singh's representative, to the effect that the Cis-Sutlej Lahore states were equally under British protection with other states; and also an order of April, 1824, from Ranjit Singh, requiring his authorities south of the Sutlej to obey the English Agent, on pain of having their noses slit. It is not improbable that Sir David Ochterloney may, at the early date quoted, have so understood the nature of the British connection with reference to some particular case then before him, but that the Cis-Sutlej states of Lahore were held under feudal obligations to the English, seems scarcely tenable, for the following reasons:—1. The protection extended

This view was not formally announced to the Sikh Government, but it was notorious, and Major Broadfoot acted on it when he proceeded to interfere authoritatively, and by a display of force, in the affairs of the priest-like Sodhis of Anandpur Makhowal, a fief to which some years before it had been declared to be expedient to waive all claim, especially as Ranjit Singh could best deal with the privileged proprietors.¹ Again, a troop of horse had crossed the Sutlej near Ferozpur, to proceed to Kotkupra, a Lahore town, to relieve or strengthen the mounted police ordinarily stationed there; but the party had crossed without the previous sanction of the British Agent having been obtained, agreeably to an understanding between the two Governments, based on an article of the treaty of 1809, but which modified arrangement was scarcely applicable to so small a body of men proceeding for such a purpose. Major Broadfoot nevertheless required the horsemen to recross; and as he considered them dilatory in their obedience, he followed them with his escort, and overtook them as they were about to ford the river. A shot was

by the English to the chiefs of Sirhind was declared to mean protection to *them* against Ranjit Singh, and therefore not protection of the *whole* country between the Sutlej and Jumna, a portion of which belonged to Lahore. (See the Treaty of 1809, and Article 1 of the Declaration of the 3rd May, 1809; and also Government to Sir D. Ochterloney, 10th April, 1809). Further, when convenient, the British Government could even maintain, that although the treaty of 1809 was binding on Ranjit Singh, with reference to Cis-Sutlej states, it was not binding on the English, whom it simply authorised to interfere at their discretion. (Government to Captain Wade, 23rd April, 1833). This was indeed written with reference to Bahawalpur, but the application was made general. 2. The protection accorded to the chiefs of Sirhind was afterwards extended so as to give them security in the plains, but not on the hills, against the Gurkhas as well as against Ranjit Singh (Government to Sir D. Ochterloney, 23rd January, 1810); while with regard to Ranjit Singh's own Cis-Sutlej possessions, it was declared that he must himself defend them (against Nepal), leaving it a question of policy as to whether he should or should not be aided in their defence. It was further added, that he might march through his Cis-Sutlej districts, to enable him to attack the Gurkhas in the hills near the Jumna, in defence of the districts in question, should he so wish. (Government to Sir David Ochterloney, 4th October, and 22nd November, 1811).

1 About the particular dispute noticed in the text, Major Broadfoot's letter to Government of the 13th Sept., 1845, may be referred to. It labours in a halting way to justify his proceedings and his assumption of jurisdiction under ordinary circumstances.

fired by the English party, and the extreme desire of the Sikh commandant to avoid doing anything which might be held to compromise his Government, alone prevented a collision.¹ Further, the bridge-boats which had been prepared at Bombay, were despatched towards Firozpur in the autumn of 1845, and Major Broadfoot almost avowed that hostilities had broken out when he manifested an apprehension of danger to these armed vessels, by ordering strong guards of soldiers to escort them safely to their destination, and when he began to exercise their crews in the formation of bridges after their arrival at Firozpur.²

The views held by Major Broadfoot, and virtually adopted by the Supreme Government, with respect to the Cis-Sutlej districts, and also the measures followed in particular instances, may all be defended to a certain extent, as they indeed were, on specious grounds, as on the vague declarations of Sir David Ochterloney or on the deferential injunctions of Ranjit Singh. It is even believed that if the cession of the tracts in question had been desired, their relinquishment might have been effected without a resort to arms; but every act of Major Broadfoot was considered to denote a foregone resolution, and to be conceived in a spirit of enmity rather than of good will.³ Nor did the Sikhs

1 Compare Major Broadfoot to Government, 27th March, 1845. It is understood that the Government disapproved of these proceedings.

2 A detachment of troops under a European officer was required to be sent with each batch of boats, owing to the state of the Punjab. Nevertheless small iron steamers were allowed to navigate the Sutlej at the time without guards, and one lay under the guns of Fitor for several days, without meeting aught except civility on the part of the Sikhs.

3 It was generally held by the English in India that Major Broadfoot's appointment greatly increased the probabilities of a war with the Sikhs; and the impression was equally strong, that had Mr. Clerk, for instance, remained as Agent, there would have been no war. That Major Broadfoot was regarded as hostile to the Sikhs, may perhaps almost be gathered from his own letters. On the 19th March, 1845, he wrote that the Governor of Multan had asked what course he, the Governor, should pursue, if the Lahore troops marched against him, to enforce obedience to demands made. The question does not seem one which a recusant servant would put under ordinary circumstances to the preserver of friendship between his master and the English. Major Broadfoot, however, would appear to have recurred to the virtual overtures of Dewan Mul Raj, for on the 20th Nov., 1845, when he wrote to all authorities in any way connected with the Punjab, that the British provinces were threatened with

seem to be menaced by their allies on one side only. In the summer of 1845 some horsemen from Multan crossed a few miles into the Sind territory in pursuit of certain marauders. The boundary of the two provinces between the Indus and the hills is no where defined, and the object of the few troopers was evident; but the Governor, Sir Charles Napier, immediately ordered the wing of a regiment to Kushmor, a few miles below Rojhan, to preserve the integrity of his frontier from violation. The Lahore authorities were indeed put upon their guard, but they did not admit the sufficiency of the reasons given, and they looked upon the prompt measures of the conqueror of Sind as one more proof of the desire to bring about a war with the Punjab.¹

The Sikh army, and the population generally, were convinced that war was inevitable; but the better informed members of the Government knew that no interference was likely to be exercised without an overt act of hostility on their part.² When moved as much by jealousy of one another as by a common dread of the army, the chiefs of the Punjab had clung to wealth and ease rather than to honour and independence, and thus Maharaja Sher Singh, the Sindhanwalas, and others, had been ready to become tributary, and to lean for support upon

invasion, he told Sir Charles Napier, the complete soldier, armed at all points, that the Governor of Multan would defend *Sind* with his provincials against the Sikhs!—thus leading to the belief that he had succeeded in detaching the Governor from his allegiance to Lahore.

1 It is known that Sir Charles Napier was anxious to station a considerable body of men at Kushmor; and that the Supreme Government countermanded the march of a detachment of European troops to that place. Some reference may also be made to an unguarded speech of Sir Charles Napier's at the time, about the British being called on to move into the Punjab (compare Major Smyth's *Reigning Family of Lahore*, Introd. xxii.),—especially as Major Broadfoot considered the Sikh leaders to be moved in a greater degree by the Indian newspapers, than is implied in a passing attention to reiterated paragraphs about invasion. He thought, for instance, that Pandit Jalla understood the extent to which the Government deferred to public opinion, and that the Brahmin himself designed to make use of the press as an instrument. (Major Broadfoot to Government, 30th Jan., 1845).

2 Compare Inclosure, No. 6, of the Governor-General's letter to the Secret Committee of the 2nd Dec., 1845 (*Parl. Papers*, Feb. 26, 1846, p. 21). Major Broadfoot, however, states of Golab Singh, what was doubtless true of many others, viz., that he believed the English had designs on the Punjab. (Major Broadfoot to Government, 5th May, 1845).

foreigners. As the authority of the army began to predominate, and to derive force from its system of committees, a new danger threatened the territorial chiefs and the adventurers in the employ of the Government. They might successively fall before the cupidity of the organized body which none could control, or an able leader might arise who would absorb the power of all others, and gratify his followers by the sacrifice of the rich, the selfish, and the feeble. Even the Raja of Jammu, always so reasonably averse to a close connection with the English, began to despair of safety as a feudatory in the hills, or of authority as a Minister at Lahore without the aid of the British name and Lal Singh, Tej Singh, and many others, all equally felt their incapacity to control the troops. These men considered that their only chance of retaining power was to have the army removed by inducing it to engage in a contest which they believed would end in its dispersion, and pave the way for their recognition as Ministers more surely than if they did their duty by the people, and earnestly deprecated a war which must destroy the independence of the Punjab.¹ Had the shrewd committees of the armies observed no military preparations on the part of the

1 Compare Inclosures to the Governor-General's letter to the Secret Committee of the 31st Dec., 1845. (*Parl. paper*, 26th Feb., 1846, p. 29). It was not thought necessary to refer to the intemperance of the desperate Jawahir Singh, or to the amours of the Maharani, which, in the papers laid before the British Parliament, were used to heighten the folly and worthlessness of the Lahore court. Jawahir Singh might have sometimes been seen intoxicated, and the Maharani might have attempted little concealment of her debaucheries, but decency was seldom violated in public; and the essential forms of a court were reserved to the last, especially when strangers were present. The private life of Princes may be scandalous enough, while the moral tone of the people is high, and is, moreover, applauded and upheld by the transgressors themselves, in their capacity of Magistrates. Hence the domestic vices of the powerful have, comparatively, little influence on public affairs. Further, the proneness of news-mongers to enlarge upon such personal failings is sufficiently notorious; and the diplomatic service of India was often reproached for dwelling pruriently or maliciously on such matters. Finally, it is well known that the native servants of the English in Hindustan, who in too many instances were hirelings of little education or respectability, thought they best pleased their employers, or chimed in with their notions, when they traduced all others, and especially those with whom there might be a rivalry or a collision. So inveterate was the habit of flattery, and so strong was the belief that Englishmen loved to be themselves praised and to hear others slighted, that even petty local authorities scarcely referred

English, they would not have heeded the insidious exhortations of such mercenary men as Lal Singh and Tej Singh, although in former days they would have marched uninquiringly towards Delhi at the bidding of their great Maharaja. But the views of the Government functionaries coincided with the belief of the impulsive soldiery; and when the men were tauntingly asked whether they would quietly look on while the limits of the *Khalsa* dominion were being reduced, and the plains of Lahore occupied by the remote strangers of Europe, they answered that they would defend with their lives all belonging to the commonwealth of Gobiind, and that they would march and give battle to the invaders on their own ground.¹ At the time in question, or early in November, two Sikh villages near Ludhiana were placed under sequestration on the plea that criminals concealed in them had not been surrendered.² The measure was an unusual one, even when the Sikhs and the English were equally at their ease with regard to one another; and the circumstance, added to the rapid approach of the Governor-General to the frontier, removed any doubts which may have lingered in the minds of the *Panchayets*. The men would assemble in groups and talk of the great battle they must soon wage, and they would meet round the tomb of Ranjit Singh and vow fidelity to the *Khalsa*.³ Thus wrought upon, war with the English was virtually declared on the 17th November; a few days afterwards the troops began to move in detachments from Lahore; they commenced crossing the Sutlej between Hariki and Kasur on the 11th December, and on the 14th of that month a portion of the army took up a position within a few miles of Firozpur.⁴

to allied or dependent Princes, their neighbours, in verbal or in written reports, without using some terms of disparagement towards them. Hence the scenes of debauchery described by the Lahore news writer were partly due to his professional character, and partly to his belief that he was saying what the English wanted to hear.

1 The ordinary private correspondence of the period contained many statements of the kind given in the text.

2 Major Broadfoot's *official* correspondence seems to have ceased after the 21st Nov., 1845: and there is no report on this affair among his recorded letters.

3 The Lahore news-letter of the 24th Nov., 1845, prepared for Government.

4 Compare the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 2nd and 31st Dec., 1845, with inclosures. (*Parl. Papers*, 1846).

The initiative was thus taken by the Sikhs; but considering the English to have been sincerely desirous of living at peace with the Punjab, the policy adopted by them does not show that strict adherence to formal engagements, and that high wisdom and sure foresight which should distinguish the counsels of an intelligent power, acquainted with actual life, and with the examples of history. Reference was only had to the probability of Sikh inroads, of a weak neighbour running upon certain destruction, and little heed was given to the original arrangement, which left the province of Sirhind almost free of troops and of English subjects, and which placed a confederacy of dependent states between themselves and Lahore to soften the mutual action of a half barbarous military dominion, and of a humane and civilized Government. The sincerity of the English rulers is not to be doubted, but their honesty can only be admitted at the expense of their judgment and knowledge of mankind.

The same defective apprehension which saw no mark of hostility in collecting boats for bridges across a boundary river, and which paid no regard to the effect on a rude people, with more to fear than to hope, of displaying an army with no road before it except that to Lahore, also led the confident English to persevere in despising or misunderstanding the spirit of the disciples of Gobind to an extent which almost proved fatal to the continuity of their triumphs. In 1842 the Sikhs were held, as has been mentioned, to be unequal to cope with the Afghans, and even to be inferior in martial qualities to the population of the Jammu hills. In 1845 the Lahore soldiery was called a "rabble" in sober official despatches, and although subsequent descriptions allowed the regiments to be composed of the yeomanry of the country, the army was still declared to be daily deteriorating as a military body.¹ It is, indeed, certain that English officers and Indian Sepoys equally believed they were

1 Major Broadfoot to Government, 18th and 25th January, 1845. A year before, Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence (*Calcutta Review*, No. III. p. 176, 170) considered the Sikh army as good as that of any other Indian power, and not inferior, indeed, to the Gwalior troops which fought at Maharajpur. The Lahore artillery, however, he held to be very bad, although he was of opinion that in position the guns would be well served. In his *Adventurer in the Punjab* (p. 47. note E.), he had previously given a decided preference to the Maratha artillery.

to win battles by marching steadily and by the discharge of a few artillery shots, rather than by skilful dispositions, hard fighting, and a prolonged contest.¹

The English not only undervalued their enemy, but they likewise mistook the form which the long-expected aggressions of the Sikhs would assume. It was not thought that the Ministry, or even that the army would have the courage to cross the river in force, and to court an equal contest; the known treasonable views of the chiefs, and the unity and depth of feeling which possessed the troops, were equally disregarded, and it continued to be believed that a desultory warfare would sooner or later ensue, which would require the British to interfere, but which would still enable them to do so at their own convenience.²

1 Major Smyth is, however, of opinion that the Sepoys in the British service had a high opinion of the Sikh troops, although the English themselves talked of them as boasters and cowards. (Major Smyth's *Reigning Family of Lahore*, Introduction, xxiv. and xxv.) Compare Dr. Macgregor, *History of the Sikhs*, ii. 89, 90.

2 Compare the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 31st Dec., 1845 (*Parl. Papers*, 1846), and the *Calcutta Review*, No. XVI. p. 475. A few words may here be said on a subject which occasioned some discussion in India at the time, viz., Major Broadfoot's reputed persevering disbelief that the Sikhs would cross the Sutlej, although his assistant, Captain Nicolson, stationed at Ferozpur, had repeatedly said they would. The matter was taken up by the Indian public as if Captain Nicolson had for several months, or for a year and more, held that the British provinces would assuredly be invaded within a definite period; whereas, with regard to what the Sikh army might eventually do, Captain Nicolson was as uncertain as others, up to within a week or so of the passage of the Sutlej in December, 1845. The truth seems to be, that Major Broadfoot affected to disbelieve Captain Nicolson's report of the actual march and near approach of the Lahore army, of its encampment on the Sutlej, and of its evident resolution to cross the river, giving the preference to intelligence of a contrary nature received direct from the Sikh capital, and which tallied with his own views of what the Sikhs would finally do. That such was the case, may indeed be gathered from the Governor-General's despatch to the Secret Committee of the 31st December, 1845 (*Parl. Papers*, 1846, p. 26, 527).

The writer of the article in the *Calcutta Review*, No. XVI., endeavours to justify Major Broadfoot's views, by showing that all the officers on the frontier held similar opinions. The point really at issue, however, is not whether, generally speaking, invasion was probable, but whether in the beginning of December, 1845 Major Broadfoot should not have held that the Sutlej would be crossed. The Reviewer forgets to add

Thus boats for bridges and regiments and guns, the provocatives to a war, were sufficiently numerous; but food and ammunition, and carriage and hospital stores, such as were necessary for a campaign, were all behind at Delhi or Agra, or still remained to be collected.¹

III. MILITARY OPERATIONS

The Governor-General joined the Commander-in-Chief at Ambala early in December, 1845, and as soon as it seemed certain that the Sikhs were marching in force towards the Sutlej, the English troops in the upper provinces were all put in motion. The nearest divisions were those of Ambala, Ludhiana and Ferozpur, which numbered in all about 17,000 available men, with 69 field guns; and as the last-mentioned force was the most exposed, the Ambala troops were moved straight to its support, and Lord Hardinge further prudently resolved to leave Ludhiana with a mere garrison for its petty fort, and to give Lord Gough as large a force as possible, with which to meet the Sikhs, should they cross the Sutlej as they threatened.²

The Lahore army of invasion may have equalled thirty-five or forty thousand men, with a hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, exclusive of a force detached towards Ludhiana to act as circumstances might render advantageous. The numbers of the

that of the local officers, Major Broadfoot alone knew at the time the extent of provocation which the Sikhs had received; and that the officers wrote with no later news before them than that of the 17th November. Hence all save Major Broadfoot himself had very imperfect means of forming a judgment of what was likely to take place. With regard to what the English should have been prepared against, Lieutenant-Colonel Richmond's letter of the 3rd April, 1844, to the address of the Commander-in-Chief may be referred to, as in favour of having stations strong if they were to be kept up at all.

1 It was a common and a just remark at the time, that although the Indian Government was fortunate in having a practical and approved soldier like Lord Hardinge at its head, under the circumstances of a war in progress, yet that had Lord Ellenborough remained Governor-General the army would have taken the field better equipped than it did.

2 The effective force at Ferozshahr was 17,727 men, according to the *Calcutta Review* (No. XVI. p. 472), and 16,700 according to Lord Hardinge's Despatch of the 31st of December 1845. This was the available force, out of 32,479 men in all, posted from Ambala to the Sutlej.

Sikhs were understood at the time to greatly exceed those given, but the strength of armies is usually exaggerated both by the victors and the vanquished; and there is no satisfactory proof that the regular troops of the Sikhs exceeded those of the English by more than a half, although numerous bodies of undisciplined horse swelled the army of the invaders to more than double that of their opponents.¹

The Sikh leaders threatened Firozpur, but no attack was made upon its seven thousand defenders, which with a proper spirit were led out by their commander, Sir John Littler, and showed a bold front to the overwhelming force of the enemy. The object, indeed, of Lal Singh and Tej Singh was not to compromise themselves with the English by destroying an isolated division, but to get their own troops dispersed by the converging forces of their opponents. Their desire was to be upheld as the Ministers of a dependent kingdom by grateful conquerors, and they thus deprecated an attack on Firozpur, and assured the local British authorities of their secret and efficient good will. But these men had also to keep up an appearance of devotion to the interests of their country, and they urged the necessity of leaving the easy prey of a cantonment untouched, until the leaders of the English should be attacked, and the fame of the *Khalsa* exalted by the captivity or death of a Governor-General.² The Sikh army itself understood the necessity of unity of counsel in the affairs of war, and the power of the regimental and other committees was temporarily suspended by an agreement with the executive heads of the State, which enabled these unworthy men to effect their

1 The Governor-General in his Despatch of the 31st of December, 1845, estimates the Sikhs at from 48,000 to 60,000 men; but with regard to efficient troops, it may be observed that the whole regular army of the country did not exceed 42,000 infantry, including the regiments at Lahore, Multan, Peshawar, and Kashmir, as well as those forming the main army of invasion. Perhaps an estimate of 30,000 embodied troops of all kinds would be nearer the truth than any other.

2 It was sufficiently certain and notorious at the time that Lal Singh was in communication with Captain Nicolson, the British Agent at Firozpur, but owing to the untimely death of that officer, the details of the overtures made, and expectations held out, cannot now be satisfactorily known. Compare Dr. Macgregor's *History of the Sikhs*, ii. 80.

base objects with comparative ease.¹ Nevertheless, in the ordinary military arrangements of occupying positions and distributing infantry and cavalry, the generals and inferior commanders acted for themselves and all had to pay some respect to the spirit which animated the private soldiers in their readiness to do battle for the commonwealth of Gobind. The effects of the enthusiastic unity of purpose in an army, headed by men not only ignorant of warfare, but studiously treacherous towards their followers, was conspicuously visible in the speediness with which numerous heavy guns and abundance of grain and ammunition were brought across a large river. Every Sikh considered the cause as his own, and he would drag guns, drive bullocks, lead camels, and load and unload boats with a cheerful alacrity, which contrasted strongly with the inapt and sluggish obedience of mere mercenaries, drilled, indeed, and fed with skill and care, but unwarmed by one generous feeling for their country or their foreign employers. The youthful *Khalsa* was active and strong of heart, but the soldiers had never before met so great a foe, and their tactics were modified by involuntary awe of the British army, renowned in the East for achievements in war. The river had been crossed, and the treaty broken; but the Sikhs were startled at their own audacity, and they partially intrenched one portion of their forces, while they timorously kept the other as a reserve out of danger's way.

The Ambala and the Ludhiana divisions of British army arrived at Mudki, twenty miles from Ferozpur, on the 18th December; and they had scarcely taken up their ground before they were attacked by a detachment of the Sikh army, believed at the time to be upwards of thirty thousand strong, but which really seems to have consisted of less than two thousand infantry, supported by about twenty-two pieces of artillery, and eight or ten thousand horsemen.² Lal Singh headed the attack, but, in

1 Lal Singh was appointed Wazir, and Tej Singh Commander-in-Chief of the army, on or about the 8th November, 1845, according to the *Lahore News-Letter* of that date, prepared for Government.

2 See Lord Gough's despatch of the 19th December, 1845, for the estimate of 30,000 men, with 40 guns. Captain Nicolson, in his private correspondence of the period, and writing from Ferozpur, gives the Sikh force at about 3,500 only, which is doubtless too low, although subsequent inquiries all tended to show that the infantry portion was weak, having

accordance with his original design, he involved his followers in an engagement, and then left them to fight as their undirected valour might prompt. The Sikhs were repulsed with the loss of seventeen guns,¹ but the success of the English was not so complete as should have been achieved by the victors in so many battles; and it was wisely determined to effect a junction with the division of Sir John Littler before assailing the advanced wing of the Sikh army, which was encamped in a deep horse-shoe form around the village of Firozshahr, about ten miles both from Mudki and from Firozpur. This position was strengthened by more than a hundred pieces of artillery, and its slight and imperfect intrenchments had, here and there, been raised almost waist high since the action at Mudki. It was believed at the time to contain about fifty thousand men, but subsequent inquiries reduced the infantry to twelve regiments, and the cavalry to the eight or ten thousand which had before been engaged. The wing of the Sikh army attacked did not, therefore, greatly surpass its assailants, except in the number and size of its guns, the English artillery consisting almost wholly of six and nine-pounders.² But the belief in the fortune of the British arms was strong, and the Sepoys would then have marched with alacrity against ten times their own numbers.

A junction was effected with Sir John Littler's division about midday on the 21st December, and at a distance of four miles from the enemy's position. Considerable delay occurred in arranging the details of the assault, which was not commenced

been composed of small detachments from each of the regiments in position at Firozshahr. *The Calcutta Review*, No. XVI., p. 499, estimates the guns at 22 only, and the estimate, being moderate, is probably correct.

1 The British loss in the action was 215 killed, and 657 wounded. (See Lord Gough's Despatch of the 19th December, 1845.) The force under Lord Gough at the time amounted to about 11,000 men.

2 Both the Sikhs and the European officers in the Lahore service agree in saying that there were only twelve battalions in the lines of Firozshahr, and such indeed seems to have been the truth. The Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief vaguely estimated the whole Sikh army on the left bank of the Sutlej at 60,000 strong, and Lord Gough makes Tej Singh bring 30,000 horse besides fresh battalions, and a large park of artillery into action on the 22nd December, which would leave but a small remainder for the previous defence of Firozshahr.—See the Despatches of the 22nd and 31st December, 1845.

until within an hour of sunset. The confident English had at last got the field they wanted; they marched in even array, and their famed artillery opened its steady fire. But the guns of the Sikhs were served with rapidity and precision, and the foot-soldiers stood between and behind the batteries, firm in their order, and active with their muskets. The resistance met was wholly unexpected, and all started with astonishment. Guns were dismounted, and their ammunition was blown into the air; squadrons were checked in mid career; battalion after battalion was hurled back with shattered ranks, and it was not until after sunset that portions of the enemy's position were finally carried. Darkness, and the obstinacy of the contest, threw the English into confusion; men of all regiments and arms were mixed together; generals were doubtful of the fact or of the extent of their own success, and colonels knew not what had become of the regiment they commanded, or of the army of which they formed a part. Some portions of the enemy's line had not been broken, and the uncaptured guns were turned by the Sikhs upon masses of soldiers, oppressed with cold and thirst and fatigue, and who attracted the attention of the watchful enemy by lighting fires of brushwood to warm their stiffened limbs. The position of the English was one of real danger and great perplexity; their mercenaries had proved themselves good soldiers in foreign countries as well as in India itself, when discipline was little known, or while success was continuous; but in a few hours the five thousand children of a distant land found that their art had been learnt, and that an emergency had arisen which would tax their energies to the utmost. On that memorable night the English were hardly masters of the ground on which they stood; they had no reserve at hand, while the enemy had fallen back upon a second army, and could renew the fight with increased numbers. The not imprudent thought occurred of retiring upon Ferozpur; but Lord Gough's dauntless spirit counselled otherwise, and his own and Lord Hardinge's personal intrepidity in storming batteries, at the head of troops of English gentlemen and bands of hardy yeomen, eventually achieved a partial success and a temporary repose. On the morning of the 22nd December, the last remnants of the Sikhs were driven from their camp; but as the day advanced the second wing of their army approached in battle-array, and the wearied

and famished English saw before them a desperate and, perhaps, useless struggle. This reserve was commanded by Tej Singh; he had been urged by his zealous and sincere soldiery to fall upon the English at day-break, but *his* object was to have the dreaded army of the *Khalsa* overcome and dispersed, and he delayed until Lal Singh's force was everywhere put to flight, and until his opponents had again ranged themselves round their colours. Even at the last moment he rather skirmished and made feints than led his men to a resolute attack, and after a time he precipitately fled, leaving his subordinates without orders and without an object at a moment when the artillery ammunition of the English had failed, when a portion of their force was retiring upon Firozpur, and when no exertions could have saved the remainder if the Sikhs had boldly pressed forward.¹

A battle had thus been won, and more than seventy pieces of artillery, and some conquered or confiscated territories graced the success; but the victors had lost a seventh of their numbers, they were paralyzed after their prodigious exertions and intense

1 For the battle of Firozshahr, see Lord Gough's Despatch of the 22nd, and Lord Hardinge's of the 31st December, 1845. The Governor-General notices in especial the exertions of the infantry soldiers. The loss sustained was 694 killed, and 1721 wounded.

The statements of the *Quarterly Review* for June, 1845, pp. 203-206, and of the *Calcutta Review* for December, 1847, p. 498, may be referred to about certain points still but imperfectly known, and which it is only necessary to allude to in a general way in this history. Two of the points are: 1st, the proposal to fall back on Firozpur during the night of the 21st December; and 2nd, the actual movement of a considerable portion of the British army towards that place on the forenoon of the following day.

Had the Sikhs been efficiently commanded, a retirement on Firozpur would have been judicious in a military point of view, but as the enemy was led by traitors it was best to fearlessly keep the field. Perhaps neither the incapacity nor the treason of Lal Singh and Tej Singh were fully perceived or credited by the English chiefs, and hence the anxiety of the one on whom the maintenance of the British dominion intact mainly depended.

At Firozshahr the larger calibre and greater weight of metal of the mass of the Sikh artillery, and consequently the superiority of practice relatively to that of the field guns of the English, was markedly apparent in the condition of the two parks after the battle. The captured cannon showed scarcely any marks of round shot or shells, while nearly a third of the British guns were disabled in their carriages or tumbrils.

excitement and the Sikhs were allowed to cross the Sutlej at their leisure to prepare for fresh contests. The Sepoy mercenaries had for the first time met an equal antagonist with their own weapons—even ranks and the fire of artillery. They loudly complained of the inferiority of their cannon: they magnified banks two and three feet high into formidable ramparts, and exploding tumbrils and stores of powder became, in their imaginations, designed and deadly mines. Nor was this feeling of respect and exaggeration confined to the Indians alone; the European soldiers partook of it; and the British public, as well as the dignitaries of the Church and the heads of the State, became impressed with the immensity of the danger which had threatened the peace, and perhaps the safety, of their exotic dominion. Regiments of men, and numerous single officers variously employed, were summoned from the most distant provinces to aid in vindicating the military renown of the English race, and the political supremacy of three generations. All longed for retribution, and all were cheered amid their difficulties by the genial temper and lofty bearing of one chief; and by the systematic industry and full knowledge of military requirements possessed by the other. But joy and gratitude were yet uppermost for the moment; the hope of revenge was disturbed by the remembrance of danger; and, unmindful of the rebuke of the wise Ulysses, a partial Divinity was praised by proclamation, for the deliverance he had vouchsafed to *his* votaries.

“Unholy is the voice
Of loud thanksgiving over slaughtered men.”¹

The British army was gradually reinforced, and it took up a position stretching from Firozpur towards Hariki, and parallel

1 *Odyssey*, xxii. The Governor-General's notification of the 25th December, 1845, called upon the troops to render acknowledgment to God, and the ecclesiastical authorities in Calcutta subsequently circulated a form of thanksgiving. The anxiety of the Governor-General may be further inferred from his proclamation, encouraging desertion from the Sikh ranks, with the assurance of present rewards and future pensions, and the immediate decision of any lawsuits in which the deserters might be engaged in the British provinces!

The feeling which prompted the troops of Cromwell or Gustavus to kneel and return thanks to God on the field of victory, must ever be admired and honoured; for it was genuine, and prevailed all ranks, from

to that held by the Sikhs on the right bank of the Sutlej. But the want of ammunition and heavy guns reduced the English to inactivity, and delay produced negligence on their part and emboldened the enemy to fresh acts of daring. The Cis-Sutlej feudatories kept aloof from their new masters, or they excited disturbances; and the Raja of Ladwa, a petty Prince dependent on the English, but who had been denounced as a traitor for a year past,¹ openly proceeded from the neighbourhood of Karnal, and joined the division of the Sikh army under Ranjor Singh, which had crossed the Jalandhar Doab, to the neighbourhood of Ludhiana. This important town had been denuded of its troops to swell the first army of defence, and it was but slowly and partially garrisoned by fresh regiments arriving from the eastward, although it covered the several lines of approach from the Jumna towards Firozpur.² Early in January the Raja of Ladwa

the leader downwards, and it would equally have moved the soldiers to reproaches and humiliation had they been beaten. But such tokens of reverence and abasement come coldly and without a vital meaning in the guise of a "general order" or "circular memorandum;" and perhaps a civilized and intelligent Government might with advantage refrain from such tame and passionless assurances of devotion and gratitude, while it gave more attention to religious exercises in its regimental regulation. God should rather be kept ever present to the minds of the armed servants of the State by daily worship and instruction, than ostentatiously lauded on the rare occasion of a victory.

1 Major Broadfoot to Government, 13th December, 1844. This chief received the title of Raja from Lord Auckland, partly as a compliment to Ranjit Singh, to whom he was related, and partly in approbation of his liberality in providing the means of throwing a bridge across the classical Saraswati, at Thaneswar. He was a reckless, dissipated man, of moderate capacity; but he inherited the unsettled disposition of his father, Gurdit Singh, who once held Karnal and some villages to the east of the Jumna, and who caused the English some trouble between 1803 and 1809.

2 It is not clear why Ludhiana was not adequately garrisoned, or rather covered, by the troops which marched from Meerut after the battle of Ferozshahr. The Governor-General's attention was indeed chiefly given to strengthening the main army in its unsupported position of Ferozpur,—the real military disadvantage of which he had ample reason to deplore; while amidst his difficulties it may possibly have occurred to his Lordship, that the original policy of 1809—of being strong on the Jumna rather than on the Sutlej—was a truly wise one with reference to the avoidance of a war with the Sikhs.

The desire of being in force near the capitals of the Punjab and the main army of the Sikhs, likewise induced Lord Hardinge to direct Sir

returned to withdraw his family from his fief of Buddowal near Ludhiana, and he took the opportunity of burning a portion of the cantonment at the latter place, which the paucity of infantry and the want of cavalry on the spot enabled him to do with impunity. About the same time, the main army of the Sikhs, observing the supineness of their opponents, began to recross the Sutlej and to construct a bridge-head to secure the freedom of their passage. The English were unwillingly induced to let the Sikhs labour at this work, for it was feared that an attack would bring on a general engagement, and that the want of ammunition would prevent a battle being won or a victory being completed. The Sikhs naturally exulted, and they proclaimed that they would again fall upon the hated foreigners. Nor were their boasts altogether disbelieved; the disadvantages of Ferozpur as a frontier post became more and more apparent, and the English began to experience difficulty in obtaining supplies from the country they had annexed by the pen, without having secured by the sword. The petty fort of Muktsar, where Gobind repulsed his Moghul pursuers after his flight from Chamkaur, was successfully defended for a time against some provincial companies and the auxiliaries of Bikaner, which, like the legionaries themselves, were deficient in artillery ammunition. The equally petty fort of Dharmkot was held, in defiance of the near presence of the right wing of the English army; and other defensible places towards Sirhind overawed the population, and interfered with the peaceful march of convoys and detachments.¹

On the 17th January, 1846, Major-General Sir Harry Smith was sent with a brigade to capture Dharmkot, which was sur-

Charles Napier to march from Sind, without heeding Multan, although, as his Lordship publicly acknowledged, that victorious commander had been sent for when it was thought the campaign might become a series of sieges.

1 The hill station of Simla, where many English families resided, and which is near the Sutlej, and the equally accessible posts of Kasauli and Subathu, were at this time likewise threatened by the Lahore feudatories of Mandi, and some Sikh partisans; and as the regiments usually stationed at these places had been wholly withdrawn, it would not have been difficult to have destroyed them. But the local British authorities were active in collecting the quotas of the hill Rajputs, and judicious in making use of their means; and no actual incursion took place, although a turbulent sharer in the sequestered Anandpur-Makhowal had to be called to account.

rendered without bloodshed, and the transit of grain to the army was thus rendered more secure. The original object of Sir Harry Smith's diversion was to cover the march of the large convoy of guns, ammunition, and treasure in progress to Firozpur, as well as to clear the country of partisan troops which restricted the freedom of traffic; but when it became known that Ranjor Singh had crossed the Sutlej in force and threatened Ludhiana, the General was ordered to proceed to the relief of that place. On the 20th of January he encamped at the trading town of Jugraon, within twenty-five miles of his destination, and the authorities of the son of Fateh Singh Alhuwalia, of the treaty of 1805, to whom the place belonged, readily allowed him to occupy its well-built fort. It was known on that day that Ranjor Singh was in position immediately to the westward of Ludhiana, and that he had thrown a small garrison into Buddowal, which lay about eighteen miles distant on the direct road from Jugraon. The British detachment, which had been swelled by reinforcements to four regiments of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and eighteen guns marched soon after midnight; and early on the morning of the 21st January, it was learnt that the whole Sikh army, estimated at ten thousand men, had moved to Buddowal during the preceding day. That place was then distant eight miles from the head of the column, and Sir Harry Smith considered that if he made a detour to the right, so as to leave the Sikhs about three miles on his other flank, he would be able to effect his junction with the Ludhiana brigade without molestation. A short halt took place to enable the baggage to get somewhat ahead, and it was arranged that the long strings of animals should move parallel to the troops and on the right flank, so as to be covered by the column. As Buddowal was approached, the Sikhs were seen to be in motion likewise, and apparently to be bent on intercepting the English; but as it was not wished to give them battle, Sir Harry Smith continued his march, inclining however still more to his right, and making occasional halts with the cavalry to enable the infantry to close up, it having fallen behind owing to the heavy nature of the ground. But the Sikhs were resolved on fighting, and they commenced a fire of artillery on the British horse, which obtained a partial cover under sand banks, while the guns of the detachment opened upon the Sikhs and served to keep their line in check. By the time

that the British infantry and small rear-guard of cavalry had closed up, the fire of the Sikhs had begun to tell, and it was thought that a steady charge by the infantry would throw them into disorder, and would allow the baggage to pass on, and give time to the Ludhiana troops to come to the aid of their comrades. A close contest was indeed the prompting of every one's heart at the moment; but as the regiments of foot were being formed into line, it was found that the active Sikhs had dragged guns, unperceived, behind sand hillocks to the rear of the column,—or, as matters then stood, that they had turned their enemy's left flank. These guns threw their enflading shot with great rapidity and precision, and whole sections of men were seen to fall at a time without an audible groan amid the hissing of the iron storm. The ground was heavy, the men were wearied with a march of nine hours and eighteen miles, and it became evident that a charge might prove fatal to the exhausted victors. The infantry once more resumed its march, and its retirement of retreat upon Ludhiana was covered with skill and steadiness by the cavalry. The Sikhs did not pursue, for they were without a leader or without one who wished to see the English beaten. Ranjor Singh let his soldiers engage in battle, but that he accompanied them into the fight is more than doubtful, and it is certain that he did not essay the easy task of improving the success of his own men into the complete reverse of his enemy. The mass of the British baggage was at hand, and the temptation to plunder could not be resisted by men who were without orders to conquer. Every beast of burden which had not got within sight of Ludhiana, or which had not, timorously but prudently, been taken back to Jugraon, when the firing was heard, fell into the hands of the Sikhs, and they were enabled boastfully to exhibit artillery store carts as if they had captured British cannon.¹

Ludhiana was relieved, but an unsuccessful skirmish added to the belief so pleasing to the prostrate princes of India, that

¹ Compare the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 19th Jan., and 3rd Feb., and Lord Gough's despatch of the 1st Feb., 1845. After the skirmish of the 21st Jan., there were found to be sixty-nine killed, sixty-eight wounded, and seventy-seven missing; of which last, several were taken prisoners, while others rejoined their corps in a day or two. Of the prisoners, Mr. Barron, an assistant-surgeon, and some European soldiers, were taken to Lahore.

the dreaded army of their foreign masters had at last been foiled by the skill and valour of the disciples of Gobind, the kindred children of their own soil. The British Sepoys glanced furtively at one another, or looked towards the east, their home; and the brows of Englishmen themselves grew darker as they thought of struggles rather than triumphs. The Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief trembled for the safety of that siege train and convoy of ammunition, so necessary to the efficiency of an army which they had launched in haste against aggressors and received back shattered by the shock of opposing arms. The leader of the beaten brigades saw before him a tarnished name after the labours of a life, nor was he met by many encouraging hopes of rapid retribution. The Sikhs on their side were correspondingly elated; the presence of European prisoners added to their triumph; Lal Singh and Tej Singh shrank within themselves with fear, and Golab Singh, who had been spontaneously hailed as Minister and leader, began to think that the *Khalsa* was really formidable to one greater far than himself, and he arrived at Lahore on the 27th of January, to give unity and vigour to the counsels of the Sikhs.¹ The army under Tej Singh had recrossed the Sutlej in force; it had enlarged the bridge-head before alluded to, and so entrenched a strong position in the face of the British divisions. The Sikhs seemed again to be about to carry the war into the country of their enemy; but Golab Singh came too late,—their fame had reached its height, and defeat and subjection speedily overtook them.

During the night of the 22nd January, Ranjor Singh marched from Buddowal to a place on the Sutlej about fifteen miles below Ludhiana, where he immediately collected a number of boats as if to secure the passage of the river. The object of this movement is not known; but it may have been caused by a want of confidence on the part of the Sikhs themselves, as there were few regular regiments among them, until joined by a brigade of four battalions and some guns from the main army, which gave them a force of not less than fifteen thousand combatants. Sir Harry Smith immediately occupied the deserted position of the enemy, and he was himself reinforced simultaneously with the

1 Compare the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 3rd Feb., 1846.

Sikhs by a brigade from the main army of the English. On the 28th January the General marched with his eleven thousand men, to give the enemy battle or to reconnoitre his position and assail it in some degree of form should circumstances render such a course the most prudent. The Sikhs were nearly ten miles distant, and midway it was learnt that they were about to move with the avowed object of proceeding with a part or the whole of their force to relieve the fort of Gungrana or to occupy the neighbouring town of Jugraon, both of which posts were close to the line of the British communications with the Jumna. On reaching the edge of the table-land, bounding the sunken belt of many miles in breadth within which the narrower channel of the Sutlej proper winds irregularly, a portion of the Sikhs were observed to be in motion in a direction which would take them clear of the left of the British approach; but as soon as they saw that they were liable to be attacked in flank, they faced towards their enemy, and occupied with their right the village of Bundri, and with their left the little hamlet of Aliwal while with that activity necessary to their system, and characteristic of the spirit of the common soldiers, they immediately began to throw up banks of earth before their guns, where not otherwise protected, such as would afford some cover to themselves and offer some impediment to their assailants. An immediate collision was inevitable, and the British Commander promptly gave the order for battle. The regiments of cavalry which headed the advance opened their glittering ranks to the right and left, and made apparent the serried battalions of infantry and the frowning batteries of cannon. The scene was magnificent and yet overawing: the eye included the whole field, and glanced approvingly from the steady order of one foe to the even array of the other; all bespoke gladness of mind and strength of heart; but beneath the elate looks of the advancing warrior there lurked that fierce desire for the death of his fellows which must ever impel the valiant soldier. When thus deployed, the lines of battle were not truly parallel. The Sikh line inclined towards and extended beyond the British right, while the other flanks were, for a time, comparatively distant. The English had scarcely halted during their march of eight miles, even to form their line; but the Sikhs nevertheless commenced the action. It was perceived by Sir Harry Smith that the

capture of the village of Aliwal was of the first importance, and the right of the infantry was led against it. A deadly struggle seemed impending; for the Sikh ranks were steady and the play of their guns incessant; but the holders of the post were battalions of hill men, raised because their demeanor was sober and their hearts indifferent to the *Khalsa*, and after firing a straggling volley, they fled in confusion, headed by Ranjor Singh, their immediate leader, and leaving the brave Sikh artillerymen to be slaughtered by the conquerors. The British cavalry of the right made at the same time a sweeping and successful charge, and one half of the opposing army was fairly broken and dispersed; but the Sikhs on their own right seemed to be outflanking their opponents in spite of the exertions of the English infantry and artillery; for there the more regular battalions were in line, and the true Sikh was not easily cowed. A prompt and powerful effort was necessary, and a regiment of European lancers, supported by one of Indian cavalry, was launched against the even ranks of the Lahore infantry. The Sikhs knelt to receive the orderly but impetuous charge of the English warriors, moved alike by noble recollections of their country, by military emulation, and by personal feelings of revenge; but at the critical moment, the unaccustomed discipline of many of Gobind's champions failed them. They rose, yet they reserved their fire and delivered it together at the distance of a spear's throw; nor was it until the mass had been three times ridden through that the Sikhs dispersed. The charge was wisely planned and bravely made; but the ground was more thickly strewn with the bodies of victorious horsemen than of beaten infantry. An attempt was made to rally behind Bundri; but all resistance was unavailing, the Sikhs were driven across the Sutlej, more than fifty pieces of cannon were taken, and the General forgot his sorrows, and the soldiers their suffering and indignities, in the fulness of their common triumph.¹

1 Compare Sir Harry Smith's despatch of the 30th January, and Lord Gough's despatch of the 1st Feb., 1846. (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1846).—The loss sustained was 151 killed, 413 wounded, and 25 missing.

The *Calcutta Review*, No. XVI. p. 499, states that Sir Harry Smith required some pressing before he would engage the Sikhs, after his reverse at Buddowal. That active leader, however, was in no need of such promptings, and had adequate reinforcements reached him sooner than they did, the battle of Aliwal would have been sooner fought. It may likewise

The victory was equally important and opportune, and the time-serving Golab Singh, whose skill and capacity might have protracted the war, first reproached the vanquished Sikhs for rashly engaging in hostilities with their colossal neighbour, and then entered into negotiations with the English leaders.¹ The Governor-General was not displeased that the Lahore authorities should be ready to yield; for he truly felt that to subjugate the Punjab in one season, to defeat an army as numerous as his own, to take two capitals, and to lay siege to Multan, and Jammu and Peshawar,—all within a few months,—was a task of difficult achievement and full of imminent risks. The domi-

be here mentioned, that neither does the reviewer throughout his article do fair justice to Lord Gough, nor, in a particular instance, to the commissariat department of the army. Thus, with regard to the Commander-in-Chief, it is more than hinted (see p. 497), that Lord Hardinge was in no way to blame,—that is, that Lord Gough *was* to blame,—for the delay which occurred in attacking the Sikhs at Ferozshahr. It may be difficult to ascertain the causes, or to apportion the blame, but the Governor-General can proudly stand on his acknowledged merits and services, and wants no support at the expense of an ancient comrade in arms. Again with regard to the commissariat, it is stated, at p. 488, that supplies, which the head of the department in the field asked six weeks to furnish, were procured by Major Broadfoot in six days. The commissariat department could only use money and effect purchases by contract, or in the open market; but Major Broadfoot could summarily require “protected chiefs,” on pain of confiscation, to meet all his demands; and the writer of the article might have learnt, or must have been aware, that the requisitions in question led to one chief being disgraced by the imposition of a fine, and had some share in the subsequent deposal of another. Had the British Magistrates of Delhi, Saharanpur, Bareilly, and other places, been similarly empowered to seize by force the grain and carriage within their limits, there would have been no occasion to disparage the commissariat department. Further, it is known to many, and it is in itself plain, that had the military authorities been required, or allowed, to prepare themselves as they wished, they as simple soldiers, who had no financial difficulties to consider, would have been amply prepared with all that an army of invasion or defence could have required, long before the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej. Lord Hardinge was chiefly responsible for the timely and adequate equipment of the army, in anticipation of a probable war; and with the Governor-General in the field, possessed of superior and anomalous powers, the Commander-in-Chief could only be held responsible—and that but to a limited extent—for the strategy of a campaign or the conduct of a battle.

¹ Compare the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, of the 19th Feb., 1846.

nion of the English in India hinged mainly upon the number and efficiency of the troops of their own race which they could bring into the field; and a campaign in the hot weather would have thinned the ranks of the European regiments under the most favourable circumstances, and the ordinary recurrence of an epidemic disease would have proved as fatal to the officers of every corps present as to the common soldiers. But besides this important consideration, it was felt that the minds of men throughout India were agitated, and that protracted hostilities would not only jeopardize the communications with the Jumna, but might disturb the whole of the north-western provinces, swarming with a military population which was ready to follow any standard affording pay or allowing plunder, and which already sighed for the end of a dull reign of peace. Bright visions of standing triumphant on the Indus and of numbering the remotest conquests of Alexander among the provinces of Britain, doubtless warmed the imagination of the Governor-General; but the first object was to drive the Sikhs across the Sutlej by force of arms, or to have them withdrawn to their own side of the river by the unconditional submission of the chiefs and the delegates of the army; for, until that were done, no progress could be said to have been made in the war, and every petty chief in Hindustan would have silently prepared for asserting his independence, or for enlarging his territory on the first opportunity. But the total dispersion of so large and so well equipped a body of brave men, as that which lay within sight of the available force of the British Government, could not be accomplished by one defeat, if the chiefs of the country were to be rendered desperate, and if all were to place their valour and unanimity under the direction of one able man. The English, therefore, intimated to Golab Singh their readiness to acknowledge a Sikh sovereignty in Lahore after the army should have been disbanded; but the Raja declared his inability to deal with the troops, which still overawed him and other well-wishers to the family of Ranjit Singh. This helplessness was partly exaggerated for selfish objects; but time pressed; the speedy dictation of a treaty under the walls of Lahore was essential to the British reputation; and the views of either party were in some sort met by an understanding that the Sikh army should be attacked by the English, and that when beaten it should be openly abandoned

by its own Government; and further, that the passage of the Sutlej should be unopposed and the road to the capital laid open to the victors. Under such circumstances of discreet policy and shameless treason was the battle of Subraon fought.¹

The Sikhs had gradually brought the greater part of their force into the intrenchment on the left bank of the Sutlej, which had been enlarged as impulse prompted or as opportunity seemed to offer. They placed sixty-seven pieces of artillery in battery, and their strength was estimated at thirty-five thousand fighting men; but it is probable that twenty thousand would exceed the truth; and of that reduced number, it is certain that all were not regular troops. The intrenchment likewise showed a fatal want of unity of command and of design; and at Subraon, as in the other battles of the campaign, the soldiers did everything and the leaders nothing. Hearts to dare and hands to execute were numerous; but there was no mind to guide and animate the whole:—each inferior commander defended his front according to his skill and his means, and the centre and left, where the disciplined battalions were mainly stationed, had batteries and salient points as high as the stature of a man, and ditches which an armed soldier could not leap without exertion; but a considerable part of the line exhibited at intervals the petty obstacles of a succession of such banks and trenches as would shelter a crouching marksman or help him to sleep in security when no longer a watcher. This was especially the case on the right flank, where the looseness of the river sand rendered it impossible to throw up parapets without art and labour, and where irregular troops, the least able to remedy such disadvantages, had been allowed or compelled to take up their position. The flank in question was mainly guarded by a line of two hundred “Zumburaks” or falconets; but it derived some support from a salient battery, and from the heavy guns retained on the opposite bank of the river.² Tej Singh commanded in

1 Compare the Governor-General's letter to the Secret Committee, of the 19th Feb., 1846: from which, however, those only who were mixed up with the negotiations can extract aught indicative of the understanding with Golah Singh which is alluded to in the text.

2 The ordinary belief that the intrenchments of Subraon were jointly planned and executed by a French and a Spanish colonel, is as devoid of foundation as that the Sikh army was rendered effective solely by the

this intrenchment, and Lal Singh lay with his horse in loose order higher up the stream, watched by a body of British cavalry. The Sikhs, generally, were somewhat cast down by the defeat at Aliwal, and by the sight of the unhonoured remains of their comrades floating down the Sutlej; but the self-confidence of a multitude soon returns: they had been cheered by the capture of a post of observation established by the English and left unoccupied at night, and they resumed their vaunting practice of performing their military exercises almost within hail of the British pickets. Yet the judgment of the old and experienced could not be deceived; the dangers which threatened the Sikh people pressed upon their minds; they saw no escape from domestic anarchy or from foreign subjection, and the grey-headed chief Sham Singh of Atari made known his resolution to die in the first conflict with the enemies of his race, and so to offer himself up as a sacrifice of propitiation to the spirit of Gobind and to the genius of his mystic commonwealth.

In the British camp the confidence of the soldiery was likewise great, and none there despaired of the fortune of England. The spirits of the men had been raised by the victory of Aliwal, and early in February a formidable siege train and ample stores of ammunition arrived from Delhi. The Sepoys looked with delight upon the long array of stately elephants dragging the huge and heavy ordnance of their predilections, and the heart of the Englishman himself swelled with pride as he beheld these dread symbols of the wide dominion of his race. It was determined that the Sikh position should be attacked on the 10th February, and various plans were laid down for making victory sure, and for the speedy gratification of a burning resentment. The officers of artillery naturally desired that their guns, the representatives of a high art, should be used agreeably to the established rules of the engineer, or that ramparts should be breached in front and swept in flank before they were stormed by defenceless battalions; but such deliberate tediousness of process did not satisfy the judgment or the impatience of the

labours and skill of French and Italian Generals. Hurbon, the brave Spaniard, and Mouton, the Frenchman, who were at Subraon, doubtless exerted themselves where they could, but their authority or their influence did not extend beyond a regiment or a brigade, and the lines showed no trace whatever of scientific skill or of unity of design.

commanders, and it was arranged that the whole of the heavy ordnance should be planted in masses opposite particular points of the enemy's intrenchment, and that when the Sikhs had been shaken by a continuous storm of shot and shell, the right or weakest part of the position should be assaulted in line by the strongest of the three investing divisions, which together mustered nearly fifteen thousand men. A large body of British cavalry was likewise placed to watch the movements of Lal Singh, and the two divisions which lay near Firozpur were held ready to push across the Sutlej as soon as victory should declare itself. The precise mode of attack was not divulged, or indeed finally settled, until noon of the preceding day, for it was desired to surprise the commanding post of observation, which indifference or negligence had allowed to fall into the hands of the Sikhs a short time before. The evening and the early hours of darkness of the 9th February were thus occupied with busy preparations; the hitherto silent camp poured all its numbers abroad; soldiers stood in groups, talking of the task to be achieved by their valour; officers rode hastily along to receive or deliver orders; and on that night what Englishman passed battalion after battalion to seek a short repose or a moment's solitary communion, and listened as he went to the hammering of shells and the piling of iron shot, or beheld the sentinel pacing silently along by the gleam of renewed fires, without recalling to mind his heroic King and the eve of Agincourt, rendered doubly immortal by the genius of Shakespeare?¹

The British divisions advanced in silence, amid the darkness of night and the additional gloom of a thick haze. The coveted post was found unoccupied; the Sikhs seemed everywhere taken by surprise, and they beat clamorously to arms when they saw themselves about to be assailed. The English batteries opened at sunrise, and for upwards of three hours an incessant play of artillery was kept up upon the general mass of the enemy. The round shot exploded tumbrils, or dashed heaps of sand into the air; the hollow shells cast their fatal contents fully before them, and the devious rockets sprang aloft with fury to fall hissing amid a flood of men; but all was in vain, the Sikhs stood unappalled, and "flash for flash returned, and fire for fire". The

¹ *Henry V*, Act iv., chorus.

field was resplendent with embattled warriors, one moment umbered in volumes of sulphurous smoke and another brightly apparent amid the splendour of beaming brass and the cold and piercing rays of polished steel. The roar and loud reverberation of the ponderous ordnance added to the impressive interest of the scene, and fell gratefully upon the ear of the intent and enduring soldier. But as the sun rose higher, it was felt that a distant and aimless cannonade would still leave the strife to be begun, and victory to be achieved by the valiant hearts of the close-fighting infantry. The guns ceased for a time, and each warrior addressed himself in silence to the coming conflict—a glimmering eye and a firmer grasp of his weapon alone telling of the mighty spirit which wrought within him. The left division of the British army advanced in even order and with a light step to the attack, but the original error of forming the regiments in line instead of in column rendered the contest more unequal than such assaults need necessarily be. Every shot from the enemy's lines told upon the expanse of men, and the greater part of the division was driven back by the deadly fire of muskets and swivels and enflading artillery. On the extreme left, the regiments effected an entrance amid the advanced backs and trenches of petty outworks where possession could be of little avail; but their comrades on the right were animated by the partial success; they chafed under the disgrace of repulse, and forming themselves instinctively into wedges and masses, and headed by an old and fearless leader, they rushed forward in wrath.¹ With a shout they leaped the ditch, and upswarming, they mounted the rampart, and stood victorious amid captured cannon. But the effort was great; the Sikhs fought with steadiness and resolution; guns in the interior were turned upon the exhausted assailants, and the line of trench alone was gained. Nor was this achievement the work of a moment. The repulse of the first assailants required that the central division should be brought forward, and these supporting regiments also moved in line against ramparts higher and more continuous than the barriers which had foiled the first efforts of their comrades. They too recoiled in confusion before the fire of the exulting Sikhs; but at the distance of a furlong they showed both their

¹ Sir Robert Dick was mortally wounded close to the trenches while cheering on his ardent followers.

innate valour and habitual discipline by rallying and returning to the charge. Their second assault was aided on the left by the presence, in the trenches of that flank, of the victorious first division; and thus the regiments of the centre likewise became, after a fierce struggle, on their own right possessed of as many of the enemy's batteries as lay to their immediate front. The unlooked-for repulse of the second division, and the arduous contest in which the first was engaged, might have led a casual witness of the strife to ponder on the multitude of varying circumstances which determine success in war; but the leaders were collected and prompt, and the battalions on the right, the victors of Aliwal were impelled against the opposite flank of the Sikhs; but there, as on all other points attacked, destruction awaited brave men. They fell in heaps, and the first line was thrown back upon the second, which, nothing daunted, moved rapidly to the assault. The two lines mingled their ranks and rushed forward in masses, just as the second division had retrieved its fame, and as a body of cavalry had been poured into the camp from the left to form that line of advance which surpassed the strength of the exhausted infantry.

Openings were thus everywhere effected in the Sikh intrenchments, but single batteries still held out; the interior was filled with courageous men, who took advantage of every obstacle, and fought fiercely for every spot of ground. The traitor, Tej Singh, indeed, instead of leading fresh men to sustain the failing strength of the troops on his right, fled on the first assault, and, either accidentally or by design, sank a boat in the middle of the bridge of communication. But the ancient Sham Singh remembered his vow; he clothed himself in simple white attire, as one devoted to death, and calling on all around him to fight for the Guru, who had promised everlasting bliss to the brave, he repeatedly rallied his shattered ranks, and at last fell a martyr on a heap of his slain countrymen. Others might be seen standing on the ramparts amid showers of balls waving defiance with their swords, or telling the gunners where the fair-haired English pressed thickest together. Along the stronger half of the battlements, and for the period of half an hour, the conflict raged sublime in all its terrors. The parapets were sprinkled with blood from end to end; the trenches were filled

with the dead and the dying. Amid the deafening roar of cannon, and the multitudinous fire of musketry, the shouts of triumph or of scorn were yet heard, and the flashing of innumerable swords was yet visible; or from time to time exploding magazines of powder threw bursting shells and beams of wood and banks of earth high above the agitated sea of smoke and flame which enveloped the host of combatants, and for a moment arrested the attention amid all the din and tumult of the tremendous conflict. But gradually each defensible position was captured, and the enemy was pressed towards the scarcely fordable river; yet, although assailed on either side by squadrons of horse and battalions of foot, no Sikh offered to submit, and no disciple of Gobind asked for quarter. They everywhere showed a front to the victors, and stalked slowly and sullenly away, while many rushed singly forth to meet assured death by contending with a multitude. The victors looked with stolid wonderment upon the indomitable courage of the vanquished, and forbore to strike when the helpless and the dying frowned unavailing hatred. But the warlike rage, or the calculating policy of the leaders, had yet to be satisfied, and standing with the slain heaped on all side around them, they urged troops of artillery almost into the waters of the Sutlej to more thoroughly destroy the army which had so long scorned their power. No deity of heroic fable received the living within the oozy gulphs of the oppressed stream, and its current was choked with added numbers of the dead and crimsoned with the blood of a fugitive multitude.

“Such is the lust of never-dying fame.”

But vengeance was complete; the troops, defiled with dust and smoke and carnage, stood mute indeed for a moment, until the glory of their success rushing upon their minds, they gave expression to their feelings, and hailed their victorious commanders with reiterated shouts of triumph and congratulation.¹

1 Compare Lord Gough's despatch of the 13th Feb., 1846, and Macgregor's *History of the Sikhs*, ii. 154, &c. The casualties on the side of the British were 320 killed, and 2,083 wounded. The loss of the Sikhs, perhaps exceeded 5,000, and possibly amounted to 8,000, the lower estimate of the English despatches.

The Commander-in-Chief estimated the force of the Sikhs at 30,000 men, and it was frequently said they had thirty-six regiments in position;

IV. TERMS OF PEACE

On the night of the victory some regiments were pushed across the Sutlej opposite Ferozpur—no enemy was visible—and on the 12th February the fort of Kasur was occupied without opposition. On the following day the army encamped under the walls of that ancient town, and it was ascertained that the Sikhs still held together to the number of twenty thousand men in the direction of Amritsar. But the power of the armed representatives of the *Khalsa* was gone; the holders of treasure and food, and all the munitions of war, had first passively helped to defeat them, and then openly joined the enemy; and the soldiery readily assented to the requisition of the court that Gola Singh, their chosen Minister, should have full powers to treat with the English on the already admitted basis of recognising a Sikh Government in Lahore. On the 15th of the month the Raja and several other chiefs were received by the Governor-General at Kasur, and they were told that Dalip Singh would continue to be regarded as a friendly sovereign, but that the country between the Beas and Sutlej would be retained by the conquerors, and that a million and a half sterling must be paid as some indemnity for the expenses of the war, in order, it was said, that all might hear of the punishment which had overtaken aggressors, and become fully aware that inevitable loss followed vain hostilities with the unoffending English. After a long discussion the terms were reluctantly agreed to, the young Maharaja came and tendered his submission in person, and on the 20th February the British army arrived at the Sikh capital. Two days afterwards a portion of the citadel was garrisoned by English regiments, to mark more fully to the Indian world that a vaunting enemy had been effectually humbled; for throughout the breadth of the land the chiefs talked, in the bitterness

but it is nevertheless doubtful whether there were so many as 20,000 *armed* men in the trenches. The number of the actual assailants may be estimated at 15,000 effective soldiers.

Subraon or correctly Subrahan, the name by which the battle is known, is taken from that of a small village, or rather two small villages, in the neighbourhood. The villages in question were inhabited by the subdivision of a tribe called Subrah, or, in the plural, Subrahan; and hence the name became applied to their place of residence, and has at last become identified with a great and important victory.

of their hearts, of the approaching downfall of the stern unharmonising foreigners.¹

The Governor-General desired not only to chastise the Sikhs for their past aggressions, but to overawe them for the future, and he had thus chosen the Beas, as offering more commanding positions with reference to Lahore than the old boundary of the Sutlej. With the same object in view, he had originally thought Raja Golab Singh might advantageously be made independent in the hills of Jammu.² Such a recognition by the British Government had, indeed, always been one of the wishes of that ambitious family; but it was not, perhaps, remembered that Golab Singh was still more desirous of becoming the acknowledged Minister of the dependent Punjab;³ nor was it perhaps thought that the overtures of the Raja—after the battle of Aliwal had foreboded the total rout of the Sikh army—were all made in the hope of assuring to himself a virtual viceroyalty over the whole dominion of Lahore. Golab Singh had been appointed Wazir by the chiefs and people when danger pressed them, and he had been formally treated with as Minister by the English when the Governor-General thought time was short, and his own resources distant⁴; but when Lal Singh saw that

1 Compare the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, under dates the 19th February, and 4th March, 1846.

2 Compare the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, of 3rd and 18th Feb., 1845.

3 This had been the aim of the family for many years; or at least, from the time that Dhian Singh exerted himself to remove Colonel Wade, in the hope that a British representative might be appointed who would be well disposed towards himself, which he thought Colonel Wade was not. Mr. Clerk was aware of both schemes of the Lahore Minister, although the greatest prominence was naturally given to the project of rendering the Jammu chiefs independent, owing to the aversion with which they were regarded after Nao Nihal Singh's death.

Had the English said that they desired to see Golab Singh remain Minister, and had they been careless whether Lal Singh lived or was put to death, it is highly probable that a fair and vigorous Government would have been formed, and also that the occupation of Lahore, and perhaps the second treaty of 1846, need never have taken place.

4 Compare the Governor-General's letter to the Secret Committee, of the 3rd and 19th February, 1846. In both of these despatches Lord Hardinge indicates that he intended to do something for Gölāb Singh, but he does not state that he designed to make him independent of Lahore, nor does he say that he told the Sikh Chiefs the arrangements then on foot

after four pitched battles the English Viceroy was content or compelled to leave Lahore a dependent ally, he rejoiced that his undiminished influence with the mother of the Maharaja would soon enable him to supplant the obnoxious Chief of Jammu. The base sycophant thus congratulated himself on the approaching success of all his treasours, which had simply for their object his own personal aggrandizement at the expense of Sikh independence. Golab Singh felt his inability to support himself without the countenance of the English; but they had offered him no assurance of support as Minister, and he suddenly perplexed the Governor-General by asking him what *he* was to get for all he had done to bring about a speedy peace, and to render the army an easy prey. It was remembered that at Kusur he had said the way to carry on a war with the English was to leave the sturdy infantry intrenched and watched, and to sweep the open country with cavalry to the gates of Delhi; and while negotiations were still pending, and the season advancing, it was desired to conciliate one who might render himself formidable in a day, by joining the remains of the Sikh forces and by opening his treasures and arsenals to a warlike population.

The low state of the Lahore treasury, and the anxiety of Lal Singh to get a dreaded rival out of the way, enabled the Governor-General to appease Golab Singh in a manner sufficiently agreeable to the Raja himself, and which still further reduced the importance of the successor of Ranjit Singh. The Raja of Jammu did not care to be simply the master of his native mountains; but as two-thirds of the pecuniary indemnity required from Lahore could not be made good, territory was taken instead of money, and Kashmir and the hill states from the Beas to the Indus were cut off from the Punjab proper, and transferred to Golab Singh as a separate sovereign for a million of pounds sterling. The arrangement was a dexterous one, if reference be only had to the policy of reducing the power of the Sikhs; but the transaction scarcely seems worthy of the British name and greatness, and the objections become stronger when it is considered that Golab Singh had agreed to pay sixty-eight lakhs of rupees (680,000*l.*), as a fine to his paramount, before the war might include the separation of Jammu; and the truth would seem to be, that in the first joy of success the scheme of conciliating the powerful Raja remained in a manner forgotten.

broke out,¹ and that the custom of the East as well as of the West requires the feudatory to aid his lord in foreign war and domestic strife. Golab Singh ought thus to have paid the deficient million of money as a Lahore subject, instead of being put in possession of Lahore provinces as an independent Prince. The succession of the Raja was displeasing to the Sikhs generally, and his separation was less in accordance with his own aspirations than the ministry of Ranjit Singh's empire; but his rise to sovereign power excited nevertheless the ambition of others, and Tej Singh, who knew his own wealth, and was fully persuaded of the potency of gold, offered twenty-five lakhs of rupees for a princely crown and another dismembered province. He was chid for his presumptuous misinterpretation of English principles of action; the arrangement with Golab Singh was the only one of the kind which took place, and the new ally was formally invested with the title of Maharaja at Amritsar on the 15th March, 1846.² But a portion of the territory at first proposed to be made over to him was reserved by his masters, the payments required from him were reduced by a fourth, and they were rendered still more easy of liquidation by considering him to be the heir to the money which his brother Suchet Singh had buried in Firozpur.³

Lal Singh became Minister once more; but he and all the traitorous chiefs knew that they could not maintain themselves, even against the reduced army, when the English should have

1 Major Broadfoot to Government, 5th May, 1845. The author never heard, and does not believe, that this money was paid by Golab Singh.

2 On this occasion "Maharaja" Golab Singh stood up, and with joined hands, expressed his gratitude to the British Viceroy.—adding, without however any ironical meaning, that he was indeed his "Zurkhurid," or gold-bought slave!

In the course of this history there has, more than once, been occasion to allude to the unscrupulous character of Raja Golab Singh; but it must not therefore, be supposed that he was a man malevolently evil. He would, indeed, deceive an enemy and take his life without hesitation, and in the accumulation of money he would exercise many oppressions; but he must be judged with reference to the morality of his age and race, and to the necessities of his own position. If these allowances be made, Golab Singh would be found an able and moderate man, who did little in an idle or wanton spirit, and who was not without some traits both of good humour and generosity of temper.

3 See Appendix for the treaties with Lahore and Jammu.

fairly left the country, and thus the separation of Golab Singh led to a further departure from the original scheme. It was agreed that a British force should remain at the capital until the last day of December, 1846, to enable the chiefs to feel secure while they reorganized the army and introduced order and efficiency into the administration. The end of the year came; but the chiefs were still helpless; they elung to their foreign support, and gladly assented to an arrangement which left the English in immediate possession of the reduced dominion of Ranjit Singh, until his reputed son and feeble successor should attain the age of manhood.¹

While the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief remained at Lahore at the head of twenty thousand men, portions of the Sikh army came to the capital to be paid up and disbanded. The soldiers showed neither the despondency of mutinous rebels nor the effrontery and indifference of mercenaries, and their manly deportment added lustre to that valour which the victors had dearly felt and generously extolled. The men talked of their defeat as the chance of war, or they would say that they were mere imitators of unapproachable masters. But amid all their humiliation, they inwardly dwelt upon their future destiny with unabated confidence; and while gaily calling themselves hapt and youthful scholars, they would sometimes add, with a significant and sardonic smile, that the *Khalsa* itself was yet a child, and that as the commonwealth of Sikhs grew in stature, Gobind would clothe his disciples with irresistible might and guide them with unequalled skill. Thus brave men sought consolation, and the spirit of progress which collectively animated them yielded with a murmur to the superior genius of England and civilization, to be chastened by the rough hand of power, and perhaps to be moulded to noblest purposes by the informing touch of knowledge and philosophy.²

1 See Appendix for the second treaty with Lahore.

2 In March, 1846, or immediately after the war, the author visited the Sikh temples and establishments at Kiritpur and Anandpur-Makhowal. At the latter place, the chosen seat of Gobind, reliance upon the future was likewise strong; and the grave priests or ministers said, by way of assurance, that the pure faith of the *Khalsa* was intended for all countries and times; and added, by way of compliment, that the disciples of Nanak would ever be grateful for the aid, which the stranger English had rendered in subverting the empire of the intolerant and oppressive Mahomedans.

APPENDIX

I. THE TREATY WITH LAHORE OF 1806.

Treaty of Friendship and Unity between the Honourable East India Company and the Sardars Ranjit Singh and Fateh Singh. (1st Jan., 1806.)

Sardar Ranjit Singh and Sardar Fateh Singh have consented to the following Articles of agreement, concluded by Lieutenant-Colonel John Malcolm, under the special authority of the Right Honourable Lord Lake, himself duly authorized by the Honourable Sir George Hilario Barlow, Bart., Governor-General, and Sardar Fateh Singh, as principal on the part of himself, and plenipotentiary on the part of Ranjit Singh:—

Article 1.—Sardar Ranjit Singh and Sardar Fateh Singh Ahluwalia hereby agree that they will cause Jaswant Rao Holkar to remove with his army to the distance of thirty *coss* from Amritsar immediately, and will never hereafter hold any further connection with him, or aid or assist him with troops, or in any other manner whatever; and they further agree that they will not in any way molest such of Jaswant Rao Holkar's followers or troops as are desirous of returning to their homes in the Deccan, but, on the contrary, will render them every assistance in their power for carrying such intention into execution.

Article 2.—The British Government hereby agrees, that in case a pacification should not be effected between that Government and Jaswant Rao Holkar, the British army shall move from its present encampment, on the banks of the river Beas, as soon as Jaswant Rao Holkar aforesaid shall have marched his army to the distance of thirty *coss* from Amritsar; and that, in any treaty which may hereafter be concluded between the British Government and Jaswant Rao Holkar, it shall be stipulated that, immediately after the conclusion of the said treaty, Holkar shall evacuate the territories of the Sikhs, and march towards his own, and that he shall in no way whatever injure or destroy such parts of the Sikh country as may lie in his route. The British Government further agrees that, as long as the said Chieftains, Ranjit Singh and Fateh Singh, abstain from holding

any friendly connection with the enemies of that Government, or from committing any act of hostility on their own parts against the said Government, the British armies shall never enter the territories of the said Chieftains, nor will the British Government form any plans for the seizure or sequestration of their possessions or property.

Dated 1st January, 1806.

II. SIR DAVID OCHTERLONEY'S PROCLAMATION OF 1809.

Precept or "Ittilloh Namah," under the Seal of General St. Leger, and under the Seal and Signature of Colonel Ochterloney; written the 9th of February, 1809, corresponding to the 23rd Zee Hijeh, 1223, Hijereh.

The British army having encamped near the frontiers of the Maharaja Ranjit Singh, it has been thought proper to signify the pleasure of the British Government, by means of this precept, in order to make all the Chiefs of the Maharaja acquainted with the sentiments of the British Government, which have solely for their object and aim to confirm the friendship with the Maharaja, and to prevent any injury to his country, the preservation of friendship between the two States depending on particular conditions which are hereby detailed.

The *Thanas* in the fortress of Khur, Khanpur, and other places on this side of the river Sutlej, which have been placed in the hands of the dependents of the Maharaja, shall be razed, and the same places restored to their ancient possessors.

The force of cavalry and infantry which may have crossed to this side of the Sutlej must be recalled to the other side, to the country of the Maharaja.

The troops stationed at the *Ghat* of Philour must march thence, and depart to the other side of the river as described, and in future the troops of the Maharaja shall never advance into the country of the Chiefs situated on this side of the river, who have called in for their security and protection *Thanas* of the British Government; but if in the manner that the British have placed *Thanas* of moderate number on this side of the Sutlej, if in like manner a small force by way of *Thana* be stationed at the *Ghat* of Philour, it will not be objected to.

If the Maharaja persevere in the fulfilment of the above stipulation, which he so repeatedly professed to do in presence of Mr. Metcalfe, such fulfilment will confirm the mutual friendship. In case of non-compliance with these stipulations, then shall it be plain that the Maharaja has no regard for the friendship of the British, but, on the contrary, resolves on enmity. In such case the victorious British army shall commence every mode of defence.

The communication of this precept is solely with the view of publishing the sentiments of the British, and to know those of the Maharaja. The British are confident that the Maharaja will consider the contents of this precept as abounding to his real advantage, and as affording a conspicuous proof of their friendship; that with their capacity for war, they are also intent on peace.¹

III. THE TREATY WITH LAHORE OF 1809.

Treaty between the British Government and the Raja of Lahore.
(Dated 25th April, 1809)

Whereas certain differences which had arisen between the British Government and the Raja of Lahore have been happily and amicably adjusted; and both parties being anxious to maintain relations of perfect amity and concord, the following Articles of treaty, which shall be binding on the heirs and successors of the two parties, have been concluded by the Raja Ranjit Singh in person, and by the agency of C. T. Metcalfe, Esquire, on the part of the British Government.

Article 1.—Perpetual friendship shall subsist between the British Government and the State of Lahore: the latter shall be considered, with respect to the former, to be on the footing of the most favoured powers, and the British Government will have no concern with the territories and subjects of the Raja to the northward of the river Sutlej.

Article 2.—The Raja will never maintain in the territory which he occupies on the left bank of the river Sutlej more troops

¹ *Note.*—The recorded translation of this document has been preserved, although somewhat defective in style.

than are necessary for the internal duties of that territory, nor commit or suffer any encroachments on the possessions or rights of the Chiefs in its vicinity.

Article 3.—In the event of a violation of any of the preceding Articles, or of a departure from the rules of friendship, this treaty shall be considered null and void.

Article 4.—This treaty consisting of four Articles, having been settled and concluded at Amritsar, on the 25th day of April, 1809, Mr. C. T. Metcalfe has delivered to the Raja of Lahore a copy of the same in English and Persian, under his seal and signature; and the Raja has delivered another copy of the same under his seal and signature, and Mr. C. T. Metcalfe engages to procure within the space of two months a copy of the same, duly ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, on the receipt of which by the Raja, the present treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on both parties, and the copy of it now delivered to the Raja shall be returned.

IV. PROCLAMATION OF PROTECTION TO CIS-SUTLEJ STATES AGAINST LAHORE. (Dated, 1809)

Translation of an "Ittilah Nameh," addressed to the Chiefs of the Country of Malwa and Sirhind, on this side of the River Sutlej. (3rd May, 1809).

It is clearer than the sun, and better proved than the existence of yesterday, that the marching of a detachment of British troops to this side of the river Sutlej was entirely at the application and earnest entreaty of the several Chiefs, and originated solely from friendly considerations in the British Government, to preserve them in their possessions and independence. A treaty having been concluded, on the 25th of April, 1809, between Mr. Metcalfe on the part of the British Government, and Maharaja Ranjit Singh, agreeably to the orders of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, I have the pleasure of publishing, for the satisfaction of the Chiefs of the country of Malwa and Sirhind, the pleasure and resolutions of the British Government, as contained in the seven following Articles:—

Article 1.—The country of the Chiefs of Malwa and Sirhind having entered under the British protection, they shall in future

be secured from the authority and influence of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, conformably to the terms of the treaty.

Article 2.—All the country of the Chiefs thus taken under protection shall be exempted from all pecuniary tribute to the British Government.

Article 3.—The Chiefs shall remain in the full exercise of the same rights and authority in their own possessions which they enjoyed before they were received under the British protection.

Article 4.—Should a British force, on purposes of general welfare, be required to march through the country of the said Chiefs, it is necessary and incumbent that every Chief shall, within his own possession, assist and furnish, to the full of his power, such force with supplies of grain and other necessaries which may be demanded.

Article 5.—Should an enemy approach from any quarter for the purpose of conquering this country, friendship and mutual interest require that the Chiefs join the British army with all their force, and, exerting themselves in expelling the enemy, act under discipline and proper obedience.

Article 6.—All European articles brought by merchants from the eastern district for the use of the army shall be allowed to pass, by the *Thanadars* and *Seyerdars* of the several Chiefs, without molestation and the demand of duty.

Article 7.—All horses purchased for the use of cavalry regiments, whether in the district of Sirhind or elsewhere, the bringers of which being provided with sealed "*Rahdaries*" from the Resident at Delhi or officer commanding at Sirhind, shall be allowed to pass through the country of the said Chiefs without molestation or the demand of duty.

V. PROCLAMATION OF PROTECTION TO CIS-SUTLEJ STATES
AGAINST ONE ANOTHER. (Dated, 1811.)

For the Information and Assurance of the Protected Chiefs of the Plains between the Sutlej and Jumna. (22nd August, 1811.)

On the 3rd of May, 1809, an *Ettanama*, comprised of seven Articles, was issued by the orders of the British Government,

purporting that the country of the Sardars of Sirhind and Malwa having come under their protection, Raja Ranjit Singh, agreeably to treaty, had no concern with the possessions of the above Sardars; that the British Government had no intention of claiming *Peishkush* or *Nazarana*, and that they should continue in the full control and enjoyment of their respective possessions: The publication of the above *Ettanama* was intended to afford every confidence to the Sardars, that the protection of the country was the sole object, that they had no intention of control, and that those having possessions should remain in full and complete enjoyment thereof.

Whereas several Zamindars and other subjects of the Chiefs of this country have preferred complaints to the officers of the British Government, who having in view the tenor of the above *Ettanama* have not attended, and will not in future pay attention to them;—for instance, on the 15th of June, 1817, Delawar Ali Khan of Samana complained to the Resident of Delhi against the officers of Raja Sahib Singh for jewels and other property said to have been seized by them, who, in reply, observed, that the “Cusba of Samana being in the Amildari of Raja Sahib Singh, his complaint should be made to him”; and also, on the 12th of July, 1811, Dussowndha Singh and Gurmukh Singh complained to Colonel Ochterloney, Agent to the Governor-General, against Sardar Charat Singh, for their shares of property, &c.; and, in reply, it was written on the back of their *arzi*, “that since, during the period of three years, no claim was preferred against Charat Singh by any of his brothers, nor even the name of any co-partner mentioned; and since it was advertised in the *Ettanama* delivered to the Sardars, that every Chief should remain in the quiet and full enjoyment of his domains, the petition could not be attended to,”—the insertion of these answers to complaints is intended as examples, and also that it may be impressed on the minds of every Zamindar and other subject, that the attainment of justice is to be expected from their respective Chiefs only, that they may not, in the smallest degree, swerve from the observation of subordination.—It is, therefore, highly incumbent upon the Rajas and other Sardars of this side of the river Sutlej, that they explain this to their respective subjects, and court their confidence, that it may be clear to

them, that complaints to the officers of the British Government will be of no avail, and that they consider their respective Sardars as the source of justice, and that, of their free will and accord, they observe uniform obedience.

And whereas, according to the first proclamation, it is not the intention of the British Government to interfere in the possessions of the Sardars of this country, it is nevertheless, for the purpose of ameliorating the condition of the community, particularly necessary to give general information, that several Sardars have, since the last incursion of Raja Ranjit Singh, wrested the estates of others, and deprived them of their lawful possessions, and that in the restoration, they have used delays until detachments of the British army have been sent to effect restitution, as in the case of the Rani of Terah, the Sikhs of Cholian, the Talukas of Kaorwley and Chelboundy, and the village of Chiba; and the reason of such delays and evasions can only be attributed to the temporary enjoyment of the revenues and subjecting the owners to irremediable losses.—It is, therefore, by order of the British Government, hereby proclaimed that if any one of the Sardars or others has forcibly taken possession of the estates of others, or otherwise injured the lawful owners, it is necessary that before the occurrence of any complaint the proprietor should be satisfied, and by no means to defer the restoration of the property,—in which, however, should delays be made, and the interference of the British authority become requisite, the revenues of the estate from the date of ejection of the lawful proprietor, together with whatever other losses the inhabitants of that place may sustain from the march of troops, shall without scruple be demanded from the offending party; and for disobedience of the present orders, a penalty, according to the circumstances of the case and of the offender shall be levied, agreeably to the decision of the British Government.

VI. INDUS NAVIGATION TREATY OF 1832.

Articles of a Convention established between the Honourable the East India Company, and His Highness the Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the Ruler of the Punjab, for the opening of the Navigation of the Rivers Indus and Sutlej. (Originally drafted 26th December, 1832.)

By the grace of God, the relations of firm alliance and indissoluble ties of friendship existing between the Honourable

the East India Company and His Highness the Maharaja Ranjit Singh, founded on the auspicious treaty formerly concluded by Sir C. T. Metcalfe, Bart., and since confirmed in the written pledge of sincere amity presented by the Right Honourable Lord W. C. Bentinck, G. C. B. and G. C. H., Governor-General of British India, at the meeting at Rupar, are, like the sun, clear and manifest to the whole world, and will continue unimpaired, and increasing in strength from generation to generation:—By virtue of these firmly established bonds of friendship, since the opening of the navigation of the rivers Indus proper (*i.e.* Indus below the confluence of the Panchnad) and Sutlej, (a measure deemed expedient by both States, with a view to promote the general interests of commerce),—has lately been effected through the agency of Captain C. M. Wade, Political Agent at Ludhiana, deputed by the Right Honourable the Governor-General for that purpose. The following Articles, explanatory of the conditions by which the said navigation is to be regulated, as concerns the nomination of officers, the mode of collecting the duties, and the protection of the trade by that route, have been framed, in order that the officers of the two States employed in their execution may act accordingly:—

Article 1.—The provisions of the existing treaty relative to the right bank of the river Sutlej and all its stipulations, together with the contents of the friendly pledge already mentioned, shall remain binding, and a strict regard to preserve the relations of friendship between the two States shall be the ruling principle of action. In accordance with that treaty, the Honourable Company has not, nor will have any concern with the right bank of the river Sutlej.

Article 2.—The tariff which is to be established for the line of navigation in question is intended to apply exclusively to the passage of merchandisc by that route, and not to interfere with the transit duties levied on goods proceeding from one bank of the river to the other, nor with the places fixed for their collection: they are to remain as heretofore.

Article 3.—Merchants frequenting the same route, while within the limits of the Maharaja's Government, are required to show a due regard to his authority, as is done by merchants generally, and not to commit any acts offensive to the civil and religious institutions of the Sikhs.

Article 4.—Any one purposing to go the said route will intimate his intention to the Agent of either State and apply for a passport, agreeably to a form to be laid down; having obtained which, he may proceed on his journey. The merchants coming from Amritsar, and other parts on the right bank of the river Sutlej, are to intimate their intentions to the Agent of the Maharaja, at Hariki, or other appointed places, and obtain a passport through him; and merchants coming from Hindustan, or other parts on the left bank of the river Sutlej, will intimate their intentions to the Honourable Company's Agent, and obtain a passport through him. As foreigners, and Hindustanis, and Sardars of the protected Sikh States and elsewhere, are not in the habit of crossing the Sutlej without a passport from the Maharaja's officers, it is expected that such persons will hereafter also conform to the same rule, and not cross without the usual passports.

Article 5.—A tariff shall be established exhibiting the rate of duties leviable on each description of merchandise, which, after having been approved by both Governments, is to be the standard by which the superintendents and collectors of customs are to be guided.

Article 6.—Merchants are invited to adopt the new route with perfect confidence: no one shall be suffered to molest them or unnecessarily impede their progress, care being taken that they are only detained for the collection of the duties, in manner stipulated, at the established stations.

Article 7.—The officers who are to be entrusted with the collection of the duties and examination of the goods on the right bank of the river shall be stationed at Mithankot and Hariki; at no other places but these two shall boats in transit on the river be liable to examination or stoppage. When the persons in charge of boats stop of their own accord to take in or give out cargo, the goods will be liable to the local transit duty of the Maharaja's Government, previously to their being landed, as provided in Article 2. The superintendent stationed at Mithankot having examined the cargo, will levy the established duty, and grant a passport, with a written account of the cargo and freight. On the arrival of the boat at Hariki, the superintendent of that station will compare the passport with the cargo; and

whatever goods are found in excess will be liable to the payment of the established duty, while the rest, having already paid duty at Mithankot, will pass on free. The same rule shall be observed in respect to merchandise conveyed from Hariki by the way of the rivers towards Sind, that whatever may be fixed as the share of duties on the right bank of the river Sutlej, in right of the Maharaja's own dominions and of those in allegiance to him, the Maharaja's officers will collect it at the places appointed. With regard to the security and safety of merchants who may adopt this route, the Maharaja's officers shall afford them every protection in their power; and merchants, on halting for the night on either bank of the Sutlej, are required, with reference to the treaty of friendship which exists between the two States, to give notice, and to show their passport to the *Thanadar*, or officers in authority at the place, and request protection for themselves: if, notwithstanding this precaution, loss should at any time occur, a strict inquiry will be made, and reclamation sought from those who are blameable. The Articles of the present treaty for opening the navigation of the rivers above-mentioned having, agreeably to subsisting relations, been approved by the Right Honourable the Governor-General, shall be carried into execution accordingly.

Dated at Lahore the 26th of December, 1832.

(Seal and signature at the top)

VII. SUPPLEMENTARY INDUS NAVIGATION TREATY OF 1834.

Draft of a Supplementary Treaty between the British Government and Maharaja Ranjit Singh for establishing a Toll on the Indus. (29th November, 1834).

In conformity with the subsisting relations of friendship, as established and confirmed by former treaties, between the Honourable the East India Company and His Highness Maharaja Ranjit Singh; and whereas in the 5th Article of the treaty concluded at Lahore on the 26th day of December, 1832, it was stipulated that a moderate scale of duties should be fixed by the two Governments in concert, to be levied on all merchandize on transit up and down the rivers Indus and Sutlej; the said Governments being now of opinion that, owing to the inexperience of the people of these countries in such matters, the mode of levying duties then proposed (*viz.* on the value and quantity

of goods) could not fail to give rise to mutual misunderstandings and reclamations, have, with a view to prevent these results, determined to substitute a toll, which shall be levied on all boats, with whatever merchandize laden. The following Articles have therefore been adopted as supplementary to the former treaty; and, in conformity with them, each Government engages that the toll shall be levied, and its amount neither be increased nor diminished except by mutual consent.

Article 1.—A toll of Rs. 570 shall be levied on all boats laden with merchandize in transit on the rivers Indus and Sutlej between the sea and Rupar, without reference to their size, or to the weight or value of their cargo; the above tolls to be divided among the different States in proportion to the extent of territory which they possess on the banks of these rivers.

Article 2.—The portion of the above toll appertaining to the Lahore Chief in right of his territory on both banks of these rivers, as determined in the subjoined scale, shall be levied opposite to Mithankot on boats coming from the sea towards Rupar, and in the vicinity of Hari-ki-Pattan on boats going from Rupar towards the sea, and at no other place:—

In right of territory on the
right bank of the rivers
Indus and Sutlej, Rs. 155
4 ans.

In right of territory on the
left bank of the rivers In-
dus and Sutlej, the Ma-
haraja's share, of Rs. 67
15 ans. 9 pie.

Article 3.—In order to facilitate the realization of the toll due to the different States, as well as for the speedy and satisfactory adjustment of any disputes which may arise connected with the safety of the navigation and the welfare of the trade by the new route, a British officer will reside opposite to Mithankot, and a native agent on the part of the British Government opposite to Hari-ki-Pattan. These officers will be subject to the orders of the British Agent at Ludhiana; and the agents who may be appointed to reside at those places on the part of the other States concerned in the navigation, *viz.*, Bahawalpur and Sind, together with those of Lahore, will co-operate with them in the execution of their duties.

Article 4.—In order to guard against imposition on the part of merchants in making false complaints of being plundered of property which formed no part of their cargoes, they are required, when taking out their passports, to produce an invoice of their cargo, which being duly authenticated, a copy of it will be annexed to their passports; and wherever their boats may be brought to for the night, they are required to give immediate notice to the *Thanadars* or officers of the place, and request protection for themselves, at the same time showing the passports they may have received at Mithankot or Hariki, as the case may be.

Article 5.—Such parts of the 5th, 6th, 9th, and 10th, Articles of the treaty of the 26th of December, 1832, as have reference to the fixing a duty on the value and quantity of merchandize, and to the mode of its collection, are hereby rescinded, and the foregoing articles substituted in their place, agreeably to which and the conditions of the preamble, the toll will be levied.

N. B.—A distribution of the shares due to the British protected States and the feudatories of the Maharaja on the left bank of the Sutlej will be determined hereafter.

VIII. THE TRIPARTITE TREATY WITH RANJIT SINGH AND SHAH SHUJA OF 1838.

Treaty of Alliance and friendship between Maharaja Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, with the approbation of, and in concert with the British Government. (Done at Lahore, 26th June, 1838, signed at Simla, 25th June, 1838.)

Whereas a treaty was formerly concluded between Maharaja Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk. consisting of fourteen Articles, exclusive of the preamble and the conclusion: And whereas the execution of the provisions of the said treaty was suspended for certain reasons: And whereas at this time, Mr. W. H. Maenaghten having been deputed by the Right Honourable George Lord Auckland, G. C. B., Governor-General of India, to the presence of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and vested with full powers to form a treaty, in a manner consistent with the friendly engagements subsisting between the two States, the

treaty aforesaid is revived, and concluded with certain modifications, and four new articles have been added thereto, with the approbation of, and in concert with the British Government, the provisions whereof, ascertained in the following eighteen Articles, will be duly and faithfully observed:—

Article 1.—Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk disclaims all title on the part of himself, his heirs and successors, and all the Sadozais, to all the territories lying on either bank of the river Indus, that may be possessed by the Maharaja, *viz.*, Kashmir, including its limits, E., W., N., S., together with the fort of Attok, Chuch Hazara, Khubul, Umb, with its dependencies, on the left bank of the aforesaid river, and on the right bank Peshawar, with the Yusufzai territory, the Khataks, Husht Nagr, Mitchni, Kohat, Hungu, and all places dependent on Peshawar, as far as the Khyber Pass, Bannu, the Waziri territory, Dowl-Tank, Gurang, Kalabagh and Khushalgarh, with their dependent districts, Dera Ismail Khan, and its dependency, Kot Mithan, Omar Kot, and their dependent territory, Sunghur, Hurround-Dajui, Hajipur, Rajenpur, and the three Kutchas, as well as Munkehra, with its district, and the province of Multan, situated on the left bank. These countries and places are considered to be the property, and to form the estate, of the Maharaja; the Shah neither has nor will have any concern with them; they belong to the Maharaja and his posterity from generation to generation.

Article 2.—The people of the country on the other side of Khyber will not be suffered to commit robberies, or aggressions, or any disturbances on this side. If any defaulter of either State, who has embezzled the revenue, take refuge in the territory of the other, each party engages to surrender him, and no person shall obstruct the passage of the stream which issues out of the Khyber defile, and supplies the fort of Fatehgarh with water according to ancient usage.

Article 3.—As, agreeably to the treaty established between the British Government and the Maharaja, no one can cross from the left to the right bank of the Sutlej without a passport from the Maharaja, the same rule shall be observed regarding the passage of the Indus, whose waters join the Sutlej, and no one shall be allowed to cross the Indus without the Maharaja's permission.

Article 4.—Regarding Shikarpur and the territory of Sind, on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah will agree to abide by whatever may be settled as right and proper, in conformity with the happy relations of friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Maharaja through Captain Wade.

Article 5.—When the Shah shall have established his authority in Kabul and Kandahar, he will annually send the Maharaja the following articles, viz.,—55 high-bred horses of approved colour, and pleasant paces; 11 Persian scimitars; 7 Persian poignards; 25 good mules; fruits of various kinds, both dry and fresh; and Sirdars or Musk melons, of a sweet and delicate flavour (to be sent throughout the year by the way of the Kabul river to Peshawar); grapes, pomegranates, apples, quinces, almonds, raisins, pistahs or chestnuts, an abundant supply of each; as well as pieces of satin of every colour; chogas of fur; kimkhab wrought with gold and silver; and Persian carpets, altogether to the number of 101 pieces,—all these articles the Shah will continue to send every year to the Maharaja.

Article 6.—Each party shall address the other on terms of equality.

Article 7.—Merchants of Afghanistan who may be desirous of trading to Lahore, Amritsar, or any other parts of the Maharaja's possessions, shall not be stopped or molested on their way; on the contrary, strict orders shall be issued to facilitate their intercourse, and the Maharaja engages to observe the same line of conduct on his part, in respect to traders who may wish to proceed to Afghanistan.

Article 8.—The Maharaja will yearly send to the Shah the following articles in the way of friendship :—55 pieces of shawls; 25 pieces of muslin; 11 dooputtahs; 5 pieces of kimkhab; 5 scarfs; 5 turbans; 55 loads of Bareh rice (peculiar to Peshawar.)

Article 9.—Any of the Maharaja's officers, who may be deputed to Afghanistan to purchase horses, or on any other business, as well as those who may be sent by the Shah into the Punjab, for the purpose of purchasing piece goods, or shawls, &c., to the amount of 11,000 rupees, will be treated by both sides with due attention, and every facility will be afforded to them in the execution of their commission.

Article 10.—Whenever the armies of the two States may happen to be assembled at the same place, on no account shall the slaughter of kine be permitted to take place.

Article 11.—In the event of the Shah taking an auxiliary force from the Maharaja, whatever booty may be acquired from Barakzais in jewels, horses, arms, great and small, shall be equally divided between the two contracting parties. If the Shah should succeed in obtaining possession of their property, without the assistance of the Maharaja's troops, the Shah agrees to send a portion of it by his own agent to the Maharaja in the way of friendship.

Article 12.—An exchange of missions charged with letters and presents shall constantly take place between the two parties.

Article 13.—Should the Maharaja require the aid of any of the Shah's troops in furtherance of the objects contemplated by this treaty, the Shah engages to send a force commanded by one of his principal officers: in like manner the Maharaja will furnish the Shah, when required, with an auxiliary force, composed of Mahomedans, and commanded by one of the principal officers, as far as Kabul, in furtherance of the objects contemplated by this treaty. When the Maharaja may go to Peshawar, the Shah will depute a Shahzada to visit him, on which occasions the Maharaja will receive and dismiss him with the honour and consideration due to his rank and dignity.

Article 14.—The friends and enemies of each of the three high powers, that is to say, the British and Sikh Governments, and Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, shall be the friends and enemies of all.

Article 15.—Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk engages, after the attainment of his object, to pay without fail to the Maharaja the sum of two lakhs of rupees, of the Nanakshahi or Kuldar currency, calculating from the date on which the Sikh troops may be dispatched for the purpose of reinstating His Majesty in Kabul, in consideration of the Maharaja stationing a force of not less than 5000 men, cavalry and infantry, of the Mahomedan persuasion, within the limits of the Peshawar territory, for the support of the Shah, and to be sent to the aid of His Majesty, whenever the British Government, in concert and counsel with the Maharaja.

shall deem their aid necessary; and when any matter of great importance may arise to the westward, such measures will be adopted with regard to it as may seem expedient and proper at the time to the British and Sikh Governments. In the event of the Maharaja's requiring the aid of any of the Shah's troops, a deduction shall be made from the subsidy proportioned to the period for which such aid may be afforded, and the British Government holds itself responsible for the punctual payment of the above sum annually to the Maharaja, so long as the provisions of this treaty are duly observed.

Article 16.—Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk agrees to relinquish for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claims of supremacy and arrears of tribute over the country now held by the Amirs of Sind, (which will continue to belong to the Amirs and their successors in perpetuity), on condition of the payment to him by the Amirs of such a sum as may be determined under the mediation of the British Government; 1,500,000 of rupees of such payment being made over by him to Maharaja Ranjit Singh. On these payments being completed, Article 4th of the treaty of the 12th March, 1883,¹ will be considered cancelled, and the customary interchange of letters and suitable presents between the Maharaja and the Amirs of Sind shall be maintained as heretofore.

Article 17.—When Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk shall have succeeded in establishing his authority in Afghanistan, he shall not attack or molest his nephew, the ruler of Herat², in the possession of the territories now subject to his Government.

Article 18.—Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk binds himself, his heirs, and successors, to refrain from entering into negotiations with any foreign State without the knowledge and consent of the British and Sikh Governments, and to oppose any power having the design to invade the British and Sikh territories by force of arms, to the utmost of his ability.

The three powers, parties to this treaty, namely, the British Government, Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, cordially agree to the foregoing Articles. There shall be no devia-

¹ Between Shah Shuja and Ranjit Singh.

^{*2} Shah Kamran.

tions from them, and in that case the present treaty shall be considered binding for ever, and this treaty shall come into operation from and after the date on which the seals and signatures of the three contracting parties shall have been affixed thereto.

Done at Lahore, this 26th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1838, corresponding with the 15th of the month of Assarh 1895, era of Bikramjit.

Ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor-General at Simla, on the 23rd day of July, A.D. 1838.

(Signed)

Auckland.

Ranjit Singh.

Shuja-ul-Mulk.

IX. INDUS AND SUTLEJ TOLL AGREEMENT OF 1839.

Agreement entered into with the Government of Lahore, regarding the Duties to be levied on the Transit of Merchandize by the Rivers Sutlej and Indus, in modification of the Supplementary Articles of the Treaty of 1832. (Dated 19th May, 1839.)

Objections having been urged against the levy of the same duty on a boat of a small as on one of a large size, and the merchants having solicited that the duties might be levied on the maundage, or measurement, of the boats, or on the value of the goods, it is therefore agreed, that hereafter the whole duty shall be paid at one place, and either at Ludhiana or Ferozpur, or at Mithankot; and that the duty be levied on the merchandize, and not on the boats, as follows:—

Pushmeena per maund	10 rupees.
Opium	7½ rupees.
Indigo	2½ rupees.
Dried fruits	1 rupee.
Superior silks, muslins, broad cloth, &c.	6 annas.
Inferior silks, cottons, chintzes	4 annas.

On Exports from the Punjab

Sugar, ghee, oil, drugs, ginger, saffron, and cotton per maund	4 annas.
Madder	8 annas.
Grain	2 annas.

On Imports from Bombay.

All Imports whatever,	...	per maund	4 annas.
-----------------------	-----	-----------	----------

X. INDUS AND SUTLEJ TOLL AGREEMENT OF 1840.

Treaty between the Lahore and British Governments, regarding the levy of Transit Duties on Boats navigating the Sutlej and Indus. (Dated 27th June, 1840.)

Formerly a treaty was executed by the Right Honourable Lord W. Cavendish Bentinck, the Governor-General of India, on the 14th of Poos Sambat, 1889 (corresponding with A. D. 1832), through Colonel, then Captain Wade, concerning the navigation of the Sutlej and the Sind rivers in the Khalsa territory, in concurrence with the wishes of both the friendly and allied Governments. Another treaty on the subject was subsequently executed, through the same officer, in Sambat, 1891 (corresponding with A.D. 1834), fixing a duty on every mercantile boat, independent of the quantity of its freight and the nature of its merchandize. A third treaty was executed on this subject, in accordance with the wishes of both Governments, on the arrival of Mr. Clerk, Agent to the Governor-General at the Durbar, in May, 1839, adjusting the rate of duties on merchandize according to quantity and kind; and it was also specified, that no further reduction of those rates should be proposed between the two Governments. On the visit of that gentleman to the Khalsa Durbar at Amritsar, in Jith Sambat, 1897 (corresponding with May, 1840), the difficulties and inconvenience which seemed to result to trade under the system proposed last year, in consequence of the obstruction to boats for the purpose of search, and the ignorance of traders, and the difficulty of adjusting duties according to the different kinds of articles freighted in these boats, were all stated; and that gentleman proposed to revise that system, by fixing a scale of duties proportionate to the measurement of boats, and not on the kind of commodities.

if this arrangement should be approved of by both Governments. Having reported to his Government the circumstance of the case, he now drew up a schedule of the rate of duties on the mercantile boats navigating the rivers Sind and Sutlej, and forwarded it for the consideration of this friendly Durbar; the Khalsa Government, therefore, with a due regard to the established alliance, having added a few sentences in accordance with the late treaties, and agreeably to what it is already well understood, has signed and sealed the schedule; and it shall never be liable to any contradiction, difference, change, or alteration, without the concurrence and consent of both Governments, in consideration of mutual advantages, upon condition it does not interfere with the established custom duties at Amritsar, Lahore, and other inland places, or the other rivers in the Khalsa territory.

Article 1.—Grain, wood, limestone, will be free from duty.

Article 2.—With exception of the above, every commodity to pay duty according to the measurement of the boat.

Article 3.—Duty on a boat not exceeding 50 maunds of freight proceeding from the foot of the Hills, Rupar, or Ludhiana to Mithankot or Rojhan, or from Rojhan or Mithankot to the foot of the Hills, Rupar, or Ludhiana, will be 50 rupees; viz.

From the foot of the Hills to Ferozpur, or back	20 Rupees
From Ferozpur to Bahawalpur, or back	... 15 "
From Bahawalpur to Mithankot or Rojhan, or back	... 15 "

The whole trip, up or down 50 Rupees

Duty on a boat above 250 maunds, but not exceeding 500 maunds: from the foot of the Hills, Rupar, or Ludhiana to Mithankot or Rojhan, or from Rojhan or Mithankot to the foot of the Hills, Rupar, or Ludhiana, will be 100 rupees, viz.

From the foot of the Hills to Ferozpur, or back	40 Rupees
From Ferozpur to Bahawalpur, or back	... 30 "
From Bahawalpur to Mithankot or Rojhan, or back	... 30 "

The whole trip, up or down 100 Rupees.

Duty on all boats above 500 maunds will be 150 rupees; viz.			
From the foot of the Hills to Ferozpur, or back	60 Rupees		
From Ferozpur to Bahawalpur or back	... 45	..	
From Bahawalpur to Mithankot or Rojhan, or			
back	... 45	..	

The whole trip, up or down 150 Rupees.

Article 4.—Boats to be classed 1, 2, or 3, and the same to be written on the boat, and every boat to be registered.

Article 5.—These duties on merchandize frequenting the Sutlej and Sind are not to interfere with the duties on the banks of other rivers, or with the established inland custom-houses throughout the Khalsa territory, which will remain on their usual footing.

Dated 13th Assarh, Sambat 1897, corresponding with 27th June, 1840.

XI. REVENUES OF THE PUNJAB AS ESTIMATED IN 1844.

TRIBUTARY STATES.		Rupees.	Rupees.
Bilaspur. Tribute, 10,000. Under Lehna Singh ...		70,000	
Suket. Do. 25,000 Do. ...		70,000	
Chamba. Not known. Under Golab Singh ...		2,00,000	
Rajaori. Do. Do. ...		1,00,000	
Ladakh. Tribute, 42,000. Do. ...		1,00,000	
Iskardo. Do. 7,000. Do. ...		25,000	
			5,65,000

Note.—All of these States, excepting Bilaspur, may be regarded rather as farms held by the Chiefs than as tributary principalities; and, ordinarily, all the resources of the Chiefs being at the disposal of the Government representative, the probable revenues have therefore been entered in full, instead of the mere pecuniary payment.

LAND REVENUE.

Farms.

Mandi. Farm with the Raja of Mandi, who was allowed one lakh out of the four for his expenses ...	4,00,000
Kulu. The members of the family had pensions ...	1,20,000
Juswan. The family had a Jaigir ...	1,25,000

			Rupees.	Rupees.
Kangra.	Do.	not included in		
	the farm	...	6,00,000	
Kotlehr.	The family had a Jaigir	...	25,000	
Siba.	The family may almost be regarded as			
	Jaigirdars for the whole estate: they			
	served with horse	...	20,000	
Nurpur.	The family had a Jaigir	...	3,00,000	
Haripur	Do.	...	1,00,000	
Dutarpur.	Do.	...	50,000	
Kotluh.	Do.	...	20,000	
<i>Note.</i> —The above were all under Lehna Singh				
Majithia.				
Bissohli.	Family at large: was held by Raja			
	Hira Singh	...	75,000	
Kashmir.	Sheikh Ghulam Muhiuddin:			
	Contract	...	21,00,000	
	Troops	...	5,00,000	
	Assignments	...	4,00,000	
			30,00,000	
Muzaffarabad, &c. (Under Kashmir).	The Muza-			
	ffarabad Chief a Jaigirdar	...	1,00,000	
Chuch, Hazara	{ Raja Golab Singh. The			
and Pukhlee	{ Gundghur and Turnouli			
Dhumtown.	{ Chiefs have Jaigirs; but		1,50,000	
	{ they are almost indepen-			
	{ dent freebooters	...		
Rawalpindi.	Dewan Hakim Rai	...	1,00,000	
Hasan Abdal,	{ Dewan Mul Raj: he lately			
Khatir, and	{ held Chuch Hazara also		1,00,000	
Ghehpee.				
Dhunnee, Kutass,	{ Raja Golab Singh	...	1,00,000	
and Chukkowal				
Peshawar.	Sardar Tej Singh. The Barakzais			
	have Jaigirs	...	10,00,000	
Tank-Bannu.	Dewan Daulat Rai. The Chief			
	fled; his brother a Jaigir	...	2,50,000	
Dera Ismail Khan.	Dewan Daulat Rai. The			
	Chief a Jaigir	...	4,50,000	
Multan, Dera Ghazi				
Khan, Munkehra	{ Dewan Sawan Mal	...		
	Contract	...	36,00,000	
	Troops	...	7,00,000	
	Assignments, &c.	...	2,00,000	
			45,00,000	
Ramnagar, &c.	Dewan Sawan Mal	...	3,00,000	
Mitta Towana.	The late Dhian Singh	...	1,00,000	
Bherah Khushab.	Raja Golab Singh	...	1,00,000	
Pind Dadul Khan.	Do.	...	50,000	
Gujrat.	Do.	...	3,00,000	
Wazirabad, &c.	The late Suchet Singh	...	9,00,000	
Sialkot.	Raja Golab Singh	...	50,000	
Jalandar Doab.	Sheikh Imamuddin	...	22,00,000	
Shekhpora, &c.	Sheikh Imamuddin	...	2,50,000	
Cis-Sutlej farms		...	6,50,000	
Miscellaneous farms in the Punjab		...	15,00,000	
				1,79,85,000

<i>Religious Grants.</i>	Rupees.	Rupees.
Held by "Sodhis"	5,00,000	
Held by "Bedis"	4,00,000	
Miscellaneous; viz., Akalis, Fakirs, Brahmins, and the lands attached to Amritsar, &c. &c.	11,00,000	20,00,000
<i>Hill Jaigirs of the Jammu Rajas.</i>		
Jesrota, &c. Hira Singh. The Chief a Jaigir ...	1,25,000	
Pader, and other districts of Chamba. } Golab Singh ...	1,00,000	
Bhudurwah. Golab Singh (in Jaigir with uncle of Chamba Raja)	50,000	
Mankot. The late Suchet Singh. Family a Jaigir	50,000	
Bhuddoo. Do. Do.	50,000	
Bundralta. Do. Do.	1,25,000	
Chunini (Ramuagar). Golab Singh. Do. ...	30,000	
Jammu and Golab Singh. Families mostly Riassi. refugees	4,00,000	
Samba. The late Suchet Singh. Family extinct or fled	40,000	
Kishtwar. Golab Singh. Family refugees ...	1,50,000	
Akhnur, including { Chukkana, with { Golab Singh. Family a Keri Singh's { Jaigir.	50,000	
Bhimbar. The late Dhian Singh. Some mem- bers of family Jaigirs; others refugees	1,50,000	
The Chibh-Bhow tribes. The late Dhian Singh. Family Jaigirs	1,00,000	2,05,50,000
<i>Jaigirs.</i>		
Kotli. The late Dhian Singh. Family Jaigirs ...	30,000	
Sunuch. Do. Family perhaps refugees	70,000	
Dangulli, Khanpur, &c. Golab Singh. Some members of family Jaigirs; others pri- soners; others refugees	1,00,000	
Various Jaigirs held by the Jammu Rajas (in the plains)	5,00,000	
The Kangra Rajas (Ranbir Chand, &c.) ...	1,00,000	
Sardar Lehna Singh Majithia	3,50,000	
Sardar Nihal Singh Ahluwalia	9,00,000	
Sardar Kishen Singh (son of Jamadar Khushal Singh)	1,20,000	
Sardar Tej Singh	60,000	
Sardars Sham Singh and Chattar Singh Attari- walla.	1,20,000	
Sardar Shamsher Singh Sindhanwala ...	15,000	
Sardar Arjun Singh, and other sons of Hari Singh	15,000	
Kunwar Peshawara Singh	5,000	

	Rupees.	Rupees.
Kunwar Tara, Singh	20,000	
Sardar Jowahir Singh (uncle of Dalip Singh) ...	50,000	
Sardar Mangal Singh	50,000	
Sardar Fateh Singh Man	50,000	
Sardar Attar Singh Kalianwala	50,000	
Sardar Hukum Singh Mulwai	50,000	
Sardar Behla Singh Mokul	50,000	
Sardars Sultan Mahomed, Syed Mahomed, and Pir Mahomed Khans	1,50,000	
Sardar Jamaluddin Khan	1,00,000	
Sheikh Ghulam Muhiuddin	30,000	
Fakir Azizuddin and his brothers	1,00,000	
Dewan Sawan Mal	20,000	
Miscellaneous	50,00,000	95,25,000
CUSTOMS, &c.		
Salt Mines. Raja Golab Singh	8,00,000	
Town Duties. Amritsar. The late Dhian Singh	5,50,000	
Do. Lahore. Do.	1,50,000	
Miscellaneous Town Duties	1,00,000	
"Abkari" (Excise), &c. &c. Lahore	50,000	
Transit Duties. Ludhiana to Peshawar	5,00,000	
"Mohurana" (Stamps)	2,50,000	24,00,000
Total		3,24,75,000

RECAPITULATION.

LAND REVENUE :—

	Rupees
Tributary States	5,65,000
Farms	1,79,85,000
Eleemosynary	20,00,000
Jaigirs	95,25,000
CUSTOMS, &c.	24,00,000
Total	3,24,75,000

XII. THE ARMY OF LAHORE, AS RECORDED IN 1844.

The Regular Army		Infantry Regiments	Cavalry Regiments	Light Artillery	Heavy Guns	
Commandants of Corps.	Description or race of Men.				Field	Garrison.
Sardar Tej Singh ...	Sikhs ...	4	1	10	0	0
Gen. Pertab Singh Puthiwalla.	Sikhs ...	3	0	0	0	0
Gen. Jowala Singh ...	Inf. Sikhs; Art. Sikhs and Mahomedans.	2	0	4	0	0
Sheikh Imamuddin* ...	Mahomedans ...	3	0	4	0	0
Sardar Lehna Singh Majithia.	Infantry, Sikhs; Guns chiefly Sikhs.	2	0	10	3	2
Gen. Bishen Singh ...	Mahomedans; a few Sikhs ...	2	0	3	0	0
Gen. Golab Singh Puhvindhia.	3 Mahomedans; Guns, Sikhs and Mahomedans.	3*	0	14	0	0
General Mehtab Singh Majithia.	Inf. Sikhs; Cav. mixed; Art. Sikhs and Mah.	4	1	12	0	0
General Gurdut Singh Majithia.	{ Inf. chiefly Sikhs; Guns. S. and M. }	3	0	0	0	0
Col. John Holmes ...	{ Formerly under Gen. Court. }	1	0	10	0	0
Gen. Dhowkul Singh ...	Hindustanis; a few Sikhs.	2	0	0	0	0
Colonel Cortlandt (discharged).	Inf. Sikhs and Hind.; Guns, Sikhs and Mah.	2	0	10	0	0
Sheikh Ghulam Muhiuddin.	Inf. Sikhs? Guns. Sikhs and Mahomedans.	1	0	6	8	0
Dewan Adjudhia Pershad; Guns under Ilahi Buksh, General.	Inf. Sikhs; Art. Sikhs and Mahomedans (Gen. Ventura).	4	2	12	22	0
Gen. Golab Singh Calcuttawala (deceased).	Sikhs ...	4	1	16	0	0
Dewan Jodha Ram ...	Sikhs, Mahom., Hillmen (Gen. Avitabile).	4	1	12	3	0
Gen. Kanh Singh Man.	Sikhs & Mahomedans	4	0	10	0	0
Sardar Nehal Singh Alhuwalla.	Inf. Sikhs and Mahom.; Art. chiefly Mahom.	1	0	4	11	0
Dewan Sawan Mal ...	Mahom. and some Sikhs	3	0	6	0	40
Raja Hira Singh ...	Hill men, some Mah. &c.	2	1	0	3	5
Raja Golab Singh ...	Do. Do. ...	3	0	15	0	40
Raja Suchet Singh (dec.)	Do. Do. ...	2	1	4	0	10
Capt. Kuldip Singh ...	Gurkhas ...	1	0	0	0	0
Commandant Bhag Singh	Sikhs and Mahomedans	0	0	6	0	0
Commandant Sheo Pershad	Do. Do. ...	0	0	8	0	0
Misr Lal Singh ...	Do. Do. ...	0	0	10	0	0

* Sheikh Imamuddin subsequently raised a fourth regiment.

The Regular Army		Infantry Regiment.	Cavalry Regiment	Light Artillery	Heavy Guns.	
Commandants of Corps.	Description or Race of Men,				Field	Garrison
Sardar Kishen Singh ...	Mah. and Hindustanis	0	0	0	0	2
Gen. Kishen Singh ...	Sikhs and Mahomedans	0	0	22	0	0
Sardar Sham Singh ...	Do. Do. ...	0	0	0	10	0
Attariwalla.						
Mian Pirthi Singh ...	Chiefly Mahomedans ...	0	0	0	56	0
Gen. Mehwa Singh ...	Sikhs and Mahomedans	0	0	10	10	0
Col. Amir Chand ...	Chiefly Mahomedans ...	0	0	0	10	0
Commandant Muzhar Ali ...	Mah. and Hindustanis	0	0	10	0	0
Jowahir Mal Mistri ...	Mahomedans; a few	0	0	0	20	12
(Lahore).	Sikhs.					
Commandant Sukhu Singh (Amritsar).	Sikhs and some Hindustanis.	0	0	0	0	10
Miscellaneous Garrison Guns	0	0	0	0	50
		60	8	228	156	171

Abstract of the whole Army.

Sixty Regiments Infantry, at 700	...	42,000	
Ramghols, Akalis	5,000	
Irreg. Levies, Garrison Companies, &c.	...	45,000	
			92,000 Infantry.
Eight Regiments Cavalry, at 600	...	4,800	
"Ghorchurras" (Horse)	12,000	
Jaigirdari Horse	15,000	
			51,800 Cavalry.
Field Artillery	381 Guns.

XIII. DECLARATION OF WAR OF 1845.

Proclamation by the Governor-General of India.

Camp. Lashkari Khan ke Serai,
December 13th, 1845.

The British Government has ever been on terms of friendship with that of the Punjab.

In the year 1809, a treaty of amity and concord was concluded between the British Government and the late Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the conditions of which have always been faithfully observed by the British Government, and were scrupulously fulfilled by the late Maharaja.

The same friendly relations have been maintained with the successors of Maharaja Ranjit Singh by the British Government up to the present time.

Since the death of the late Maharaja Sher Singh, the disorganized state of the Lahore Government has made it incumbent on the Governor-General in Council to adopt precautionary measures for the protection of the British frontier: the nature of these measures, and the cause of their adoption, were, at the time, fully explained to the Lahore Durbar.

Notwithstanding the disorganized state of the Lahore Government during the last two years, and many most unfriendly proceedings on the part of the Durbar, the Governor-General in Council has continued to evince his desire to maintain the relations of amity and concord which had so long existed between the two States, for the mutual interests and happiness of both. He has shown, on every occasion, the utmost forbearance, from consideration to the helpless state of the infant Maharaja, Dalip Singh, whom the British Government had recognized as the successor to the late Maharaja Sher Singh.

The Governor-General in Council sincerely desired to see a strong Sikh Government re-established in the Punjab, able to control its army, and to protect its subjects; he had not, up to the present moment, abandoned the hope of seeing that important object effected by the patriotic efforts of the Chiefs and people of that country.

The Sikh army recently marched from Lahore towards the British frontier, as it was alleged, by the orders of the Durbar, for the purpose of invading the British territory.

The Governor-General's Agent, by direction of the Governor-General, demanded an explanation of this movement, and no reply being returned within a reasonable time, the demand was repeated. The Governor-General unwilling to believe in the hostile intentions of the Sikh Government to which no provocation had been given, refrained from taking any measures which might have a tendency to embarrass the Government of the Maharaja, or to induce collision between the two States.

When no reply was given to the repeated demand for explanation, while active military preparations were continued at Lahore, the Governor-General considered it necessary to order the advance of troops towards the frontier, to reinforce the frontier posts.

The Sikh army has now, without a shadow of provocation, invaded the British territories.

The Governor-General must therefore take measures for effectually protecting the British provinces, for vindicating the authority of the British Government, and for punishing the violators of treaties and the disturbers of the public peace.

The Governor-General hereby declares the possessions of Maharaja Dalip Singh, on the left or British bank of the Sutlej, confiscated and annexed to the British territories.

The Governor-General will respect the existing rights of all Jaigirdars, Zemindars, and tenants in the said possessions, who, by the course they now pursue, evince their fidelity to the British Government.

The Governor-General hereby calls upon all the Chiefs and Sardars in the protected territories to co-operate cordially with the British Government for the punishment of the common enemy, and for the maintenance of order in these States. Those of the Chiefs who show alacrity and fidelity in the discharge of this duty, which they owe to the protecting power, will find their interests promoted thereby; and those who take a contrary course will be treated as enemies to the British Government, and will be punished accordingly.

The inhabitants of all the territories on the left bank of the Sutlej are hereby directed to abide peaceably in their respective villages, where they will receive efficient protection by the British Government. All parties of men found in armed bands, who can give no satisfactory account of their proceedings, will be treated as disturbers of the public peace.

All subjects of the British Government, and those who possess estates on both sides the river Sutlej, who, by their faithful adherence to the British Government, may be liable to sustain loss, shall be indemnified and secured in all their just rights and privileges.

On the other hand, all subjects of the British Government who shall continue in the service of the Lahore State, and who disobey the proclamation by not immediately returning to their allegiance, will be liable to have their property on this side the Sutlej confiscated, and themselves declared to be aliens and enemies of the British Government.

XIV. FIRST TREATY WITH LAHORE OF 1846.

Treaty between the British Government and the State of Lahore, concluded at Lahore, on March 9th, 1846.

Whereas the treaty of amity and concord, which was concluded between the British Government and the late Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the ruler of Lahore, in 1809, was broken by the unprovoked aggression on the British provinces of the Sikh army, in December last: And whereas, on that occasion, by the proclamation dated the 13th of December, the territories then in the occupation of the Maharaja of Lahore, on the left or British bank of the river Sutlej, were confiscated and annexed to the British provinces; and, since that time, hostile operations have been prosecuted by the two Governments, the one against the other, which have resulted in the occupation of Lahore by the British troops: And whereas it has been determined that, upon certain conditions, peace shall be re-established between the two Governments, the following treaty of peace between the Honourable English East India Company, and Maharaja Dalip Singh Bahadur, and his children, heirs, and successors, has been concluded, on the part of the Honourable

Company, by Frederick Currie, Esq., and Brevet Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in them by the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G. C. B., one of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-General, appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies and, on the part of His Highness the Maharaja Dalip Singh, by Bhai Ram Singh, Raja Lal Singh, Sardar Tej Singh, Sardar Chatter Singh Attariwala, Sardar Ranjor Singh Majithia, Dewan Dina Nath, and Fakir Nuruddin, vested with full powers and authority on the part of His Highness.

Article 1.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government, on the one part, and Maharaja Dalip Singh, his heirs and successors, on the other.

Article 2.—The Maharaja of Lahore renounces for himself his heirs and successors, all claim to, or connection with, the territories lying to the south of the river Sutlej, and engages never to have any concern with those territories, or the inhabitants thereof.

Article 3.—The Maharaja cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories, and rights, in the Doab, or country, hill and plain, situate between the rivers Beas and Sutlej.

Article 4.—The British Government having demanded from the Lahore State, as indemnification for the expenses of the war, in addition to the cession of territory described in Article 3, payment of one and a half crores of rupees; and the Lahore Government being unable to pay the whole of this sum at this time, or to give security satisfactory to the British Government for its eventual payment; the Maharaja cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for one crore of rupees, all his forts, territories, rights, and interests, in the hill countries which are situate between the rivers Beas and Indus, including the provinces of Kashmir and Hazara.

Article 5.—The Maharaja will pay to the British Government the sum of fifty lacs of rupees, on or before the ratification of this treaty.

Article 6.—The Maharaja engages to disband the mutinous

troops of the Lahore army, taking from them their arms; and His Highness agrees to reorganize the regular, or *Aicén*, regiments of infantry, upon the system, and according to the regulations as to pay and allowances, observed in the time of the late Maharaja Ranjit Singh. The Maharaja further engages to pay up all arrears to the soldiers that are discharged under the provisions of this article.

Article 7.—The regular army of the Lahore State shall henceforth be limited to 25 battalions of infantry, consisting of 800 bayonets each, with 12,000 cavalry: this number at no time to be exceeded without the concurrence of the British Government. Should it be necessary at any time, for any special cause, that this force should be increased, the cause shall be fully explained to the British Government; and, when the special necessity shall have passed, the regular troops shall be again reduced to the standard specified in the former clause of this Article.

Article 8.—The Maharaja will surrender to the British Government all the guns, thirty-six in number, which have been pointed against the British troops, and which, having been placed on the right bank of the river Sutlej, were not captured at the battle of Sobraon.

Article 9.—The control of the rivers Beas and Sutlej, with the continuations of the latter river, commonly called the Garrah and Punjnad, to the confluence of the Indus at Mithankot, and the control of the Indus from Mithankot to the borders of Baluchistan, shall, in respect to tolls and ferries, rest with the British Government. The provisions of this Article shall not interfere with the passage of boats belonging to the Lahore Government on the said rivers, for the purposes of traffic, or the conveyance of passengers up and down their course. Regarding the ferries between the two countries respectively, at the several ghats of the said rivers, it is agreed that the British Government, after defraying all the expenses of management and establishments, shall account to the Lahore Government for one half of the net profits of the ferry collections. The provisions of this Article have no reference to the ferries on that part of the river Sutlej which forms the boundary of Bahawalpur and Lahore respectively.

Article 10.—If the British Government should, at any time, desire to pass troops through the territories of his Highness the Maharaja for the protection of the British territories, or those of their allies, the British troops shall, on such special occasions, due notice being given, be allowed to pass through the Lahore territories. In such case, the officers of the Lahore State will afford facilities in providing supplies and boats for the passage of rivers; and the British Government will pay the full price of all such provisions and boats, and will make fair compensation for all private property that may be damaged. The British Government will moreover observe all due consideration to the religious feelings of the inhabitants of those tracts through which the army may pass.

Article 11.—The Maharaja engages never to take, or retain, in his service, any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American State, without the consent of the British Government.

Article 12.—In consideration of the services rendered by Raja Golab Singh of Jammu to the Lahore State, towards procuring the restoration of the relations of amity between the Lahore and British Governments, the Maharaja hereby agrees to recognize the independent sovereignty of Raja Golab Singh, in such territories and districts in the hills as may be made over to the said Raja Golab Singh by separate agreement between himself and the British Government, with the dependencies thereof, which may have been in the Raja's possession since the time of the late Maharaja Kharak Singh: and the British Government, in consideration of the good conduct of Raja Golab Singh, also agrees to recognise his independence in such territories, and to admit him to the privileges of a separate treaty with the British Government.

Article 13.—In the event of any dispute or difference arising between the Lahore State and Raja Golab Singh, the same shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government; and by its decision the Maharaja engages to abide.

Article 14.—The limits of the Lahore territories shall not be, at any time, changed, without the concurrence of the British Government.

Article 15.—The British Government will not exercise any interference in the internal administration of the Lahore State; but in all cases or questions which may be referred to the British Government, the Governor-General will give the aid of his advice and good offices for the furtherance of the interests of the Lahore Government.

Article 16.—The subjects of either State shall, on visiting the territories of the other, be on the footing of the subjects of the most favoured nation.

This treaty, consisting of sixteen Articles, has been this day settled by Frederick Currie, Esq., and Brevet Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under the directions of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G. C. B., Governor-General, on the part of the British Government; and by Bhai Ram Singh, Raja Lal Singh, Sardar Tej Singh, Sardar Chattar Singh Attariwala, Sardar Ranjor Singh Majithia, Dewan Dina Nath, and Fakir Nuruddin, on the part of the Maharaja Dalip Singh; and the said treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G. C. B., Governor-General, and by that of His Highness Maharaja Dalip Singh.

Done at Lahore, this 9th day of March, in the year of our Lord 1846, corresponding with the 10th day of Rabi-ul-awal, 1262, Hijri, and ratified on the same day.

XV. SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLES TO FIRST TREATY WITH LAHORE OF 1846.

Articles of Agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar, on the 11th of March, 1846.

Whereas the Lahore Government has solicited the Governor-General to leave a British force at Lahore, for the protection of the Maharaja's person and of the capital, till the reorganization of the Lahore army, according to the provisions of Article 6 of the treaty of Lahore, dated the 9th instant: And whereas the Governor-General has, on certain conditions, consented to the measure: And whereas it is expedient that certain matters concerning the territories ceded by Articles 3 and 4 of the aforesaid treaty should be specifically determined; the following eight Articles of agreement have this day been concluded between the afore-mentioned contracting parties.

Article 1.—The British Government shall leave at Lahore, till the close of the current year, A.D. 1846, such force as shall seem to the Governor-General adequate for the purpose of protecting the person of the Maharaja, and the inhabitants of the city of Lahore, during the reorganization of the Sikh army, in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 of the treaty of Lahore; that force to be withdrawn at any convenient time before the expiration of the year, if the object to be fulfilled shall, in the opinion of the Durbar, have been obtained; but the force shall not be detained at Lahore beyond the expiration of the current year.

Article 2.—The Lahore Government agrees that the force left at Lahore, for the purpose specified in the foregoing Article, shall be placed in full possession of the fort and the city of Lahore, and that the Lahore troops shall be removed from within the city. The Lahore Government engages to furnish convenient quarters for the officers and men of the said force, and to pay to the British Government all the extra expenses, in regard to the said force, which may be incurred by the British Government, in consequence of their troops being employed away from their own cantonments, and in a foreign territory.

Article 3.—The Lahore Government engages to apply itself immediately and earnestly to the reorganization of its army, according to the prescribed conditions, and to communicate fully with the British authorities left at Lahore, as to the progress of such reorganization, and as to the location of the troops.

Article 4.—If the Lahore Government fails in the performance of the conditions of the foregoing Article, the British Government shall be at liberty to withdraw the force from Lahore, at any time before the expiration of the period specified in Article 1.

Article 5.—The British Government agrees to respect the *bona fide* rights of those Jaigirdars within the territories ceded by Articles 3 and 4 of the treaty of Lahore, dated 9th instant, who were attached to the families of the late Maharaja Ranjit Singh, Kharak Singh, and Sher Singh; and the British Government will maintain those Jaigirdars in their *bona fide* possessions, during their lives.

Article 6.—The Lahore Government shall receive the assistance of the British local authorities in recovering the arrears of revenue justly due to the Lahore Government from their Kardars and managers in the territories ceded by the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of the treaty of Lahore, to the close of the Kharif harvest of the current year, viz. 1902, of the Sambat Bikramjit.

Article 7.—The Lahore Government shall be at liberty to remove from the forts in the territories specified in the foregoing Article, all treasure and State property, with the exception of guns. Should, however, the British Government desire to retain any part of the said property, they shall be at liberty to do so, paying for the same at a fair valuation; and the British officers shall give their assistance to the Lahore Government, in disposing on the spot of such part of the aforesaid property as the Lahore Government may not wish to remove, and the British officers may not desire to retain.

Article 8.—Commissioners shall be immediately appointed by the two Governments, to settle and lay down the boundary between the two States, as defined by Article 4 of the treaty of Lahore, dated March 9th, 1846.

XVI. TREATY WITH GOLAB SINGH OF 1846.

Treaty between the British Government and Maharaja Golab Singh, concluded at Amritsar, on March 16th, 1846.

Treaty between the British Government on the one part, and Maharaja Golab Singh of Jammu on the other, concluded, on the part of the British Government, by Frederick Currie, Esq., and Brevet Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under the orders of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G. C. B., one of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-General, appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and by Maharaja Golab Singh in person.

Article 1.—The British Government transfers and makes over, for ever, in independent possession, to Maharaja Golab Singh, and the male heirs of his body, all the hilly or mountainous country, with its dependencies, situated to the eastward of the river Indus, and westward of the river Ravi, including

Chamba and excluding Lahul, being part of the territory ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State, according to the provisions of Article 4 of the treaty of Lahore, dated March 9th, 1846.

Article 2.—The eastern boundary of the tract transferred by the foregoing Article to Maharaja Golab Singh shall be laid down by commissioners appointed by the British Government and Maharaja Golab Singh respectively, for that purpose, and shall be defined in a separate engagement, after survey.

Article 3.—In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs by the provisions of the foregoing Articles, Maharaja Golab Singh will pay to the British Government the sum of seventy-five lacs of rupees (Nanakshahi), fifty lacs to be paid on ratification of this treaty, and twenty-five lacs on or before the 1st of October of the current year, A.D. 1846.

Article 4.—The limits of the territories of Maharaja Golab Singh shall not be at any time changed without the concurrence of the British Government.

Article 5.—Maharaja Golab Singh will refer to the arbitration of the British Government any disputes or questions that may arise between himself and the Government of Lahore, or any other neighbouring State, and will abide by the decision of the British Government.

Article 6.—Maharaja Golab Singh engages for himself and heirs, to join, with the whole of his military force, the British troops, when employed within the hills, or in the territories adjoining his possessions.

Article 7.—Maharaja Golab Singh engages never to take, or retain, in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American State, without the consent of the British Government.

Article 8.—Maharaja Golab Singh engages to respect, in regard to the territory transferred to him, the provisions of Articles 5, 6, and 7, of the separate engagement between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar, dated March 11th, 1846.

Article 9.—The British Government will give its aid to Maharaja Golab Singh, in protecting his territories from external enemies.

Article 10.—Maharaja Golab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the British Government, and will, in token of such supremacy, present annually to the British Government one horse, twelve perfect shawl goats of approved breed (six male, and six female), and three pairs of Kashmir shawls.

This treaty, consisting of ten articles has been this day settled by Frederick Currie, Esq., and Brevet Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under the directions of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G. C. B., Governor-General, on the part of the British Government, and by Maharaja Golab Singh in person, and the said treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G. C. B., Governor-General.

Done at Amritsar, this 16th day of March, in the year of our Lord 1846, corresponding with the 17th day of Rabi-ul-awal, 1262, Hijri.

XVII. SECOND TREATY WITH LAHORE OF 1846.

Foreign Department, Camp, Bhyrowal Ghat, on the left Bank of the Beas, the 22nd December, 1846.

The late Governor of Kashmir, on the part of the Lahore State, Sheikh Imamuddin, having resisted by force of arms the occupation of the province of Kashmir by Maharaja Golab Singh, the Lahore Government was called upon to coerce their subject, and to make over the province to the representative of the British Government, in fulfilment of the conditions of the treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846.

A British force was employed to support and aid, if necessary, the combined forces of the Lahore State and Maharaja Golab Singh in the above operations.

Sheikh Imamuddin intimated to the British Government that he was acting under orders received from the Lahore Durbar in the course he was pursuing; and stated that the insurrection had been instigated by written instructions received by him from the Wazir Raja Lal Singh.

Sheikh Imamuddin surrendered to the British Agent on guarantee from that officer, that if the Sheikh could, as he

asserted, prove that his acts were in accordance with his instructions, and that the opposition was instigated by the Lahore Minister, the Durbar should not be permitted to inflict upon him, either in his person or his property, any penalty on account of his conduct on this occasion. The British Agent pledged his Government to a full and impartial investigation of the matter.

A public inquiry was instituted into the facts adduced by Sheikh Imamuddin, and it was fully established that Raja Lal Singh did secretly instigate the Sheikh to oppose the occupation by Maharaja Goleb Singh of the province of Kashmir.

The Governor-General immediately demanded that the Ministers and Chiefs of the Lahore State should depose and exile to the British provinces the Wazir Raja Lal Singh.

His Lordship consented to accept the deposition of Raja Lal Singh as an atonement for the attempt to infringe the treaty by the secret intrigues and machinations of the Wazir. It was not proved that the other members of the Durbar had cognizance of the Wazir's proceedings; and the conduct of the Sardars, and of the Sikh army in the late operations for quelling the Kashmir insurrection, and removing the obstacles to the fulfilment of the treaty, proved that the criminality of the Wazir was not participated in by the Sikh nation.

The Ministers and Chiefs unanimously decreed, and carried into immediate effect, the deposition of the Wazir.

After a few days' deliberations, relative to the means of forming a Government at Lahore, the remaining members of the Durbar, in concert with all the Sardars and Chiefs of the State, solicited the interference and aid of the British Government for the maintenance of an administration, and the protection of the Maharaja Dalip Singh during the minority of His Highness.

The solicitation by the Durbar and Chiefs has led to the temporary modification of the relations between the British Government and that of Lahore, established by the treaty of the 9th March of the present year.

The terms and conditions of this modification are set forth in the following Articles of Agreement.

Articles of Agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar on 15th December, 1846.

Whereas the Lahore Durbar and the principal Chiefs and Sardars of the State have, in express terms, communicated to the British Government their anxious desire that the Governor-General should give his aid and his assistance to maintain the administration of the Lahore State during the minority of Maharaja Dalip Singh, and have declared this measure to be indispensable for the maintenance of the Government: And whereas the Governor-General has, under certain conditions, consented to give the aid and assistance solicited, the following articles of agreement, in modification of the Articles of agreement executed at Lahore on the 11th March last, have been concluded, on the part of the British Government, by Frederick Currie, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Montgomery Lawrence, C. B., Agent to the Governor-General, North-West Frontier, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in them by the Right Honourable Viscount Hardinge, G. C. B., Governor-General, and on the part of His Highness Maharaja Dalip Singh, by Sardar Tej Singh, Sardar Sher Singh, Dewan Dina Nath, Fakir Nuruddin, Rai Kishen Chand, Sardar Ranjor Singh Majithia, Sardar Attar Singh Kaliwala, Bhai Nidhan Singh, Sardar Khan Singh Majithia, Sardar Shamsher Singh, Sardar Lal Singh Morarea, Sardar Kher Singh Sindhanwala, Sardar Arjun Singh Rungrunglia, acting with the unanimous consent and concurrence of the Chiefs and Sardars of the State assembled at Lahore.

Article 1.—All and every part of the treaty of peace between the British Government and the State of Lahore, bearing date the 9th day of March, 1846, except in so far as it may be temporarily modified in respect to clause 15 of the said treaty by this engagement, shall remain binding upon the two Governments.

Article 2.—A British officer, with an efficient establishment of assistants, shall be appointed by the Governor-General to remain at Lahore, which officer shall have full authority to direct and control all matters in every department of the State.

Article 3.—Every attention shall be paid, in conducting the administration according to the feelings of the people, to preser-

ving the national institutions and customs, and to maintain the just rights of all classes.

Article 4.—Changes in the mode and details of administration shall not be made, except when found necessary for effecting the objects set forth in the foregoing clause, and for securing the just dues of the Lahore Government. These details shall be conducted by native officers, as at present, who shall be appointed and superintended by a Council of Regency, composed of leading Chiefs and Sardars, acting under the control and guidance of the British Resident.

Article 5.—The following persons shall in the first instance constitute the Council of Regency, viz.—Sardar Tej Singh, Sardar Sher Singh Attariwala, Dewan Dina Nath, Fukir Nuruddin, Sardar Ranjor Singh Majithia, Bhai Nidhan Singh, Sardar Attar Singh Kaliwala, Sardar Shamsber Singh Sindhanwala; and no change shall be made in the persons thus nominated, without the consent of the British Resident, acting under the orders of the Governor-General.

Article 6.—The administration of the country shall be conducted by this Council of Regency in such manner as may be determined on by themselves in consultation with the British Resident, who shall have full authority to direct and control the duties of every department.

Article 7.—A British force, of such strength and numbers, and in such positions, as the Governor-General may think fit, shall remain at Lahore for the protection of the Maharaja, and the preservation of the peace of the country.

Article 8.—The Governor-General shall be at liberty to occupy with British soldiers any fort or military post in the Lahore territories, the occupation of which may be deemed necessary by the British Government for the security of the capital, or for maintaining the peace of the country.

Article 9.—The Lahore State shall pay to the British Government twenty-two lacs of new Nanakshahi rupees of full tale and weight per annum, for the maintenance of this force, and to meet the expenses incurred by the British Government; such sum to be paid by two instalments, or 13 lacs and 20,000 in May or June, and 8 lacs and 80,000 in November or December of each year.

Article 10.—Inasmuch as it is fitting that Her Highness the Maharani, the mother of Maharaja Dalip Singh, should have proper provision made for the maintenance of herself and dependent family, the sum of 1 lce and 50,000 rupees shall be set apart annually for that purpose, and shall be at Her Highness's disposal.

Article 11.—The provisions of this engagement shall have effect during the minority of His Highness Maharaja Dalip Singh, and shall cease and terminate on His Highness attaining the full age of 16 years, or on the 4th September of the 1854; but it shall be competent to the Governor-General to cause the arrangement to cease, at any period prior to the coming of age of His Highness, at which the Governor-General and the Lahore Durbar may be satisfied that the interposition of the British Government is no longer necessary for maintaining the Government of His Highness the Maharaja.

This agreement, consisting of eleven Articles, was signed and executed at Lahore, by the officers and Chiefs and Sardars above-named, on the 16th day of December, 1846.

NVIII. TERMS GRANTED TO, AND ACCEPTED BY MAHARAJA DALIP SINGH (1849).¹

Terms granted to the Maharaja Dalip Singh Bahadur, on the part of the Honourable East India Company, by Messrs Meirs Elliot, Esq., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Montgomery Lawley, K. C. B., Resident, in virtue of full powers vested in them by the Right Honourable James, Earl of Dalhousie, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, one of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-General and appointed by the Honourable East India Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and accepted on the part of His Highness the Maharaja, by Raja Tej Singh, Raja Dina Nath, Bhai Nidhan Singh, Fakir Nuruddin, Gundur Singh, Agent of Sardar Sher Singh Sindhanwala, and Sardar Lal Singh, Agent and son of Sardar Attar Singh Kalianwala, Members of the Council of Regency, invested with full power and authority on the part of His Highness.

¹1 Inserted by the Editor

1st.—His Highness the Maharaja Dalip Singh shall resign for himself, his heirs, and his successors, all right, title, and claim to the sovereignty of the Punjab, or to any sovereign power whatever.

2nd.—All the property of the State, of whatever description and wheresoever found, shall be confiscated to the Honourable East India Company, in part payment of the debt due by the State of Lahore to the British Government, and of the expenses of the war.

3rd.—The gem called the Kohinur, which was taken from Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk by Maharaja Ranjit Singh,¹ shall be surrendered by the Maharaja of Lahore to the Queen of England.²

4th.—His Highness Dalip Singh shall receive from the Honourable East India Company, for the support of himself, his relatives, and the servants of the State, a pension not less than four and not exceeding five lakhs of Company's rupees per annum.

5th.—His Highness shall be treated with respect and honour. He shall retain the title of Maharaja Dalip Singh Bahadur, and he shall continue to receive, during his life, such portion of the above-named pension as may be allotted to himself personally, provided he shall remain obedient to the British Government, and shall reside at such place as the Governor-General of India may select.

Granted and accepted at Lahore, on the 29th of March, 1849, and ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor-General on the 5th April, 1849.

*1 See N. K. Sinha, *Ranjit Singh*, pp. 187-188.

*2 Lord Dalhousie wrote in his Diary : "The Koh-i-Nur had ever been the symbol of conquest. The Emperor of Delhi had it in his Peacock Throne. Nadir Shah seized it by right of conquest from the Emperor. Thence it passed into the hands of the King of Kabul. While Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk was King, Ranjit Singh extorted the diamond by gross violence and cruelty. And now, when, as the result of unprovoked war, the British Government has conquered the kingdom of the Punjab, and has resolved to add it to the territories of the British Empire in India, I have a right to compel the Maharaja of Lahore, in token of his submission, to surrender the jewel to the Queen, that it may find its final and fitting resting place in the crown of Britain. And there it shall shine, and shine too, with purest ray serene". (Lee Warner, *Life of Dalhousie*, Vol. I, pp. 231-232).

[This Index covers the text and the foot notes; *Appendix and Introduction* and excluded.]

A

Afghan War (First) and the Sikhs, 64-78, 84-91.
 Ahluwalia Misl, 4, 15-17, 34-35, 35*n.*, 131.
 Ahmad Shah Abdali, 17, 26.
 Ahmad Shah, of Balti, 80.
 Ajit Singh Sindhanwala, 69, 74, 93, 94.
 Akalis, 5-6, 6*n.*, 105.
 Akbar Khan, 87, 88.
 Ala Singh, 4.
 Aligarh, 13.
 Aliwal, battle of, 134-135.
 Allard, 55-56, 56*n.*
 Amar Singh, of Patiala, 8, 10.
 Amar Singh Thapa, of Nepal, 28, 29.
 Ambala, 21.
 Amherst, Lord, 35.
 Amir Khan (Pindari), 14, 15, 15*n.*, 17, 27.
 Amirs of Sindh, 40-41, 43-45, 48-49, 59, 59*n.*, 62, 90.
 Amritsar, treaty of, 17-26.
 Anglo-Sikh War (First): causes, 109-122; military operations, 122-143; terms of peace, 144-149.
 Apa Khande Rao, 9.
 Appa Sahib, of Nagpur, 32.
 Argaum, battle of, 11.
 Assaye, battle of, 11.
 Attar Singh Sindhanwala, 71, 74, 94, 97.
 Auckland, Lord, 63*n.*, 64*n.*, 65, 67, 89*n.*, 113*n.*, 129*n.*
 Avitabile, General, 75, 78, 84, 85, 85*n.*
 Aziz-ud-din, Fakir, 20*n.*, 109.

B

Baghel Singh, Karora Singhia, 8, 9.
 Bahawalpur, 37, 37*n.*, 40, 41, 45.
 Baiza Bai, 37.
 Banda, 11.
 Begam Samru, 9.
 Bentinck, Lord William, 38-40, 58.
 Bhag Singh, of Jhind, 9, 13-16, 16*n.*, 18.
 Bhagat Ram, 109.
 Bhangal Singh, of Thanewar, 13.
 Bhangi Misl, 4.
 Bharatpur, 16, 34.
 Bir Singh, Bhai, 94, 97.
 Bir Singh, of Nurpur, 32-33, 33*n.*
 Bourquin, 10*n.*, 11.
 Broadfoot, Major, 77, 102*n.*, 114, 114*n.*, 115, 116*n.*, 117*n.*, 121*n.*, 122*n.*

Burn, Colonel, 14.

Burnes, Sir Alexander, 39-41, 43, 56, 60*n.*, 61, 113.

C

Chait Singh, 64, 65.
 Chand Kaur, 71-74, 86, 92, 92*n.*, 93.
 Chattr Singh Atariwala, 112, 113.
 Clerk, Sir George, 26*n.*, 64*n.*, 65*n.*, 67, 75*n.*, 77*n.*, 85*n.*, 92*n.*, 114, 116*n.*, 145*n.*
 Clive, Lord, 12.
 Cornwallis, Lord, 20.
 Court, General, 74.

D

Dalip Singh, 72, 105, 114, 114*n.*, 144.
 Dallewala Misl, 4, 10.
 De Boigne, 8, 9.
 Delhi, battle of, 11, 13.
 Dharmkot, 130-131.
 Dhian Singh, 55, 64, 65, 67, 70, 71*n.*, 72-74, 84, 84*n.*, 90*n.*, 92, 92*n.*, 93, 95, 145*n.*
 Dick, Sir Robert, 141*n.*
 Dig, battle of, 14.
 Dinanath, Dewan, 109.
 Dost Muhammad, 44, 44*n.*, 45, 45*n.*, 51-55, 60, 50*n.*, 61*n.*, 59, 72-73, 89*n.*, 91, 107, 113.
 Dulcha Singh, of Rudowr, 12*n.*

E

East India Company, 11, 12; protection to Cis-Sutlej States, 23, 24; war with Nepal, 29, 29*n.*
 Eka Rao, 14.
 Ellenborough, Lord, 87, 88*n.*, 89, 89*n.*, 90, 90*n.*, 113*n.*, 122*n.*
 Elphinstone, Mountstuart, 20, 30.

F

Fane, Sir Henry, 57, 57*n.*
 Faridkot, 21.
 Fateh Khan Towana, 95, 97, 102, 107.
 Fateh Singh Ahluwalia, 15-17, 35, 35*n.*, 37.
 Firozshahr, battle of, 12*n.*, 127*n.*
 Forster, 13, 13*n.*
 Franklin, 12-13.
 Fyzallapur Misl, 4.

G

Garden, Lt. Col., 57*n.*
 Ghulam Muhiuddin, 83.
 Ghulam Qadir, 8.
 Gilgit, 80.
 Gnodup Tunzin, 80.
 Gobind Shahi Coins, 1*n.*
 Gobind Singh, Guru, 1, 1*n.*, 2*n.*, 6*n.*, 12, 12*n.*, 18, 29*n.*, 36, 120, 104

Golab Singh, 62*n.*, 65*n.*, 73-74, 80, 83, 83*n.*, 86, 86*n.*, 87, 88, 95, 96, 99-106, 108, 133, 136-137, 144-147.
Gough, Lord, 122, 126, 136*n.*, 148.
Gujar Singh Majithia, 46.
Gurdit Singh, of Ladwa, 14.
Gurkhas, 28, 29, 81, 81*n.*
Gurmukh Singh, Bhair, 92, 94.
Gurumatta, 2, 2*n.*

H

Hardinge, Lord, 113*n.*, 122, 122*n.*, 126, 128*n.*, 129*n.*, 136*n.*, 144-147.
Hari Singh Nalwa, 38, 46, 54, 59.
Harlan, Dr., 53*n.*
Hastings, Marquis of, 25.
Hastings, Warren, 12, 13*n.*
Hindur, 29*n.*, 30*n.*
Hira Singh, 93-101, 103, 105-107.
Holkar, Jaswant Rao, 9, 11, 14, 15, 15*n.*, 17, 18, 27.
Hugel, 23*n.*
Hurlon, 139*n.*

I

Indus, navigation of, 39-42, 67, 67*n.*, 68.

J

Jaipur, 16.
Jalandhar Doab, 68.
Jalla, Pandit, 101-103, 107.
Jassa Singh, 4, 15.
Jaswant Rao Holkar: *See* Holkar.
Jaswant Singh, of Nabha, 18-19.
Jhind, 4*n.*, 9, 13-16, 16*n.*, 18-20.
Jindan, Rani, 72, 103, 108, 118*n.*
Jodh Singh Kalsia, 24, 24*n.*
Jodhpur, 32.
Jowahir Singh, 95, 96, 103, 105-108, 108*n.*, 118*n.*
Jowla Singh, 92*n.*

K

Kanheya *Misl*, 4, 31.
Karora Singhia *Misl*, 4, 8, 24*n.*
Kashmir, 28*n.*, 29, 30, 74, 75, 80, 83, 100, 104.
Kashmira Singh, 95-97.
Katoch, 16, 16*n.*, 28, 29, 32.
Keane, Lord, 65, 66.
Ken, fort of, 48-50.
Khalsa, 3, 8, 12, 38, 78, 86, 90, 94, 97, 98, 102, 103, 106-108, 108*n.*, 119, 123, 124, 135, 144, 148*n.*
Kharak Singh, 27, 38, 49, 64, 64*n.*, 65, 65*n.*, 66, 66*n.*, 70, 71.
Kythal, 4*n.*, 13-16, 16*n.*, 19, 20.

L

Labh Singh, 97, 103.
Ladakh, 68, 80, 81, 82*n.*, 83, 87.
Ladwa, Raja of, 129, 129*n.*
Lake, Lord, 13, 13*n.*, 14-16, 16*n.*, 18*n.*, 35.
Lal Singh, 103, 105, 108, 109, 118, 119, 123, 123*n.*, 124, 124*n.*, 127, 133, 139, 145, 145*n.*, 146, 147, 147*n.*

Lal Singh, of Kythal, 13-16.
Lassa, 81-83, 83*n.*
Laswari, battle of, 11, 13-14.
Lawrence, Sir Henry, 87, 87*n.*, 120*n.*
Leh, 80, 83.
Lehna Singh Majithia, 90, 91*n.*, 102, 102*n.*
Lehna Singh Sindhanwala, 74, 77, 93, 94.
Littler, Sir John, 123, 125.
Louis Philippe, 56*n.*
Lukwa Dada, 9.

M

Mackeson, Major, 62.
Macnaghten, Sir William, 61, 61*n.*, 113.
Malcolm, Sir John, 16*n.*
Maler Kotla, 10, 21.
Malwa Sikhs, 5, 19*n.*, 24-26.
Mamdot, 35*n.*
Manjha Sikhs, 4.
Matabar Singh, 81*n.*
Metcalf, Sir Charles, 20-23, 22*n.*, 24, 28, 56.
Mihun Singh, 74, 80.
Misla, 1-5, 3*n.*, 18, 25.
Misr Beli Ram, 94.
Mithankot, 47, 48.
Mohan Lal, 60*n.*
Monson, Col., 14.
Moorecroft, 24*n.*, 30, 31, 33, 47, 48, 97, 105, 113, 113*n.*
Mouton, 139*n.*
Mudki, battle of, 124-125.
Muhkam Chand, 19, 114*n.*
Mul Raj, 106, 108, 116*n.*
Multan, 24*n.*, 30, 31, 33, 47, 48, 97, 105, 113, 113*n.*
Murray, Captain, 26*n.*, 36.
Murray, Dr., 36.
Muzaris, 47, 48, 50.

N

Nabha, 4*n.*, 18, 19, 99.
Nahan, 10*n.*
Nakkai *Misl*, 4.
Nanak, Gurm, 1*n.*, 10, 12, 18, 34.
Nannu Mal, of Patiala, 8.
Nao Nihal Singh, 45, 49, 50, 54*n.*, 56, 63-65, 65*n.*, 67-70, 70*n.*, 71.
Napier, Sir Charles, 117, 117*n.*, 130*n.*
Napoleon, 20, 31.
Nicolsou, Captain, 121*n.*, 123*n.*, 124*n.*
Nihang *Misl*, 4.
Nishanwala *Misl*, 4, 4*n.*
Nurpur, 32, 33, 33*n.*
Nuruddin, 109.

O

Ochterloney, Sir David, 14, 16*n.*, 21*n.*, 22-25, 26*n.*, 27, 29, 29*n.*, 30*n.*, 31, 112*n.*, 114*n.*, 115*n.*
Omichand, 12, 12*n.*
Oudh, 8, 12.

P

Panchayets, 78, 79, 96-98, 104, 106, 108, 118, 119, 123.
 Patiala, 4n., 8, 9, 14, 15, 15n., 18, 19, 19n., 20, 21, 112n.
 Perron, 8-11.
 Peshawara Singh, 95, 96, 102, 102n., 103, 103n., 104-108.
Phulkia Mist, 4.
 Pollock, General, 86-88.
 Pottinger, Col., 40, 41, 49.
 Punjabia *Mist*, 4.

R

Rai Singh, of Jugadhri, 8.
 Rajenpur, 46, 46n.
 Rajinder, Bibi, 9, 9n., 10n.
 Rakhi, 2n.
Ramgarhia Mist, 4.
 Ranjit Singh, coinage, 1n.; and Akalis, 5; alliance with Bourquin, 11, 11n., 13; and Holkar, 15; in Lord Lake's camp, 15; treaty with Lord Lake, 15-16; attempt to create Sikh unity, 17-18; interference in quarrel between Nabha and Patiala, 18-19, 19n., conquest of Ludhiana, 18; aggressive policy to Cis-Sutlej States, 19; Metcalfe's Mission, 20-23; conquest of Faridkot and Ambala, 21; alleged anti-British intrigues, 27-28; and Garkhas, 28, 28n., 29, 34; and Shah Shuja, 30-33, 42-47, 47n.; dispute on Wadni, 31, 36, 37; and Appa Sahib, 32; and Moorcroft, 33-34; and Sind, 34, 39, 39n., 40n., 41, 46, 49-50, 59n.; and Bharatpur, 34; and Murray, 35; and Lord Amherst, 35-36; claims on Ferozpur, Chamkaur and Anandpur-Mahowal, 36-37; and Baluchistan, 37; and Herat, 37; and Russia, 37-38; and Lord William Bentinck, 38-39; and navigation of Indus, 39-42; and navigation of Sutlej, 42, 42n.; and Shikarpur, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 62, 62n.; and Peshawar, 45-46; envoy to England, 46; and Muzaris, 47-48; on Marathas, 50, 50n.; and Dost Muhammad, 52-55, 60; letter from Louis Philippe, 56n.; and Sir Henry Fane, 57; inquisitiveness, 57-59; and Hari Singh Nalwa, 59; visit to Jammu, 61n., 62n.; and Sir William Macnaughten, 61; and Tripartite Treaty, 62, 62n., 63; and Lord Auckland, 63n.; death, 64; 95, 98, 99, 101, 110, 111, 113, 114n., 115n.

Ranjor Singh, 129, 131-133, 134.
 Richmond, Lt.-Col., 92n., 114.
 Rupar, 38, 39, 39n., 61n.
 Russian intrigues, 59, 60, 60n.

S

Sada Kaur, 31.
 Sahib Singh Bedi, 10.
 Sahib Singh, of Patiala, 11, 15, 15n., 18, 19.
 Sansar Chand, 16, 16n., 29, 29n., 32.
Sarbat Khalsa, 1, 1n., 2, 61n.
 Shali Alam, 7, 14.
 Shah Mahmud, of Herat, 37.
 Shah Shuja, 20, 30, 30n., 39n., 42-47, 49, 55, 58n., 61, 61n., 62, 63, 65, 66, 69, 76, 77, 78, 83, 86, 88, 113.
 Shah Zaman, 20, 32, 77.
Shahid Mist, 4, 4n.
 Sher Singh, 64, 64n., 71, 71n., 72-76, 76n., 80, 82, 84, 87-90, 90n., 91, 92, 92n., 93, 117.
 Sher Singh, of Barin, 14.
 Shyam Singh Atariwala, 56.
 Sindhia, Daulat Rao, 8, 11, 27.
 Sindhia, Mahadji, 7-8, 12.
Singhpuria Mist, 4.
 Smith, Sir Harry, 130-135, 135n.
 Sohan Singh, 102, 103.
 Somnath, gates of, 43, 43n.
 Steinbach, Lt.-Col., 55n., 70n.
 Sobraon, battle of, 137-143, 143n., 144n.
 Suchet Singh, 94, 96, 102, 147.
Sukerchakia Mist, 4.
 Sultan Muhammad Khan, of Peshawar, 46, 52, 53, 60n., 70, 83, 89n.
 Sutlej, free navigation of, 40-42, 42n.
 Syed Ahmad, 42, 42n.

T

Tara Singh Dallewala, 10.
 Tej Singh, 109, 118, 118, 123, 124n., 125n., 127, 133, 135, 147.
 Thomas, George, 5n., 9, 18.
 Timur (son of Shah Shuja), 63.
 Tripartite Treaty of 1838, 44n., 62, 63, 86, 88n.

V

Ventura, General, 37n., 41, 56n., 69, 76n., 84n.

W

Wade, Lt.-Col., 26n., 28n., 36, 38, 40, 42, 49, 60n., 63, 64, 64n., 65, 66, 66n., 67, 79, 85n., 145n.
 Wadni, 31, 36, 37.
 Wellesley, Lord, 16.
 Wheeler, Col., 73n.

Z

Zabita Khan, 8.
 Zorawar Singh, 80-82.

